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1

Czym jest szczęście? Analiza zagadnienia na podstawie koncepcji Władysława Tatarkiewicza

100%

Dalke J., Szulc A., Broniewska M., Brzoska A., Zimmermann M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2013

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issue nr 21

149-160

EN

The aim of this article is the analysis of the term of the happiness on the basis of theWładysław Tatarkiewicz’s conception. According to his workO szczęściu (AboutHappiness) happiness is defined here as justified, full, constant satisfaction fromthe life as a whole. Considering the individual elements of this definition leads tothe better understanding of the term and lets to assign the area of its application.The article also attempts to response the two fundamental questions concerning the happiness. The first: is the happiness the aim or rather the result of our endeavours?And the second: does the happiness depend on ourselves or rather on the external circumstances?

2

Polska adaptacja Kwestionariusza Dobrostanu (Psychological Well-Being Scales) Caroll Ryff

86%

Karaś D.

Roczniki Psychologiczne

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2017

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vol. 20

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issue 4

815-853

PL

Skale Dobrostanu Psychologicznego (Psychological Well-Being Scales, PWBS) to kwestionariusz zaprojektowany przez Ryff do pomiaru sześciu wymiarów dobrostanu w ujęciu eudajmonistycznym: samoakceptacji, pozytywnych relacji z innymi ludźmi, autonomii, panowania nad otoczeniem, celu życiowego oraz osobistego rozwoju. Ten przetłumaczony na kilkadziesiąt języków kwestionariusz jest powszechnie stosowanym narzędziem do pomiaru dobrostanu. Artykuł prezentuje efekty pracy nad polską adaptacją kwestionariusza PWBS w dwóch wersjach: pełnej (84-itemowej) oraz skróconej (18-itemowej), w serii czterech badań w łącznej grupie 2035 osób w wieku od 13 do 78 lat. Otrzymane wyniki potwierdzają rzetelność pełnej wersji kwestionariusza PWBS oraz 6-czynnikową strukturę dobrostanu. Potwierdzona została również trafność kryterialna zastosowanego kwestionariusza, odzwierciedlona w korelacji z zastosowanymi narzędziami walidacyjnymi.

EN

The Psychological Well-Being Scales (PWBS) is a questionnaire designed by Ryff (1989) to mea-sure six dimensions of eudaimonic well-being: self-acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth. Translated into several dozen languages, this questionnaire is a commonly used instrument for measuring well-being. The article presents the effects of work on the Polish adaptation of two versions of the PWBS: full (84-item) and short (18-item), conducted as a series of four studies with a total sample of 2,035 participants aged 13 to 78.The results confirmed the reliability of the full version of the PWBS and the six-factor structure of well-being. They also confirmed the criterion validity of the questionnaire, reflected in correlations with validation instruments.

3

An Aristotelian Naturalist Perspective on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration

86%

Biondi P.

Diametros

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2016

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issue 50

138-151

EN

This polemical note looks at the ethical issue of providing artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) to patients with advanced dementia from the perspective of an Aristotelian and naturalist ethics. I argue that this issue may be considered in terms of the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, well-being. I present a number of facts about the conditions of human life that contribute to eudaimonia. In addition, I present a number of facts about advanced dementia as well as clarify the goals of medicine. From these facts, I argue that we are not ethically obligated to provide ANH to this class of patients.

4

Elementy psychologii pozytywnej w nawiązaniu do rozważań Arystotelesa

86%

Juruś D.

Państwo i Społeczeństwo

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2012

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issue 4

11-20

EN

In the paper I argue, contrary to the statement uttered once by Martin Seligman, that Aristotelian theory of eudaimonia (one of the key concept of positive psychology) is not subjective and based on uncertain principles. I reconstruct Aristotelian theory of eudaimonia and argue that the concept of good is neither subjective nor objective but relational. It means that a thing, act or action is good if it contributes to one’s eudaimonia. I also pinpoint that the concept of flow, which seems to be a “discovery” of positive psychology, must be based on the theory of virtues and the doctrine of human nature, which are the foundations of the Aristotelian view.

