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Human Affairs
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2011
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vol. 21
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issue 3
249-261
EN
Strawson’s work seems to contain both pragmatic and semantic concepts of presupposition. The former concept has largely been studied by many philosophers and linguists, while the latter has not been properly investigated (van Fraassen being an exception). The present author explicates the semantic concept of existential presupposition in relation to deriving existential statements and distinguishing their de dicto/de re variants (in the rather generalized sense following Tichý).
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Logický čtverec a otázka existence

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EN
The aim of this article is to challenge a time-honoured myth which claims that the Aristotelian demarcation of the mutual relations between particular types of categorical judgements, as represented in the “square of opposition”, and also a part of Aristotelian syllogistics, are not valid from the point of view of modern logic without the assumption of the non-emptiness of the concepts under consideration. In reality, however, the Aristotelian tradition works with empty concepts and the square of opposition is valid for those concepts. The only problem is with the inadequate formal transcription of categorical judgements which modern logic usually offers: it assumes, that is, an “existential import” (if the judgement is true then there must exist an instance of the subject’s concept) in partial judgements, while the Aristotelian logic assumes it in positive judgements. On this Aristotelian assumption, the relations of the square of opposition, and syllogistics in general, function without difficulties, even for empty concepts. This had been quite explicitly formulated by medieval logicians. In the following part of the article, some traditionally controversial expressions of Aristotle concerning just this question of existential import are analysed. Some of these controversies probably stem from the confusion of two different problems – on the one hand, the question of the mutual logical relations of the categorical judgements under analysis, on the other hand the problem of the possibility of a truthful account of non-existent objects. To this second problem the Aristotelian tradition takes a different approach than modern logic, which considers existence as a second-order property and identifies it with presence in the universe.
EN
I examine the familiar quadruple of categorical statements “Every F is/is not G”, “Some F is/is not G” as well as the quadruple of their modal versions “Necessarily, every F is/is not G”, “Possibly, some F is/is not G”. I focus on their existential import and its impact on the resulting Squares of Opposition. Though my construal of existential import follows modern approach, I add some extra details which are enabled by framing my definition of existential import within expressively rich higherorder partial type logic. As regards the modal categorical statements, I find that so-called void properties bring existential import to them, so they are the only properties which invalidate subalternation, and thus also contrariety and subcontrariety, in the corresponding Square of Opposition.
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Aristotelés, Łukasiewicz a prázdné termíny:

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EN
In recent times there has been a shift in the interpretation of Aristotle’s logic. Many researchers have pointed out that the concept of existential import appears in Aristotle’s logic and philosophy, and that Aristotle worked with the concept of empty terms although his concept differs from that which is used in modern logic. Additionally, his search for the “culprits” of old and incorrect interpretation has been tied to the development of modern interpretation. Apart from the traditional concept of the logical square and syllogistics, where the assumption of non-emptiness of terms was widely used, J. L. Łukasiewicz is also labeled as an offender. This article tries to show that Łukasiewicz was aware that Aristotle was also dealing with empty terms. His restriction of syllogistics to only non-empty terms therefore differs significantly from the approach of traditional logicians.
CS
V poslední době dochází k posunu v interpretacích Aristotelovy logiky. Mnozí badatelé poukazují na to, že i v Aristotelově logice a filosofii se objevuje pojetí existenčního importu a že Aristotelés pracoval s pojetím prázdných termínů, třebaže se jeho koncepce liší od pojetí moderní logiky. S rozvojem moderní interpretace se pojí také hledání „viníků“ staré a nesprávné interpretace. Kromě tradičního pojetí logického čtverce a sylogistiky, kde byl předpoklad neprázdnosti termínů hojně používán, je za viníka označován také J. L. Łukasiewicz. Tento článek se snaží ukázat, že Łukasiewicz si byl vědom toho, že se Aristotelés zabýval i prázdnými termíny. Jeho omezení sylogistiky pouze na neprázdné termíny se tedy podstatně liší od přístupu tradičních logiků.
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