The paper presents a pluralistic solution to the epistemological problem of the value of knowledge. In the first part, the starting points for the discussion on the value of knowledge are mapped out, including the key assumptions that knowledge is valu- able (1) distinctively, (2) universally and (3) necessarily. It then summarizes the most important routes to take towards solving this problem, which, however, bump up against an inability to satisfy all three of these assumptions at the same time. The second part of the paper presents an alternative pluralistic view of the value of knowledge, which is inspired by M. Weiner’s concept of knowledge as a “Swiss Army Knife”. Paradoxically, however, this approach simultaneously denies all three assumptions about the value of knowledge, which it explains as a variable and contextual quality of knowledge. However, as it ultimately turns out, this explanation might be fully in accordance with common intuitions about why knowledge is valuable.
The founding text for the new current in modern philosophy—experimental philosophy—can be seen in Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich’s “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (2001). The authors describe in this article a study to prove cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions. On the basis of their results, they argue that since epistemic intuitions seem to serve a crucial role in the use of thought experiments, contemporary philosophical methodology is highly unjustified. That study has brought about at least three replication attempts (Seyedsayamdost 2015; Kim, Yuan 2015; Nagel, San Juan, Mar 2013). None of them confirmed the original results. The aim of this article is to critically analyze in detail Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s methodology and the three replications mentioned. Regarding the results of my analysis, I will try to examine what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the outcomes of analized studies. In particular I will refer to far-reaching conclusions about the universality of epistemic intuitions or universality of folk epistemology, which are sometimes—hastily, as I will argue—extrapolated from the results of such kind of studies (e.g., Kim, Yuan 2015; Kim Yuan 2016).
The aim of the first part of the article is to elucidate the nature of (modern) philosophical scepticism. The author defends the view that scepticism is not a homogenous doctrine, but a general label for heterogenous ways of sceptical argumentation. Sceptical argumentation is, in turn, understood to include any kind of philosophically relevant argument which aims at calling into doubt epistemically-valued qualities, especially knowledge. In the second part of the article the author focuses on the question of what constitutes the intrinsic value of philosophical scepticism. The author defends the thesis that philosophical scepticism has instrumental value as a tool for understanding knowledge. This thesis is the result of the application of a particularist approach to the problem of knowledge. Scepticism provides the material for thought experiments in the context of which findings about epistemic intuitions connected with knowledge can be revealed. In spite of this, scepticism is of value only in the form of a means and its value cannot be reduced to the value of other elements.
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