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EN
This paper analyses the impact of Spanish Renaissance science (particularly natural history and cosmography) – or rather, its methodology – on the scientific thought of Francis Bacon. The aim of this study is to identify the features of Baconian thought that are similar to some of the concepts and practices of Spanish scholars (Francisco Hernandez, Juan Huarte de San Juan and cosmographers of the House of Trade in Seville). Specifically, the text tries to demonstrate the hypothetic influence of Spanish thought on Bacon's concepts of the institutionalisation of knowledge, empirical and experimental methods of scientific research, the idea that "power is knowledge" and the ways of classification of sciences. Some simplifications and misinterpretations of the Spanish roots of Baconian science (Cañizares-Esguerra, A. Barrera-Osorio, T. J. Reiss, D. Goodman and J. Pimentel) are also reappraised or refuted in this paper.
EN
The seventeenth century witnessed the transition from qualitative to quantitative physics. The very process was not easy and obvious and it consisted of discussions in many fields. One of them was the question about the nature of chemistry which was at the time undergoing some changes towards the form we know now. The main argument concerned the explanatory principles one should invoke to understand properly certain outcomes of chemical experiments. The present paper is a presentation of such an (indirect) argument between R. Boyle, a prominent proponent of corpuscular, quantitative principles and S. Duclos, an al-chymist and a proponent of paracelsian, qualitative ones. What is interesting, Duclos knew The Sceptical Chymist, Boyle’s main work which contained a severe critique of paracelsian chemistry, and a%empted to point out some weaknesses of Boyle’s own position. Duclos scrutinized Boyle’s experiments described in his Certain Physiological Essays and other works and argued for certain shortcomings of Boyle’s laboratory skills, his failure to indicate some literature sources and, first of all, insufficiency of Boyle’s arguments for the corpuscular thesis. According to Duclos, Boyle did not follow in laboratory certain procedures recommended by himself, using unclear notions and applying the corpuscular principles without proper justification. What is more, Duclos argued also in favour of paracelsian chymistry presenting some qualitative explanations in experiments in which Boyle failed to give quantitative ones. Knowing the further development of natural philosophy, it seems interesting to realize how complex it was. The present paper shows also how much irremovable from scientific research is the theoretical component.
EN
The 17th century faced some deep changes within the scope of the philosophy of nature. Having discarded hylemorphism, modern philosophers had to find new ways of gaining knowledge of and explaining natural phenomena. One of the new currents was the experimental philosophy that had a famous proponent – Robert Boyle. Nevertheless the new method also had its opponents, Thomas Hobbes being one of the most prominent of them. The present paper is an attempt to show the most fundamental reasons why the two philosophers took radically opposite positions towards the experimental method. The discussion started with T. Hobbes’s work Dialogus physicus de natura aeris which was a severe critique of Boyle’s New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, touching the Spring of the Air. The paper is not any examination of the detailed discussion of the two, rather it focuses on differences concerning the concepts of knowledge (philosophy) accepted by them and some theoretical problems interwoven with the way of experiment. It seems that Boyle accepted to some extent the probabilistic and temporal concept of knowledge, whereas Hobbes defended the traditional ideal of universal and certain one, and maintained that experiments cannot be any source of it. Hobbes was in favor of the deductive concept of natural philosophy. What is more, Hobbes pointed out that experimentalists’ attempts to secure some degree of certainty fail because they are built on some conventional presumptions. According to Hobbes, any outcome of an experiment must be strongly influenced by those assumed assumptions. Further development of sciences and also the philosophy of sciences proved the deductive concept of natural philosophy ineffective, on the other hand, however, Hobbes was right in pointing out the inevitable theoretical context of any pursuit after ‘matters of fact’.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie możliwości zastosowania metody eksperymentu w kontekście badań prowadzonych w obszarze zarządzania zasobami ludzkimi. Pośrednimi etapami służącymi do realizacji wskazanego celu było omówienie ogólnych podejść do analiz w omawianym obszarze i wskazanie historycznych przykładów zastosowania eksperymentu w badaniach nad człowiekiem w procesie pracy. Następnie scharakteryzowano zasady prowadzenia badań przy użyciu analizowanej metody. Przedstawiono także dylematy związane z możliwościami stosowania eksperymentu oraz wskazano błędy, które obniżają rzetelność podjętych badań. Artykuł ma charakter problemowy i został oparty na studiach literaturowych połączonych z refleksją naukową.
EN
The aim of the article is to present the possibility of applying the experimental method in empirical research conducted in the field of human resource management. The intermediate steps leading to this objective involve a discussion on approaches to general research in the field. They also include the identification of historical examples of using experimentation in studying people in the work process. At the same time there are dilemmas coupled with the ability to actually perform experiments and an indication of errors that lower the reliability of performed experiments is provided. The paper shows a problem-oriented approach and is based on topical literature studies combined with academic reflection.
