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EN
Purpose: Assuming a duopoly industry with pollution producing processes, the aim of this work is to study the firms’ choice to engage in Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) by means of “green” managerial delegation, i.e. hiring managers with preferences for environmental concerns to whom owners delegate both sales and decisions to adopt green technology. Methodology: Depending on the firms’ strategic choices, a two/three-stage game takes place solved by the backward induction method to obtain sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. Results: When the market structure is a Cournot duopoly, and the environmental sensitivity of “green” managers is extremely low, then the engagement in ECSR is the firms’ dominant strategy, regardless of the efficiency level of the available abatement technology. Nonetheless, firms are cast into a prisoner’s dilemma. On the other hand, if “green” managers have low-intermediate to intermediate environmental sensitivity, then either no ECSR, multiple symmetric equilibria, or ECSR engagement can emerge as a result in equilibrium. Finally, if managers’ environmental sensitivity is adequately high, then firms do not engage in ECSR. When a market entry game is considered with the Stackelberg competition in which the incumbent adopts ECSR while the entrant does not, socially responsible behaviors cause the market to be more contestable. However, the incumbent’s owners can use ECSR to secure a dominant position in the market, provided that they hire “green” managers with adequate environmental concerns. Implications: In the case of entry, non-trivial policy implications arise. Due to increased competition, the welfare of consumers improves (lower prices for the goods). However, the entry of a polluting firm increases emissions. Higher emissions damage consumers and lower the overall social welfare of an environmentally concerned government. Thus, a complete welfare analysis is required prior to the design of a government’s regulatory intervention. Originality/Value: This paper is the first that introduces the figure of the “green” manager who shows, in its utility function, an environmental concern.
PL
Od początku XXI wieku w demokracji polskiej obserwowane jest zjawisko zwane duopolem PO-PiS, co oznacza przejmowanie miejsc w parlamencie przez dwie główne partie polityczne i stopniową eliminację pozostałych. Początkowo największym poparciem cieszyła się PO, jednak po rządach Donalda Tuska i Bronisława Komorowskiego elektorat zwrócił się ku ich głównemu oponentowi politycznemu, partii PiS. Obecnie PiS wydaje się być w szczytowym momencie swojej dominacji. Wybory do Senatu pokazały, że mimo wygranej w Sejmie, PiS nie rośnie w siłę już tak szybko, a ponowne przebicie się mniejszych partii do Sejmu stawia pod znakiem zapytania dalsze istnienie duopolu. Celem opracowania jest pokazanie efektu jaki miałoby postulowane w niektórych środowiskach wprowadzenie systemu jednomandatowych okręgów wyborczych i alternatywnych sposobów przeliczania głosów na mandaty, jak metoda Sainte-Laguë w wersji podstawowej i zmodyfikowanej
EN
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a phenomenon called the PO-PiS duopoly has been observed in Polish democracy, which means that two major political parties have taken over seats in parliament and gradually eliminated the others. Initially, PO enjoyed the greatest support, but after the rule of Donald Tusk and Bronisław Komorowski, the electorate turned to their main political opponent, the PiS party. Currently, PiS seems to be at the peak of its dominance. Elections to the Senate showed that despite winning the Sejm, the PiS is not growing in strength so quickly, and the re-break of smaller parties to the Sejm calls into question the further existence of the duopoly. The aim of the study is to show the effect postulated in some environments by introducing a system of singlemandate constituencies and alternative ways of converting votes into seats, such as the basic and the modified Sainte-Laguë method
PL
Praca ma na celu przypomnienie, w zarysie, okoliczności ponad ćwierćwiecza przemian polskiego rynku dzienników regionalnych, od upadku PRL do czasów współczesnych. W tym okresie przebyliśmy likwidację monopolu prasy RSW, potem stopniową duopolizację rynku w rękach dwóch grup wydawców zagranicznych, a od końca 2013 roku powrót do monopolu w strukturach Polska Press Grupy. Autor, wstępnie bilansując zmiany na rynkach regionalnych i ich implikacje dla rynków lokalnych (na szczeblu mikroregionalnym), sygnalizuje potencjalne niebezpieczeństwa oraz obszary domagające się dalszych badań.
EN
Against the background of the historical evolution of the Polish daily press market after 1989, the author attempts to quantitatively and qualitatively make a balace of the changes occuring in this segment, especially after 2000. In general, these changes were from a monopoly within the communist concern ‘RSW’, and then two decades (2003-2013) of an extension of the duopoly by two foreign publishers, ie. a German group ‘Polskapresse’ and a Norwegian corporation ‘Orkla’ (in 2006 the group was named the ‘Media Regionalne’ Group, taken over by ‘Mecom’ – a British investment fund), until another monopoly in the structure of the Polska Press Group (built consitently after 2013). The author is trying to estimate the magnitude of this monopolization and its potential effects, as well. In addition he indicates areas requiring further research.
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