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A priori a matematika u Berkeleyho

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According to the Oxford English Dictonary George Berkeley introduced the term a priori into English. His inspiration for this was, it seems, to be found partly in the writings of his immediate predecessors, particularly Pierre Bayle, and partly in his pedagogical work where he adjudicated disputations between his pupils. Some of his arguments against the existence of matter Berkeley tells us are a priori, others a posteriori. Even the a priori arguments are underpinned by prior semantic principles of an anti-abstractionist character, which are shown to be important particularly in the immaterialist philosophy of mathematics. Berkeley's courageously unorthodox, and generally unpublished, thoughts about mathematics thus grow from the same soil as his celebrated denial of matter.
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The paper explores the views of historians presented during the session of the methodological section of the 7. General Congress of Polish Historians held in 1948 in Wrocław. The session was attended by such scholars as Stanisław Śreniowski, Bogusław Leśnodorski, Roman Lutman, Marian Henryk Serejski, Ewa Maleczyńska, Wanda Moszczeńska and Adam Stebelski. The researchers’ opinions are shown against the background of a methodological controversy among Kazimierz Tymieniecki, Jan Rutkowski and Witold Kula, expressed vividly in the papers they delivered during the session of the historical section of the Congress. Tymieniecki emphasised the inductive and empirical nature of historiographical research, while Rutkowski and Kula shared a deep conviction that empirical material should be analysed in the light of theoretical considerations.
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Senses and “sensual data”

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One of the main goals of modern philosophy was to achieve an in-depth insight into the foundations of empirical knowledge. The problem was expected to be resolved by the analysis of experience. However, the road to a plausible account of experience was at the very beginning obstructed by turning the analysis into a search for clear and distinctive elements of experience and by sticking to purely intellectual intuition as means of this analysis. Moreover, clear and distinctive elements of experience were thought of as the basis of cognitive certainty. Both psychology and philosophy, at least until the nineteen-thirties, were deeply influenced by this essentially rationalistic conception of sensor experience. It is gestalt psychology and phenomenology that should be merited for overcoming that ill-conceived model. Only by taking into account the immediate sensor relation between the human subject and the environment, it is possible to show the kind of unity which is the prerequisite of human intellect.
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This article is an attempt to analyze of the standpoint's one of the most influential representative of Austrian Economics School against historicism and empiricism. This article shows that while Ludwig von Mises shared a standpoint of founder Austrian Economic School Carl Menger's against historicism, in the area of empirical methods in the social science differences between two key figures of Austrian School existed, and Mises rejected the empirical methods of Menger. The author of this article used an inter-pretative method of the social science and focused on the text's analysis. The article will conclude that in the opinion of Mises, historicism is the method of self-contradiction and empirical methods in the social science are imperfect and unreliable in the sphere of prediction future event.
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Donald Gillies a modifikovaný faksifikacionismus

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Popper’s critical rationalism and especially his solution of the problem of induction, which is based on the fact that beliefs are not inferences and rejection is not induc-tive, has little orthodox followers but more critics and revisers. Many of Popper’s fol¬lowers admit that his concept is rightly criticized from various positions and they seek to further develop Popper’s legacy by adopting different strategies and correc¬tions. Unlike the orthodox followers of Popper (e.g. David Miller) they tend to make serious changes to Popper’s conception (e.g. John Watkins, John Worrall) under the influence of Imre Lakatos and his discussions with Popper. Donald Gillies belongs to the seemingly moderate revisers of Popper’s legacy. He tries to deal with the objec¬tions raised, especially against falsificationism, and he calls his elaborate conception modified falsificationism. This article deals with the question as to what extent Gillies’ attempt is successful and how it responds to the real problems of falsificationism within contemporary debates.
