Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  european union law
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The article explores a new phenomenon that has recently emerged in the ordinary legislative procedure: the early informal legislative agreements. They can be defined as legislative acts which are negotiated informally in restricted and secluded trilogues by a group of representatives from the European Parliament the Council and the European Commission, and then adopted formally without any change under the first or early second reading. The aim of the article is to identify and explain the conditions under which early first reading agreements are likely to occur. Based on social constructivism assumptions, a series of hypotheses are posed. They are complemented by control factors emphasized by rationalist theories. The hypotheses and factors are tested on an original and manually collected database consisting of 615 legislative acts (regulations, directives, decisions and framework decisions) adopted between 1999 and 2009 under the codecision procedure (at present, ordinary legislative procedure) and subjected to at least one amendment proposed by the European Parliament. The results show that early agreements are better explained by constructivism than rationalism. First, early agreements are the result of socialization into cooperative norms, as their likelihood increases with the time informal trilogues have been in use. Second, early agreements are more likely when legislative acts are negotiated during the 20 months preced-ing the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European Parliament. Third, European Parliament committees have a profound impact on early agreements. They are likely in the LIBE and ECON whereas unlikely in TRAN and CULT. Fourth, there is no evidence that distributional, regulatory, formal or complex character of the legislative file affects the early conclusion. The only exception is the saliency of the act, although it loses its role when taking into account early sec-ond-reading agreements.
EN
The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical assessment of the existing Law on Personal Data Protection in the Republic of Macedonia. The paper aims to analyse whether there is a need for additional legal tools in order to achieve a balance between maintaining data integrity in the digital age and the use of modern technology. The paper discusses the meaning of “information privacy” in the age of big data, cyber threats and the domestic and international response to these issues. Special focus is dedicated to privacy policy enforcement in European Union Law. Having regard to the development of new technologies, prevailing data protection legislation may no longer be able to provide effective protection for individuals’ personal information. Therefore, existing laws should be continuously adapted to respond to new challenges and situations deriving from different online activities and communications.
PL
Unia Europejska nie posiada kompetencji do ustalania wynagrodzeń, ale może zaproponować wspólne kryteria, które można wziąć pod uwagę przy ich ustalaniu w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich. Komisja Europejska przedłożyła zatem projekt dyrektywy w sprawie adekwatnych wynagrodzeń minimalnych w Unii Europejskiej. Jej równorzędnymi celami są ustanowienie ram prawnych na poziomie Unii w celu zapewnienia godziwych płac minimalnych oraz wzmocnienie procesów prowadzenia negocjacji zbiorowych w UE. Płaca minimalna nie ma być jednolita w całej Unii, nie ma też planów harmonizacji systemów jej ustalania. Ponadto wszelkie środki przewidziane przez dyrektywę byłyby stosowane w sposób zróżnicowany, w zależności od rozwiązań i tradycji obowiązujących w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich, z pełnym poszanowaniem ich kompetencji, drogą stopniowego wdrażania w celu osiągnięcia pewnych minimalnych standardów. Mimo to projekt już obecnie spotyka się z krytyką niektórych państw członkowskich ze względu na ingerencję w ich kompetencje, a także niektórych posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego ze względu na swój niedostatecznie „ambitny” charakter.
EN
The European Union has no competencies in the fifi eld of directly setting wages, but it can propose common criteria to be taken into consideration when wages are set on a Member State level. The European Commission is therefore proposing a directive on adequate minimum wages in the European Union. Its twin objectives would be to establish a framework at Union level to ensure fair minimum wages, their adequacy and an increase in their accessibility by workers, and to strengthen collective bargaining in Europe, as high collective bargaining coverage tends to lead to lower share of low-wage workers. The minimum wage will not be uniform across the EU, nor there are any plans to harmonise the systems of setting it. In addition, any possible measures would be applied in a differentiated manner, depending on the systems applicable in particular Member States as well as traditions followed therein, in full respect of the competencies of the Member States, in order to achieve minimum standards through gradual implementation. Nevertheless the proposal is already facing criticism of certain Member States for intrusion into their competencies, as well as of some members of the European Parliament for not being ‘ambitious’ enough.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.