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PL
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a different perspective on the problem of demarcation. It presents the results achieved by J. Hintikka and the Finnish school of the philosophy of science. However, the origins of this approach can be traced to the work of R. Carnap and Y. Bar-Hillel. The controversy over confirmationism and falsificationism is based on false assumptions. We need both probability and informative content. Our theories must have a connection with reality (high probability) and reflect its deep structure (information). Expected informational content allows us to define a “negative” demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience.
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100%
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2014
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vol. 62
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issue 1
25-36
EN
In Paul Thagard’s article “Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience”, we might find some demarcation criteria which are best used in determining whether certain fields with a lot of practitioners can be claimed to be pseudoscientific. Theory T for the pseudoscience club is if T has long been less progressive than its competitors and faces many more unsolved problems; and, adherents to T do not try to develop the theory to solve puzzles, do not attempt to evaluate T with respect to its alternatives, and are highly reserved and selective in seeking confirmation and falsification. Ten years later Thagard gave us new proposals. If T is a pseudoscience, then it is usually the case that (1) T is neither simple nor unified; the explanations, resources, (2) and predictions of T tend to be ad hoc, spurious, or ill-fitted to the rest of T; or, (3) adherents to T do not try to develop the theory to solve puzzles, do not attempt to evaluate T with respect to competitors, and (4) are highly reserved and selective in seeking confirmation and falsification. In this article, Paul Thagard’s criteria of demarcation are examined and evaluated from the point of view of the history of astrology.
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Spór o naukowość eugeniki

80%
EN
How to classify eugenics? Is it an ideology, outlook, or maybe a science? These are the questions asked by philosophers and historians for a long time, but there is still no answer. Even the people who created this idea did not know how to specify it. They wanted to characterize eugenics as science, but the problems with logic and methodology increased. They made a formal fallacy and entrusted too much to induction. The lack of knowledge about heredity was also a serious problem. For all that, they tried to create a new scientific theory based on eugenics. Recently, most historians claim that old eugenics failed, however some have a different opinion. It seems that this view depends on individual’s emotional and subjective assessment of modern researchers.
PL
Jak zakwalifikować eugenikę? Czy jest ona ideologią, światopoglądem czy może nauką? To pytania, które od dawna zadają sobie filozofowie i historycy. Wciąż nie ma na nie odpowiedzi. Nawet ludzie, który stworzyli tę ideę nie potrafili jednoznacznie określić czym ona jest. Zależało im na tym, żeby eugenikę zaliczyć do grona nauk. Mieli jednak duże problemy z metodologią oraz logiką. Popełniali błędy formalne i zbyt mocno zawierzyli indukcji. Problemem był również brak wiedzy na temat dziedziczności. Mimo wszystko próbowali stworzyć teorię naukową oparta na eugenice. Współcześnie większość historyków twierdzi, że próba ta się nie powiodła, jednak niektórzy są innego zdania. Wydaje się, że ta kwestia zależy od indywidualnej, emocjonalnej i subiektywnej oceny badaczy.
EN
Steven Pinker’s recent Enlightenment Now (2018) aside, Enlightenment values have been in for a rough ride of late. Following Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s critique of Enlightenment as the source of fascism, recent studies, amplified by Black Lives Matter, have laid bare the ugly economic underbelly of Enlightenment. The prosperity that enabled intellectuals to scrutinize speculative truths in eighteenth-century Paris salons relied on the slave trade and surplus value extracted from slave labor on sugar plantations and in other areas Europeans controlled. Indeed, deprived of its ugly economic underbelly, Enlightenment was barely conceivable; furthermore, its reliance on surplus value extraction from oppressed labor was accompanied by a racism that, with the exception of the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and a few other thinkers, was arguably inherent to Enlightenment. However, I am not proposing yet another revelation of Enlightenment’s complicity in exploitation of, or disregard for, the Other. Rather, I want to highlight the damage being done today by an insidious strategy of labelling as “pseudo-science” entire domains of non-Western knowledge such as Chinese medicine and Ayurveda, thereby rendering them no-go zones for serious minds. Even though the term pseudo-science had yet to be coined, the beginnings of this tendency are already evident in Enlightenment-era works such as Jean-Baptiste Du Halde’s Description … de la Chine (1735). The perpetuation of this dismissive treatment of non-Western natural knowledge creates a significant obstacle to superseding a “scientific revolution” whose confines have long been burst: it is increasingly recognized that traditional/indigenous knowledge affords a vast reservoir of materials, skills and insights of which the world has desperate need, no more urgently than in response to the covid-19 pandemic.
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