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Dylematy moralne i logika deontyczna

100%
Drofiszyn M.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2019
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vol. 14
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issue 3
125-132
EN
In the paper I discuss an argument of deontic logic concerning the problem of the existence of moral dilemmas. First, I draw attention to the philosophical context of this argument and present three proofs which reveal an inconsistency in the nature of moral dilemmas. These proofs, however, are philosophically and logically controversial. Accordingly, I provide an alternative proof, based on the LP-system of deontic logic. The system is described from syntactic and semantic point of view. Assuming only the noncontroversial axiom K and a certain formulation of Elzenberg’s principle, I argue that, from the point of view of the LP-system, there is an inconsistency in the definition of moral dilemmas.
2
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Zasada aglomeracji i dylematy moralne

80%
Drofiszyn M.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2019
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vol. 14
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issue 4
89 - 104
EN
Standard deontic logic does not tolerate normative conflicts. If we assume that one ought to do A and ought to do B, but cannot do them both, we get a contradiction within deontic logic. Philosophers who deny that there could be genuine moral dilemmas treat this fact as the proof that dilemmas are logically impossible. At the same time, the advocates of the possibility of moral dilemmas propose to reject or restrict standard deontic principles. What consequences does it have for the resulting logic? Some of them are too strong because they contain the theorem of normative triviality or “deontic explosion,” which says that if there is any case of normative conflict, then everything is obligatory. On the other hand, some of them are too weak, since they are not able to validate more important deontic inferences (especially the Smith Argument). Lou Goble introduces three criteria of adequacy that any deontic logic should meet if it is to accommodate normative conflicts successfully. First, I present these conditions and then I introduce a new logic of ought that fully meets all of them.
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An adaptive logic framework for conditional obligations and deontic dilemmas

61%
Straßer C.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
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2010
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vol. 19
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issue 1-2
95–128
EN
Lou Goble proposed powerful conditional deontic logics (CDPM) that are able to deal with deontic conflicts by means of restricting the inheritance principle. One of the central problems for dyadic deontic logics is to properly treat the restricted applicability of the principle “strengthening the antecedent”. In most cases it is desirable to derive from an obligation A under condition B, that A is also obliged under condition B and C. However, there are important counterexamples. Goble proposed a weakened rational monotonicity principle to tackle this problem. This solution is suboptimal as it is for some examples counter-intuitive or even leads to explosion. The paper identifies also other problems of Goble’s systems. For instance, to make optimal use of the restricted inheritance principle, in many cases the user has to manually add certain statements to the premises. An adaptive logic framework based on CDPM is proposed which is able to tackle these problems. It allows for certain rules to be applied as much as possible. In this way counter-intuitive consequences as well as explosion can be prohibited and no user interference is required. Furthermore, for non-conflicting premise sets the adaptive logics are equivalent to Goble’s dyadic version of standard deontic logic.
4
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Segundo Rudolf Carnap: as éticas semânticas

61%
Borges Meneses R. D.
Prosopon. Europejskie Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne
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2015
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issue 2(11)
5-17
EN
On this article, I explain the critical position to ethic in relation to logic analysis foundation from the “Viena Circle”. However, there are conditions to carrie out the application from the verificability principle of language philosophy, by the thinking of R. Carnap, and the deontic logic plays a very important role to the bioethical foundations.
5
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Czeżowski's Axiological Concepts as Full-Fledged Modalities. We Must either Make What is Good, or Become Revisionists

61%
Rebuschi M.
Forum Philosophicum
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2008
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vol. 13
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issue 1
103-110
EN
This short paper provides a tentative formalization of Czeżowski's ideas about axiological concepts: Good and Evil are conceived of as modalities rather than as predicates. A natural account of the resulting “ethical logic” appears to be very close to standard deontic logic. If one does not resolve to become an antirealist regarding moral values, a possible way out is to become a revisionist about deontology: convert to intuitionism or some other kind of revisionism in deontic logic, and remain classical in ethical logic.
6
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Idee naukowe Leona Petrażyckiego, które przetrwały próbę czasu

41%
Kojder A.
Studia Iuridica
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2018
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vol. 74
155-161
PL
In this paper author presents the achievemenets of Leon Petrażycki and his novelty in various areas of humanities. Petrażycki is recognised as forerunner of deontic logic, and also as creator of the principle of adeqacy, ennoblement of law, pluralistic vision of law. He exhibits primacy of legal norms over moral norm, and he establish scientific legal policy. Additionaly Petrażycki is treated as classic of the sociology of law and also as the artificer of emotions.
7