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O fundamentalnej roli interpretacji

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The article looks at the field of hesitant self-definitions reflecting ambiguities of scientific thinking in a rapidly changing (late) modern world. It concentrates on matters belonging to the domain of political science, bringing to light a fundamental question – how should we understand a current crisis of legitimacy undermining the canons of scientific knowledge, plunged in contradictions, stretched between two opposite poles of technical efficiency and communicative rationality. It advances the conception of a radical revision aimed at counterbalancing the influence of a positivist tradition, celebrating the idea of empirical knowledge, following the demands of a “scientific” method. In expectation to open a new and promising perspective it puts forward a conception of experience concentrating on language (language is looked upon as a spehere of primary and most important experience). In this effort the article brings to focus the questions of understanding and interpretation, putting to the fornt line the notion of heremenutics and considering possible advantages resulting from establishing links between cultural anthropology and political science.
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The author claims that the conceptual content of perception can serve as an argument in favour of epistemological realism. He argues on behalf of the main theses of conceptualism in philosophy of perception, and explores the relational aspects of perceptual objects which make up the general conditions determining their reality. The relational aspects are as follows: the unity of quantitative and qualitative contents, their concomitance and inherence property in relation to an object. These general aspects are essential for epistemological realism and establish the correlates of the conceptual identification of objects of perception.
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The Polish philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz adopted the notion of “conceptual apparatus”, which is very similar to the idea of “conceptual scheme” put forward by Donald Davidson, Willard V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher and others. Ajdukiewicz’s theses are, in this regard, very important although less known, and he treated cognitive processes as inseparably connected with language.
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The mutual relations between theory (seen as a set of theoretical statements) and empiricism is of special importance, especially in pedagogics. Why? Since pedagogics is immersed in practice, everyday reality and the mundane. The author focuses his reflections on the observation of an insufficient use of the theoretical potential by contemporary social sciences. Obviously, this is accompanied by the insufficient use of the research potential, which in turn deepens the stagnation in the field of theory. The author takes into account the classical approaches to theory with its relations with empiricism and moreover indicates contemporary exemplifications of this state of affairs. He moreover claims that research results are inadequately linked to theoretical reflection and indicates the similarities and differences in this respect in the field of social sciences.
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Jean-Henri Fabre made numerous discoveries observing meticulously the lifestyle and behaviour of insects which lived around his traditional house in Provence. Those discoveries are still valid, even though the heterodox entomologist became the standard bearer for opponents of transformism, which perpetually progressed and is about to triumph. Fabre is first known to have been an outstanding observer, but also to have gathered together in a colossal collection his entomologist’s memoirs, whose literary – and even poetic – value is celebrated as far away as Japan. This article proposes to question the validity of the preconceived idea that Les Souvenirs entomologiques adds to the accurate eye of the observer the fertile imagination of the poet. Refusing to just make note of this a posteriori superposition, it hypothesizes that there is a reunification of the inflexible empiricism of the biological approach with a creative imagination which reveals to be omnipresent in every phase of Fabre’s enterprise: the hypothesis, the validation by observation, and the literary transcription.
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Empirismus, naturalismus a ideje

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The author analyses the modern reception of key themes in Hume’s philosophy during the past century. The first part presents Hume’s version of three such themes – empi­ricism, naturalism and the theory of ideas. The following three parts give an exposition of modern forms of each of these themes, with the choice of modern reception being directed to those contemporary authors who not only developed Hume’s motifs in the most original way, but who also explicitly traced the origin of their modern theory to Hume. For this reason, in the second part, which deals with the reception of empiricism in logical positivism, Hans Reichenbach and his treatment of Hume’s problem of inductive knowledge is discussed. In the third part, dealing with naturalism, the obvious choice is the most influential version of this doctrine in the work of W. V. O. Quine. The fourth part deals with the modern reception of Hume’s theory of ideas in a recent monograph by Jerry Fodor. The author considers Hume’s naturalism as the most live part of Hume’s legacy. Empirismus has, after all, been considerably transformed in content, or has even been rejected by later philosophers; while Fodor’s updating of the theory of ideas does not offer an adequate answer to the question of the place of thinking and intentionality in the material world.
