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EN
The following essay is dedicated to a particular way of the creation of space and places by Grabinski in his novels. These spaces can be both analysed as an action scenes and as an important part of the story building up the overall horror atmosphere. An aptly constructed space can evoke the impression of fear and danger. Together with other irrational incidents in the storis, space co-creates the very atmosphere in the novels by Stefan Grabinski. It must not, however, be forgotten that this space can as well be fully meaningful by itself. The evil houses play a particular horror-bearing role in the Grabinski's literary creations. It is said that such literary figures represent a hidden core of the human nature, as if they were two emmanations of the personality's structure combining both the waking life and the sphere of dreaming. Space so originally thought by Grabinski is a means to their symbolic presentations as weird, unconscious yet always active reality.
EN
Sport is - and should be - an amoral phenomenon (what should not be confused with an immoral one); that is, a phenomenon which is completely independent from ethics, except of, possibly, deontological ethics which concerns professionals who have professional obligations towards their employers and other persons who are provided with and influenced by their services.Conduct according to rules of a given sport has no moral character. It has only pragmatic character, similarly as conduct in compliance with principles of the administrative code, the civil code or the penal code. Of course, when you act in accordance with rules of sports rivalry you can additionally realize also other aims - like, for example, aesthetic, spectacular or moral ones. However, in each case rules of the game and legal norms have priority, because they are the most important regulative determinant of conduct in various societies, including variously defined human teams. The above mentioned legal and sports regulations are not moral norms. They can, however, influence moral behaviours if they are in conflict with the law or rules of the game.From that viewpoint moral norms are exterritorial in their relation to assumptions and rules of a particular sport. Contestants and people responsible for them - like, for example, coaches or sports officials - as well as their employers are neither required to account for their moral beliefs, nor for their moral behaviours, if only they act in compliance with rules of sports rivalry.
PL
Artykuł prezentuje filozoficzną koncepcję zła moralnego w myśli Martina Bubera (†1965) jako braku ukierunkowania życia. Źródłem inspiracji dla koncepcji Bubera były mity biblijne i perskie. Artykuł ma cztery części: 1) pojęcie mitu (świadectwo spotkania z Absolutem i narzędzie w odkryciu prawdy egzystencjalnej); 2) przesłanie mitów biblijnych (przeciwieństwa wpisane w naturę ludzką oraz wezwanie do ukierunkowania swego życia na Boga); 3) przekaz mitów perskich (niebezpieczeństwo kłamstwa egzystencjalnego oraz braku decyzji); 4) filozoficzne ujęcie zła (zło jako życie człowieka w chaosie możliwości i braku ukierunkowania swego życia na Boga).
EN
The paper presents the philosophical idea of moral evil in the thought of Martin Buber (†1965) as the lack of direction in the life of a man. The source of inspiration were for the concept of Buber biblical and Persian myths. The paper has four parts: 1) idea of myth (testimony of the meeting with the Absolute and instrument in searching for the existential truth); 2) message of the biblical myths (contradiction in the human nature and appeal to the direction of the life); 3) Persian myths (danger of existential lie and lack of decision); 4) philosophical idea of evil (existance in the chaos of possibilities and lack of the direction in the life to God).
EN
One of the most important ideas for the strategists of security is the idea of evil. This idea must be considered in two aspects: as a philosophical thought (as evil „in itself ”) and as related to concrete evil we can encounter. If we accept that the evil is real, it must be destroyed. If we accept that it is only a lack of good, should be completed to restore balance. The article spotlights the forgotten Zoroaster’s theories and some of their adaptations placed in the context of modern definitions of reality, human nature, hostility, war, and leadership. The summary encourages reflexion of the question what contemporary strategists can learn from Zoroaster.
EN
The paper analyses various conceptions of good and evil, as well as the bases of these two basic values. The author does not present these values in isolation but as elements of metaphysical conceptions and also of social systems.
EN
This study in its current form has been inspired by the keynote lecture of Dr Christian M. Billing at the Brno Theatralia Conference in 2016 analysing two productions of Othello, one of them being the production of 2014 at the National Theatre Brno. He questioned the way scenography could raise issues of race and identity using common material signifiers such as props, costumes or theatre make-up. The presented study proposes a polemic with his conclusions based on an overview of the productions of Othello within the Czechoslovak context and suggests Czech and Slovak critics should pay more attention to the issues of race and identity with regards to productions of Othello.
