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EN
The paper deals with the problems related to the legal definition of artificial intelligence and at the same time with the issues related to the criminal liability for actions in which artificial intelligence or systems containing it are involved to varying degrees. In this context, artificial intelligence is a key element in the direction of the development of autonomous vehicles.
EN
Jean Echenoz’s text presents Victoria’s story who runs away from Paris, believing that she has killed her lover. Her straying (that embraces the form of a relative deterritorialization in a Deleuzian sense) lasts one year and it is built up geographically upon a descent (more or less symbolical) to the South of France and, after that, she comes back to Paris and encloses the spatial and textual curl. From a spatial point of view, she turns into a heterotopia (Foucault) every place where she is located, fact that reflects her incapability of constituting a personal, intimate space. The railway stations, the trains, the hotels, the improvised houses of those with no fixed abode are turning, according to Marc Augé’s terminology, into a « non-lieux » that excludes human being. Her vagrancy is characterized through a continuous flight from police and people and through a continuous decrease of her standard of living and dignity. It’s not about a quest of oneself, but about a loss of oneself. Urged by a strong feeling of culpability, her vagrancy is a self-punishment that comes to an end when the concerns of her problems disappear and she finds out that her lover is alive.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyse the problem of the criminal liability of a perpetrator who, while committing an offence, was in the state of inebriation or intoxication as a cause of insanity. Although the regulation of this matter was introduced in Art. 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, it should be re-examined in the light of the separation of intentionality or negligence and culpability in the Criminal Code of 1997. Traditionally, insanity was treated as an exonerating circumstance, although the legislator mentions the elements that characterise intentionality and negligence. That is why, firstly the relation between Art. 31 § 1 and Art. 9 of the Criminal Code should be examined. Taking under consideration the result of this analysis, the article presents evidence that in the light of Art. 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, the perpetrator can be sentenced only for a negligent offence.
EN
The article searches for the sources of guilt. It evokes Nietzsche’s notion of guilt as a derivative of unpaid mercantile debts. In opposition to this is Bouber’s socio-divine origin of fault. J. Tischner and J. Hołówka are also cited; they ascribe to guilt objective status. There is an important distinction between guilt and reconciliation, as well as a description of the possible contamination by guilt. The article also deals with Jasper's call to accept one’s own fault, otherwise there is a risk of trivialisation of life. The source of fault lies in relations between people and in the "point of holiness" mentioned by M. Blondel.
EN
The purpose of the study is to determine the meaning of the term ‘offence’ under the Code of Civil Procedure. Hitherto, this issue has not been the subject of comprehensive in-depth considerations in the Polish doctrine. Meanwhile, this term used several times in the provisions of the aforementioned code may be understood in various ways, primarily due to the multiplicity of prohibited acts the commission of which may result in widely understood criminal liability. According to the authors, a narrow understanding of this concept in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is justified what corresponds essentially to the meaning given to it under the provisions of the Criminal Code. Whereas, the term ‘offence’ in the Code of Civil Procedure does not include penal fiscal offences, fiscal petty offences or petty offences.
PL
Celem opracowania jest ustalenie znaczenia pojęcia „przestępstwo” na gruncie kodeksu postępowania cywilnego. Zagadnienie to nie było dotąd przedmiotem pogłębionych rozważań w polskiej doktrynie. Tymczasem termin ten, używany kilkukrotnie w przepisach wymienionego kodeksu, może być różnorako rozumiany przede wszystkim ze względu na wielość czynów zabronionych, których popełnienie skutkować może szeroko rozumianą odpowiedzialnością karną. W ocenie autorów uzasadnione jest wąskie rozumienie tego pojęcia w przepisach kodeksu postępowania cywilnego, odpowiadające zasadniczo znaczeniu nadanemu mu w oparciu o przepisy kodeksu karnego. Pojęcie przestępstwa używane w przepisach kodeksu postępowania cywilnego nie obejmuje zaś przestępstw skarbowych, wykroczeń skarbowych ani wykroczeń. The purpose of the study is to determine the meaning of the term ‘offence’ under the Code of Civil Procedure. Hitherto, this issue has not been the subject of comprehensive in-depth considerations in the Polish doctrine. Meanwhile, this term used several times in the provisions of the aforementioned code may be understood in various ways, primarily due to the multiplicity of prohibited acts the commission of which may result in widely understood criminal liability. According to the authors, a narrow understanding of this concept in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is justified what corresponds essentially to the meaning given to it under the provisions of the Criminal Code. Whereas, the term ‘offence’ in the Code of Civil Procedure does not include penal fiscal offences, fiscal petty offences or petty offences.
