Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 16

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  deterrence
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
100%
EN
The aim of the paper is to provide an analysis of security in the Baltic region, regarding the decision taken by NATO toward strengthening the security of the Baltic region when facing the threat from the East. It looks deeper into geostrategy as one of the keys to understand the vagaries of security dilemmas in the Baltic area. The article presents a situation analysis from both the Baltic states’ and NATO’s perspectives, having as a background recent actions undertaken by Russia.
EN
Directive 2014/104/EU on private antitrust enforcement opted for the exclusion of punitive damages from the category of recoverable damages following a violation of antitrust law. This article will outline the concept of punitive damages and analyse the relevant case-law of the courts of the Member States, of the ECtHR and of the ECJ. Then, it will examine the regime laid down in the Directive and consider the possible reasons why the European legislator opted for this exclusion. Thus, the opportunity to introduce such a provision into the European legal system will be evaluated, taking into consideration the problem of overdeterrence, the problem of the division of functions between public and private enforcement, and making a comparison with the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Finally, a possible modification of Article 3(3) of the Directive will be suggested, in the framework of the review that the Commission is required to undertake by December 27, 2020
FR
La Directive 2014/104/UE sur l’application privée du droit de la concurrence a opté pour l’exclusion des dommages-intérêts punitifs de la catégorie des dommages recouvrables suite à la violation du droit de la concurrence. Cet article décrira la notion de dommages-intérêts punitifs et analysera la jurisprudence pertinente des tribunaux des États membres, de la CEDH et de la CJUE. Ensuite, il examinera le régime prévu par la Directive et examinera les raisons possibles pour lesquelles le législateur européen a opté pour cette exclusion. Donc, l’opportunité d’introduire une telle disposition dans le système juridique européen sera d’évaluée en prenant en considération le problème de la dissuasion excessive, celui de la répartition des fonctions entre l’application publique et privée du droit de la concurrence et en faisant une comparaison avec les dispositions pertinentes de la Directive 2004/48/ EC relative au respect des droits de propriété intellectuelle. Enfin, une éventuelle modification de l’article 3, paragraphe 3, de la Directive sera d’envisagée, dans le cadre d’une révision de la Directive que la Commission doit faire au plus tard le 27 décembre 2020
EN
This paper aims to label industrial accidents as white-collar crime in Bangladesh apparel industry, where occupational health and safety provisions are mostly brushed aside by the factory owners. The study incorporates theory and evidence from over 92 sources from the of criminology, legal systems, occupational health and safety systems, and industrial accidents. The study observes a severe leniency and negligence among the factory owners in advocation and adaptation of these provisions which can be labelled as white-collar crime.
EN
This article deals with the problem of modern terrorism, especially suicide bombing, and problems for the criminal law that arise from this phenomenon. It focuses on the limited applicability of the economic analysis of law in the case of religiously motivated terrorism and identifies causes and effects of those limitations. The main aim is to identify problems that may be solved by an effectively designed criminal law and those that need a more complex, possibly value-based approach.
EN
The article argues that the current security model was shaped in a long period. It is shown that the system was shaped by the solutions applied after the II WW, what embraces global and regional solutions. Until the end of the Cold War the applied solutions were assigned to two opposite Blocs: Western and Eastern. After 1989, which is considered to be the symbolic turning point and end of the Cold War, part of the states from the former Eastern Bloc, after introducing market and democratic reforms have joined NATO and the EU. This also included three states created after the dissolution of the former SU. The article states also that security in Europe is challenged by attempt to reconstruct the area of Russian influence. At the same time it states that this process is not limited to voluntary access of the former republics of SU but also includes annexation of the territories of sovereign Ukraine. The article illustrates that the contemporary security system is characterized by strong asymmetry of applied solutions. NATO applies liberal, cooperative solutions, while Russia uses solutions build upon force and military potential. This asymmetry and moves undertaken by Russia undermine the solutions introduced by international laws. They resulted introduction of sanctions by the US and EU states, what was followed by some political and military steps, labelled as boost NATO military presence in the NATO states bordering with Russia. The article states that in parallel to Hard Power, NATO and the EU should apply also Soft Power. Solutions applied in Russia follow the feeling of majority people in Russia who experience the trauma of former superpower and its fall. The article describes basic conditions of security system with its global and regional solutions, which create its current determinants. This concerns the level of military spending, economic potential, as well as weight of individual states and their groupings in the world scene.