Organon
|
2020
|
vol. 52
101-131
XX
The problem of evil is unavoidable and largely incomprehensible, and it is exactly for that reason that it is of great importance for our being. This aspect of Tischner’s philosophy can be successfully shown using the example of Andrei Srubov, the protagonist of The Chekist. By looking at Tischner’s agathology we receive hope that we are not doomed to be defeated by evil within our lifetime. What seems to be crucial in opposing evil is the realization that there is always a decision to be made.
PL
The Twentieth Century provided the religious and irreligious alike with tremendous challenges in regards to belief. Evil and carnage were pervasive and the Church was in decline. In that cultural moment rose an interpreter of that challenge who theodicy was clear and efficient in answering the complex challenge of evil in the modern world. John Paul II, more than almost any other figure of the age, addressed the vexing issue of evil in the modern world. In the corpus of his writing mankind comes to know evil through an act of memory, remembering from where evil sprang, and what evil has done in man to separate him from his creator. And mankind comes to terms with identity of evil as seen and experienced through the act of suffering. Through processing memory, and examining identity, mankind can discover how Jesus Christ’s work on Calvary places us at the threshold of victory.
9
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Reincarnation in Plato and in the Christian Perspective

88%
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2015
|
vol. 6
|
issue 1
195-204
EN
The present study focuses on research about reincarnation in order to formulate some preliminary conclusions concerning various philosophical theories. The overview extends over a considerable period range, from ancient Greek and up to the patristic tradition. The relevant issues include the problem of evil, the question of human decomposition and death as well as reincarnation (metempsychosis) in the Platonic thought. The problem of evil is a problem of reason that emerges from the philosophical background of ancient Greek thought but also from the subsequent Christian patristic thought and transforms itself into diverse concepts (e.g. the significance of justice). According to the original thought of Socrates, evil is associated with ignorance and good with knowledge. This point of view is given a brief review in the philosophical thought of several important representatives of the patristic tradition (e.g., Origen and Gregory of Nyssa). On the other hand, the idea of immortality of the soul, which dates to the religious movement of the Orphic mysteries (seventh century BC) means that the persistence of the immortal soul at the moment of death needs the use of a new body. This essay will try to analyze the ancient character of the myth of reincarnation through the perspectives of philosophy and religion.
PL
The present article is an attempt at establishing a way of understanding the term evil as well as characterizing all the phenomena the term encompasses in communities of Polish and Russian students. The author analyses the results of a Free Word Association Test on the material of associative dictionaries.
EN
I would like to present in the article an “omnipotence model of a theodicy of chance”, which is, as I believe, compatible with the view called probabilistic theism. I also would like to argue that this model satisfies the criteria of being a good theodicy. By a good theodicy I mean a reasonable and plausible theistic account of evil. A good theodicy should be: a) comprehensive, b) adequate, c) authentic and d) existentially relevant.
EN
In this article, I will sketch a particular way of thinking about existence in time, the consequence of which would be practicing historiography as a response to the voices of the dead coming from the past. This theoretical conception of history tries to understand history not so much as an unfolding process of succession over time but as some community of the living and the dead. If the voices of the dead, defined in terms of spectrality, are to be active somehow in the present, they cannot be prematurely suppressed by gestures of closing the past understood as blocking the transmission of these voices to the future. After analyzing the problem of false closures in history, I am trying to understand spectrality that would combine both past and present activity. The article aims to propose tasks for a historiography that would consist in regaining in con-temporary culture the ability to hear the voice, the gaze, and the expectations coming from the past, present in various forms which can be grasped by an encompassing notion of spectrality. Reflection on spectrality brings us closer to the meaning of the concept of counter‑time.
