The subject of this article is the traditional problem of free-will. In particular, I address the question of the compatibility of free-will and determinism. I formulate and defend a certain version of Compatibilism (the thesis that free-will is compatible with determinism), which is founded on Moore’s conditional analysis of the problem. I endeavour to elucidate this analysis by means of the modern logic of counter-factual sentences.
The article deals with the problem of linguistic determinism and relativism. The author attempts to proof the existence of a relationship between the structure of a word and the extralinguistic reality and thus to contribute to the discussion on the problem.
I would like to discuss—on the basis of a phenomenological argumentation—the different meanings of our everyday claim that we are free in our actions and decisions. First, I reject deterministic theories in the naturalistic approach by using Husserl’s ar-gument that the subsumtion of human decisions under the causal paradigm is simply an unjustified extension of a methodical idealization in the framework of naturalization. Then I argue for Husserl’s understanding that humans are generally subjects under a manifold of effective influences but they are nevertheless free. In the end some as-pects of our freedom are delineated.
The questions od determinism, causality, and freedom have been the main philosophical problems debated since the beginning of temporal logic. The issue of the logical value of sentences about the future was stated by Aristotle in the famous tomorrow sea-battle passage. The question has inspired Łukasiewicz’s idea of many-valued logics and was a motive of A. N. Prior’s considerations about the logic of tenses. In the scheme of temporal logic there are different solutions to the problem. In the paper we consider indeterministic temporal logic based on the idea of temporal worlds and the relation of accessibility between them.
The figure of Cassandra is well-known from numerous representations in ancient and modern literature as an archetype of a woman who has the power to see the future, but whose visions are not believed. In ancient Greek literature, Cassandra was an important character serving as a prophet of an approaching catastrophe. In her modern adaptations, this figure became a metaphor in psychoanalytical research on human moral behaviour (Melanie Klein and the Cassandra complex) developed in feminist writing. Cassandra has also been of interest to filmmakers, with perhaps the best adaptation of the subject of Cassandra’s clairvoyance being Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report. Loosely based on Philip K. Dick’s 1956 short story The Minority Report, the plot presents a version of the Cassandra myth, in which a woman together with male twins operate as a group mind to predict future crimes. Their visions are used by the state to prevent the crimes and imprison the would-be criminals. This article offers a thorough analysis of all the ancient and modern features of the metaphor of Cassandra employed in this movie within the overarching framework of the central theme of free will vs. determinism. According to this approach, the central theme is examined with reference to ancient Aristotelian and Stoic moral philosophy, the modern feminist psychoanalysis of Melanie Klein, and the political philosophy and legal issues in the post-9/11 world.
In the second half of the 20th century, integral serialism and rational way of thinking were considered as an indicate of determinism in music. At the same time, indeterminism was associated with the music composed with the use of chance operations, classified like that by Henri Pousseur in his reading entitled Theorie und Praxis in der neusten Musik, delivered in Darmstadt in 1958. However, certain music pieces show that the demarcation between determinism and indeterminism in music remainsunclear. The author attempts to outline the problem of determinism and indeterminism in avant-garde music of the second half of the 20th century, taking into consideration selected crucial compositions and the context of development in science and philosophy of that time.
The purpose of the conducted studies was to elaborate a questionnaire of attitudes towards cheating in school and investigate the relation between determinism and free will and attitudes towards unfairness in school. In order to elaborate on the questionnaire of attitudes towards cheating in school, Study 1 was carried out among 198 adolescents - students of technical schools and high schools. The elaborated tool was characterised by satisfying psychometric properties. Study 2, in which 107 students participated, examined the role of belief in free will and determinism as factors related to attitudes towards cheating in school. The study showed ambivalent results between variables. The only factor that was clearly positively related to negative attitudes towards cheating was scientific determinism.
In modern science, the theory of probability is one of the basic tools. Scientists using probability often refer to its objective interpretation. They emphasize that their probabilistic hypotheses concern objective facts, not degrees of belief. Accordingly, the following questions arise: What is the meaning of this type of probabilistic hypothesis? Is the assumption of objectivity necessary? The paper addresses these questions by analyzing objective probability in the context of the scientific debate on determinism. Two types of arguments will be presented. On the one hand, there is the assertion that objective probability can exist only in an indeterministic world. Then, on the other hand - I analyze the assertions of those who believe in the co‑existence of objective probability and determinism. As a result I show that the acceptance of deterministic and indeterministic fields as possible areas where objective probability can occur is extremely problematic. Depending on the chosen area we encounter different types of problems. Therefore, I show that a significant number of these problems are associated with the acceptance of incorrect metaphysical assumptions. And finally, I postulate that the objectivity of probability (and assumptions pertaining to it) can be reduced (without any losses) to the epistemic variant.
In this paper we present the opinions of Ludwik Silberstein (1872-1948) on the question of causality in the scientific investigations. The discussion is based on the examples taken from physics and astronomy. Silberstein is convinced that the principle of causality is an important heuristic law, a different kind of law of nature (as, for example, Kepler’s laws or Ohm’s law).
