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EN
Electoral method is mathematical mode of translating votes on mandates. Electoral method, together with constituencies and electoral thresholds is one of the element of proportional electoral system. In the surveys of proportional system majority of doctrine assume, that deciding influence on electoral outcomes has magnitude and structure of constituencies and amount of electoral thresholds, while electoral method comparing with aforementioned elements has usually minor meaning. Consequences of choosing electoral method can be however very crucial, sometimes becoming even the most important factor deciding which political parties takes power after elections. This fact create tribute to contemplations on mathematical apparatus and consequences of their applying. In doctrine are proposing different proportional methods. One of the best esteem expert of electoral systems Arend Lijphard, consider that proportional methods should be divided on simple transferable vote system, in which voter vote on individual candidates marking his preferences and party list system, which consist of divisor and quota method. In the article was presenting mathematical and political implication of using particular electoral methods. Author points out that contemporary divisor methods are using commonly than quota methods. It’s ensue mainly form it’s simplicity, endurance on antinomies and easiness in tinkering. Large part of consideration regarded to instrumentalization of electoral methods.
EN
Pathologies and abuses accompany elections and are connected with the electoral system both in its narrow and broad sense. Moreover, they stem from a human nature and a degree of democratic principles consolidation. Cohabitation is conditioned by the electoral system and, in the case of the proportional allocation of seats, it arises more often than in the majority system with single member constituencies. The phenomenon itself is not always pathological. However, such an adverse situation develops when it comes to clashes, neither substantive nor creative, between the municipal bodies and, in consequence, the interests of the local community are jeopardised. Elections at the municipal level are also accompanied by other pathologies and abuses including: coercing votes when voting by proxy, adding voters to an electoral roll, bringing residents to a polling place, paying for one’s votes, preying on the naïvety of voters which can take grotesque forms or brutalising an election campaign caused by the mediatisation of local policy. The above-mentioned phenomena were examined and presented in the paper based on the analysis of statistical data, articles from the local press and, most essentially for the discussed subject, a rich material collected thanks to the in-depth interviews conducted by the authors.
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EN
The article presents a review of possible procedures of changing the electoral system in a comparative perspective with special regard to the Polish legislation. The author claims that changes in electoral system are often manipulated by the political parties. To prevent such tinkering two solutions can be applied: first, is to fix the electoral system in the constitution and, second, to protect the electoral system from amendment within one year before the election. He also provides an analysis of the legal basis of the Polish referendum on electoral system held on 6th September 2015.
EN
This article focuses on the issue of equality of elections, in the context of the 2014 European Parliament election in Poland. Most often the definition of principles of elections’ equality comes down to emphasizing its two aspects: the formal one and the material one. The first of them refers to guaranteeing each person with the active voting right the same number of votes. The material aspect of the equality principle is connected with striving to guarantee the same “voting power” to the election participants. Most briefly, it means that a given number of people elect as many representatives as another group with the same numerical strength. The main aim of this article is focus on the material aspect of implementing the principle of equality in EP elections. In the article will be emphasized three issues decisive for the specific features of the electoral system (electoral districts, election threshold and electoral formula), at the same time influencing the range of implementation of the material equality of elections. General findings will be confronted with empirical data, which will allow to formulate conclusions about the degree to which the European Parliament election conducted in Poland on 25th May 2014 met the principle of material equality.
EN
On 6 May 2015, the Act No. 52 was passed. It introduced important changes in the method of electing the composition of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. The most important of them consisted in a change in the construction of the majority bonus, as it was not enough to obtain the largest number of votes to receive extra seats. An additional requirement was imposed according to which bonus seats will be granted only to a grouping which reaches at least 40% of valid votes. In the judgment of 25 January 2017 (Ref. No. 48b/2015) the Constitutional Court of the Italian Republic found the unconstitutionality of the majority bonus. One of the main objections of the Court was to seek the authors of the challenged legal regulation to create each time a parliamentary majority capable of forming a stable government, at the expense of a high imbalance in the fi nal allocation of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which violates Article 48 para. 2 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic
EN
The article is a polemic with some of the theses presented by Karol Pachnik and Jakub Krajewski in the article “The Admissibility of Single-member Constituencies in European Parliament Elections Act” published in “Przegląd Sejmowy” No 6/2013. The purpose of this article is to answer the question of whether the introduction of single-member constituencies into Polish electoral law governing elections to the European Parliament is in accordance with the law of a higher rank and, above all, with EU law. After addressing the importance of the European Parliament for the legitimacy of the EU, the former and existing legal regulation of the elections to the European Parliament, the author fi nds that an analysis of the rules of EU law concerning the electoral system does not lead to a clear conclusion on the admissibility of the introduction of one-mandate constituencies while maintaining the proportionality of election results. Therefore, he also analyzes of how the introduction of single-member constituencies while maintaining the proportional nature of the voting system could look like in practice and points out the consequences of such a reconstruction of the electoral system.