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Our present knowledge in the field of dynamical systems, information theory, probability theory and other similar domains indicates that the human brain is a complex dynamical system working in a strong chaotic regime in which random processes play important roles. In this environment our mental life develops. To choose a logically ordered sequence from a random or almost random stream of thoughts is a difficult and energy consuming task. The only domain in which we are able to do this with a full success is mathematics. Leibniz’s life ambition was to extend this success, with the help of what he called characteristica universalis, to other areas of human activity. The belief that this is possible lies at the basis of Leibniz’s rationalist system. Reasoning within his system, Leibniz claimed that also fundamental laws of physics can be deduced from the “first principles”. Just as linguistic or conceptual units are at the basis of the charactersistica universalis, his monads are responsible for physical activity of material bodies. When this rationalistic strategy is applied to the philosophy of space and time, it leads to their radically relational conception. Leibniz’s rationalistic approach to philosophy and science arouses out sympathy but it was Newton’s mathematical-empirical method that turned out to be effective in human endeavour to understand the functioning of the physical world. Successes of the Newtonian method  compel us to revise our concept of rationality.
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This paper is an attempt to systematize the methodological insights and contributions of the Austrian School of Economics and present them in their most up-to-date elaboration, thereby building on the earlier literature on the subject. It aims to improve on the publications listed above in two aspects. First, it takes into account the most recent conceptual developments that address some of the common misunderstandings of the Austrian methodological position, as well as some of its more insightful contemporary criticisms. Second, it organizes the presentation of the relevant material around several clearly specifi ed methodological dimensions, while, in contrast to most of the abovementioned literature, keeping the description of the historical background behind the development of the Austrian method to an absolute minimum, as well as leaving out the non-methodological differences between the ASE and its intellectual rivals, thus aiming to make the presentation in question maximally focused and thematically unified.
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In this article, I reconstruct Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s view that he called radical conventionalism (as opposed to moderate conventionalism developed by Henri Poincaré and Pierre Duhem). Then, I recall little‑known criticism of this approach developed by Stefan Amsterdamski. Finally, I demonstrate, contrary to the conception of the originator’s declarations, that a radical conventionalism is not a ‘paper fiction’. On the other hand, the standpoint of radical conventionalism is useful due to the precision of expressions provided to it by Ajdukiewicz; it shows the difficulties that have to be tackled by each philosophical approach assuming a social constructivism or related notion.
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In his works the American philosopher Willard van Quine constantly rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction claiming that it is not justified. This happens because, in his opinion, human statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not individually but as a corporate body, which implies that the judgment on their validity ultimately rests on experience itself. Many problems arise at this point, since even language plays a fundamental role in the Quinean view, and it must be accommodated into the picture if the picture itself means to be coherent. Conceptual scheme and external world are both necessary, but language does not seem to be a factor whose ultimate legitimacy relies on something outside the conceptual sphere, and this means in turn that we face a dualistic situation. Conceptual schemes or world-views, like the ones provided by Newtonian mechanics or quantum theory, are the primary bearers of truth, and the truth of a statement strictly depends from the particular conceptual scheme one currently adopts.
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The article contains reflections on the “speculative realism”, a direction in 21st century philosophy initiated by Graham Harman, whose books (The Quadruple Object, Object-Oriented Ontology. A New Theory of Everything) continue and process Martin Heidegger’s concept of “the quadruple” (das Geviert), and they also use the ideas of such thinkers as Edmund Husserl and Bruno Latour. The basic problem formulated in this text arises from the following questions: is speculative realism another turn in scientific research, or rather a return to those sources of thinking that take into account the complexity and the irreducibility of reality to any metaphysical instance? What is the role of the “speculative turn” in cultural studies, in various interpretative practices?
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The paper reconstructs John Locke’s critique of Edward Herbert’s conception of common notions presented in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Though aimed at the epistemological significance of the term, the critique seems to miss the point, since due to the Platonic character of Herbert’s philosophy, the notions have also a metaphysical and religious significance overlooked by Locke. Thus the attack is justified only in part: for Herbert, the rationality of nature is understood as an ideal and not as a certain historic state of affairs, as Locke seems to suggest. It is an interesting feature of the discussion, that both the common notions and their critique is aimed at justification of religious rationality. The difference between both philosophers seems to have its roots in different understanding of knowledge. For Herbert it relates to an ideal, conceptual structure of reality, whereas for Locke it culminates in natural histories of cumulative character.
