Search results

1

National defence training of public administration personnel in Poland

100%

Grenda B., Soboń A.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2018

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vol. 21

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issue 4

89-107

EN

National defence training of public administration personnel can be broadly defined as a set of activities undertaken at all levels of public administration, aimed at preparing staff to perform offi cial duties concerned with state defence. This paper opens with the presentation of essential areas of national defence training. The subsequent section provides an overview of implementations of national defence training at various levels of public administration and at Higher Universities. The final part of this analysis describes the assumptions of a new didactic framework of courses in defence for public administration and national authorities at the Faculty of National Security of War Studies University in Warsaw.

2

Lithuania in European Union common security and defence policy context

100%

Palavenis D.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2019

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vol. 25

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issue 3

15-36

EN

Objectives EU Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that encompasses 29 nations is gaining momentum. The aim of this study is to acknowledge ongoing developments in EU CSDP and define their impact for Lithuanian defence and security policy. Methods Comparative scientific literature and document analysis method was used throughout this study. Article firstly reviews a path of EU CSDP developments, outlines roles and responsibilities of EU structures and examines current activities in CSDP framework with the focus to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second part is devoted to consider Lithuanian’s role in current EU CSDP context, to outline decisions that Lithuanian authorities made to implement new PESCO initiative. Results Study reveals that: CSDP remains adaptive framework for EU; established procedures ensure CSDP is in compromise with all of nations; PESCO initiative signals positive outcomes while reinforcing idea of “EU Strategic autonomy”. Furthermore it was indentified that: approved National Security Strategy backs current EU initiatives; PESCO could provide flexible response options without duplicating NATO’s efforts; national participation in PESCO initiatives will enable improvements in cyber security and will enable rapid access for possible EU and NATO troops deployments; participation in PESCO negotiation phase reached given political aims to seek more extensive projects and position nation within core members of EU. Conclusions Lithuanian policies’ shift for deeper engagement in CSDP is likely shaped by recognition that strategic trans-Atlantic partnership is not certain anymore, as well as UK role at post-Brexit period as 3rd party.

3

Cooperation of military educational institutions as a tool for developing regional security and confidence

100%

Gawliczek P.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2014

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vol. 2

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issue 1

79-89

EN

The paper deals with issues related to security and defence as seen from the perspective of the role played by military education. The essence of the new security environment realm and new threats for security are described. The importance of military educational institutions is underlined. In this context, observations and reflections on education and training based on NDU Warsaw’s experiences are offered. There are four leading issues mentioned. The first one is the approach to military education, the second one is the curricula, the third one is research and the lessons learned, and the fourth one is to share the experiences of an activity aimed at forging strategic trust. Finally, the author puts forward suggestions on how to strengthen educational cooperation in the Europe and Asia-Pacific region.

4

European Union common security and defence policy and Latvian involvement in EU battlegroups

100%

Bodnieks V.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2019

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vol. 24

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issue 2

202-212

EN

In this article, the author analyses types of Europeanisation: top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, circular, and looks at Latvian involvement in the EU CSDP capability project - EU Battlegroups. Additionally, the author analyses the EU CSDP strategies in 2003 and 2016 with emphasis on key threats and key directions of action for the security of the EU. If it is necessary, EU Battlegroups can become involved to secure the EU. In the article, the author examines Latvian involvement in EU Battlegroups and changes in political planning documents and legal acts regarding EU Battlegroups. The author shows that for the future, it is necessary to involve an EU Battlegroup in real action in the area of operations, and that it is necessary to initiate discussions on a possible review and evaluation of the format of the EU Battlegroup.

5

Defence infrastructure - an attempt at identification

100%

Krzykowski P.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2018

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vol. 22

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issue 5

71-98

EN

Security and infrastructure are two closely related terms, which is why they are so often referred to at the same time. In today’s world, infrastructure is essential to ensure broadly understood security, and a lack of security will not fulfi l its basic role. Today, identifi ed threats and challenges to national security, and thus to the security of the state, evoke the need to participate in preparing all components of the defence system of the state. The management of state defence is a very complex process, requiring a properly prepared system to function reliably in times of peace, but also in times of crisis and war. Its role is to integrate individual elements of the defence system into a uniform and efficient whole. Effective defence activities and ensuring the security of its citizens and all its assets are the core activities of the state. The defence area of the state is now comprehensive in nature and is of interest to the entire apparatus of state power. The aim of the article is to present the role of the defence infrastructure in the life of the state, its relation to national security and an attempt to identify the defence infrastructure of the state, taking into account the key state infrastructure.