EN
For Romania, 1918 above all meant the implementation of the national unification program. As a result of a favourable and unique coincidence, Romania emerged victorious from the de facto already lost war, thanks to which the land that had previously belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia was incorporated to the Old Kingdom. The significant enlargement of the country’s territory and the events that had taken place during the war were a perfect pretext to carry out radical changes in the Romanian parliamentary system. In the unique atmosphere of consensus new common rules for the whole country were introduced (universal elections to the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, the principle of equality of the vote), at the same time allowing some certain — sometimes quite significant — changes reflecting local diversities, usually referring to previous electoral regulations. The change in the manner of electing the parliament as well as the membership therein of politicians from the incorporated areas gave hope for improving the condition of political and civic culture in Romania. Unfortunately, politicians who appeared in the Romanian system began to adapt to the old system and old political culture instead of adapting them to their needs and thus changing them.
EN
The paper presents the mixed electoral system and its models, and analyses their applicability in the elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. The authors focus on the German personalised proportional system and the proposal for an electoral system based on this system constructed by Jarosław Flis. The analysis concerns not only the legal aspect but also the political and social consequences. The presented experiences of various countries show that the reaction of political parties and voters to a new electoral system can be surprising and the political consequences unpredictable.
EN
The electoral system plays an important role in the process of the determining of the election results. It enables the distribution of the seats among the competing electoral committees, and it affects the balance of the political forces in the representative bodies. But the meaning of the electoral system is not limited to the electoral process. The elec-toral system affects also the communication of the elected people with the voters. The electoral code introduced important changes in the manner of the conduct of elections to the municipal councils. The purpose of this presentation is an attempt to analyse how much these changes may affect the reinforcement of the ties between the councillor and the voters and they may contribute to better representation of the interests of the elec-torate in the work of the municipal council.
EN
The article contains the first notes and reflections upon the consequences of changes in the Polish electoral system implemented in the Electoral Code formulated following the 2014 local–government election. The author focuses on three types of changes. The first one covers only the reforms of the local–government electoral system (e.g. changes in electoral formula or electoral districts). The second includes reforms of electoral pro-cedures applicable to all Polish elections (voting act and candidate registration). The last one touches upon the general purpose of electoral law codification, primarily the stabili-zation of the electoral system.
EN
The article, based on works Ancient historian and Classicists, presents direct democracy in the Ancient World. The author is looking for an example institution of oppositions in con-temporary political system, especially the electoral system. In his opinion, the institution of oppositions was hidden within the electoral systems of Athens and Rome.
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2014
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vol. 17
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issue 4
79-92
EN
The ongoing process of democratisation lead to the growing importance of the electoral systems that regulate the procedures of gaining and legitimizing power in democracy. Taking it into account it is worth asking about the relationship between these particular ‘game rules’ contained into electoral law and the respect of the rule of law, being one of the basic norms of a democratic system. A question then may be raised about the existence and the character of the relation between electoral systems and the level of political corruption. It is worth noticing that besides the research conducted by political scientists and the representatives of various branches of social sciences the significant analysis of the issue have been presented by the economists. In this article a brief overview of the economic studies on the relationship between level of political corruption and the electoral systems is presented so as to assess to what degree this approach may be treated as fruitful.
EN
This paper examines the relationship between the candidate’s position on an electoral list and the feasibility of winning a seat in the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish parliament). This research hypothesizes that winning a seat strongly depends on the candidate having a top position on the electoral list. This hypothesis is verified vis-à-vis the results of the 2015 election to the Sejm. The study confirmed the initial assumption, since it was found that nearly 82% of the seats were taken by the candidates from the so-called “seat-winning places,” namely the top places on the lists of candidates (the number of these places equals the number of seats taken by a given party in a given constituency).
PL
Chorwackie prawo parlamentarne przewiduje instytucję zastępcy deputowanego. Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie przepisów dotyczących tej instytucji oraz praktyki jej stosowa-nia. Analizie poddane zostały przepisy Konstytucji, ordynacji wyborczej oraz regulaminu parlamentu. W szczególności dotyczące trybu wyboru deputowanych oraz zasady niepo-łączalności mandatu parlamentarnego. Praktyka parlamentarna w Chorwacji wskazuje, że najczęstszą przyczyną zawieszania mandatu jest, objęcie funkcji ministra w rządzie.
EN
Croatian parliamentary law predicts institution of assistant of a deputy. Article is sacrificed analysis of this institution and practice in using it. Regulations of the constitution, electoral regulations and rules of the parliament have been analysied. Especially procedure of election deputies and rules of the incompatibilitas parliamentary mandate. Parliamentary practice in Croatia suggest that the most often cause of suspension an election mandate is becoming a minister in the government.
