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2014
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vol. 9
|
issue 4
9-20
EN
The system changes of the Polish economy, which began in the 80s of the 20th century and were continued after the accession to the European Union in 2004, have caused significant transformations, not only in the economy and ownership relations, but also in single markets. What is more, some of the European Commission’s guidelines have introduced the market regulations which were dominated by natural monopolies. These changes were to cause the competitiveness on the market and to improve its functioning in an efficiency allocative sense in order to make the consumers’ situation better. However, it is often a kind of struggle without any visible effects in short or long term. One of such examples is the Polish Post Office as the national operator in the market of postal services. The scientific objective of this study is to answer the question whether the changes in the law regulating the postal market cause real changes in the market structure, resulting in a reduction in allocative inefficiency? The working hypothesis referring to such research problem is formulated as follows: large business entities operating in the monopolistic market structure until now use all of the tools – including changes in the law, to maintain their position. It causes an increase in allocative inefficiency of companies and market. The object of the research is Poczta Polska SA. The primary research method will be based on the analysis of the legal rules, the analysis of the activities and entities’ decisions and the comparative analysis. The active research is supported by the literature recognition.
EN
The Slovak hybrid mail services case (or Slovenska posta case) is truly unique in EU jurisprudence. Within the last decade, the European Commission rarely applied Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions in individual cases. Thus Slovenska posta constitutes one of the rare examples of such enforcement. Slovenska posta also constitutes a very rare example of a judicial review of Commission decisions based on Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU. Slovenska posta is only the second case when European courts were called upon to review the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU by the Commission and the first when the judicial review was conducted over a Commission decision regarding “failure to meet the demand”. Indeed, since 1989-1990 (when the Commission commenced to apply Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions introduced by the Member States) and until 2014, when the Court of Justice adopted its decision in Greek lignite (DEI) case , none of the Commission decisions was reviewed by EU courts. Such lack of appeals resulted in a rather strange situation under which the Commission and CJEU developed their own jurisprudence on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU and occasionally interpreted the same legal criteria differently. In this regard, a court review in Slovenska posta was eagerly awaited in the hope it would reconcile these diverging positions and provide more clarity on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU.
FR
Pendant de nombreuses années, les paiements d’exclusivité et le type spécifique de rabais de fidélité ont été traités par la Commission européenne (la Commission) comme des restrictions par objet. Cette approche a été progressivement révisée en faveur d’un raisonnement fondé sur les effets. Dans les Orientations sur les priorités retenues par la Commission pour l’application de l’article 82 du Traité CE aux pratiques d’éviction abusives des entreprises dominantes (Orientations), la Commission a démontré sa volonté de suivre l’approche “économique”. En particulier, la Commission a annoncé que pour les pratiques d’exclusion fondées sur les prix, le test du “concurrent le plus efficace” sera utilisé. Cet article vise à vérifier si la Commission a suivi les lignes directrices dans son évaluation des pratiques d’exclusion dans deux affaires, Qualcomm et Google (Android), considérées par l’auteur comme des occasions de passer d’une approche fondée sur la forme à une approche économique. Dans ses considérations, l’Auteur fournit des propositions sur la manière dont la pratique de la Commission devrait être modifiée afin de garantir que les entreprises dominantes bénéficient d’un niveau suffisant de sécurité juridique.
EN
For many years, exclusivity payments and its specific type – loyalty rebates – were treated by the European Commission (Commission) as restrictions by object. This approach has been gradually revised towards a more effect-based reasoning. In the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (Guidance), the Commission demonstrated its willingness to follow the so-called ‘economic approach’. In particular, the Commission announced that for price-based exclusionary conduct the so-called ‘as-efficient competitor’ test (AEC test) is going to be used. This article aims to verify whether the Commission followed the Guidance in its assessment of exclusionary practices in two cases, Qualcomm and Google (Android), considered by the Author as an opportunity to make a move from a form-based to an economic-based approach. In his considerations, the Author provides proposals on how the practice of the Commission should be changed to ensure dominant undertakings are provided with a sufficient level of legal certainty.
EN
This paper addresses the issue of the functioning of regional facilities for the processing of municipal waste in the light of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 16 February 2007. The authors seek answers to the question of whether in certain specific situations it is possible to conclude that a given facility holds a dominant position on the market in which it operates. Two situations will be subjected to close analysis, namely those in which only one or two facilities with RMWPF status operate in a given region of municipal waste management.