13
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Zwrot etyczny i nowa antropologia moralności

88%
Lud
|
2014
|
vol. 98
137-156
EN
An inquiry into moral and ethical questions has been undertaken by anthropologists from the beginning of the discipline. Nonetheless, the lack of theoretical basis for conceptualizing ethics and morality was regularly regarded as a sign that the anthropology of morality was in the state of underdevelopment. The last decade or so witnessed an intensified interest of several anthropologists into theorizing ethical and moral issues within the discipline. This “movement” has been labelled an “ethical” or “moral turn”, or “the new anthropology of moralities”. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it analyzes the main theoretical approaches that emerged within recent years, i.e. anthropology of morality/moralities; anthropology of ethics; critical moral anthropology, and anthropology of evil. Second, it points at those social and cultural phenomena that have not yet received due attention from anthropologists of morality, such as politics, bioethics, and the immoral.
EN
From Sous le Soleil de Satan to Monsieur Ouine, Bernanos’ novels are characterized by the emergence of ‘supernatural silence(s)’ (Bernanos, 2015 : 679), which can prove to be disturbing. The brutal sign of evil’s appeance in the narrative limits in most cases the character to silence, to verbal incapacity. Indeed, evil has the strength to hold thought and speech in check. That is the reason why the characters that are racked by evil make good use of language so that they don’t say anything genuine nor honest. Bernanos’ writing succeds in defining these silences thanks to numerous ellipsis as well as things that remain unmentioned, embarrased silences, thus emphasizing the presence of the supernatural. Punctuation in particular takes an important part in creating breaks, switchovers within sentences as well as in the narrative. These silences show off an experience that cannot be told. As a consequence, a true rhetoric of what is unspeakable is at stake in Bernanos’ novels. The use of adjectives made up with privative prefixes, indefinite pronouns, rough phrases and other figures of what is unspoken, contribute to explaining evil’s unbelievable experience.
15
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God and Toleration

88%
|
2010
|
vol. 15
|
issue 2
335-353
EN
The enduring debate on the question of whether an omnipotent, omniscient God exists amid the existence of evils in the world is crucial to understanding religions. Much recent discussion has taken an approach in which the focal question is whether we can cognitively—for example, logically, evidentially, and the like—and rationally justify that God’s full power and full goodness cannot be doubted amid the existence of evils. In this paper I argue that we can reasonably assume that God exists in an evil-afflicted world if he chooses to do so and if he tolerates evils. We can reasonably argue that he does exist in an evil-afflicted world because he chooses to tolerate evils for whatever reasons. I would like to make a stronger claim: he tolerates evils in order to give humankind a chance to grow in knowledge of good and evils by combating evils, which implies that his toleration of evils imposes a task on humankind to combat evils.
16
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The Problem of Evil in Józef Tischner's Philosophy

88%
|
2007
|
vol. 12
|
issue 2
277-291
EN
The problem of evil is a metaphysical problem bound up with the conditions of human existence. The radical evil of fascism and communism, according to Józef Tischner, opens up the possibility that we live in the time of a modern Manichaeism, understood as having two faces: nihilism and pessimism. The possibility of thinking of such a modem form of Manichaeism necessarily calls for a new inquiry into the question of evil. For Tischner, evil, like good, is not an object, but something in which man participates, and for this reason it cannot be objectified and defined. One can only ask how it appears.
17
88%
|
2010
|
vol. 15
|
issue 2
251-274
EN
Skeptical theism—a strategy for dealing with so-called “evidential arguments from evil”—is often held to lead to moral skepticism. In this paper I look at some of the responses open to the skeptical theist to the contention that her position leads to moral skepticism, and argue that they are ultimately unsuccessful, since they leave the skeptical theist with no grounds for ruling out the possibility of maximal divine deception. I then go on to argue that the situation is particularly bleak for the skeptical theist, since the most prominent ways of dealing with this pervasive type of skepticism are not available to her. Furthermore, since this pervasive type of skepticism entails moral skepticism, it follows that moral skepticism will after all have found a way in “through the back door.” In order to solidify my case, I go on to outline and deal with three potential objections.