EN
Amending a constitution or replacing it with a new one is never easy. Even if politicians usually have a lot of ideas how it should be done, the real problem is to put these ideas into practice. If the President Duda’s initiative is to succeed, so in other words – if such a referendum is to be held, the consent of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, i.e. the second chamber of the Polish parliament is needed. According to the Article 125 of the current Constitution the consent of the Senate is given “by an absolute majority vote taken in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators”. And while Law and Justice has such an absolute majority of seats in the Senate, it is difficult to say with certainty whether today, in the face of a rather tight relationship between President Duda and the Law and Justice’s leadership, Senators of this party will support the president’s initiative. And even if the referendum is held, it will only be the first step. The change of the constitution itself requires either the so-called ‘constitutional majority’ or a bipartisan consent, that is the agreement between the ruling party and at least part of the opposition. For the moment Law and Justice does not have such a constitutional majority, even if it joins forces with Kukiz ’15 parliamentary faction – the only political group that welcomed President Duda’s initiative with great enthusiasm. Other Polish political parties do not want to hear about any constitutional change accusing both Law and Justice and President Duda of repeatedly violating the constitution that is currently in force. Of course, it may change after the next parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2019 and 2020 respectively, especially if Law and Justice gets even better results, what – at least today – is suggested in the opinion polls. Maybe then, to change the constitution, they will not need agreement with any other political party, just like the Hungarian Fidesz after the 2010 elections. However, there is no doubt that disputes on the competences and powers of the President of the Republic of Poland, especially (but not only) in the context of the way he/she is elected, will return regularly in the discussions on potential constitutional changes. The possible evolution of the Polish parliamentarism into the presidential or semi-presidential regime would force a significant increase in the powers of the head of state, still elected directly by the people. Staying within the framework of the parliamentary regime would require a more precise definition of the constitutional position of the President of the Republic of Poland, leaving open the issue of the way he/she is elected.
Zeszyty Prasoznawcze
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2014
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vol. 57
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issue 2
203-220
EN
After each election Polishmedia publish nationwide rankings of candidates, comparing the number of votes gained individually. Analysis of the individual results of such candidates, however, shows that they are strongly dependent on factors external to a candidate –the size ofparticular district, its territorial structure and the turnout. The results depend not only on the candidates’ previous media visibility, but also on the visibility of their competitors.
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2020
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vol. 212
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issue 4
425-444
EN
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the impact of the electoral system on turnout, moderated by political knowledge. Following the introduction of the FPTP system to some city councils in the 2014 elections, we used a quasi-experimental design to compare two sets of economically, socially and culturally similar cities, chosen using the Propensity Score Matching method. Data from two waves of a survey with residents, city councillors and local social leaders after the 2014 local elections showed that, despite widespread public debates, knowledge about the electoral system was very low. The results proved that, although the level of political knowledge was higher in the FPTP system than in the PR system, the turnout in the former was lower, even when controlled by political knowledge. However, the joint impact of the electoral system and political knowledge on turnout was mixed, and depended on the method of measuring political knowledge.
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EN
Electoral bonus is one of the elements of the electoral system with important but little-known political implications. The purpose of the articles is to review the electoral systems that use the mechanism for granting additional seats, and to identify their political implications. It provides an analysis of solutions used in multiple-tier electoral systems and party list-linking mechanisms. The electoral practice shows that electoral bonuses can be used both to offset the disproportionate results of the election and to reinforce large parties. This mainly applies to election winners who, due to bonus seats, can receive an absolute majority of seats in parliament without gaining an absolute majority of votes. It is, therefore, a powerful electoral engineering tool that can signifi cantly correct the effects of any election formula, for example, from a proportional to a majority one or vice versa.
EN
The translated text in the Slovenian act on the National Council of 10 September 1992. The second chamber of the parliament was established in accordance with the Slovenian Constitution of 23 December 1991. Such concept of the second chamber resulted from the tradition of corporative representation, the existence of the three-chamber Skupstina in the People’s Republic of Slovenia, as well as the model of a second chamber of this kind, functioning in Bavaria at the time and still functioning in Ireland. The Slovenian second chamber is therefore one of the few upper chambers elected on the basis of functional representation. It is the representation of social, economic, professional and local interests. With the National Assembly, the chamber participates in exercising the legislative power; it may also, i.a., submit a motion for the appointment of an investigative committee or holding a referendum – a motion binding for the National Assembly. It is also vested with limited oversight competences of the executive. The act contains mostly regulations on the manner of electing the National Council, its internal organization and the status of its members. The act also regulates matters related to the works of the National Council.
EN
The article addresses the last elections that took place in the Polish People’s Republic in June 1989, the so called contract elections. They was held as a result of an agreement concluded at the Round Table between ruling communists and their allies and the part of the anti-communist opposition. The election was not free and democratic. The contract, which was concluded, specifi ed the way of holding elections and percentage distribution of seats for the participants of the agreement. Establishing the outcome of election even before casting the vote was the constant practice of the communist state. In 1989 an additional peculiarity, unknown even during the Stalinist period, was to change the electoral law during the election, when, after the fi rst round, it did not guarantee the expected result. Contracting parties assumed that, for political reasons, they could manipulate the law. That “original sin” lies at the root of the Third Republic of Poland.
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