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Understanding the effects of the resolutions of the 1884–85 Berlin Conference to Africa’s Development and Euro-Africa relations

100%
Idejiora-Kalu N.
Prague Papers on the History of International Relations
|
2019
|
issue 2
99-108
EN
The incursion into Africa by Europe in the 19th Century was formally ratified by the 1884–85 Berlin Conference. The reason for Europe to decide in venturing into the South was basically centered on the need for natural resources and to be later realized deep yearnings for trade and cooperation with Africa. But the reverse was the case with the supposedly cooperation with Africa initiative in a conference that was strangely not to have Africa diplomatically represented and with resolutions which instead of enabling this proper partnership with Africa became a master — slave empire-type of relations. This master-slave relation is also seen in many aspects even in trade and is known also to have changed the economic behavior of African countries. An unequal relationship between the north and its colonies is revealed.
2
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Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations

86%
Sokolovskyi D. B., Sokolovska O. V.
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
|
2015
|
issue 3
47-70
EN
Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.
3

Collective Intentionality, Team Reasoning and the Example of Economic Behavior

72%
Giovagnoli R.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
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2019
|
issue 67
103-116
EN
Collective intentionality is essential to understanding how we act as a “team”. We offer an overview of the contemporary debate on the sense of acting together. There are some theories which focus on unconscious processes and on the capabilities we share with animals (Tomasello, Walther, Hudin), while others concentrate on the voluntary, conscious processes of acting together (Searle, Tuomela, Bratman, Gilbert). Collective intentionality also represents a relevant issue for economic theories. The theories of team reasoning move from the assumption that agents can sometimes behave in accordance with beliefs and preferences attributed to a group or a team. We will point out the role of institutions as created by collective intentionality (Searle) for understanding coordination and cooperation.
PL
Pojęcie intencjonalności zbiorowej jest kluczowe dla prób zrozumienia, w jaki sposób ludzie działają „zespołowo”. Przegląd współczesnej debaty na temat natury wspólnego działania, jaki proponuje niniejszy artykuł, pozwala wyróżnić w niej dwa główne wątki: część teorii skupia się na nieświadomych procesach oraz na kompetencjach, które dzielimy ze zwierzętami (Tomasello, Walther, Hudin), podczas gdy inne interesują się przede wszystkim świadomym, celowym podejmowaniem wspólnego działania (Searle, Tuomela, Bratman, Gilbert). Zbiorowa intencjonalność jest także istotna dla teorii ekonomicznych. Teorie myślenia zespołowego wychodzą z założenia, że podmioty działają czasami na podstawie przekonań i preferencji, które przypisują swojej grupie lub zespołowi. Dlatego na szczególną uwagę zasługuje rola, jaką w koordynacji ich działań i komunikacji między nimi odgrywają tworzone przez zbiorową intencjonalność instytucje (Searle).
4

Herné Princípy v Ekonomickej Teórii

58%
Lačný M.
Roczniki Wydziału Nauk Prawnych i Ekonomicznych KUL
|
2006
|
vol. 2
|
issue 2 Ekonomia
231-242
PL
Artykuł wskazuje rolę, jaką odgrywają elementy gry (zwłaszcza konkurencyjności, skrajnej wytrzymałości) w kulturze (J. Huizinga, R. Caillois, E. Fink) a szczególnie w sferze gospodarki. Przedstawiono tu podstawowe cechy elementu gry, takie jak zjawisko culture building (budowanie kultury). Autor wskazuje na rolę, jaką odgrywają te elementy, które są wyraźnie odzwierciedlone w teorii ekonomii, koncentrując się na klasycznej teorii Adama Smitha neoklasycznej koncepcji Homo Oeconomicus, teorii gier i zachowań ekonomicznych, teoriach instytucjonalnych, jak również teorii wyboru publicznego.
EN
This article reflects the role of play elements (and especially competitive, agonal principle) in culture (J. Huizinga, R. Caillois, E. Fink), particularly in the sphere of economy. Basic characteristics of the play element as a culture-building phenomenon are summarized here. The author points at play elements, as they are explicitly reflected by the theory of economics, focusing on the classical theory of Adam Smith, neoclassical concept of Homo Oeconomicus, theory of games and economic behavior, institutional theories, as well as the public-choice theory.
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