EN
Deterrence research has evolved considerably since the 1970s when a favourite offence for study was the emerging phenomenon of widespread cannabis use among mainstream populations. The deterrent model of crime prevention has expanded far beyond the study of objective and subjective indicators of certainty and severity to encompass social support, moral evaluations, peer involvement and, most recently, risk sensitivity and situational factors. Most earlier research found no evidence of deterrence of cannabis use, a fi nding attributed to its low actual and perceived risk of arrest and changes in public attitudes. This interview study with adult experienced cannabis users drawn from a representative survey base in Toronto, Canada, where possession is still treated as a criminal offence, provides a more nuanced interpretation of deterrence. The authors found that users had generally inaccurate knowledge about the current law and penalties and believed they would avoid arrest in the future. However, they were not oblivious to the possibility of police intervention, and took precautions such as carrying small amounts and avoiding public use. Thus, users were not unaffected by the law, but rather these discreet practices illustrate the operation of restrictive deterrence, shaping their choices of when, where and how to commit the crime of cannabis use. Further research on deterrence should examine situated choices by risk-sensitive offenders, and should also include cross-national patterns of arrest and user risk perceptions. While cannabis continues to be prohibited by international treaties, the reality of widespread use presents opportunities for innovative deterrence studies into this normalised yet illegal crime. The variation in policies, penalty structures and enforcement across European nations, compared to those in other Western jurisdictions, can foster relevant research for a transatlantic discussion about global drug policy transformation.
EN
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the dilemma NATO has faced since February 2014 in its defence policy regarding the Baltic States. If NATO pursues a policy of deterrence, it might trigger war because Russia, the would-be deteree, may perceive actions taken by NATO as not intended to strengthen deterrence but rather to intimidate or coerce it. If it pursues an alternate policy of leaving the Baltic States visibly undefended, it might trigger war because Russia may see this as a sign of weakness and a gap to be exploited. This article investigates the logic of the dilemma, before considering whether NATO’s choice, made at the Warsaw Summit of July 2016, is working as intended. Ultimately, we cannot predict the answer and, therefore, we should consider all possible outcomes, including those which lead to a defensive war in the Baltic States.
PL
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, jaką rolę w izraelskiej strategii odstraszania odgrywa broń nuklearna. Przyjęto założenie, że o potencjale odstraszania izraelskiego arsenału jądrowego decyduje celowe utrzymywanie go w tajemnicy (tzw. strategia amimut). Założono także, że odstraszanie nuklearne stanowi ważną część składową strategii odstraszania militarnego Izraela, ze względu na zmieniający się charakter zagrożeń nie jest jednak jej głównym elementem. W opracowaniu zastosowano teoretyczne metody badawcze: analizę krytyczną i analizę porównawczą źródeł, opracowań naukowych, dokumentów strategicznych oraz komunikatów przedstawicieli władz Izraela. Niniejszy artykuł stanowi próbę uchwycenia specyfiki strategii odstraszania nuklearnego Izraela i cech odróżniających ją od odstraszania innych państwa nuklearnych.
EN
The aim of the article is to answer the question: What role does nuclear weapon play in Israeli strategy of deterrence? The main hypothesis of the paper is based on the assumption, that the deterrence potential of the Israeli nuclear arsenal is strictly determined by deliberate ambiguity (so-called amimut). The author also assumes that nuclear deterrence plays a significant role in the general Israeli deterrence strategy. However, due to the changing nature of threats, it is not its core element. The author used the following theoretical research methods: critical analysis and comparative analysis of sources, scientific studies, strategic documents as well as selected speeches of the Israeli authorities. This article can be seen as an attempt to capture the specifics of the Israeli nuclear deterrence strategy and the features that distinguish it from deterrence of other nuclear states.
EN
The article focuses on legitimation and limitation factors of Enlightenment’s punishment theories. The author divides the conceptions of the most important punishment theorists of XVIII century into two groups: the first includes deterrent theories of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, the second amounts to retribution theories of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. Arguing that the paradigm of the limitation and legitimation factors of punishment needs to play a key role in the modern theory of punishment, the article shows that the Enlightenment discourse between deterrent and retribution theories delivers many important arguments for the modern practice of lawmaking and law-enforcement in the criminal law sphere.
EN
The aim of the research, the results of which are presented in this article, was to clarify Russian views on strategic deterrence and the mechanisms of its application. It was established that strategic deterrence has a broader scope of meaning than its Western counterpart, as it encompasses peacetime, the influence of crisis and wartime by nuclear, non-nuclear and non-military means. Russian deterrence is universal in nature because it shapes the behavior of strategic rivals without the need for armed confrontation. Holistic coercive campaigns conducted in cyberspace allow to combine conventional military and non-military capabilities with nuclear ones and achieve political goals in the ongoing international competition.
