Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  enthymeme
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
A few years ago, believing that human thinking is nonmonotonic, I tried to reconstruct a nonmonotonic reasoning by application of two monotonic procedures. I called them “step forward” and “step backward” (see [4]). The first procedure is just a consequence operation responsible for an extension of the set of beliefs. The second one, defined on the base of the logic of falsehood reconstructed for the given logic of truthfulness, is responsible for a reduction of the set of beliefs. Both procedures taken together were successfully verified by using so-called AGM (see [5]), postulates for expansion, contraction and revision formulated by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (e.g. [1]). Reasoning composed of the mutual application of both procedures seemed to be quite natural for modeling our thinking. At that time, I supposed that it should be nonmonotonic but I was wrong. It turned out impossible to satisfy a definition of the nonmonotonic inference by reasoning composed both steps. To understand why this is impossible, I began to analyze how nonmonotonicity is obtainable in some well-known cases in the literature. I analyzed the problem from two points of view: (1) non-formal examples for nonmonotonicity and (2) formal constructions of nonmonotonic operations/relations. The result of those investigations was astonishing: none of the considered by me cases of nonmonotonicity belonging to point (1) and almost none belonging to (2) satisfies the definition of nonmonotonic inference. Arguments against the nonmonotonic character of well-known examples for nonmonotonicity of human thinking are more precisely presented in [6]. I present them below an abbreviated version of them.
EN
The paper considers the question of the logical status of conceited epigram. 16th century theoreticians, for instance J.C. Scaliger, already applied logical methods to the analysis of epigrams, and 17th century theoreticians developed a strict logical description of the so-called compound epigram. This form of epigrams met with particular interest in the Baroque period because of the opportunity it gave to express the construction of a conceit. A conceit was defined as an “argument urbanely fallacious” by E. Tesauro, i.e. an enthymematical construction built upon a metaphor. It should be therefore called a paralogismo, but 17th century theoreticians avoided this term in the belief that the conceit offered special cognitive possibilities. In my paper I use logical methods to analyse the epigrams by J.A. Morsztyn, M.K. Sarbiewski and S.H. Lubomirski, to argue the assumed thesis that conceits served as logical experiments performed in the conviction of the insufficiency of Aristotle’s categories to describe the transcendent as well as the visible world. Above all, the questioning of Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction allowed Baroque writers to transgress the two classical logical values, “true” and “false”, bringing along the intuition of a third logical value, defined in the 20th century as the “unknown” by J. Łukasiewicz.
PL
Barokowe epigramaty bywają oceniane krytycznie, uznawane za mało ciekawe i wymyślne. Jak się okazuje, dzisiejsi czytelnicy i interpretatorzy mogą błądzić nie tylko w ocenach, ale i rozumieniu dorobku dawnej epoki. Na przestrzeni czasu zagubiony został bowiem w badaniach literaturoznawczych entymemat, jeden z istotnych składników procesu twórczego i jedna z metod odczytywania poezji. Zasady, jakimi kierowano się, korzystając z sylogizmu krasomówczego w poezji, omawia w ósmym rozdziale swojego dzieła pod tytułem Ars nova argutiarum jeden z najwybitniejszych uczonych jezuickich XVII wieku, Jakub Masen. Autor podejmuje utrwalone w dialektyce i retoryce pojmowanie entymematu, oparte na wykładzie Arystotelesa, który skłania się ku tzw. koncepcji stylistycznej rozumienia zjawiska, wiążąc je zasadniczo z kompozycją dzieła. Swój wykład popiera licznymi przykładami i pokazuje, jak łączyć sylogizm z innymi środkami poetyckimi. Dzieło jezuity jest tym bardziej cenne, że stanowiło swego rodzaju itinerarium dla adeptów sztuki poetyckiej. Pozwalało uczniom i czytelnikom poznać niuanse procesu twórczego. Obecnie stanowić może dobre narzędzie do „deszyfracji” zawartego w epigramatach przesłania, co pozwoli bardziej skutecznie i poprawnie tłumaczyć i interpretować dawny dorobek epigramatyczny.
EN
Baroque epigrams are sometimes criticised and considered as not interesting and sophisticated enough. It appears that today’s readers and interpreters may be wrong not only in their judgements but also in their understanding of the achievements of the past era. With the passage of time, literary studies have lost the enthymeme, which is a major component of the creative process and one of the methods for interpreting the meaning of poetry. The principles applied when using rhetorical syllogism in poetry are discussed in chapter eight of the work entitled Ars nova argutiarum by one of the most eminent Jesuit scholars of the 17th century, namely Jakub Masen. The author deals with the understanding of enthymeme as it is established in dialectics and rhetoric, based on Aristotle’s lecture. On the one hand, Masen leans towards the so-called stylistic concept of understanding the phenomenon, linking it – in principle – with the composition of the work. His lecture is illustrated with numerous examples and shows how to combine syllogism with other poetic means. The Jesuit’s work is all the more valuable because it was a kind of itinerarium for beginners in the art of poetry. The work allowed students and readers to discover nuances of the creative process. Today, it can be a useful tool in “deciphering” the message contained in epigrams, which will allow for even more effective and correct explanation and interpretation of the epigrams of the past.
PL
Arystoteles wyodrębnił w Organonie dwa rodzaje rozumowań: analityczne i dialektyczne. Badaniami rozumowań analitycznych, które podjął w Analitykach I i II, zasłużył sobie na miano ojca logiki formalnej. Według Chaima Perelmana, współczesnym logikom umknął z pola widzenia fakt, że rozważania Arystotelesa na temat rozumowań dialektycznych – podjęte w Topikach, Retoryce i O dowodach sofistycznych – czynią zeń także ojca teorii argumentacji. Niniejszy artykuł jest próbą odpowiedzi na tę diagnozę. Jego celem jest potwierdzenie tezy Perelmana o jednorodności Arystotelesowskiej koncepcji sylogizmu teoretycznego i praktycznego. W tym potwierdzeniu kluczową rolę odgrywa pojęcie entymematu. W artykule odpowiadamy na pytanie, jakie miejsce zajmuje ono w teorii retoryki Arystotelesa i porównujemy je z ogólnym pojęciem sylogizmu. Szkicujemy też strukturę argumentacji przez entymemat oraz przedstawiamy dwa typy entymematów omawiane przez Arystotelesa: pozorne i obalające.
EN
The aim of the article is to confirm the thesis of Chaim Perelman on the homogeneity of Aristotle’s results regarding the theoretical and practical syllogism by presenting the concept of enthymeme; the article presents a description of what the enthymeme is and what place it occupies in the theory of Aristotle’s rhetoric; the concept of enthymeme is confronted with the concept of syllogism, the structure of the argumentation through the enthymeme is outlined and the particular types of the enthymeme distinguished by Aristotle, namely the apparent enthymeme and the refutational enthymeme, are also discussed. An attempt to look at the analyzed types of enthymemes from the point of view of contemporary logic (especially nonmonotonic logic) is also undertaken.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.