EN
After a few decades of transformation China is becoming a major contender for the number two position in the world. Is it really possible? Will China balance the power of the United States? Today the United States supremacy is so great that it seems to be undeniable. The situation was similar at the end of the twentieth century when U.S. domination was obvious and any other reality was hard to imagine. Recently though, more and more often America’s political decisions are criticised. A few decades ago, in Beijing a new idea was developed. The essence of that idea was to transform the People’s Republic of China into a superpower. Since China was very vast and densely populated, but mostly a poor and backward country, it was a very daring vision. Years of consistent and painful reforms changed the way the world is looking at China, even though some of them were not accepted by international opinion.
EN
The paper presents and evaluates the impact of the 'more economic' approach of the Hungarian Competition Office’s decisional practice as to predatory pricing, margin squeeze and refusal to deal under Hungarian competition law. It compares the Hungarian practice with the more formalistic approach of the CJEU’s jurisprudence. The paper evaluates the Hungarian decisional practice in abuse cases and provides a brief assessment on the consequences of applying diverging standards in EU and national abuse of dominance law.
FR
Cet article présente et apprécie l’impact de l’approche plus économique (« more economic approach ») de l’Autorité hongroise de la concurrence en matière de prix d’éviction, compression des marges et refus de vente en droit hongrois. Il compare la pratique hongroise avec l’approche plus formaliste de la jurisprudence de la CJUE. L’article apprécie la pratique hongroise en matière d’abus de position dominante et rend la récapitulation des conséquences de l’application des règles divergentes en droit européen et national en matière d’abus.
EN
First, the paper presents two basic models of the competition law regulation: a system based on prohibition and a system based on so-called control of abuse, and their historical development internationally. In principle, the model based on the prohibition principle relies on an absolute prohibition of certain practices that restrain competition (per se). The other model relies on ex ante state control of the economic activity, with the state’s intervention into this activity when the competition on the market is distorted, hindered or threatened. In the system based on prohibition it is necessary to develop certain mechanisms that will make prohibitions relative. This necessity arises from the economic as well as socio-political circumstances. The legal means of relativisation may be divided into measures used in advance (ex ante) and measures used subsequently (ex post).Neither Polish nor European Competition Law provides for the possibility of making the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position relative ex ante, therefore relativisation is feasible only by acts of the application of law by the state competition authorities, or relevant courts. The paper identifies axiological grounds for relativisation, and describes its different legal means which include, inter alia, all judicial doctrines. Some of those doctrines have foundations in the historical application of the prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position, while introducing some others seems to require a legislative action. Accordingly, certain solutions de lege ferenda are proposed.
PL
Na wstępie artykuł przedstawia dwa zasadnicze modele regulacji ochrony konkurencji: system oparty na zakazie i oraz system oparty na tak zwanej kontroli nadużywania, wraz z prezentacją rozwoju historycznego obu modeli na świecie. Zasadniczo model oparty na zakazie stosowania praktyk ograniczających konkurencję polega na wprowadzeniu zakazu o charakterze bezwzględnym (per se). Drugi model opiera się na państwowym nadzorze działalności przedsiębiorców, z państwową ingerencją w tę działalność w razie zaistnienia ograniczenia czy zagrożenia dla konkurencji na rynku. W systemie opartym na zakazie niezbędne jest wprowadzenie określonych mechanizmów relatywizujących zakazy. Wskazana konieczność podyktowana jest tak zarówno względami ekonomicznymi, jak i społeczno-politycznymi. Mechanizmy relatywizacji można podzielić na środki stosowane uprzednio (ex ante) oraz środki stosowane następczo (ex post). Polskie oraz europejskie prawo konkurencji nie zawiera przepisów wprowadzających możliwość relatywizacji zakazu nadużycia pozycji dominującej ex ante, dlatego relatywizacja taka możliwa jest jedynie w drodze aktów stosowania prawa przez organy ochrony konkurencji oraz przez właściwe sądy. Artykuł przedstawia aksjologiczne podstawy relatywizacji, jak również opisuje poszczególne środki wymienionej relatywizacji. Do środków tych należą przede wszystkim doktryny orzecznicze, wypracowane przez judykaturę. Niektóre doktryny mają podstawy w historii stosowania zakazu nadużywania pozycji dominującej, wprowadzenie innych wydaje się wymagać odpowiedniej interwencji ustawodawcy. W tym zakresie artykuł prezentuje wnioski de lege ferenda.