EN
The article attempts to trace Hannah Arendt’s presence in Gustaw Herling-Grudziński’s writing. The first time she appears in his texts is as the author of Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil – a bookthat the writer considered an exceptionally important voice in reflections about the nature of totalitarian systems and in the dispute over the nature of evil both in individual and metaphysical sense. Arendt’s analyses of basic dehumanisation mechanisms were close to him; he is fascinated by the soundness of Arendt’s key thesis on the ‘banality of evil.’ At the same time, Herling-Grudziński disputes with Arendt, indicating certain shortcomings in her thinking, mostly related to cognitive limitations resulting from herproposed take on the key problematics and partial disconsonance between theoretical disquisitions and existential experience. This criticism is limited and eventually Herling-Grudziński himself disputes with Arendt’s main critics. These issues are discussed in the final section of the article.
EN
Hannah Arendt brings the traditionally ontological practice of phenomenology into social and political philosophy. She does this in two ways: by employing phenomeno-logical methods in her approach to examining the world around her and by showing how phenomenology is related to ethical life through her description of thinking. In this article, I explore the first of these ways by locating Arendt’s methods in relation to Martin Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology, as given in the Being and Time. Arendt’s usage of phenomenological methods is clear in her examinations of banal evil and modern judicial systems. These topics lead to a discussion of how thinking, for Arendt, is a phenomenological activity that has bearing on ethical life. I will turn to Arendt’s essay, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship” to clarify how phenome-nology, as characteristic of the thinking Arendt prescribes, is ethically important.
20
Content available remote

Radikální a banální zlo

75%
EN
Hannah Arendt, in a letter to Gerschom Scholem, claims that now she has published her work Eichmann in Jerusalem she abandoned the concept of radical evil and came to the conclusion that evil has no depth or demonic dimension. This study analyses her understanding of radical evil in The Origins of Totalitarianism as well as the concept of the banality of evil in the book Eichmann in Jerusalem, and poses the question of whether Arendt’s thinking about evil marks a discontinuity, as not only the author herself asserts, but also some commentators (D. Villa), or whether the core of her thought on evil has not in any way altered and only points of emphasis are different (R. Bernstein). Arendt has reasons for her rejection of the concept of radical evil, which are connected with her opening assumption that evil is always merely shallow and banal, and that it cannot be overcome even dialectically. This thesis is not, however, new, and evidence of it can be found not only in The Origins of Totalitarianism but also in the correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers from the 1940s. The aim of this study is to show that the shift from the concept of radical evil to banal evil is a change in points of emphasis, rather than a change in the content of the concept, even if the points emphasized were already present in the earlier work of this important philosopher.
DE
Hannah Arendt stellt in ihrem Brief an Gerschom Scholem die Behauptung auf, dass sie den Begriff des radikalen Bösen nach Herausgabe ihres Werks Eichmann in Jerusalem aufgegeben habe und zu dem Schluss gelangt sei, dass das Böse weder Tiefe noch eine dämonische Dimension habe. In der vorliegenden Studie wird Arendts Auffassung des radikal Bösen in Ursprünge des Totalitarismus sowie der Begriff der Banalität des Bösen in ihrem Buch Eichmann in Jerusalem analysiert. Dabei wird die Frage gestellt, ob sich Arendts Nachdenken über das Böse durch Diskontinuität auszeichnet, wie nicht nur sie selbst, sondern auch einige Interpreten (D. Villa) behaupten, oder ob der Kern ihrer Gedanken über das Böse unverändert blieb und lediglich andere Schwerpunkte gesetzt werden (R. Bernstein). Arendt hat für ihre Ablehnung des Begriffs des radikal Bösen Gründe, die mit ihrer Ausgangsvoraussetzung zusammenhängen, der gemäß das Böse stets seicht und banal ist und daher auch nicht dialektisch überwunden werden kann. Diese These ist freilich nicht neu und ist sowohl in Ursprünge des Totalitarismus als auch in der Korrespondenz Hannah Arendts mit Karl Jaspers in den 40. Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts nachweisbar. Ziel der Studie ist es nachzuweisen, dass der Übergang vom Begriff des radikal Bösen zum Begriff des banalen Bösen nicht so sehr eine inhaltliche Begriffsänderung bedeutet, sondern eher eine Verlagerung der Schwerpunkte, die jedoch bereits in früheren Werken dieser bedeutenden Philosophin präsent waren
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