Quantified temporal alethic-deontic logic

41%
Rönnedal D.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
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2015
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vol. 24
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issue 1
19–59
EN
The purpose of this paper is to describe a set of quantified temporal alethic-deontic systems, i.e., systems that combine temporal alethicdeontic logic with predicate logic. We consider three basic kinds of systems: constant, variable and constant and variable domain systems. These systems can be augmented by either necessary or contingent identity, and every system that includes identity can be combined with descriptors. All logics are described both semantically and proof theoretically. We use a kind of possible world semantics, inspired by the so-called T × W semantics, to characterize them semantically and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof theoretically. We also show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics.
8
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Logic of faith and deed. The idea and an outline of the theoretical conception

41%
Wybraniec-Skardowska U.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2019
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vol. 55
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issue 2
125-149
EN
This paper discusses the theoretical assumptions behind the conception of the logic of faith and deed (LF&D) and outlines its formal-axiomatic frame and its method of construction, which enable us to understand it as a kind of deductive science. The paper is divided into several sections, starting with the logical analysis of the ambiguous terms of ‚faith’ and ‚action’, and focusing in particular on the concepts of religious faith and deed as a type of conscious activity relating to a matter or matters of social importance. After outlining the main ideas and basic assumptions of the theoretical conception of the LF&D as an axiomatic theory, the author introduces some axiom systems for: 1) the logics of faith LF (doxastic logics), 2) the logic of deed LD, and 3) certain logics of norms DL (deontic logics) connected with „duties” and concerning actions/deeds. Lastly, the paper outlines the scientific LF&D based on the three types of logic 1)–3).
9
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Problem dobrowolnego niewolnictwa w filozofii politycznej libertarianizmu

41%
Dominiak Ł.
Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
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2017
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vol. 54
61-84
EN
The present paper deals with the problem of voluntary slavery lawfulness within the libertarian theoretical framework. It hypothesises that libertarian theory of natural rights assumes the possibility of licit slavery contracts and that it stems logically from the alienability and compossibility of natural rights. Moreover, the paper discusses arguments against voluntary slavery presented in the literature. The method of logical analysis has been employed to examine validity of the hypotheses.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy problemu możliwości prawnej istnienia dobrowolnego niewolnictwa na gruncie libertariańskiej teorii naturalnych praw podmiotowych. Praca stawia hipotezę, iż teoria ta zakłada możliwość prawną istnienia umów niewolnictwa i że możliwość ta wynika logicznie ze zbywalności oraz komposybilności (compossibility) naturalnych praw podmiotowych. Artykuł prowadzi dyskusję z przedstawianymi w literaturze przedmiotu argumentami negującymi taką możliwość. W pracy wykorzystano metodę analizy logicznej.
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Aspekty temporalne powinności w logice deontycznej: od von Wrighta do Thomasona

41%
Popławski P.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
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2023
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issue 75
67-91
PL
Celem artykułu jest omówienie początków zainteresowania aspektami temporalnymi obowiązków w logice deontycznej. Badany okres to lata 1951–1981. Najpierw autor przybliża dyskusję dotyczącą obowiązków warunkowych i wyodrębnia tam pierwszy aspekt: czas powinności. Później charakteryzuje myśli Patricii Greenspan, która wprost wykorzystuje ten aspekt do rozwiązania paradoksu Chisholma. Następnie omawia przekonania Héctora-Neri Castanedy, który wyróżnił inne aspekty: czas na realizację obowiązkowego czynu, czas wypowiedzenia lub powstania obowiązku i czas, gdy wypowiedź lub zdanie stwierdzające powinność jest prawdziwe. Potem autor rozpatruje poglądy Richmonda Thomasona, który przedstawił system formalny logiki deontycznej ufundowany na logice temporalnej. Na końcu zostają podsumowane zmiany w zainteresowaniu aspektami temporalnymi.
EN
The aim of the article is to discuss the beginnings of interest in the temporal aspects of obligations in deontic logic. The analyzed period is the years 1951–1981. First, the author presents a discussion on conditional oughts. There he also singles out the first aspect: the time of the oughtness. Later, he characterizes the views of Patricia Greenspan, who explicitly used this aspect in her attempt to solve the Chisholm paradox. Then, the author discusses the views of Héctor-Neri Castaneda, who highlighted other aspects: the time of the action one ought to do, the time of utterance or of the making of an ought-statement, and the time of the truth of an ought-statement. Next, the author discusses Thomason Richmond’s views, who presented a formal system of deontic logic based on temporal logic. At the end, he summarizes the changes in interest in temporal aspects in analyzed period.
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