6

Assessment of the Training of Private Individuals and Non-commissioned Officers in the Reserve within the Academic Legion from the Perspective of the Students from Słupsk

100%

Gierszewski J., Rutkowski P.

Security Dimensions: International & National Studies

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2019

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vol. 30(30)

42-64

EN

This article presents the opinions of Pomeranian Academy students about military training organized as a part of the Academic Legion and their subjective view on this training and the perspective of working in the army. In the study, special attention was paid to the strengths and weaknesses of the first edition of the theoretical program carried out at the Pomeranian University and practical carried out at the training center in Ustka. An additional motive for undertaking the study was the exploration of the university environment, especially the attempt to determine the level of preparation of students to perform roles in the army, which allowed to examine the feelings and attitudes of students to the program of the Academic Legion and develop six recommendations for its change. The research problem is the question: How do students evaluate the program of the Academic Legion? Due to the lack of research in this area, no hypothesis was adopted. The research method was a diagnostic survey conducted using a survey technique using the author’s own questionnaire.

7

Assessment of the Training of Private Individuals and Non-commissioned Officers in the Reserve within the Academic Legion from the Perspective of the Students from Słupsk

100%

Gierszewski J., Rutkowski P.

Security Dimensions: International & National Studies

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2020

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vol. 30(30)

42-64

EN

This article presents the opinions of Pomeranian Academy students about military training organized as a part of the Academic Legion and their subjective view on this training and the perspective of working in the army. In the study, special attention was paid to the strengths and weaknesses of the first edition of the theoretical program carried out at the Pomeranian University and practical carried out at the training center in Ustka. An additional motive for undertaking the study was the exploration of the university environment, especially the attempt to determine the level of preparation of students to perform roles in the army, which allowed to examine the feelings and attitudes of students to the program of the Academic Legion and develop six recommendations for its change. The research problem is the question: How do students evaluate the program of the Academic Legion? Due to the lack of research in this area, no hypothesis was adopted. The research method was a diagnostic survey conducted using a survey technique using the author’s own questionnaire.

8

Involvement of the Common Security and Defence Policy on the Asian Continent on the Examples of Missions in Afghanistan and Indonesia

100%

Wojnicz L.

Reality of Politics

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2014

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issue 5

166-182

EN

European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a fundamental example of comprehensive approach used by the EU to achieve its goals. Though CSDP the EU is able to carry out civil missions and military operations not only in Europe, but also away from it, in the farthest regions. Since 2003 CSDP’s missions and operations have been taking place on three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. EU’s presence on continents other than Europe allows it to be perceived as a global player responsible for security on the international arena. Each of the continents is important for EU’s policies. It contributes to each of them as well as has benefits from each of them. The Union plays a certain role on each of the continents, which contributes to its position on the international arena. Focusing the actions of European Security and Defence Policy’s (ESDP) (at that time) on Asia was a crucial step towards the status of a global player and also meant a beginning of a new dimension for the relations between the EU and Asia in the area of security. Missions in Indonesia and Afghanistan proves too, that the Asian continent is particularly important for the EU when it comes to security.

9

The European Parliament in view of the development of the EU Security and Defence Policy after the Lisbon Treaty

100%

Staszczyk A.

Reality of Politics

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2018

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issue 9

123-136

EN

This article analyses the position of the European Parliament on the priorities for the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. The issues covered by this policy after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty remained the domain of intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms. Despite the changes made to the Lisbon Treaty to unify the Union’s external relations by removing its pillars and expanding CSDP tasks, the role of the EP in its creation has not increased in line with its expectations. In accordance with the provisions of the TEU, decisions on the operation of the CSDP shall be adopted by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or from a Member State. As a result of such Treaty arrangements, the EP is unable to play such a role in the area of CSDP that would correspond to the importance of this body in the EU’s institutional system. Therefore, the main instrument for the implementation of the EP policy in the area of CSDP remain resolutions in which this body calls for the inclusion of transnational cooperation mechanisms in it. By expressing its position in resolutions, the EP advocates for the development of a strong, unified CSDP based on defined European security interests, as well as the development of a pan-European approach to the issues covered by this policy.

10

Education for Security: What Every EU Citizen Should Know about CSDP?