8
Content available remote

Abuse of market power in ICT sector

63%
The Lawyer Quarterly
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2018
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vol. 8
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issue 1
75-81
EN
The paper provides a general brief overview of specificities in market abuse (abuse of a dominant position) in the sector of information and communication technologies that have been identified in the literature namely with regard to cases against Microsoft and Google. The paper describes problems related to network effect, technology shift, definition of a relevant market, relationship between the protection of intellectual property and the protection of competition, and a territorial overlap of technologies. Moreover, the paper describes the problem of big data analysis and utilization of artificial intelligence as means of market abuse.
EN
Competition Law is an important aspect of free market economy. It determines the functioning of the economic system based on the free market principles of supply and demand. Competition law is in the initial stage of its implementation in the Republic of Kosovo. Its development began in 2004 with the adoption of Kosovo’s Law on Competition, the country’s very first law passed to regulate the legal basis of free market competition. The Law on Competition of 2004 had many shortcomings both with respect to its content and implementation. New legislation was thus passed in 2010 under the name the Law on the Protection of Competition. The latter act is in force now along with an Amendment that entered into force in early 2014. Taken in its entirety, Kosovo’s competition law meets the standards and is in accordance with EU legislation. Kosovo, although it is only in the initial stage of its contractual relations with the EU, has aligned most of its laws with the requirements of EU legislation. Kosovo is Europe’s youngest country and as such, it has various problems when it comes to the functioning of the rule of law. This paper will discuss several topics related to the development of competition law in Kosovo including: the political, legal and economical situation in the field of competition law; the legal bases for the protection of competition in Kosovo; the Kosovo Competition Authority and the insufficiency in its capacities to combat competition law infringements; legal provisions on restrictive practices and merger control. The paper also includes comprehensive conclusions. A number of competition cases deal with by the Kosovo Competition Authority will be mentioned throughout the paper.
PL
Sytuacja konkurencyjna w sektorze towarowego transportu towarowego jest szczególna, gdyż rozpoczęty proces liberalizacji nie został jeszcze zakończony. W związku z tym istnieje duża dysproporcja skali aktywnych uczestników rynku, gdzie dominacja publicznych operatorów stanowi pozostałość ich statusu monopolisty sprzed liberalizacji. Wyzwanie, przed jakim stoi Komisja Europejska, nie polega więc na ochronie procesu konkurowania, tylko a na zapewnieniu, żeby w przyszłości rynek osiągnął pożądany poziom konkurencyjności, realizując tym samym cele liberalizacji. Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia w tym kontekście szczegółowe uwarunkowania stosowania przepisów kontroli koncentracji w prawie Unii Europejskiej.
EN
The competitive situation in rail transport is peculiar because the liberalisation process is still ongoing. As a result, there is a significant difference in scale between various undertakings active on the market, where existing dominance is inherited from the pre-liberalisation monopolist status. The challenge faced by the European Commission is thus not the safeguarding of the competitive process, but rather creating a level playing field to foster future competition and thus making it possible to achieve the goals of liberalisation. In this context, this paper presents a detailed analysis of the application of merger control rules in EU Law.
PL
Artykuł opisuje mechanizm third-party ownership (dalej: TPO) w piłce nożnej. Autor dokonuje analizy rynku transferowego pod kątem potencjalnych potrzeb zewnętrznego finasowania z wykorzystaniem funduszy inwestycyjnych. Autor zwraca uwagę na orzeczenie sądu I instancji w Brukseli zapadłe w sprawie z wniosku Doyen Sports i klubu Seraing United przeciwko FIFA, UEFA oraz belgijskiej federacji piłki nożnej w przedmiocie zgodności zakazu TPO wskazanego w art. 18 bis i art. 18 ter Regulaminu FIFA z regułami ochrony konkurencji, tj. art. 101 i 102 TFUE i konfrontuje je z dorobkiem orzeczniczym TSUE z zakresu sportu.
EN
The article refers to the mechanism of third-party ownership (TPO) in football. The author confronts the transfer market sectors with the necessity of external funding by investment funds. The author emphasizes the meaning of Brussel’s court decision in case Doyen Sport & Seraing United vs FIFA, UEFA and Belgium Football Association, which refers to the conformity of FIFA’s ban on TPO with Article 101 and 102 TFEU. The author compares this decision with CJEU jurisprudence related to the sport sector.
