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1
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The effect of self epistemic authority on compliance with expert recommendations

100%
Stasiuk K., Maksymiuk R., Bar-Tal Y.
Polish Psychological Bulletin
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2016
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vol. 47
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issue 2
174-178
EN
The study examines the interaction effect between source epistemic authority (EA) and self epistemic authority (SEA) on the intention to follow the source’s recommendation. The results showed that high SEA subjects were more likely to follow the recommendation if its source had high EA and less likely if the source’s EA was low. The results are discussed using the Lay Epistemology framework.
2

Student-Perceived Epistemic Authority of Associate Professors in Institutions of Higher Education

88%
Blumberga S.
Signum Temporis
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2011
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vol. 4
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issue 1
10-16
EN
The article analyses the topical social epistemology issue of transmission and sharing of knowledge in the context of social psychology. Essential is focusing on authority as an attitude and, within this context, also focusing on an analysis of the structure of authority, situational structuring of authority. Therefore, the aim of the study is to explore the epistemic authority of associate professors in institutions of higher education as perceived by the students of various study areas. The concept of epistemic authority has been used to pursue the aim (Raviv, Bar-Tal, Ravi & Abin, 1993; Kruglanski, 1989; Hepburn, 2006; Asmuß & Svennevig, 2009; Glenn & LeBaron, 2011). Exploring epistemic authority is related to exploring the degree of trust in epistemic authority (Kruglanski et al., 2005). An epistemic authority study methodology including three interrelated surveys has been used in the study (Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv & Abin, 1993). The study sample consisted of students of various institutions of higher education in Riga (N=307). The article analyses the results of the descriptive statistics of student-perceived epistemic authority of associate professors; statistically significant differences between the evaluations given by students of various areas for their perception of the epistemic authority of associate professors. The article includes key conclusions which show that students rate the epistemic authority of associate professors as medium high, it is comparatively higher in the cognitive aspect - evaluation of the authority’s level of knowledge and the cognitively emotional, i.e., trust in knowledge. The students have given a lower rating to the epistemic authority of associate professors in the cognitive behaviour aspect.
3
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Expertise is in the Eye of the Beholder – Financial Advisor Evaluations and Client Satisfaction as a Result of Advisor Recommendations

75%
Danieluk B., Muda R., Kicia M., Stasiuk K.
Polish Psychological Bulletin
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2020
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vol. 51
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issue 1
4
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The Authority of Precedents in Civil Law Systems

63%
Spaić B.
Studia Iuridica Lublinensia
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2018
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vol. 27
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issue 1
EN
In this paper, precedents are analysed in terms of reasons that they can give to judges in various legal systems, with the purpose of identifying the ways in which precedents can be authoritative in judicial reasoning. The analysis starts with the distinction between two kinds of precedents – precedents of solution and precedents of interpretation. The ways in which both precedents of solution and precedents of interpretation affect the reasoning of future courts are identified and described, in order to focus on instances in which this affection can be considered practically and epistemically authoritative. Finally, conditions for considering under which it can be justified to treat precedents as authoritative are laid down, with a special emphasis on the possibility of justifying the epistemic authority of interpretative precedents.
PL
W artykule omówiono teoretycznoprawne aspekty wpływu precedensów na praktykę stosowania prawa w systemach prawnych należących do kręgu civil law jako modelu przyszłych decyzji prawnych. W tym kontekście analizie poddano samo pojęcie precedensu i wskazano różnice pomiędzy precedensem decyzyjnym i interpretacyjnym. Na gruncie tych ustaleń prowadzone są rozważania dotyczące źródeł „autorytetu” precedensu oraz podstaw i sposobu jego wpływu na późniejsze orzeczenia. W efekcie prowadzi to do wyodrębnienia i dostrzeżenia specyfiki praktycznego i epistemicznego ujęcia oraz uzasadnienia autorytetu precedensu.
5
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Lindy Trinkaus Zagzebski teoria autorytetu poznawczego. O potrzebie ufania innym

51%
Dobrzeniecki M.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2016
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vol. 52
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issue 2
35-52
EN
In this paper the author analyzes Trinkaus Zagzebski’s theory of epistemic authority. This theory underlines the importance of trust in the process of justification of beliefs and it indicates the limitations of so called epistemic egoism. The ideal for epistemic egoism is self-reliance of a subject in justifying his or her beliefs. Trinkaus Zagzebski defends so called epistemic universalism, according to which, the mere fact that a person x claims that p is a prima facie reason in favor of p. In the text the author indicates the weak points of universalism and concludes that either one accepts this point of view with its consequence rejecting the thesis of equality of epistemic subjects or one adheres to the point of view of epistemic egoism. The author claims that Trinkaus Zagzebski gives a reader indications how to improve this standpoint so it does not result in counterintuitive claims.
PL
W artykule autor analizuje teorię autorytetu przedstawioną przez Trinkaus Zagzebski. Teoria ta podkreśla rolę zaufania w uzasadnianiu zdań, m.in. wskazując na ograniczenia stanowiska egoizmu poznawczego, dla którego ideałem jest sytuacja, w której podmiot, uzasadniając swe przekonania, polega tylko na własnych zdolnościach poznawczych. Trinkaus Zagzebski broni uniwersalizmu poznawczego, wg którego już sam fakt, że osoba x, głosi że p, jest prima facie racją za p. W tekście autor wskazuje na słabe punkty uniwersalizmu i konkluduje, że albo uznamy to stanowisko z jego konsekwentnym odrzuceniem tezy o równości podmiotów poznających, albo też mimo wszystko opowiemy się za egoizmem poznawczym. Autor uznaje przy tym, że amerykańska filozofka daje nam wskazówki, jak ulepszyć owo stanowisko, by nie prowadziło ono do twierdzeń sprzecznych z intuicją.
6
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Autorytety religijne w pedagogice. Uwagi metateoretyczne