100%

Willa R.

Kultura i Edukacja

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2015

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issue 4 (110)

85-101

EN

The contemporary world is full of threats. Their scale, variety and dynamics make single countries, especially those smaller and less wealthy, unable to prevent them. Also former leaders of world politics such as France and Great Britain find this harder and harder. That is why, among integrating European countries there appeared the idea of Common Security and Defence Policy. Its assumption was strenghtening cooperation in these spheres, coordination of positions or the creation of rapid reaction forces, which may lead to common defence. Bearing in mind the events happening just outside the EU (North Africa, Middle East, Ukraine) and inside the EU (Paris terrorist attacks in 2015) there is a question what assumptions have been accomplished? What can the EU do to protect its citizens? These are the issues the article deals with.

11

Zgodność z Konstytucją rządowego projektu ustawy o obronie Ojczyzny

100%

Dubowski R.

Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS

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2022

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issue 2(74)

91-98

EN

The author refers to the doubts raised during the first sitting of the special subcommittee considering the bill. In particular, he emphasises that the constitutional concepts of “state of war” and “time of war” are not the same, and thus Article 2 point 2 of the bill, which defines the concept of “time of war”, cannot be in conflict with Article 116 of the Constitution, which refers to a “state of war”. As a result, he concludes that the proposed provision is not inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution.

12

Dopuszczalność wyłączenia z konstytucyjnego limitu zadłużenia pożyczek, gwarancji i poręczeń finansowych służących finansowaniu potrzeb obronnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

100%

Dubowski R.

Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS

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2023

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issue 2(78)

69-74

EN

The study considers whether it would be constitutionally permissible to establish such subconstitutional (e.g. statutory) regulations that would prejudge that in calculating the ratio of the state public debt to the value of the annual gross domestic product, loans, guarantees and financial warranties used to finance the defence needs of the Republic of Poland are not included. According to the author, the introduction of such regulations is unacceptable without amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.

13

Willingness to defend one's own country and to resist in the Baltic states

88%

Andžāns M., Sprūds A.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2020

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vol. 30

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issue 3

15-30

EN

This article addresses the question of willingness to defend one’s own country and a similar notion of resistance, should Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia be attacked. The study principally relies on quantitative data from a dedicated nationally representative survey across all three countries. The data acquired thereof reaffirm findings from previous studies concluding that the highest level of willingness to defend one’s own country is in Estonia, while it is lower in Latvia and in Lithuania. Asked if and how respondents would resist in case of an attack, more willingness to resist either non-violently or violently was expressed by respondents in Lithuania, ahead of the number of willing to do so in Estonia and more so in Latvia. Demographic background of the respondents visualized and discussed in the article provides further nuances of both research questions. While situation with the willingness to defend Estonia is relatively comfortable, this should not be treated as a reason for complacency. There is still room for progress within some groups of the society. Meanwhile, valuable lessons could be drawn for policies of Latvia and more so of Lithuania to avert some of the less ﬂattery trends identifed in this study.

14

COVID-19 as a prestige-promoting mechanism: PESCO framework as an opportunity for EU member states

88%

Bodnieks V., Broka S.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2020

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vol. 32

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issue 5

55-68

EN

The goal of this study is to identify whether PESCO can be one of the tools for future projects in medicine and whether it can be used to strengthen the military medicine of the EU and, simultaneously, be in synergy with the civilian sector by providing support to the civilian field, and, finally, can EU member states increase their prestige through PESCO. The study, which is based on qualitative research methods, shows that based on Latvia’s case, strengthening the medical field by participating in PESCO can lead to countries promoting their prestige on the international stage, as well as strengthening civil-military cooperation to build much stronger policies within the EU member states. Firstly, the findings showed that from all 47 PESCO projects, only two are related to the field of medicine. Secondly, with the whole world being affected by COVID-19, PESCO can be used for new projects related to the field of medicine. Thirdly, different types of projects can be initiated under PESCO, for example, a new kind of transport for evacuation, new types of medical devices, the creation of new regional laboratories and research centres, development of new analytical and biotechnological equipment, improvement of logistic chains, the establishment of unique and specific training institutions for civilian and military medics, and the development and use of robotic technologies or drones. Finally, countries that engage in epidemiological security measures during COVID 19 are clearly enhancing their prestige by not only demonstrating their readiness to react to the current situation, but also by taking practical action.