EN
Human dignity is a well-known concept among Western countries since after World War II, when states, in an effort to create a new platform of cooperation with a view to guaranteeing peace, were looking for an axiological foundation of the new order. The findings described in the article may serve to underpin the following notions, which have to be the object of further research on relations between the human dignity principle and rules of criminal liability, guilt in particular. First, the “guilt standard” is obligatory, whenever a state intends to punish a person. Second, punishment can be meted out only to an offender with an ability to bear responsibility. In other words, only a person whose characteristic derived from the principle of dignity is fully actualized can be punished. Third, punishing should be preceded by an analysis of the degree of guilt. The more eager the perpetrator was to act against the legal system and against the values protected by it, the severer punishment should be meted out. Finally, law should provide for exclusion of culpability when the human dignity principle demands one to act in a manner that is outwardly criminal, but was committed due to a motivation that ought to be excused in the light of the dignity principle.
EN
Human dignity is a well-known concept among Western countries since after World War II, when states, in an effort to create a new platform of cooperation with a view to guaranteeing peace, were looking for an axiological foundation of the new order. The findings described in the article may serve to underpin the following notions, which have to be the object of further research on relations between the human dignity principle and rules of criminal liability, guilt in particular. First, the “guilt standard” is obligatory, whenever a state intends to punish a person. Second, punishment can be meted out only to an offender with an ability to bear responsibility. In other words, only a person whose characteristic derived from the principle of dignity is fully actualized can be punished. Third, punishing should be preceded by an analysis of the degree of guilt. The more eager the perpetrator was to act against the legal system and against the values protected by it, the severer punishment should be meted out. Finally, law should provide for exclusion of culpability when the human dignity principle demands one to act in a manner that is outwardly criminal, but was committed due to a motivation that ought to be excused in the light of the dignity principle.
PL
W polskim prawie karnym błąd sprawcy odgrywa niezwykle istotną rolę. Niekiedy bowiem przyczynia się do przyjęcia takiej, a nie innej kwalifikacji prawnej zachowania się sprawcy bądź podstawy wymiaru kary za takie, a nie inne jego zachowanie się, odmiennej niż ta, którą przyjęto by w przypadku niewystąpienia po jego stronie błędu. Niekiedy zaś – z uwagi na dominującą rolę w polskim prawie karnym normatywnych ujęć winy (kompleksowego i czystego), których rysem charakterystycznym jest doszukiwanie się istoty winy w elemencie negatywnej oceny sprawcy i jego zachowania się – powoduje wyłączenie winy sprawcy czy też – mówiąc precyzyjniej – uniemożliwia jej przypisanie. Fakt ten znajduje odzwierciedlenie chociażby na gruncie czterech następujących przepisów kodeksu karnego: art. 28 § 1 k.k. (błąd co do okoliczności stanowiącej znamię czynu zabronionego z art. 28 § 1 k.k.), art. 28 § 2 k.k. (błąd co do okoliczności stanowiącej znamię czynu zabronionego z art. 28 § 2 k.k.), art. 29 k.k. (błąd co do okoliczności wyłączającej bezprawność oraz błąd co do okoliczności wyłączającej winę) i art. 30 k.k. (błąd co do prawa). Oczywiście, w zasadzie każdy ze wskazanych wyżej błędów budzić może pewne wątpliwości. Niniejsza praca nie została jednak poświęcona analizie poszczególnych błędów (i ich skutków) wyróżnianych na gruncie polskiego prawa karnego, lecz kwestii ogólniejszej, a mianowicie kwestii istoty błędu, a więc próbie udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie – czym jest błąd (na czym błąd polega). W następstwie przeprowadzonych rozważań ustalono, że z całą pewnością można mówić o czymś na kształt dwustronności błędu. Podkreślenia wymaga bowiem, że na każdy błąd składa się zarówno mylne wyobrażenie, że jest tak, a nie inaczej, jak i nieświadomość tego, że nie jest tak, jak to sobie wyobrażamy. Stwierdzono jednocześnie, że sama nieświadomość tego, jak jest, jest wyłącznie elementem towarzyszącym i niezbędną, acz nie jedyną, przesłanką błędu.
