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Three well-known physicists have recently argued that libertarian freedom is impossible. In their view, free will is incompatible with what we know about science at the most fundamental level. Here I show that their arguments presuppose a naïve version of reductionism and consider two alternatives, one appealing to mind–body dualism and the other to emergentism. The former says that free will is a capacity of one’s mind, an immaterial entity not subject to the laws of nature. The latter says that free will is an emergent capacity that cannot be reduced to the properties of an agent’s constitutive atoms. These alternatives, however, face the same problem: They seem to violate a fundamental law, namely the conservation of energy. I show how the libertarian can respond to this objection.
EN
Materialism is a family of naturalistic ontologies, according to which matter is the only material of all reality. One of the modern proponents of the materialistic doctrine is an philosopher Mario Bunge. According to his version of materialism, called emergentist materialism or, shortly, „systemism”, all material entities are divided into at least five qualitatively different complementary levels: physical, chemical, biological, social and technical. Accordingly these levels correspond to several types of matter: physical, chemical, animated, social and technical. „Systemism” was inspired by the ideas of the Hungarian biologist and philosopher, Ludwig von Bertalanffy’ general system theory. „Systemism”, according to the author's intention, should avoid the simplifications of physicalism, as well as the ambiguity of dialectical materialism. The system materialism is a specific view of the world, the axis of which being emergentism. Emergentism accepts the formation of qualitatively new forms and properties as a result of interactions between the elements of a given system. The opposite concept to the concept of emergence is submergence, which means the loss of one or more of the properties of an entity or system because of its metamorphosis into something else. System materialism („Everything is related to some other things”) is a middle path between the two extreme directions: holism („Everything is related to all other things”) and atomism („Everything follows its own way”). In his explanation of systems, Bunge dissociates himself from naive reductionism („Just explain the whole with the knowledge you have about the elements”), while recommending that a strategy of moderate reductionism („You can reduce anything that just might be reduced, but without ignoring the diversity and emergence” ). In the center of the materialistic system ontology is the thesis that there are no absolutely isolated things: everything works together with (some) others. Together they form coherent systems.
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PL
This article has an introductory character and systematizes the topic. It introduces the idea of emergence which is currently enjoying something of a renaissance and aims to bring order to the terminology associated with this idea. The article concerns the very beginning of the formation of emergentism and its intuitive understanding. It also presents the main concepts of representative authors of emergentism (S. Alexander, CL Morgan, Ch. D. Broad) as well as the numerous characteristics of emergence (synchronic and diachronic emergence, weak and strong emergence). The article concludes with a systematization of meanings and contexts in which the concept of emergence occurs.
EN
Emergentism is an important and yet underexplored component of John Dewey’s metaphysical program, and concerns the ways in which existences relate, operate, and grow in coordination with a more inclusive environment. Through an emergent account, Dewey addresses continuities among the generic traits of nature, inanimate substance, biological life, and experiential “fields” such as mind and consciousness. The notion of a field is especially important for depicting the ways in which existences serially interact in accordance with some particular purpose or set of functions. Apart from an emergent scheme that contextualizes the interactive contexts of experience, phenomena such as “mind” and “consciousness” remain enigmatic occurrences. Moreover, cognition, and with it instances of “knowing,” remain susceptible to merely “subjective” characterizations that reinforce a misleading dualism between mind and nature. In addition to its role in addressing naturalistic continuities, Dewey’s emergentism suggests a non-reductive philosophical methodology that directly challenges contemporary varieties of realism and materialism.
EN
Emergetism is a theory which explains the mechanism of evolutionary development of nature by stipulating that in complex natural systems on the higher levels of complexity there appear some functions and properties that can not be reduced to and accounted for by functions and properties of the lower levels of complexity. It is therefore the theory of emergence – which stands for some special way the complex systems arise (emerge) from a multiplicity of their relatively simply components. The idea of evolutionary emergentism appears in the philosophical writings of Joseph Życiński in the context of a discussion on the possibility of creating a interpretation of evolutionary processes in which biological theory of evolution could be combined in a coherent way with a theological doctrine about God, the creator of the universe. This paper presents the main ideas and opinions Życiński formulated about this theory; the first part of it contains some basic characterization of emergetnism, the second one compares the notions of emergence and of supervenience; the third one concerns some theological interpretation of this two notions.
PL
Termin „społeczeństwo” powszechnie używany jest jako podmiot różnego rodzaju twierdzeń: „społeczeństwo zmierza w stronę…”, „społeczeństwo nie ufa politykom” itp. Na poziomie teoretycznym przeważa jednak indywidualizm zarówno w wymiarze ontologicznym („społeczeństwo” jest jedynie złożeniem jednostkowych działań), jak i metodologicznym. Przy pewnej opcji teoretycznej możliwe jest jednak ujęcie społeczeństwa jako intencjonalnego, sprawczego podmiotu zdolnego do budowania struktur samowiedzy i poddającego refleksji swoje działania. W artykule dyskutowane są konsekwencje przyjęcia „nastawienia intencjonalnego” (intentional stance) w badaniu społeczeństwa.
EN
The term “society” is usually used as the subject of various statements: “society tends to…”, “society does not trust politicians”, etc. Theoretically, however, individualism prevails both ontologically (“society” is a complex of individual actions) and methodologically. However, there exists a theoretical stance that considers society as an intention-driven agent, a self-reflective subject able to build the structures of self-knowledge. The paper discusses the consequences of adapting the “intentional stance” in the study of society.
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