EN
Strategic ambiguity, or the deliberate policy of uncertainty as to whether the United States would use force to defend Taiwan against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, has been the centrepiece of US policy towards the Taiwan issue for decades. This paper discusses the factors driving the redefinition of strategic ambiguity and its recalibration throughout Donald Trump's presidency (2017–2021). The fundamental driver of this change was to balance the rising power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper applied offensive realism as a theoretical framework for its analysis. Under President Donald Trump, Washington modified its policy of strategic ambiguity, explicitly framing relations with Taiwan within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. While the US retained key elements of strategic ambiguity, including the 'One China' policy, it added new features to deploy it offensively against Beijing's growing regional hegemony. The increased dynamism and unpredictability of relations with Taiwan were matched by a welcoming attitude towards strengthening Taiwanese identity and highlighting the systemic differences between communist China and democratic Taiwan. America stepped up arms sales and encouraged Taiwan to build its self-defence capabilities. Washington engaged in countering Chinese attempts to isolate Taiwan internationally and included it in restructuring global supply chains. Although the United States has not formally revised the boundaries of the 'One China' policy, the modification of strategic ambiguity increased Taiwan's prominence in US-China power competition and pushed back the prospect of peaceful unification.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza zmian w polityce odstraszania USA po zimnej wojnie w realiach „drugiego wieku nuklearnego”, rosnącej liczby państw dysponujących bronią masowego rażenia oraz groźbami sięgnięcia po nią przez rządzone przez dyktatury agresywne państwa zbójeckie oraz organizacje terrorystyczne (przede wszystkim radykałów islamskich). Podstawowe modyfikacje polityk odstraszania USA uwzględniały zastąpienie jednego głównego zagrożenia i rywala - radzieckiego - wieloma potencjalnymi państwowymi i niepaństwowymi adwersarzami o zróżnicowanych potencjałach i zdolnościach, wymagających zastosowania odstraszania „szytego na miarę”. Wyzwaniami geopolitycznymi o najpoważniejszym znaczeniu dla USA pozostawały w okresie pozimnowojennym relacje z potężnymi mocarstwami niedemokratycznymi - Rosją i Chinami - oraz państwami niechętnymi wobec Zachodu, rozwijającymi zdolności posługiwania się bronią masowego rażenia i środkami jej przenoszenia (Koreą Północną, Iranem). Wyjątkowo trudnym wyzwaniem geopolitycznym okazała się rosnąca niechęć Rosji wobec mocarstw zachodnich potęgowana przez rozszerzenie NATO oraz euroatlantyckie aspiracje Ukrainy i Gruzji, które dla autorytarnego i brutalnego reżimu Władimira Putina stały się powodem do agresji militarnej, rozpoczynającej wraz nielegalną aneksją Krymu okres tzw. „nowej zimnej wojny”. W odniesieniu do rozpraw H. Mackindera w XXI w. szczególnie istotnym pozostało pytanie o pozycję Europy Wschodniej jako klucza do eurazjatyckiego sworznia („Heartland”) i obszaru dążącego do obrony niepodległości wobec naporu rosyjskiego.
EN
The aim of the text is an analysis of changes in U.S. deterrence policy after the Cold War under the conditions of the “second nuclear age”, the growing number of countries in the possession of weapons of mass destruction and threats of its seizure by aggressive rogue states governed by dictatorships or terrorist organizations. The basic modifications of U.S. deterrence policies incorporated the replacement of one major threat and rival by many potential state and non-state adversaries of diverse potentials and capacities, demanding the introduction of “tailored” deterrence. In the post-Cold War era the relations with mighty non-democratic powers, Russia and China, and countries hostile towards the West developing weapons of mass destruction and its delivery means (North Korea, Iran) remained the geopolitical challenges of most serious significance for the United States. A geopolitical challenge of particularly high difficulty concerned a growing hostility of Russia towards the Western powers, multiplied by the enlargement of NATO and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, which became a reason for the authoritarian and violent regime of Vladimir Putin to start a military aggression, which opened, altogether with an illegal annexation of Crimea, the era of the so called “New Cold War”. In reference to the dissertations of H. Mackinder, particularly important remains the question concerning the position of Eastern Europe as a key to Eurasian “Heartland” and an area striving for independence in circumstances of Russian pressure.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza procesu instytucjonalizacji studiów strategicznych jako podstawy rozwoju współczesnych studiów nad bezpieczeństwem (Security Studies). Artykuł omawia genezę studiów strategicznych i próby zakreślenia obszarów refleksji w tej dziedzinie wiedzy. Studia strategiczne rozwinęły się w połowie XX wieku w USA. Stanowiły próbę syntezy wiedzy militarnej, ekonomicznej i politologicznej w celu opanowania ówczesnego zagrożenia globalną wojną nuklearną. Kryzys tego podejścia przypadł na lata 70. XX wieku. Koniec zimnej wojny spopularyzował problematykę bezpieczeństwa w naukach społecznych, a kwestie podejmowane niegdyś w ramach studiów strategicznych zyskały nowy wymiar. Refleksja nad metodyką studiów strategicznych dąży do wzmocnienia współczesnego potencjału badań nad bezpieczeństwem.