51%
Magier P.
Paedagogia Christiana
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2015
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vol. 1/35
161-179
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu są funkcje przypisywane w pedagogice kategoriom, twierdzeniom i koncepcjom autorstwa osób uznawanych za autorytety religijne. Niejednokrotnie w tej dyscyplinie wiedzy wykorzystywane są pojęcia i tezy formułowane przez osoby niebędące naukowcami (np. przez osoby reprezentujące określoną religię bądź wyznanie) w celu wprowadzenia, argumentowania lub oceny określonych postulatów. Powszechność użycia argumentu „z autorytetu” budzi pytania dotyczące potrzeby, zasadności oraz zakresu tego typu zabiegu. Artykuł ma charakter metaprzedmiotowy oraz analityczny. Nie stawia sobie za cel skonstruowania i postulowania modelu analizowanej relacji. Chodzi o sformułowanie elementarnych uwag opisujących teoretyczne funkcje, jakie przypisuje się wypowiedziom określonych osób uznanych za autorytety religijne. Dodatkowo formułowane są uwagi o charakterze oceniającym, służące uwypukleniu problemu zasadności użycia argumentów „z autorytetu” w pedagogice.
EN
The subject of the article is the functions, which in pedagogy are attributed to categories, statements and concepts of the people who are considered to be religious authorities. Many a time in this field of study, the used notions and thesis are formulated by people who are not scientists (e.g. by people who represent a particular religion or creed) in order to introduce justification or assessment of the particular postulates. The widespread use of the argument “from authority” raises questions about the need, legitimacy as well as the scope of this measure. The article is metatopical and analytical in nature. It does not aim at constructing and calling for a model of the analysed relation. It is about formulating fundamental remarks describing theoretical functions, which are attributed to the statements of particular people who are considered to be religious authorities. Additionally, the notes formulated are apprising in nature, which emphasises the problem of the legitimacy of using arguments “from authority” in pedagogy.
7
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Kognitiver Ratschlag, testimoniale Autoritäten und der Wert epistemischer Weisheit

38%
Schmechtig P.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica
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2018
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issue 32
185-214
EN
This paper deals with the question of which role wisdom plays in epistemology. Firstly, I briefly sketch the general framework of this inquiry. Linked to this is a specific proposal for the conceptual definition of epistemic wisdom. This proposal is explained in more detail with regard to three different aspects (ontological, epistemic, axiological) of the attribution of epistemic wisdom. In the following, the main thesis behind the proposed definition is discussed more closely. Accordingly, epistemic wisdom is a testimonial activity that has an interpersonal structure. As a consequence of this view, wise (cognitive) advisors are to be regarded as testimonial authorities whose cognitive superiority is to be analyzed within the framework of an “authority-resources model” of the explanation of personal wisdom. Finally, on the basis of this model, it can be shown that wisdom in connection with cognitive advice has a distinctive epistemic value.
DE
Der vorliegende Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche Rolle Weisheit in der Erkenntnistheorie spielt. Zu Beginn skizziere ich kurz den allgemeinen Rahmen der Untersuchung. Damit verbunden ist ein konkreter Vorschlag zur begrifflichen Bestimmung epistemischer Weisheit. Dieser Vorschlag wird im Hinblick auf drei unterschiedliche Aspekte der Zuschreibung epistemischer Weisheit (ontologisch, epistemisch, axiologisch) näher erläutert. Im Anschluss daran wird die zentrale These genauer diskutiert, die hinter der vorgeschlagenen Begriffsbestimmung steht. Demnach ist epistemische Weisheit eine testimoniale Aktivität, die eine interpersonale Struktur aufweist. Gemäß dieser Sichtweise sind weise (kognitive) Ratgeber als testimoniale Autoritäten zu betrachten, deren kognitive Überlegenheit im Rahmen eines „Autoritäten-Ressourcen-Modells“ der Erklärung personaler Weisheit zu analysieren ist. Ausgehend von diesem Modell lässt sich abschließend zeigen, dass Weisheit in Verbindung mit kognitiven Ratschlägen einen unverwechselbaren epistemischen Wert besitzt.
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