EN
Error of the perpetrator plays an important role in Polish criminal law. That is because at times it contributes to accepting a particular legal qualification of the perpetrator’s behavior or a basis of the penalty for their particular behavior, which would be different than the one accepted when there would be no error on their side. Whereas sometimes – because of the dominant role in the Polish law of normative approach to culpability (comprehensive and pure), which purpose is to find out the nature of culpability in the element of negative evaluation of the perpetrator and their behavior – it is used to exclude the perpetrator’s culpability, or – to be more precise – prevent from attributing the culpability to the perpetrator. This fact is reflected in at least the following four regulations of the Penal Code: art. 28 § 1 k.k. (error regarding circumstances of a criminal offense from art. 28 § 1 k.k.), art. 28 § 2 k.k. (error regarding circumstances of a criminal offense from art. 28 § 2 k.k.), art. 29 k.k. (error regarding circumstances excluding unlawfulness and error regarding circumstances excluding culpability) and art. 30 k.k. (error of law). Of course, each of aforementioned errors might rise some doubts. This work, however is not devoted to analyzing particular errors (and their effects) distinguished in Polish criminal law, but to a more general matter, specifically – the matter of nature of error, or trying to answer a question – what is an error, what it consists of. As a result of conducted deliberations, one can definitely distinguish some kind of bilaterality of error. It should be emphasized that each error consists of a false assumption that some matter presents itself differently than in reality, and on the other hand of ignorance of the fact that it doesn’t. At the same time it has been concluded that the ignorance of the real shape of things is just an accompanying element and a crucial, but not only required circumstance of an error.
EN
In the paper a thesis that psychopathy can be understood as a stable evolutionary strategy has been presented. We believe that this view may generate implications for criminal law, especially in the sphere of criminal responsibility. We propose a thesis that traditional understanding of legal insanity is not an adequate tool to assess the criminal actions of psychopaths. Moreover, the application of security measures may be de lege lata impossible. However, natural-born psychopaths can be isolated according to the provisions of the statue on proceedings against persons with mental disorders.
PL
W artykule zostały zaprezentowane wyniki badań nauk ewolucyjnych; na ich gruncie psychopatia może być ujmowana jako stabilna strategia ewolucyjna. Takie rozumienie psychopatii prowadzi do kilku implikacji w sferze odpowiedzialności karnej psychopatów. W artykule wskazano na nieadekwatność kategorii niepoczytalności do oceny prawnej czynów psychopatów, de lege lata niemożliwość stosowania wobec psychopatów środków zabezpieczających, określonych w Kodeksie karnym, oraz generalną dopuszczalność izolacji psychopatów na podstawie ustawy o postępowaniu wobec osób z zaburzeniami psychicznymi.
EN
Dostoyevsky’s famous novel Crime and Punishment can be interpreted as an argument with Nietzsche’s view on the genealogy of conscience. While Nietzsche believes that conscience is a product of a disease and inhibits the will to power, Dostoevsky shows the situation of crossing the border as a source of moral illness and self-destruction of the human person. Crime andPunishment, as well as Dostoevsky’s novel Demons and The Trial of F. Kafka, also criticize modern and postmodern society, in which there is a strong trend, stimulated by psychoanalysis, to liberate people from guilt. With reference to Martin Buber’s views, the author of the article formulatesa thesis on the ontological nature of guilt, treating its confession as a necessary act of self-enlightenment in conscience.Examining the structure of conscience in the context of guilt, a deeper level must be indicated, called synderesis in the scholastic tradition. Considering the elements of experience present in the experience of conscience, the author criticizes the intellectualist interpretation of synderesis. He takes into account the deep level of understanding of conscience in the category of heart made by D. v. Hildebrand and the anamnesis category of J. Ratzinger.