EN
The aim of this article is to outline the process of institutionalization of strategic studies, understood as the essence of contemporary security studies. Article explores the genesis of strategic studies and attempts to determine areas of reflection in this field of knowledge. Strategic studies developed in the half of the 20th century. Its mission was to form a creative synthesis of military, economic and political scientific approaches towards the threat of nuclear war. Crisis of strategic studies took place in the 70s. The end of so called Cold War popularized the issue of security within the non-military context. Therefore, problems analysed by traditional strategic studies evolved. Author’s final reflection tries to strenghten Polish potential in developing contemporary security studies.
PL
Artykuł analizuje wyzwania, jakie przed stabilnością strategiczną stawia nowy nuklearny porządek świata, obejmujące koncepcyjne warianty teorii odstraszania w ramach zimnej wojny, przełom technologiczny i krytyczną transformację postaw nuklearnych państw. Wbrew dotychczasowym publikacjom na ten temat twierdzimy, że w nowym porządku nuklearnym stabilność strategiczna zostanie utrzymana, a nawet może wzmocniona przez złożoną kombinację wyzwań, jakie stoją przed bezpieczeństwem, biorąc pod uwagę rosnącą niemożność deeskalacji wojny po jej wybuchu.
EN
The article explores the challenges that strategic stability is facing under the new nuclear world order. These are conceptual deviations from Cold War-framed deterrence theory, technological breakthroughs and critical transformations of states’ nuclear postures. Contrary to the existing publications on this issue, we claim that strategic stability will continue under the new nuclear order and might even be strengthened by the complex combination of security challenges, given the growing impossibility to de-escalate war once it breaks out.
EN
Aggression in Ukraine and illegal annexation of the Crimea region carried out by the Russian Federation in 2014 led to drastic and negative changes in the international security environment and initiated confrontation with the West. In this situation, NATO was forced to take precautions. The assessment of the developing paradigm of assuring security by the Alliance in the new international situation is made in the article. Its contents introduce changes which took place in relations of NATO with Russia during the last few years. The article explains the way the Alliance assures security in the area covered by the treaty and in the Black Sea region.
PL
Agresja na Ukrainie i nielegalna aneksja Krymu dokonana przez Federację Rosyjską w 2014 roku doprowadziła do drastycznych, negatywnych zmian w środowisku bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego i zapoczątkowała konfrontację z Zachodem. W tej sytuacji NATO było zmuszone do podejmowania działań zapobiegawczych. W artykule dokonano oceny kształtującego się paradygmatu zapewniania przez Sojusz bezpieczeństwa w nowej sytuacji międzynarodowej. Jego treści prezentują zmiany jakie dokonały się w relacjach NATO z Rosją na przestrzeni ostatnich kilku lat. W artykule wyjaśniono w jaki sposób Sojusz zapewnia bezpieczeństwo w obszarze odpowiedzialności traktatowej oraz w regionie Morza Czarnego.
16
58%
EN
This paper deals with military mobility, which in recent years has become one of the strategic priorities for both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The authors argue that the ability to quickly transport soldiers and military equipment over long distances across member states’ territories is a prerequisite for an effective and rapid military response by the allies. An analysis of the achievements to date shows that the European Union is one of the key actors in identifying and eliminating existing barriers and initiating necessary infrastructure construction. Simultaneously, close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in this area allows the parties involved to achieve synergies. This paper analyzes the results achieved in the light of the assumed objectives. Simultaneously, elements that hinder military mobility and perspectives of the development of the studied issue are indicated.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.