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EN
People have different point of view about social – work. Some of them thought that is a normal work like other profession. But on the other hand some people thought that it is a special kind of work called, a challenge which sometimes called, sacrifice. As we see there are some different meanings of that category. Doctor Jasinski as a medical – man who works in a hospital understand quite well how important is such work for hospital patients. So no wonder that he support such work in any occasion . This paper gives many examples such kind of facts which say all about the force and sacrifice from hospital workers usually from social workers of Silesia hospitals. he has showed quite clear how important work is for whole medical staff. They can play a good example for panther profession any other branch of economy. It is a fine moral essay for everyone who works for another people.
EN
The article is devoted to the Stamp Duty Act of 13 December 1957. It was the first piece of legislation regulating stamp duty in the Polish People’s Republic. It followed the premises of the Polish People’s Republic’s tax policy. Some of its regulations were incorporated into subsequent stamp duty acts from that period and have even survived the post-1989 transformations. In the article the author discusses the various elements of the Act and evaluates them from the point of view of the premises of tax policy of asocialist state and from the point of view of the essence of the duty as apublic levy.
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Błąd teoretyzmu w aksjologii

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EN
This article presents a new interpretation of and a new of justification for the theory of the naturalistic fallacy in axiology. According to this interpretation the lack of inference between descriptive language and valuing language is caused by the fact that valuing language is practical, whilst descriptive language is theoretical. Between theory and practice there is freedom which constitutes a lacuna in inference logic. The so-called naturalistic fallacy is presented in this article as the fallacy of theoreticism. This new interpretation is preceded by a critical analysis of the theories of D. Hume, I. Kant and G. E. Moore, concerning the question of the naturalistic fallacy.The final part of the article contains a critique of J. Searle’s reasoning which he advanced against the theory of naturalistic fallacy.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia nową interpretację i nowe uzasadnienie teorii błędu naturalistycznego w aksjologii. Wedle tej interpretacji brak wynikania między językiem deskryptywnym a wartościującym jest spowodowany tym, że język wartościujący jest praktyczny, podczas gdy deskryptywny jest teoretyczny. Pomiędzy teorią a praktyką jest zaś usytuowana wolność, która stanowi lukę w wynikaniu logicznym. Tzw. błąd naturalistyczny jest więc w artykule przedstawiony jako błąd teoretyzmu. Ta nowa interpretacja jest poprzedzona krytyczną analizą koncepcji D. Hume’a, I. Kanta i G. E. Moore’a, dotyczących kwestii błędu naturalistycznego. Końcowa część artykułu zawiera krytykę argumentacji, jaką J. Searle wysunął przeciwko teorii błędu naturalistycznego.
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Significance of ontic duty

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EN
What are the relationships between value and duty? Which ontic status has a duty and why? This article aims at clarifying these concepts. It is indicated that in Kant’s writings, we come across texts that enable a slightly different interpretation of his philosophy. And so: the ma%er of good will is the goals themselves; good will must act according to the maxim that the members of the kingdom of goals follow. And this is a moral good since the highest principle of morality is the desire for autonomy of will. Thus, the form of universal legislation is a community of autonomous beings in which the humanity of each of them is realized. In such a community, the a priori content – the content of an ethical reality – is created. It can be said that relationships between people are various forms of ontic status of a duty.
EN
According to the Polish constitutional tradition, regulations concerning the duties of man and citizen can be found in chapter II of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland devoted to the rights and freedoms of the Polish Constitution, specifically in Articles 82-86 inclusive. The Constitution devotes relatively little space to its duties, and the catalog indicated therein is not extensive. The purpose of articulating obligations in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is primarily to emphasize the most important ones from the point of view of the state, society and individual. In each country, some constitutional obligations are addressed only to citizens, while others are imposed on all who are subject to the authority of a given country. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland also does so. Indicated in art. 86 the obligation to care for the state of the environment and responsibility for its deterioration is in the group of universal obligations in terms of subject, which are imposed on every person who is within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Poland. This study is an analysis of the concept of environment, care for the state of the environment and the provisions of the constitution on this subject.