PL
Dostoyevsky’s famous novel Crime and Punishment can be interpreted as an argument with Nietzsche’s view on the genealogy of conscience. While Nietzsche believes that conscience is a product of a disease and inhibits the will to power, Dostoevsky shows the situation of crossing the border as a source of moral illness and self-destruction of the human person. Crime and Punishment, as well as Dostoevsky’s novel Demons and The Trial of F. Kafka, also criticize modern and postmodern society, in which there is a strong trend, stimulated by psychoanalysis, to liberate people from guilt. With reference to Martin Buber’s views, the author of the article formulates a thesis on the ontological nature of guilt, treating its confession as a necessary act of self-enlightenment in conscience.Examining the structure of conscience in the context of guilt, a deeper level must be indicated, called synderesis in the scholastic tradition. Considering the elements of experience present in the experience of conscience, the author criticizes the intellectualist interpretation of synderesis. He takes into account the deep level of understanding of conscience in the category of heart made by D. v. Hildebrand and the anamnesis category of J. Ratzinger.
PL
Rzeczpospolita Polska i Republika Czeska są krajami o zbliżonej kulturze prawnej oraz historii legislacyjnej. Jest to zauważalne również w dziedzinie prawa karnego. W związku z tym przydatne jest dokonanie badań prawnoporównawczych dotyczących struktury przestępstwa i jej elementów (bezprawności, społecznej szkodliwości i winy). Ustalenie podobieństwa również w tym zakresie pozwoli uzasadnić prowadzenie dalszych badań, mogących przyczynić się do rozwiązania szczegółowych problemów związanych z poszczególnymi elementami modelu przestępstwa. Dzięki temu ustalenia dokonane w ramach jednego z zaprezentowanych porządków prawnych mogłyby oddziaływać na drugi.
EN
The Republic of Poland and the Czech Republic are countries with a similar legal culture and legislative history. This is also noticeable in the field of criminal law. Therefore, it is useful to conduct comparative legal studies on the structure of the crime and its elements (unlawfulness, social harmfulness and culpability). Determining the similarity also in this area will allow to justify further research that may contribute to solving specific problems related to individual elements of the crime body. Thanks to this, the arrangements made within one of the presented laws could affect the other.
PL
Artykuł zawiera analizę poglądów dotyczących 1) miejsca znamion typu czynu zabronionego w strukturze normy sankcjonowanej, 2) relacji okoliczności wyłączających bezprawność do normy sankcjonowanej oraz do znamion typu czynu zabronionego, a także 3) sposobów rozumienia pojęcia „znamiona normatywne”. Zaprezentowane zostało, w jaki sposób ustawowy zapis zakresu zastosowania konstrukcji 1) błędu co do okoliczności stanowiących znamiona typu czynu zabronionego, 2) błędu co do okoliczności stanowiących znamiona okoliczności wyłączających bezprawność oraz 3) błędu co do okoliczności wpływających na ustalenie świadomości po stronie sprawcy tego, że jego zachowanie jest bezprawne, wpływa na przyjęcie konwencji co do tego, co powinno stanowić treść świadomości sprawcy, aby można było przyjąć, że zrealizował on znamiona czynu zabronionego umyślnie. W artykule omówiono sposoby zapisywania strony podmiotowej oraz unormowania błędu w ustawie. Zaprezentowano poglądy na interpretację rozgraniczenia pomiędzy przesłankami strony podmiotowej i przesłankami warunkującymi przypisanie sprawcy zawinienia. Całość rozważań teoretycznych przeniesiono na grunt obecnie obowiązującego kodeksu karnego.
EN
The article contains an analysis of views on 1. the issue of the features of a prohibited act in the structure of the sanctioned norm, 2. the relation between the circumstances excluding unlawfulness and the features of a prohibited act, and 3. the issue of “the normative features”. Author’s view on what in the statutory provisions, which are regarded to the issue of the scope of 1. the error regarding features of a prohibited act, 2. the error regarding premises excluding unlawfulness and 3. the error regarding circumstances affecting the perpetrator’s consciousness that his behavior is unlawful, should be contained, is presented in the study. There is also a revision of what should enclose the content of the perpetrator’s consciousness, so that it can be assumed that he has fulfilled the features of a prohibited act intentionally. The article discusses the methods of describing in statutory provisions the mental state of a prohibited act and the issue of the error. Author’s view on the method of the interpretation of the distinction between premises of a mental state of a prohibited act and premises constitute conditions of the assignment of culpability to the perpetrator, also is presented in the article. All theoretical considerations were transferred to the current criminal code.
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