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The Policy of the George H.W. Bush’s Administration Toward Macedonia

100%
Szczesio S. L.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2014
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issue 4(30)
227-254
EN
At the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost its geopolitical significance for the United States. The President George H.W. Bush Administration tried to support these political forces in the SFRY, which tended to maintain the multiethnic country, for example the new Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Ante Marković, and the leader of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov. The Americans opposed the independence aspiration of Croatians and Slovenians, because they were afraid that it would lead to the ultimate falling apart of the country, which could influence the USSR. When the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia, the Bush Administration refrained from following European countries until April 1992, considering the consequences for Bosnia and Macedonia. The peaceful and democratic nature of Macedonia’s independence placed the republic in a good position to be recognized by the United States. But Greece led a vigorous campaign against the recognition of Macedonia and the Administration of George H.W. Bush was worried that a conflict between Greece and Macedonia could spark a regional conflict in which Greece and Turkey, two members of the NATO, could clash against each other. One influence on the decision of the Bush Administration was the Greek lobby in the United States, which actively engaged in the Macedonian case and the 1992 presidential campaign. Concurrently, without establishing official diplomatic relations with Macedonia, the Americans engaged in the works of the CSCE mission and supported the preventive deployment of “blue helmets” to appease the domestic situation and contain neighbours from aggressive steps. “The Macedonian Problem,” as the bloody war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, remained unravelled by George H.W. Bush and became a problem for his successor in the White House.
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Serbia – an Opponent or an Ally of Independent Macedonia (1991-2013)?

72%
Szczepański W.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2014
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issue 4(30)
347-361
EN
The relations between Serbia and Macedonia in the period from the disintegration of SFR of Yugoslavia (1991) to 2013 became the subject of the proposed considerations. They are targeted at searching for an answer to the question in the title about the character of the attitude of Serbia towards its southern neighbour during the last twenty years. As an introduction the issues regarding the previous stage of the relations between Serbia and Macedonia, i.e. with the Yugoslavian period (since 1943), were briefly mentioned. Through decades, within the Yugoslavian order, the links between Serbia and Macedonia were so close that only the links that the biggest of the republics of former Yugoslavia had with its smallest member, i.e. Montenegro, seemed to be closer. The situation changed rapidly when in 1991 Macedonia decided to declare sovereignty and following the precursors of the defragmentation of SFRY – Slovenia and Croatia, it started to shape its political and economic being without ties to Yugoslavia, at that time cut and stuck in the chaos and on the verge of gory conflicts. Although, from the point of view of Belgrade, Macedonia was never officially considered an enemy, and the regime of Milosevic was mainly interested in those republics of the former SFRY, which territories were numerously inhabited by Serbs (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro), in the relations between Serbia and Macedonia cooled off and the Serbian radicals (the political camp of V. Šešelj) for some time called for “dealing with” Macedonia. On the threshold of the independence of Macedonia, it turned out that the main problems which this weak country will have to tackle in the relations with the outside world, will not be connected with Serbia but other neighbours (in the text the conflicted relations between Macedonia and Greece are mentioned, as well as the tensions between Macedonia and Albania inside Macedonia together with the background presence of the issue of Kosovo; the relation between Macedonia and Bulgaria were skipped). In the 90s of the 20th century as well as in the first 13 years of the current century, the relations between Serbia and Macedonia underwent interesting transformations. They evolved from quite hostile to fairly friendly, although occasionally various political, economic and even religious problems put a shadow on them. Especially important moments, which squeezed stigma on the transforming relation between Yugoslavia/Serbia and Macedonia, were the events happening in Kosovo and northern and western Macedonia at the turn of the 21st century, the centre of which was the Albanians. The changes on top of authorities of both countries, happening during the 20 years of censorship in 1991‑2011, were also of vital importance. The interpolitical transformations of both post‑Yugoslavian countries contributed to the gradual development of their, at first frozen, relations (in the text they are analysed since the visit of Kiro Gligorov in Belgrade in 1995 and the official establishment of diplomatic relations by Macedonia and Yugoslavia, comprised of Serbia and Montenegro in 1996 to the elections in Serbia in 2011, when the president of Serbia became T. Nikolić and the prime minister I. Dačić – the first once connected with V. Šešelj, the latter with S. Milošević – who paradoxically turned out to be an advocate of the rapprochement between Serbia and Macedonia, which was expressed by inter‑governmental connections in 2013). Another issue, pointed out in the article, is the presence in the bilateral relations between Macedonia and Serbia the problem of integration of both countries and the whole west Balkan macro region with the EU, significant since the democratization of Serbia (autumn 2000). The submitted sketch is closed with an optimistic evaluation of the present conditions and perspectives of the relations between Serbia and Macedonia. It is worth underlining that they did not deteriorate when the coalition of the nationalistic party (SNS) with the socialistic (SPS) came to power in Belgrade, although some analysts predicted – wrongly as it turned out – that this kind of reconfiguration of the political scene in Serbia would not provide the relation between Serbia and Macedonia with new, positive impulses, but only difficult challenges and trials, if not dramatic crises.
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War trauma and the terror of freedom: Yugoslav black wave and the critics of dictatorship