The main aim of this article is to analyse Searle’s conception of free-will in view of the objections which have brought against it. First of all, the problem of free-will is defined as a controversy between determinism and libertarianism. Compatibilism is rejected as unenlightening. Next, biological naturalism is presented as the basis of the problem of free-will in Searle’s thought, and the psychological and neurobiological levels of the problem are delineated. In the light of this, several objections to Searle’s approach are discussed. Because Searle sees a possible solution to the problem being provided by quantum mechanics, the last part is devoted to Searle’s understanding of science, and his position is compared with quantum theory (as it is outlined by Harry Stapp). In the course of this comparison a new fundamental question emerges which can be defined in the spirit of the psycho-physical problem, and which must be answered before the problem of free will can be successfully tackled. It is demonstrated that, in the light of the current state of knowledge, none of the objections levelled at Searle’s conception of free-will is fatal to it. The solution of this question is, at this moment, dependent on the future development of science.
From the article we learn how timely and significant are the deliberations, especially on the freedom of human will, of one of the most prominent living German philosophers R. Spaemann. He presents his attitude in the dispute with the representatives of modern materialistic determinism, brain scientists and neurophilosophers. For these intelectuals our decisive acts are nothing more than states of the brain. These acts may come to life by the power of neural processes, not by the power of reasons (motives) initiated by us, as Spaemann convincingly shows. From the main and largest part of the article we learn why thedeterministic vision is not acceptable. Now it leads itself to absurd because of contradictions and mistakes in its assumptions (petitio principii, regressus ad infinitum) and (openly declared) proclaimed dogmatism. Moreover, it is contrary to experience, facts, practice of life, commonly accepted opinions on freedom. The famous Dennett’s experiment, which was supposed to give an argument against the classic thesis on our free will, in reality did not showany connection with our decisive acts.
The primary goal of the study was to examine the relationships between spirituality, belief in free will and perceived self-efficacy among young adults. In order to develop the preliminary adaptation of the FAD-Plus questionnaire, used for measuring the lay beliefs in free will and three related constructs, Study 1 was carried out among 485 young adults. The tool had satisfactory psychometric properties. Study 2, in which 340 students participated, verified the role of believing in free will as a potential mediator between spirituality and perceived self-efficacy. In the case of male students, total mediation was found, and in the case of female students, partial mediation was noted. The studies indicate the need to put greater emphasis on the spiritual sphere and the sense of free will in the education provided for young adults.
The article presents an analysis of the validity and reliability of the FAD-Plus scale by D. L. Paulhus and J. M. Carey, which is used to measure beliefs in free will, determinism, and the unpredictability of events. The results of three studies are presented. Based on the results of the first study, it was found that the tool has a consistent structure and that its 3-factor 16-item version is reliable. The second study revealed positive correlations between determinism and religious fundamentalism and belief in an unjust world as well as a positive correlation between belief in unpredictability and belief in an unjust world. The correlations of belief in free will with authoritarianism, belief in an unjust world, and religious fundamentalism were not significant. The third study revealed a positive correlation between belief in free will and positive emotions, a negative correlation between belief in determinism and positive emotions, and negative correlations of belief in determinism and belief in unpredictability with life satisfaction. The analysis of the FAD-Plus scale for the Polish sample proves that the 3-factor scale (the 16-item version) consisting of subscales measuring beliefs in free will, determinism, and unpredictability, is a parametrically satisfactory tool.
This essay aims to show that the recent development of quantum theory may provide us with an answer to one of the most compelling metaphysical problems, namely the problem of determinism. First, I sketch the conceptual background and draw the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determinisms. Then, on the ground of the analysis of the problem of determinism in quantum mechanics, I argue that (1) metaphysical determinism is independent of quantum-mechanical formalism, and (2) that quantum nonlocality makes epistemological determinism impossible. I also try to show that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as a Kantian regulative idea which sets the horizon for scientific inquiry but which at the same time lacks what Kant calls “objective validity.” The main conclusion is that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as an idealization – a formal, cognitive principle that we a priori assume and not something that we discover through scientific inquiry.