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Powinność i obowiązek

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EN
The interest of the author is in the tangled fates of two synonymous, and partially univocal words in the title: powinność ‘duty’ and obowiązek ‘obligation’. The author follows the two words’ quantitatively and semantically different, but always interwoven presence in the history of the Polish language, using dictionary data and, for contemporary times, data from the National Corpus of Polish. After an initial predominance of powinność, from the 18th century on, obowiązek takes the lead quantitatively, while powinność gradually becomes more clearly linked with the meaning of ‘serious internal moral obligation’ and formal language, leaving to obowiązek mainly the field of legal and administrative duties, and thereby the official style. Nonetheless, a complete semantic and stylistic separation of these two synonymous words has not as yet happened.
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Studia Ełckie
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2015
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vol. 17
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issue 3
211-223
EN
One of the oldest benefits collected during the reign of the Piast dynasty was the duty. This benefit, had no doubt the nature of the tribute paid to the general public in exchange for crossing the customs house, the city or the state border, levied on goods transported. Were burdened with him both professionally traders trade and ordinary residents in special for this purpose established collection points – customs chambers, on the basis of existing tariffs.
EN
Execution proceeding and execution are two basic terms of the execution law. Administrative proceeding and administrative execution are terms with different notional ranges. An execution proceeding is a legally organized series of actions performed by an execution organ and other subjects, which are aimed at making real the concrete legal norm, established in the act that constitutes the basis for execution (warrant of execution), with application of legal means of enforcement. Execution means an application, by relevant execution organs, of means of state-sanctioned enforcement in order to fulfill the duty defined in the warrant of execution. Execution makes the executive stage in execution proceeding in administration. The notion “execution proceeding” points to the aspect of the law-suit character of applying the execution enforcement, whereas that of “administrative execution” – to its material aspect.
EN
Article 19 of the Polish Public Notary Law imposes limitations on public notary workers with regard to undertaking commissioned work outside their main public notary work. This provision, however, is unclear in its interpretation. The article considers the scope of the norm included in the above-mentioned provision and indicates that the norm undoubtedly relates to public notary workers, public notary trainees, associate public notaries and retired public notaries, but it does not include candidates to a public notary position. Further in the article, the author makes a clear division of notions referring to work and activities that bring profit (but not necessarily bring a profit) outside the main public notary work. The above division shows different procedures of obtaining permission from the Council of the Chamber of Public Notaries (RIN). In case of employment outside of the main notary work, advance consent has to be granted. Such consent is not required for work as an academic teacher. RIN, however, can occasionally terminate the employment if it interferes with public notary work. The division results in RIN’s preventative control over the impact an employment will have on the main work of public notary. Commissioned work can be more complex due to a broader interpretation of this notion. This means that a public notary has the duty to report any commissioned work, but they do not have to postpone its commencement until the consent is granted. If the consent is not granted, the notary must terminate any commissioned work with immediate effect. The article considers various types of employment, starting from self-employment to legal person functions, to capital investments. The article also presents the law as it ought to be regarding a simplification and clarification of Article 19 of the Public Notary Law.
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Kantian Friendship: Duty and Idea

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Diametros
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2014
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issue 39
140-153
EN
Kant commentators have recently begun to pay attention to Kant’s account of friendship. They have asked questions, such as: Is his description of friendship consistent and robust and does it provide an account of friendship that satisfies common intuitions and expectations of friendship? Their answers to these questions have often been negative. At the same time, many of these critics share a common understanding of two basic aspects of Kant’s account of friendship. Kant sees friendship as both a duty and an ideal state. One critic, Patricia Flynn, considers the implications of this dual claim. She argues that the view that friendship is both duty and idea gives rise to a tension in the concept of friendship. This tension makes the duty of friendship different from all other Kantian moral duties and leaves us with a duty that we cannot achieve. My aim is to revisit Flynn’s argument and by reassessing Kant’s claims to show that there is indeed complexity in Kant’s understanding of friendship, but there is no conceptual problem that makes friendship a duty unlike all other duties or makes it an impossible duty.