58%
Lazarević Radak S.
Miscellanea Posttotalitariana Wratislaviensia
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2017
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vol. 6: TRAUMA KULTUROWA JAKO PALIMPSEST: (post)komunizm w kontekście porównawczym nowoczesności, totalitaryzmów i (post)kolonializmów
107-117
EN
Relying on the concept of cultural trauma, the author interprets the attitude of post-Yugoslav societies towards the so-called Black Wave films. The paper examines the prohibitions of these films during the communist period, the increased interest in them during the 1990s, and finally, its disappearance from popular culture, which all testify the multilayered cultural trauma which Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav societies have been going through since the 1940s.
RU
Опираясь на концепцию культурной травмы, автор интерпретирует отношение постюгославских обществ к фильму-нуар. В коммунистическую эпоху Новые фильмы были запрещены; в девяностые годы возник некоторый интерес к «черным фильмам», наконец, они исчезли из популярной культуры. Это свидетельствует о многослойности культурной травмы через которую прошли югославские и постюгославские общества начиная с 1940-х годов до настоящего времени.
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Rola sił pokojowych ONZ w wojnie w Bośnii Hercegowinie (1992–1995) – wybrane zagadnienia

58%
Szczesio S. L.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
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2018
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issue 101
191-207
EN
One of the biggest challenges for the international community at the beginning of 1990s became an issue of dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, and Yugoslav federation had in fact collapsed. A bloody war broke out in Croatia, and in February 1992 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution to send the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to this country. But soon there appeared a new problem for Europe and America – tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia was the most ethnically-mixed republic in Yugoslavia. In March 1992 UNPROFOR headquarters was established in the Bosnian capital – Sarajevo, which was chosen as a neutral location. But in April 1992 tensions in this country exploded into a bloody war. The „blue helmets” tasks were e.g. protection of Sarajevo airport, humanitarian relief convoys and six safe areas, including Srebrenica and Sarajevo. During the war in Bosnia, UNPROFOR had many failures, such as the fall of Srebrenica and the use of soldiers as hostages to protect the Serbs from attacks from NATO air. Eventually, thanks to the active role of the American diplomacy and the success of the Croat-Muslim coalition it was possible to force all parties of the conflict to negotiate the ending of the war in November 1995.
PL
Jednym z największych wyzwań dla społeczności międzynarodowej na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych XX w. była kwestia rozpadu Socjalistycznej Federacyjnej Republiki Jugosławii. W czerwcu 1991 r. Słowenia i Chorwacja ogłosiły niepodległość, a federacja jugosłowiańska faktycznie upadła. W Chorwacji wybuchła krwawa wojna, a w lutym 1992 r. Rada Bezpieczeństwa ONZ przyjęła rezolucję o wysłaniu Sił Ochronnych Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych (UNPROFOR) do tego kraju. Wkrótce jednak pojawił się nowy problem dla Europy i Ameryki – napięcia w Bośni i Hercegowinie. Bośnia była najbardziej zróżnicowaną etnicznie republiką w Jugosławii. W marcu 1992 r. kwatera główna UNPROFOR powstała w stolicy Bośni – Sarajewie, które zostało wybrane jako neutralna lokalizacja. Jednak w kwietniu 1992 r. napięcie w tym państwie przerodziło się w konflikt zbrojny. Zadaniem „błękitnych hełmów” była np. ochrona portu lotniczego w Sarajewie, konwojów z pomocą humanitarną oraz sześciu „stref bezpieczeństwa”, w tym Srebrenicy i Sarajewa. Podczas wojny w Bośni UNPROFOR poniósł wiele porażek, takich jak upadek Srebrenicy i użycie żołnierzy jako zakładników do ochrony Serbów przed atakami NATO z powietrza. Ostatecznie, dzięki aktywnej roli amerykańskiej dyplomacji oraz sukcesom koalicji chorwacko-muzułmańskiej, okazało się możliwe zmuszenie wszystkie stron konfliktu do wynegocjowania zakończenia wojny w listopadzie 1995 r.
5
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Rok 1989 jako začátek konce Jugoslávie - slovinská perspektiva: slovinské veřejné mínění a povaha federace

51%
Gašparič J., Medková B.
Soudobé dějiny (Contemporary History)
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 1
70-98
EN
The author examines the attitude of Slovenians to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia since the late 1960s until the declaration of the independent Republic of Slovenia in 1991. He asks himself a question whether socialist Yugoslavia was indeed a state which Slovenians perceived as theirs, just like they had done in the case of the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and he observes how their identification with that state was changing over time, the reasons of the changes, and whether the loss of their loyalty caused the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. He is looking for answers in public opinion polls which had been continually taking place in Slovenia since 1968 and conducted in a relatively fair manner, without political interventions, which is indeed a rarity in the context of socialist countries. Using their results, the author concludes that Slovenians viewed themselves as a natural part of the Yugoslav community until the late 1980s. This opinion was shared by a majority of Slovenia’s population, although many of them were not satisfied with Slovenia’s position in Yugoslavia, or their living standard at times of economic crises. It was only in 1989 that the opinion that Yugoslavia as a “country of many advantages” had run out of its potential and no longer offered good prospects for future prevailed among Slovenians. However, their attitudes reacting to accelerating changes both at home and abroad did not cause the disintegration of the common state. After 1991, Slovenians completely (and sometimes uncritically) identified themselves with independent Slovenia, and mostly (although rather declaratively) also with values of parliamentary democracy. The author’s exposition is preceded by an analysis of published sources on the disintegration of Yugoslavia and based on an extensive set of empirical data from public opinion polls in the form of tables.
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