5

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics: Their Common Field of Inquiry and Their Common Reader

75%

Skowroński L.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2016

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vol. 7

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issue 1

167-182

EN

The aim of the article is to indicate that there is quite strong support in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics for the argument that its inquiry is “political” rather than “ethical” in character – the textual evidence provides reasons to challenge the traditional belief that Aristotle separated ethics from politics and started the rise of ethics as a new branch of philosophy. In addition, one can posit a hypothesis (and this has already been done) that the reader, whom Aristotle had in mind while writing what we now know as the Ethics, was a politician-lawgiver (and not just any educated Greek or – which is even less probable – any human being). So the reader aimed at in the Ethics is the same as the reader aimed at in the Politics – a politician-lawgiver. The Ethics and the Politics are a two-part but inseparable compound that together make a textbook for a politician-lawgiver. Both parts should be read together because the one cannot be understood correctly (i.e. as closely as possible to the intentions of their author) without the other. Aristotle studies human good not from the point of view of the individual but from the point of view of the human community. The highest human good – the philosopher’s eudaimonia – is achieved not by individual effort (or not fundamentally by that) but as a result of good laws and a well-organized life in a polis.

PL

The aim of the article is to indicate that there is quite strong support in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics for the argument that its inquiry is “political” rather than “ethical” in character – the textual evidence provides reasons to challenge the traditional belief that Aristotle separated ethics from politics and started the rise of ethics as a new branch of philosophy. In addition, one can posit a hypothesis (and this has already been done) that the reader, whom Aristotle had in mind while writing what we now know as the Ethics, was a politician-lawgiver (and not just any educated Greek or – which is even less probable – any human being). So the reader aimed at in the Ethics is the same as the reader aimed at in the Politics – a politician-lawgiver. The Ethics and the Politics are a two-part but inseparable compound that together make a textbook for a politician-lawgiver. Both parts should be read together because the one cannot be understood correctly (i.e. as closely as possible to the intentions of their author) without the other. Aristotle studies human good not from the point of view of the individual but from the point of view of the human community. The highest human good – the philosopher’s eudaimonia – is achieved not by individual effort (or not fundamentally by that) but as a result of good laws and a well-organized life in a polis.

6

Aristotle’s πόλις: The Political Community as a Common Project

75%

Skowroński L.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2017

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vol. 8

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issue 1

343-358

EN

At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.

PL

At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.

7

„Euthymia” we fragmentach Demokryta z Abdery

72%

Narecki K.

Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae

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2021

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vol. 31

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issue 1

179-204

EN

The author carries out a thorough philological analysis of 9 fragments of Democritus, in which both the noun εὐθυμίη and related verbs and adjectives appear. This allows to establish the contextual semantic scope of the basic concept and to define the role it plays in Democritus’ ethical thought.

8

Thinking About End of Life in Teleological Terms

72%

Biondi P., Haliburton R.

Diametros

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2015

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issue Diametros 45

1-18

EN

This brief paper presents an Aristotelian-inspired approach to end-of-life decision making. The account focuses on the importance of teleology, in particular, the telos of eudaimonia understood as the goal of human flourishing as well as the telos of medicine when a person’s eudaimonia is threatened by serious illness and death. We argue that an Aristotelian bioethics offers a better alternative to a “fundamentalist bioethics” since the telos of eudaimonia (i) offers a more realistic conception of the self and the realities of frailty and mortality, (ii) provides a more objective basis for making decisions regarding end-of-life treatment and care, and (iii) is better able to resist the pull of the Technological Imperative. In addition, this teleological concept is flexible enough for it to be employed in multicultural and pluralistic societies.

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THE END OF MAN IN JACQUES MARITAIN’S CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

58%

Scrandis D. A.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2017

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vol. 6

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issue 4

573-583

EN

This essay considers man’s perennial search for the meaning of life, specifically in its philosophical (Aristotelian) formulation namely as the pursuit of happiness, and how Christianity radically redefined the issue. Jacques Maritain began his philosophical analysis on the basis of Aristotle’s analysis because he regards Aristotle’s position as the finest fruit of reason even though it fails. Maritain’s analysis supplements Aristotle’s with man’s experience of the Incarnation and the Christian’s experience of faith, hope, and charity. Jesus promised the good thief “Today thou shalt be with me in paradise” (Luke 23:43) and thereby identified God as man’s objective end. Jacques Maritain’s reflection employs rational concepts drawn from reason and theological concepts taken from theology, adequately considered the issue, and constitutes a Christian philosophical treatment of the end of man.