15

Components of defence strategies in society’s information environment: a case study based on the grounded theory

88%

Mustonen-Ollila E. B., Lehto M., Heikkonen J.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2020

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vol. 28

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issue 1

19-43

EN

The goal of this study is to explore the components of defence strategies faced by society in its information environment, and how these strategies are inter-related. This qualitative in-depth case study applied past research and empirical evidence to identify the components of defence strategies in a society’s information environment. The data collected was analysed using the Grounded Theory approach and a conceptual framework with the components of defence strategies and the relationships between these components was developed using the Grounded Theory. This study shows that the goal of politically and militarily hostile actors is to weaken society’s information environment, and that their operations are coordinated and carried out over a long time period. The data validates past studies and reveals relationships between the components of defence strategies. These relationships increase confidence in the validity of these components and their relationships, and expand the emerging theory. First, the data and findings showed 16 inter-connected components of defence strategies. Second, they showed that the political, military, societal, power, and personal goals of the hostile actors carrying out cyber operations and cyber attacks are to weaken society’s information environment. Third, they revealed that cyber operations and cyber attacks against networks, information and infrastructures are coordinated operations, carried out over a long time period. Finally, it was revealed that the actors defending society’s information environment must rapidly change their own components of defence strategies and use the newest tools and methods for these components in networks, infrastructures and social media.

16

The Territorial Defence Force as an Element of the National Security System

88%

Falkowski M., Horyń W., Nagody-Mrozowicz K.

Security Dimensions: International & National Studies

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2018

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vol. 27(27)

22-44

EN

The purpose of this article is to present the basic determinants as regards the use of the Territorial Defence Force (TDF) in the national defence system. The article focuses on issues related to security and defence as well as their impact on national security, and indicates the need to establish territorial forces in order to increase military potential in any country. What is more, it describes basic tasks which TDF can perform during individual stages of armed operations. Particular attention is paid to the fulfilment of the tasks by TDF as regards purely army-related activities, both military and non-military. It is indicated that TDF is a military formation that fills the gap as regards the security of a given area or territory, and that it can supplement the operational forces, thus constituting a vital element of the national defence system.

17

The Territorial Defence Force as an Element of the National Security System

88%

Falkowski M., Horyń W., Nagody-Mrozowicz K.

Security Dimensions: International & National Studies

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2019

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vol. 27(27)

22-44

EN

The purpose of this article is to present the basic determinants as regards the use of the Territorial Defence Force (TDF) in the national defence system. The article focuses on issues related to security and defence as well as their impact on national security, and indicates the need to establish territorial forces in order to increase military potential in any country. What is more, it describes basic tasks which TDF can perform during individual stages of armed operations. Particular attention is paid to the fulfilment of the tasks by TDF as regards purely army-related activities, both military and non-military. It is indicated that TDF is a military formation that fills the gap as regards the security of a given area or territory, and that it can supplement the operational forces, thus constituting a vital element of the national defence system.

18

Total Defence in a consumer society: a real possibility or wishful thinking? The case study of Sweden

88%

Czarny R. S., Kubiak K.

Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka

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2022

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vol. XLVIII

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issue 3

63-74

EN

The article presents the demographic and social conditions of the Swedish civil defence subsystem known as total defence (Totalförsvar). The authors explain the original meaning of the term and its role in the national defence system. They draw attention to the existing threats related mainly to the uneven distribution of the population and the aging of the population The issue of the progressive ethnic and cultural differentiation of the Swedish society has been treated separately.

19

Legal Aspects of the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation – 2020

88%

Nowak Z., Laszkiewicz K.

Cybersecurity and Law

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2022

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vol. 8

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issue 2

230-250

EN

On August 15, Mariusz Błaszczak, Minister of National Defense, and Michael Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, signed an agreement to strengthen the permanent presence of U.S. troops in Poland. The agreement was signed in the presence of the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda. The agreement sets the legal framework for the presence of U.S. troops in Poland. The adopted principles are based to a large extent on regulations common to all NATO members, i.e. the NATO SOFA agreement of 1951, which Poland adopted with its membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. The agreement, which replaces the existing agreement from 2009, has been concluded for an indefinite period, and both parties can terminate it after informing the partner. This article details the provisions of the new international agreement, comparing its provisions with the existing legal regulations in the field of Polish-American cooperation.

20

Unia Europejska jako instytucja bezpieczeństwa. Analiza systemowa

88%

Staszczyk A.

