Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  criminal charge
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The present article aims to answer the question whether an undertaking’s responsibility (sometimes also referred to as liability) in an antitrust proceeding held by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the Polish National Competition Authority) is of a criminal nature. The notion of ‘criminal charge’ is rather extensively construed in the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, which has formulated the criteria for criminal responsibility. Taking these criteria into account, the author postulates that the severe character of pecuniary sanctions imposed in Polish antitrust proceedings is an argument for the criminal character of the proceedings. Thus the guarantees of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights should be applicable to Polish antitrust proceedings.
FR
Le présent article a pour objectif de répondre à la question de savoir si dans une procédure de concurrence devant le Président de l’Office polonais de protection de la concurrence et des consommateurs, la responsabilité d’un entrepreneur est de nature à porter une « accusation dans une affaire pénale ». Cette notion a été créée par la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, dans laquelle sont énumérés les critères d’une telle évaluation de la responsabilité. À force de les considérer, l’auteur du présent article conclut que le lien entre la violation des règles du droit de la concurrence d’une part et les conséquences sous forme de peines pécuniaires de l’autre, parle en faveur de la nature pénale de cette responsabilité. Cela conduit à la nécessité de respecter, dans la procédure de concurrence, les garanties que requiert en matière pénale l’art. 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.
EN
The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in tax matters has developed in three dimensions. Firstly, it involved Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention with reference to “the payment of taxes”, viewed, notwithstanding the State’s wide margin of appreciation, in the light of the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. Secondly, from the perspective of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention, tax disputes can be covered by the guarantees of a fair trial where the proceedings and sanctions, for example, concerning tax surcharges, are qualified in their autonomous Convention meaning as a “criminal charge” against the taxpayer. Moreover, despite its traditional case-law, in the last years the Court has seemed to allow the possibility of qualifying tax disputes as concerning “civilrights and obligations” Thirdly, on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, the Court has found violations of the prohibition “to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings” in the context of dual, i.e. tax (administrative) and penal, proceedings. The author critically assesses the Court judgment in the case of A. and B. v. Norway, in which the Court did not find a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In the Norwegian case, the distinct administrative and penal proceedings were in fact merged, since the state introduced a system of integrated legal answers to taxpayers’ behavior. According to Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, expressing a dissenting opinion, the Court in this judgment wrongly changed its stance from pro persona to pro auctoritate, possibly forgetting that it is a court of humanrights, and not a pleader of raison d’Etat. Although the Court declared that it considers the Convention “as a whole”, and seeks to ensure the consistency of the Convention system and harmony of its provisions, it might have lost sight of ties existing between them. Taxpayers are also individual humansand have a title to human rights, thus tax disputes are those of a human rights nature. Understandably, the ECHR must persist as a Court of Human Rights.
PL
Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka dotyczącego rodzajów postępowań, do których zastosowanie znajduje art. 6 Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności. Autorka koncentruje się na zdekodowaniu znaczenia terminu „sprawa”, którym posługuje się powyższy przepis. Rozważania obejmują zarówno sprawy, w których rozstrzyga się o cywilnych prawach i obowiązkach jednostki („sprawy cywilne”) jak i o zasadności każdego oskarżenia w wytoczonej przeciwko niej sprawie karnej („sprawy karne”). Analizie poddane są stosowane przez Trybunał kryteria warunkujące uznanie konkretnej sprawy za cywilną bądź karną w rozumieniu art. 6. Autorka akceptuje co do zasady podejście Trybunału Strasburskiego w tej materii, ale dostrzega również potrzebę dalszego doprecyzowania stosowanych kryteriów w celu uniknięcia rozbieżności w orzecznictwie oraz zapewnienia większej przewidywalności trybunalskich rozstrzygnięć.
XX
The aim of the paper is to analyze and criticly assess the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the applicability of the Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to national legal procedings. The latter provision refers to cases in which the civil rights and obligations of individual or any criminal charge against him are determined. The author discusses the criteria which enable to qualify the case as civil or criminal in the autonomous meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights. She accepts in general the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, but underlines a need for further clarifications of applied criteria, to avoid inconsistence and allow the future case-law to be predictable.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.