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Toward a Critical Appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for the 21st Century

58%

Brien K. M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2016

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issue 4

49-67

EN

This is a working paper that presents the first phase of what will eventually be a huge project, namely a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Early on it provides a sketch of the main strands of Aristotle’s theoretical web in his N. Eth-ics. Following that, the paper offers some critical commentary concerning some of Aris-totle’s main positions: especially his views on moral virtue, the soul, intellectual virtue, and human well-being. The paper then turns to the development of some significantly different ways of construing both intellectual virtue as well as moral virtue. With re-spect to intellectual virtue, I present my own perspective in interconnection with a pro-cess-oriented way of understanding reality, as opposed to Aristotle’s substance-oriented way. With respect to moral virtue, I present my interpretation in relation to a this-worldly understanding of the human spirit/soul, as well as a humanistic-Marxist inter-pretation of human well-being. Toward the paper’s end, I offer some suggestions con-cerning a modified “doctrine of the mean” that would be a sort of critical synthesis of the views of Aristotle and Confucius.

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Sense of Balance in Indian Conceptualisation of Psychological Well-being

51%

Swaminathan J. J., Crea G., Formella Z.

Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae

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2021

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vol. 19

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issue 4

55-68

PL

Pojęcie dobrostanu psychicznego (PDP) przyciąga uwagę zarówno tych, którzy mieszkają na Globalnej Północy, jak i tych na Globalnym Południu. Podobnie jak zachodnia koncepcja PDP, jej indyjski odpowiednik ma długą historię, sięgającą co najmniej 3000 lat. Opracowanie to podkreśla, że w Indiach „poczucie równowagi” (sanskryt sama) jest nadrzędną zasadą, która kieruje dobrostanem ekologicznym, społecznym i osobistym. To poczucie równowagi jest omawiane w oparciu o takie pojęcia jak hedonizm i eudajmonia, które można znaleźć zarówno w zachodniej, jak i indyjskiej koncepcji PDP. Główne różnice obejmują kolektywistyczną naturę Hindusów, ich nacisk na duchowość oraz to, że cierpienie i szczęście są dwoma wymiarami jednej rzeczywistości. Dzięki porównawczej metodzie narracji dowiedziono, że takie indyjskie terminy, jak Sama, Dharma, Sattva, Rajas i Tamas, w znaczący sposób korespondują z takimi uniwersalnymi zasadami, jak etyczne życie, zaangażowanie społeczne i świadomość duchowa. Podsumowując, indyjska konceptualizacja PDP głosi, że jest ona holistyczna, zintegrowana i zrównoważona. Rozszerzoną perspektywą tego poczucia równowagi jest jego adekwatność w umożliwianiu ludziom osiągnięcia równowagi ekologicznej, niezależnie od ich przynależności kulturowej.

EN

The concept of psychological well-being (PWB) engages the attention of those who live in the Global North, as well as those in the Global South. Similar to the Western concept of PWB, its Indian conceptualisation too, has a long history dating back to at least 3,000 years. This article accentuates that, in India, a ‘sense of balance’ (sama in Sanskrit) is an overarching principle that guides ecological, social, and personal well-being. This sense of balance is discussed in the exposition of concepts, such as hedonia and eudaimonia, which are found in both the Western and Indian concept of PWB. Major differences include the collectivist nature of Indians, their emphasis of spirituality and their belief that suffering and happiness are two dimensions of a single reality. Through a comparative narrative method, it is evidenced that Indian constructs, namely, Sama, Dharma, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas resonate meaningfully with universal principles, such as ethical living, social commitment, and spiritual awareness. In short, Indian conceptualisation of PWB holds that it is holistic, integrated, and balanced. An extended prospect of this sense of balance is its appropriateness in enabling people to achieve ecological balance, irrespective of their cultural affiliations.

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Czym jest szczęście? Analiza zagadnienia na podstawie koncepcji Władysława Tatarkiewicza

Polska adaptacja Kwestionariusza Dobrostanu (Psychological Well-Being Scales) Caroll Ryff

An Aristotelian Naturalist Perspective on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration

Elementy psychologii pozytywnej w nawiązaniu do rozważań Arystotelesa

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics: Their Common Field of Inquiry and Their Common Reader

Aristotle’s πόλις: The Political Community as a Common Project

„Euthymia” we fragmentach Demokryta z Abdery

Thinking About End of Life in Teleological Terms

THE END OF MAN IN JACQUES MARITAIN’S CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

Toward a Critical Appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for the 21st Century

Sense of Balance in Indian Conceptualisation of Psychological Well-being