Much has been written recently about the problem of justifying punishment in the context of anthropological determinism and incompatibilism. However, the problem of the relationship between determinism, on the one hand, and the theory of punishment, on the other, is multi-dimensional. This article focuses on criminal responsibility in a world of determinism. It is mostly an attempt to review the basic concepts and issues in the philosophy of responsibility and compare them with the concepts and issues of the criminal law as broadly defined. The starting point is the observation that if the thesis of determinism is true and it is not possible to reconcile determinism with human freedom, then it will be particularly difficult to justify punishment. Prima facie, this applies to retributionism, although a more thorough analysis leads to the conclusion that various utilitarian approaches will also have to be significantly modified to allow for determinism. Punishment can obviously implement certain goals and be useful in some way without necessarily being just (it can even be cruel and/or immoral). Punishment may be formally fair (like revenge) and constitute “an eye for an eye.” However, if people do not have free will, then they are not responsible for their misdeeds. This is problematic as they do not deserve revenge and their behaviour does not merit condemnation. However, it is possible to apply different measures which are closer to the sui generis of preventive measures. This paper attempts to demonstrate that there is a link between criminal punishment and moral responsibility. This follows from the fact that punishment is marked by moral condemnation and only a morally responsible person can be condemned. Excluding moral responsibility therefore makes it impossible to condemn a perpetrator. The distinguishing feature of, and (indirectly) the moral justification for, criminal punishment are thereby eliminated. In particular, from a retributionist viewpoint, punishment can only be justified if the wrongdoer is morally responsible for his/her actions (in the sense that he/she can be accused of having upset the moral order). If the perpetrator is not morally responsible, it is difficult to morally justify the legitimacy and practice of punishment. Furthermore, the premise about moral responsibility is a prerequisite for justifying punishment in any case involving the notion of guilt. A lack of moral responsibility in a world ruled by determinism does not necessarily mean that people should not be punished for wrongdoing. Nor does it mean that there are no arguments in favour of maintaining the practice of punishment. The basic question is what views – empirical or emotional – should be given priority in the science of criminal law. The answer lies in the demand for minimalism in the criminal law and for a reflective analysis of the foundations of criminal responsibility.
There has been a long-standing debate in philosophical literature about the relationship of predictability and determinism. Some philosophers have claimed that determinism implies predictability; some have claimed the opposite and the others that there are no direct implication relations between these two concepts. According to the above, there are various notions of determinism and predictability at work in the philosophical literature. In contrast, in scientific tradition, the belief that any deterministic system is predictable has long history and is based on the power of the intuitions lying behind the concept of physical determinism, confirmed by many experiments. In this essay, the author focuses on the Laplacean vision for determinism and predictability (or more precisely on what he takes to be such a vision). While many forms of predictability are inconsistent with this vision, he argues that a suitably modified notion of predictability, defined within a framework of model notion of physical determinism, is implied by the Laplacean concept of determinism and, after some modifications, by other modern theories in physics, chemistry and related sciences. It is also argued, that such modified concept of predictability is consistent with common practice of scientists, and any attempt to find out whether a given scientific theory is deterministic, should be accompanied by careful analysis and appropriate modification of constituent elements of modern notion of determinism.
The article concerns the metaphysical problem of divine will as it is discussed in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Its essence can be expressed in the following question: in which way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of freedom in action and deciding? Leibniz is convinced that there is no contradiction between these two theses. Clarke is strongly opposed to that view. He is the protagonist of indeterminism. The article is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the divine will in relation to the principle of the sufficient reason. The second part points to some difficulties related to Leibniz's view on determinism.
The theory and practice of co-evolution offers a way forward for humanity that goes well beyond the deterministic confines of an outmoded mechanistic science that still inhabits much academic thought and research; and also goes well beyond post-deterministic efforts to exempt the human mind and will from its presumed inexorable embeddedness in the mechanistically perceived life and motions of the body. Co-evolution rejects both and goes to the root of the matter regarding nature. It decisively affirms the post-mechanistic understandings of nature by quantum physics, feminist critique of patriarchy, and ecological philosophy. Co-evolution affirms that nature’s relational and animated being situates the human being and all individual human beings in an interactive mode. From this, dialogue is a natural, instead of a contrived, out-growth and fulfillment of the human project. The way then is clear for humanity to co-evolve interdependently with natural forces for mutual benefit.
From an existential and metaphysical standpoint, the African world is dualised into the physical and metaphysical world. This is bald-faced in the dynamics of the relationship that characterizes the African worldview. In praxis, the metaphysical world is seen to be higher in the scheme of things because, it is from it that the impersonal beings/forces operate and superintend on the physical world of man. It is based on this that the twin issue of destiny and freedom is topical and recurrent in Igbo-African metaphysics. The concern is whether man can be free in the physical world, which seems to be a manifestation of the will/wishes and/or the whims and caprices of the beings/forces in the metaphysical world. It is consequent upon this that this paper undertook an existential analysis of these contending issues of freedom and destiny within the Igbo-African context. From the analysis, it was palpable that, though there can be manipulations from the metaphysical world which can bring about luck (good or ill), the Igbo-African is expected to make effort to excel and work responsibly with his chi; because, a man can have a good or bad luck but his/her practical effort is still expedient.
Przyszłość nie zawsze jest określona przez przeszłość. Czasami jest ona zdeterminowana przez bardziej odległe przyszłości, a czasem przez nasze działania w teraźniejszości. Aby skutecznie myśleć o przyszłości, trzeba wyjść poza paradygmat klasycznego determinizmu.
EN
The future is not always defined by the past. Sometimes, it is determinated by a more distant future, and sometimes by our actions in the presence. To effectively think about the future, one needs to go beyond the paradigm of classical determinism.
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