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Wisława Szymborska and Ewa Lipska adopt a stance of opposition to the currently dominant attitudes of looseness of poetic identity, formulating programmes of “negative poetics”, emphasizing the issues of word’s “inexpressibility” and a questionable status of practised profession. Auto-thematic reflection on the creative act seldom appears in their literature and rather in a humorous, auto-ironic convention – they both reject the former conventions demonizing the role of poetry and a poet as well as contemporary poses accentuating the helplessness of the word. The two writers define art as a peculiar annexe to reality – extratextual concrete reality is simultaneously the source and the target of a poem, thus negating the traditional text and context opposition. Mimetic aesthetics is described as “eccentric” against the background of contemporary conceptions of autotelism of the work of literature and questioning its referentiality. There still remains the awareness of radical border between empiricism and the language sphere – therefore the artist is adopts the role of a mediator in a tough mission of settling these two perspectives.
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The term “Lublin Philosophical School” refers to a mode of philosophizing (which might be called a paradigm) and a teaching programme devised in the 1950s at the Catholic University of Lublin. Against the background of the concept of “school,” the paper first shows the origin of and motives for developing a specific mode of philosophizing as well as phases of the Lublin School’s development. It then discusses some methodological features, indicating that realism, empiricism and accepting the truth as a goal of philosophical cognition are decisive for this mode of philosophizing. In spite of substantive debates within the School, it constitutes the unitas in pluribus. The paper then shows that those methodological features, also wisdom-directedness, justify the roles in individual and social life that the School ascribes to philosophy, including its role as a self-consciousness of culture and a basis for dialogue. The paper claims that this mode of philosophizing can take up issues that arise in our contemporary intellectual environment, and it constitutes a promising paradigm for solving them. Thus, even if the Lublin Philosophical School was founded seventy years ago, its methodology and theoretical approaches are of value for us today and therefore it is worthwhile to develop further its achievements.
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“Does my life have a meaning that wouldn’t be destroyed by my inevitably approaching death?” Confessional reflections on death of Leo Tolstoy The search for the meaning of life, contributing to the dramatic changes that have occurred in the philosophy and work of Leo Tolstoy, has been reflected in his Confession (1879–1882). The theme of death first appears in the third chapter of the Confession, among the episodes that represent memoirs, and then expands, occupying the main space in the IV–VII chapters. In his memoirs, trying to get a trustworthy answer to the question that tortures him, the writer uses me­thods of experiential and theoretical sciences. As a result, he comes to the conclusion that life is meaningless and creates a four-part typology. Only taking the path of “irrational knowledge” that is faith, and having experienced a deep religious understanding, he creates a doctrine that makes the sense of life.
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„Czy jest w życiu mem cel, któregoby nie zniszczyła nieunikniona, czekająca śmierć?” — rozmyślania Lwa Tołstoja o śmierci Poszukiwanie sensu życia, będące przyczyną kardynalnych zmian, jakie nastąpiły wświa­topoglądzie i twórczości Lwa Tołstoja, znalazło swoje odzwierciedlenie w jego Spowiedzi (1879–1882). Temat śmierci po raz pierwszy pojawia się w III rozdziale dzieła, w części mającej charakter pamiętnikarski, a następnie rozwija się, stanowiąc zasadniczą treść rozdziałów IV–VII. Pisarz, starając się uzyskać wiarygodną odpowiedź na dręczące go pytanie, w swoich rozważa­niach ucieka się do metod nauk empirycznych i spekulatywnych. W efekcie dochodzi do wnio­sku obezsensowności życia i tworzy czteroczęściową typologię. Dopiero po wejściu na ścieżkę „wiedzy nierozsądnej” — wiary, doświadczając głębokiego doznania religijnego, Tołstoj tworzy doktrynę, zgodnie z którą odnajduje sens życia.
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