PL
Celem niniejszego opracowania jest przybliżenie ostatniej nowelizacji niemieckiej ustawy kartelowej, czyli ustawy przeciwko ograniczaniu konkurencji (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – dalej: GWB), która weszła w życie 30 czerwca 2013 r. Za najważniejszą część noweli uznaje się wprowadzanie zmian w przepisach dotyczących kontroli koncentracji, przede wszystkim zaś testu SIEC (significant impediment of effective competition), a także podwyższenie progu posiadania pozycji dominującej przez pojedyncze przedsiębiorstwo. Jako równie istotne wskazuje się m.in. na częściowe objęcie regulacją GWB kas chorych (Krankenkassen).
EN
This paper is devoted to the 8th Amendment of the German Act against Restraints on Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) that came into force in July 2013. Pointed out are the most important changes: the introduction of the SIEC test (significant impediment of effective competition) and the increase of the market share threshold for the presumption of “single” market dominance. Also among the key changes introduced by the 8th Amendment is partial applicability of German competition rules to statutory health insurance funds.
13
45%
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest szwajcarskie prawo konkurencji, przedstawione w zarysie w oparciu o stosowną legislację oraz orzecznictwo. W opracowaniu zaprezentowano wybrane najważniejsze aspekty (zarówno materialno-prawne, jak i proceduralne) szwajcarskiej regulacji antymonopolowej dot. inter alia zakresu jej zastosowania, organów ochrony konkurencji, a także „trzech tradycyjnych filarów prawa konkurencji”, tj. porozumień ograniczających konkurencję, nadużycia pozycji dominującej oraz kontroli koncentracji. W tekście wskazane zostały również niektóre różnice i podobieństwa z polskim i unijnym reżimem omawianej gałęzi prawa. Uwagi końcowe poświęcone zostały projektowi rychłej nowelizacji ustawy federalnej o kartelach i innych ograniczeniach konkurencji oraz kwestii zacieśniania się stosunków pomiędzy Szwajcarią i Unią Europejską w dziedzinie prawa konkurencji.
EN
This article focuses on Swiss competition law, as outlined on the basis of the relevant legislation and case law. The paper presents selected key aspects (in relation to both substantive and procedural law) of Swiss anti-trust law regarding, inter alia, its scope, competition protection authorities, as well as “the three traditional pillars of competition law” (agreements restricting competition, abuse of dominance and control of concentrations). Noted in the text are some of the differences and some of the similarities between Swiss, Polish and EU competition law. The imminent revision of the Federal Act on cartels and other competition restrictions is considered in the closing remarks, as is the strengthening of the relations between Switzerland and the European Union in the field of competition law.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł został poświęcony problematyce udzielania rabatów przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące w świetle unijnego prawa konkurencji. Zagadnienie przedstawiono w świetle bardziej ekonomicznego podejścia (more economic approach) oraz w oparciu o wydane w latach 2011–2015 orzeczenia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej – Tomra (2011), Intel (2014) oraz Post Danmark II (2015) oraz uwzględnia opublikowaną w październiku 2016 r. opinię Rzecznika Generalnego Nilsa Wahla.
EN
This article is dedicated to the problematic issue of rebate schemes applied by dominant undertakings under EU competition law. The said problem is presented in the light of the more economic approach, and in accordance with ECJ judgements published between 2011-2015: Tomra (2011), Intel (2014) and Post Danmark II (2015). Moreover, the article includes an analysis of the Opinion of the Advocate General Nils Wahls to the Intel Case, issued in October 2016.
PL
Autor analizuje praktykę polskich i europejskich organów konkurencji w zakresie definicji rynków właściwych i siły rynkowej w sektorze internetowym (z wyłączeniem sprzedaży internetowej). Autor konkluduje, że organy konkurencji powinny być bardziej wstrzemięźliwe w ingerowaniu w działalność przedsiębiorców świadczących usługi online ze względu na wysoką substytucję popytową w ramach reklamy internetowej oraz naturę reklamy jako takiej.
EN
The paper discusses the practice of the Polish and the EU competition authorities with regard to the definition of relevant markets and market power in the internet (excluding internet sales). It is concluded that competition authorities should show more restraint in their interference with the business of internet services providers because demand substitution on internet advertising markets is relatively high and a decrease in the supply of internet advertising would be unlikely to be anticompetitive under competition law.
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