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Horyzonty Polityki
|
2018
|
vol. 9
|
issue 29
113-130
EN
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: This paper aims to summarize and discuss key findings in the literature around the concept of disruption or disruptive innovation and how the ad hoc academic knowledge evolved in the recent couple of decades. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The research method is based on historical and critical literature review. Hence, this paper discusses other scholars’ research and findings around the topic of disruption innovation. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: This paper starts with a summary of Christensen’s disruption theory (1997) followed by some important clarifications of ad hoc definitions. Then it inspects some of this theory weaknesses highlighted in the literature before investigating the main recent developments in the last couple of decades and the related research venues. RESEARCH RESULTS: Despite the positive efforts made by many scholars to reconcile Christensen’s disruption theory (1997) with the reality of the market and empirical data and to clarify the concept of disruption and its numerous implications and frameworks, some fuzziness and many gaps are still persisting in the extant literature. Namely, a normalized and exhaustive disruption framework seems to be missing hitherto. CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: This paper provides a refined picture of the academic discussion around disruption innovation, and is hence a useful starting point for researchers interested in topics related to “innovation management” who would like to investigate further avenues of research directly or indirectly linked to disruption.
EN
The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree, the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network, IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects will probably fail.
FR
Le but de cet article est de présenter le droit irrévocable d’usage (IRU) comme un remède possible pour les projets d’infrastructure de télécommunications de l’UE qui, en Pologne, ont été lancés avec du retard. Grâce à l’IRU, les bénéficiaires de ces projets européens seront en mesure d’épargner à la fois le temps et l'argent pour terminer des projects avec succès. L'auteur décrit deux méthodes possibles de mise en œuvre de l'IRU: par l’obligation réglementaire et par le bias de bonne fois de l’opérateur historique. L'auteur propose un modèle de la théorie des jeux avec des gains qui dépendra de la stratégie choisie par le législateur et par l’opérateur historique. Par l'utilisation d'un arbre de la théorie des jeux, l'auteur montre que si seulement l’opérateur historique est prêt à offrir son propre réseau, l'IRU peut être signé, ce qui en effet aboutira à la disparition de la plupart des retards dans la mise en oeuvre des projets. Le succès n'est pas si évident dans le cas où la mise en œuvre de l'IRU est une obligation - là, les projets européens échoueront probablement.
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