EN
The exposition of moral theology devoid of adequate arguments for the presented theses will always be too superficial, cursory and not profound enough. This is why the task for theologians-moralists is to look for such ways of detailed arguments that would be adequate for the existing social and religious-moral situation. The traditional way of argumentation „from authority” today should be considered definitely insufficient, which, however, does not mean questioning its validity in general. Similarly, the strictly theological argument may not be rejected. However, faith and love should be treated in this argumentation not only as single duties, but as uniform principles integrating the whole morality. Justification of the theological type, because of the modern moral-social situation and the character of culture, however, has to be complemented with personalistic and pragmatic aspects, which may be aided by the adequate use of data coming from the so-called science of man. The „new” argumentation should also to a greater degree take into consideration the new meaning of some concepts and the specificity of the addressee's circles.
PL
Wykład teologii moralnej, pozbawiony adekwatnej argumentacji przedstawianych tez, będzie zawsze zbyt powierzchowny, pobieżny i mało pogłębiony. Dlatego zadaniem teologów moralistów jest poszukiwanie adekwatnych do aktualnej sytuacji społecznej i religijno-moralnej sposobów szczegółowych uzasadnień. Tradycyjny sposób argumentacji „z autorytetu” należy uznać dzisiaj za zdecydowanie niewystarczający, co jednak nie oznacza zakwestionowania jego wartości w ogóle. Podobnie zresztą nie można odrzucić argumentu stricte teologicznego. Wiara i miłość w tej argumentacji winny być jednak traktowane nie tylko jako pojedyncze obowiązki, ale także jako jednolite zasady integrujące całą moralność. Uzasadnianie typu teologicznego, ze względu na współczesną sytuację moralno-społeczną oraz charakter kultury, musi być jednak uzupełnione o aspekty personalistyczne oraz pragmatyczne, czemu może służyć odpowiednie wykorzystanie danych tzw. nauk o człowieku. „Nowa” argumentacja winna także w większym stopniu uwzględniać nowe znaczenie niektórych pojęć oraz specyfikę środowiska adresata.
EN
When we talk about anthropological and social problems, we usually methodologically assume an epistemically stable structure of thought “human-family-society”. This creates a basis for the philosophical model of the family, which is characterized by causal hermeneutics. One cannot talk reliably about the family without referring to the individual and you cannot speak reliably about the society without referring to the family, which then enables the family to be “communion personarum”. This constellation takes on a transcendental configuration at Kant, phenomenological at Husserl and existential at Heidegger. The reference to mandatory ethics, living world and concern is taken. This establishes the methodological framework, where the ontological-epistemic and ethical structure of the family can be analyzed, looking back at the value of life.
EN
The article deals with taxation of tobacco and tobacco products in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After tobacco was imported into Poland, its use spread extremely quickly; initially it was used as snuff, and from the 18th century onwards, smoking in pipes became prevalent. Importantly, tobacco and tobacco products were then regarded as a medicine to prevent and cure almost all diseases. Duties on tobacco/snuff were first imposed in 1643 in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and in the Crown tobacco monopoly was introduced in 1659. From that time, tobacco/snuff duties were imposed regularly in Lithuania; in the Crown duty on these products was imposed once again in 1677, and then in the 1690s tobacco monopoly ended throughout the Polish Republic. The issue was revived only in the times of King Stanisław August Poniatowski, when tobacco monopoly was introduced, initially managed by a private company called Kompania Tabaczna, and then, in the 1690s, by the state-owned Manipulacja Tabaczna. However, over the whole period under consideration, revenues from tobacco/snuff taxation were relatively small.