Acta Politica Polonica

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2016

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vol. 35

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issue 1

21-34

EN

The paper analyses the role of the EU as a security institution and explores the issue of EU’s role in the shaping of the post-Cold War European security system. The system is characterised by a heterogeneous structure and high development dynamics. One of the key components of European security architecture is the European Union. By developing a number of policies which constitute the instruments of external security management, the EU has built the capacity, resources, institutions and procedures, as well as identified the goals and threats, which is why it can be analysed in terms of a security system. The EU’s fundamental security policy is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is primarily based on intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, yet it does not establish a common European defence capability. However, it allows the EU to implement crisis management operations and acts as a stabilizer of peace and security on both the global and regional level. The character of the CSDP is largely determined by the nature of the EU’s security system, which is predominantly focused on the elimination of external non-military threats. The above means that the EU does not constitute a common defence system which would offer the so-called hard security guarantees, but rather aims to shape the security environment in alignment with the values it proclaims by favouring the use of the so-called soft power instruments.

PL

Artykuł analizuje rolę UE jako instytucji bezpieczeństwa i porusza problem wpływu UE na kształtowanie postzimnowojennego systemu bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. System ten charakteryzuje się pluralistyczną strukturą i dużą dynamiką rozwoju. Jednym z kluczowych elementów europejskiej architektury bezpieczeństwa jest UE. Rozwijając szereg polityk stanowiących instrumenty zewnętrznego zarządzania bezpieczeństwem, UE zbudowała zdolności, zasoby, instytucje i procedury, a także określiła cele i zagrożenia pozwalające analizować ją w kategoriach systemu bezpieczeństwa. Najważniejszą polityką stanowiącą fundament rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa UE jest Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony (WPBiO). Polityka ta mimo nazwy sugerującej uwspólnotowienie funkcjonuje przede wszystkim w oparciu o mechanizmy współpracy międzyrządowej i nie ustanawia również wspólnej obrony w ramach UE. Pozwala ona jednak UE realizować operacje zarządzania kryzysowego i pełnić rolę stabilizatora pokoju i bezpieczeństwa zarówno w wymiarze globalnym jak i regionalnym. Kształt WPBiO determinuje w dużym stopniu charakter systemu bezpieczeństwa UE, który nastawiony jest przede wszystkim na eliminowanie zagrożeń o charakterze niemilitarnym pochodzących z zewnątrz. Oznacza to, że UE nie stanowi systemu zbiorowej obrony oferującego tzw. twarde gwarancje bezpieczeństwa, ale raczej stara się stosując instrumenty tzw. miękkiej siły kształtować środowisko bezpieczeństwa zgodnie z preferowanymi przez siebie wartościami.

Refine search results

National defence training of public administration personnel in Poland

Lithuania in European Union common security and defence policy context

Cooperation of military educational institutions as a tool for developing regional security and confidence

European Union common security and defence policy and Latvian involvement in EU battlegroups

Defence infrastructure - an attempt at identification

Assessment of the Training of Private Individuals and Non-commissioned Officers in the Reserve within the Academic Legion from the Perspective of the Students from Słupsk

Assessment of the Training of Private Individuals and Non-commissioned Officers in the Reserve within the Academic Legion from the Perspective of the Students from Słupsk

Involvement of the Common Security and Defence Policy on the Asian Continent on the Examples of Missions in Afghanistan and Indonesia

The European Parliament in view of the development of the EU Security and Defence Policy after the Lisbon Treaty

Education for Security: What Every EU Citizen Should Know about CSDP?

Zgodność z Konstytucją rządowego projektu ustawy o obronie Ojczyzny

Dopuszczalność wyłączenia z konstytucyjnego limitu zadłużenia pożyczek, gwarancji i poręczeń finansowych służących finansowaniu potrzeb obronnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Willingness to defend one's own country and to resist in the Baltic states

COVID-19 as a prestige-promoting mechanism: PESCO framework as an opportunity for EU member states

Components of defence strategies in society’s information environment: a case study based on the grounded theory

The Territorial Defence Force as an Element of the National Security System

The Territorial Defence Force as an Element of the National Security System

Total Defence in a consumer society: a real possibility or wishful thinking? The case study of Sweden

Legal Aspects of the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation – 2020

Unia Europejska jako instytucja bezpieczeństwa. Analiza systemowa