PL
The aim of this analysis is to show the categorical imperative as the cornerstone of human dignity and form of revelation of God in the work of Immanuel Kant and Karol Wojtyla. The suspicious and distant attitude of Christian philosophers, as well as the Catholic Church compared to Kant has a long history. To this day there are only a few researches that analyse from this point of view (Kantian influences) the philosophical thinking of Karol Wojtyla. Though Kant identified the question of God as the cardinal question of our abstract rationality, he believed in God and future life, even in his lifetime he was underestimated, misunderstood and treated with hostility. The experience of duty is”ratio conoscendi” of freedom in Kant and Wojtyla. For the two thinkers the question of freedom is the basic category of there philosophies. Through which authority moral law challenges the human being? Kant and Wojtyla, both philosophers comprehend the highest authority as divine power which formulated the moral law before man. The “holy lawmaker” – God – reveals himself in the human act.
EN
Military chaplaincy in Poland has a rich tradition, shaped by many different circumstances and political conditions. With the development of the army, various regulations were created over the centuries intended to normalize the functioning of religious ministry in the military and adapt it to meet the needs of the developing armed forces. The article presents the work of both secular and church authorities aimed at regulating the status of military chaplains by granting privileges and rights, as well as clearly defining the duties of chaplains in the military, from the time of the First Partition to the 1921 Treaty of Riga.
PL
Duszpasterstwo wojskowe w Polsce ma bogatą tradycję, kształtowaną wieloma okolicznościami i uwarunkowaniami politycznymi. Wraz z rozwojem organizacji armii na przestrzeni wieków powstawały różne regulacje, które miały na celu unormowanie funkcjonowania posługi religijnej w wojsku i dostosowanie jej do potrzeb rozwijających się sił zbrojnych. Artykuł przedstawia działania władz świeckich, jak również kościelnych, mające na celu uregulowanie statusu duszpasterzy w wojsku poprzez nadawanie przywilejów i uprawnień, a także jasne określenie obowiązków kapelanów w wojsku, od czasów rozbioru do czasu pokoju ryskiego z 1921 r.
EN
By the ignorance of the motives of the critical philosophy Kant’s, many interpreters see his aim not in the rescue, but in the destruction of metaphysics. Kant’s practical philosophy is often misunderstood, as long as the expositors deny the unconditional validity of the moral law, “the only factum of pure reason”. The article tries to point out the similarities (the importance of free will and the experience of duty) in the thinking of Karol Wojtyła and Immanuel Kant. The moral experience, the demand of duty of the categorical imperative (Kant), personalistic standard (Wojtyła), shows the importance of self-determination/will decision towards the human act. Although Wojtyła admits in his work „person and act“, that just the Kant studies have helped to emphasize the will as a self determining factor of the person and the primacy of the will to the feelings, there is no lack of interpreters who like to overemphasize the great influences of Thomism and phenomenology (such as Max Scheler) on the thinking of the Krakow philosopher. Many interpreters ignore the cantian approach without comment. The goal of the article is therefore at least begin to fill this glaring omission. Wojtyła’s and Kant’s thinking is determined by the question of the freedom of the people. In the practical affirmation of the possibility of free actions – in the deed – the morality and dignity of human, which points to the unconditional – God – immortality of man – is revealed. Also Wojtyła, in the sense of Kant, stresses that the mind itself and with its own power is unable to reach the deity and man must engage on the uncertainty and the abyss of faith, when he leaves the island of pure reason. For Wojtyła, the ability to free, responsible, self-determining act is a sign of the inviolability of personal dignity and for Kant (similar to Augustine and Thomas) a determination of each person to the realization of the highest good. The two thinkers see the people in the light of the experience of duty – commandment of love – that can materialize only through action and deed. For Kant, implicitly for Wojtyła also the deference to God is done explicitly by the act.
EN
The two expansive articles from which the book has been compiled show that the starting point and basic principle of Kant’s moral doctrine is moral law in a more universal formulation than what the categorical imperative presents. According to Cramer, moral law is not a prescriptive, but a descriptive proposition; according to Wolff, it is a postulate. With Cramer, Wolff shares a focus on pure will as the subject of an a priori moral metaphysics. Pure will is where the determining reason for an action is the universalization of its intent (“maxim”). Such a maxim becomes a practical law. The a priori moral theory is – we might add – Kant’s solution to the problem of giving reason a higher meaning than the mere alleviation of life. Up to this point, Kant’s theory of morality is a polemic with the Enlightenment conception of reason.
CS
Oba rozsáhlé články, z nichž je kniha sestavena, ukazují, že východiskem a základním principem Kantovy morální nauky je morální zákon v obecnější formulaci, než jakou představuje kategorický imperativ. Podle Cramera je morální zákon nikoli preskriptivní, nýbrž deskriptivní větou, podle Wolffa je postulátem. Wolff sdílí s Cramerem zaměření na čistou vůli jako předmět apriorní morální metafyziky. Čistá vůle je tam, kde určujícím důvodem jednání je univerzalizace jeho záměru („maximy“). Taková maxima se stává praktickým zákonem. Apriorní morální teorie je – dodáváme – Kantovým řešením problému, jak dodat rozumu vyšší smysl, než je pouhé ulehčení života. Potud je Kantova teorie morality polemikou s osvícenským pojetím rozumu.
DE
In beiden umfangreichen Artikeln, aus denen das Buch besteht, wird gezeigt, dass der Ausgangspunkt und das Grundprinzip von Kants Morallehre das moralische Gesetz in einer allgemeineren Formulierung ist, als sie der kategorische Imperativ vorlegt. Laut Cramer ist das moralische Gesetz kein vorschreibender, sondern ein beschreibender Satz; laut Wolff ist es ein Postulat. Wolff eint mit Cramer der Blick auf den reinen Willen als Gegenstand der apriorischen moralischen Metaphysik. Reiner Wille ist dort, wo der bestimmende Handlungsgrund die Universalisierung seiner Absicht („Maxime“) ist. Die Maxime wird zum praktischen Gesetz. Die apriorische Moraltheorie ist – so fügen wir hinzu – Kants Lösungsansatz für das Problem, wie der Vernunft ein höherer Sinn als der bloßen Vereinfachung des Lebens zu verleihen ist. Bis dahin ist Kants Moraltheorie eine Polemik mit der aufklärerischen Auffassung von Vernunft.
EN
The article focuses on Ondřej Sikora’s book, Kant’s Practical Metaphysics (Kantova praktická metafyzika. Praha, Karolinum 2017). Emphasis is placed on the metaphysical anchoring of Kant’s ethics, which is expressed in the thesis of Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), to the effect that a person is called to a higher meaning of his or her existence than the meaning that existence alone supplies him or her. >From this perspective, Kant’s thesis of the two causalities, natural causality and causality from freedom, becomes intelligible. The author places further emphasis on Sikora’s interpretation of the difference between Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), which hinges on its movement from the hypothetical analyses of the “idea … of a possible pure Will” (“Idee … eines möglichem reinen Willens”) to the categorical assertions of the Critique of Practical Reason. The movement from Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals to the Critique of Practical Reason is facilitated by the introduction of the “fact of Reason” as a piece of knowledge that in itself also contains an ethical claim.
CS
Tato studie je vyjádřením ke knize Ondřeje Sikory Kantova praktická metafyzika (2017). Za její první klad recenzent považuje důraz na metafyzické zakotvení Kantovy etiky, které se projevuje v tezi Základů metafyziky mravů , podle níž je člověk povolán k vyššímu významu své existence, než jaký mu skýtá existence sama. Z tohoto pohledu je pochopitelná teze o dvojí kauzalitě u Kanta, kauzalitě přírodní a kauzalitě ze svobody. Recenzent dále klade důraz na Sikorovu interpretaci rozdílu mezi Základy metafyziky mravů a Kritikou praktického rozumu, který záleží v postupu od hypotetických rozborů „ideje … možné čisté vůle“ („Idee … eines möglichem reinen Willens“) ke kategorickým tvrzením Kritiky praktického rozumu. Postup od Základů metafyziky mravů ke Kritice praktického rozumu je umožněn zavedením „faktu rozumu“ jako poznatku, který v sobě zároveň obsahuje etický nárok.
DE
Die vorliegende Studie ist dem 2017 erschienenen Buch Ondřej Sikoras Kants praktische Metaphysik (Kantova praktická metafyzika. Praha, Karolinum 2017) gewidmet. Schwerpunkt ist die metaphysische Verankerung von Kants Ethik, die in der These Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten deutlich wird, dergemäß der Mensch zu einer höheren Bedeutung seiner Existenz berufen ist, als sie ihm selbst gibt. Aus dieser Perspektive wird die These der doppelten Kausalität bei Kant verständlich, nämlich der natürlichen Kausalität und der Kausalität durch Freiheit. Der Autor betont des weiteren Sikoras Interpretation des Unterschieds zwischen Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten und Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, der im Fortschreiten von der hypothetischen Analyse „Idee … eines möglichen reinen Willens“ zu den kategorischen Behauptungen der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft besteht. Der Schritt von Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten hin zur Kritik der praktischen Vernunft wird durch die Einführung des „Faktums der Vernunft“ als Erkenntnis möglich, die auch einen ethischen Anspruch umfasst.
PL
W artykule omawiam kwestię odniesienia przedmiotowego zasady, przez niektórych nazywanej „prawem Kanta” (Kant’s Law), która głosi, że jeżeli dana osoba powinna uczynić X, to może ona uczynić X. Twierdzę, że reguła ta nie znajduje zastosowania u człowieka jako zjawiska, lecz odnosi się wyłącznie do człowieka jako noumenu. Pokazuję, że o ile będziemy traktować podmiot Kantowski jako jednolity punkt odniesienia dla tej zasady, o tyle uwikłamy się w sprzeczność w interpretacji tekstu Kanta, ponieważ wtedy będzie on twierdzić zarówno, że człowiek powinien spełniać swoje obowiązki, dane że może to robić, jak i że imperatyw kategoryczny przedkłada prawo niezależnie od tego, czy człowiek jest w stanie mu sprostać, czy nie.
EN
In this paper I discuss the problem of a referent of a principle, deemed by some as “Kant’s Law”, which states that if one ought to do X, then one can do X. I argue that in Kant’s philosophy this principle does not apply to man as a phenomenon, but only to man as a noumenon. I show that if we stick to the idea of a “man” as a unified center of reference for this principle, then we will end up with a contradiction, since Kant ostenesibly says both: that people can act in a certain way, provided that they ought to, and that moral law legislates regardless of what man can or cannot do.
EN
Acts of heroes and acts of saints are also called supererogatory acts. An act is supererogatory if several conditions are fulfilled. These conditions elaborates J.O. Urmson whose article has stimulated many discussions about extracurricular actions. Other understanding of saints and heroes shows S. Wolf who speaks of moral saints quite unfavorably. Both Wolf and Urmson unquestionably agree on the characteristics of moral acts of the saints. The problem that the author of this article focuses on refers to obligation of supererogation.
PL
Czyny bohaterskie i czyny święte są w etyce nazywane również czynami supererogacyjnymi. O czynach supererogacyjnych możemy mówić wówczas, gdy spełnionych jest kilka warunków. Omawia je szczegółowo J.O. Urmson, którego artykuł stał się przyczynkiem do licznych dyskusji na temat czynów nadobowiązkowych. Inne pojmowanie świętych i bohaterów przedstawia w swojej pracy S. Wolf, która o moralnych świętych wyraża się dość niepochlebnie. Zarówno Wolf, jak i Urmson bezdyskusyjnie zgadzają się co do charakterystyki czynów moralnych świętych. Problem, na jakim koncentruje się autorka niniejszego artykułu, dotyczy obowiązywalności czynów supererogacyjnych. 
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