EN
The seventeenth century witnessed the transition from the qualitative physics to quantitative. The very process was not easy and obvious, it consisted of discussions in many fields. One of them was the question about the nature of chemistry which was undergoing then some changes towards the form we know now. The main argument concerned the explanatory principles one should invoke to understand properly certain outcomes of chemical experiments. The present paper is a presentation of such an (indirect) argument between R. Boyle, a prominent proponent of corpuscular, quantitative principles and S. Duclos, an al-chymist and a proponent of paracelsian, qualitative ones. What is interesting Duclos knew The Sceptical Chymist, Boyle’s main work which contained a severe critique of paracelsian chymistry, and attempted to point out some weaknesses of Boyle’s own position. Duclos scrutinized Boyle’s experiments described in his Certain Physiological Essays and other works and argued for certain shortcomings of Boyle’s laboratory skills, his failure to indicate some literature sources and, first of all, insufficiency of Boyle’s arguments for the corpuscular thesis. According to Duclos, Boyle did not follow in laboratory certain procedures recommended by himself, using unclear notions and applying the corpuscular principles without proper justification. What is more, Duclos argued also in favor of paracelsian chymistry presenting some qualitative explanations in experiments in which Boyle failed to give quantitative ones. Knowing the further development of natural philosophy, it seems interesting to realize how complex it was. The present paper shows also how much irremovable from scientific research is the theoretical component.
PL
W XVII wieku rozpoczął się proces przechodzenia od nauki uprawianej w aspekcie jakościowym do nauki uprawianej w aspekcie ilościowym. Był on złożony i pociągał za sobą dyskusje na wielu polach. Jedna z nich odnosiła się do natury rodzącej się nowoczesnej chemii. Główna linia sporu dotyczyła rodzaju zasad wyjaśniających (jakościowych czy ilościowych), do których należy się odwołać przy wyjaśnianiu wyników eksperymentów. Obecny artykuł opisuje szczegóły (pośredniej) dyskusji między R. Boyle’em, jednym z głównych zwolenników zasad korpuskularnych, ilościowych, i S. Duclosem, al-‘chemikiem’ i zwolennikiem teorii paracelsjańskich i zasad jakościowych. Co ciekawe, Duclos znał The Sceptical Chymist, główne dzieło Boyle’a, w którym zawarł on surową krytykę ‘chemii’ paracelsjańskiej, i podjął próbę wskazania słabych punktów stanowiska Boyle’owskiego. Duclos zanalizował eksperymenty, jakie Boyle opisał w "Certain Physiological Essays" i innych dziełach i wskazał na popełnione błędy – jego zdaniem Boyle nie zna dobrze praktyki laboratoryjnej; pomija źródła, z jakich korzysta opisując niektóre eksperymenty; przede wszystkim jednak nie potrafi przekonująco argumentować na rzecz tezy korpuskularnej. Zdaniem Duclosa, Boyle nie przestrzega procedur, które sam zaleca – posługuje się niejasnym językiem i arbitralnie odwołuje się do wyjaśnień korpuskularnych. Co więcej, Duclos argumentuje na rzecz paracelsjańskiej koncepcji ‘chemii’, przedstawiając jakościowe wyjaśnienia w eksperymentach, w których Boyle nie zdołał podać wyjaśnień ilościowych. Przedstawiona krytyka poglądów Boyle’a pokazuje jak złożony był proces wyłaniania się ilościowego podejścia do filozofii naturalnej, pokazuje również istotną rolę, jaką w badaniach naukowych odgrywa składnik teoretyczny.
6
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Jak rekonstruować językowo-kulturowy obraz Europy?

45%
PL
Autor nawiązuje do wypowiedzi Wojciecha Chlebdy i Anny Horolets na temat Europy i podtrzymuje postulat metodologiczny, by rekonstrukcję JOS w ramach programu EUROJOS nastawić na to, co wspólnotowe, utrwalone w potocznym (standardowym) wariancie języka, by nie ograniczać się do jakiegoś jednego typu danych (np. frazeologizmów czy przysłów), do jednego typu dyskursu publicznego (np. politycznego). W płaszczyźnie metodologicznej postulat ten oznacza sięganie do wielu źródeł materiałowych i stosowania różnych technik ich analizy. Podstawą rekonstrukcji JOS powinna być baza „zrównoważona”, na oparta na danych językowosystemowych, językowo-tekstowych (dostępnych dzięki narodowym korpusom językowych) oraz źródłach wywołanych (metodami kwestionariuszowymi, ankietowymi), w skrócie S-A-T. Autor pokazuje, że w przypadku EUROPY sięgnięcie do metody eksperymentalnej (ankieta typu otwartego) pozwala ubogie dane słownikowe i bardzo zróżnicowane dane tekstowe wzbogacić i zweryfikować.
EN
The author relates to the words of Wojciech Chlebda and Anna Horolets concerning Europe (at a meeting of the Ethnolinguistic Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, December 4, 2009, published in the present volume in a slightly modified form) and continues to advocate his methodological postulate that the reconstruction of the linguistic worldview (JOS) within the EUROJOS research programme focus on what is common, entrenched in the colloquial (standard) variety of a given language, rather than limiting oneself to just one category of data (collocations, proverbs) or a single type of discourse (e.g. political). On the methodological platform, the postulate amounts to making use of various sources of data and techniques of their analysis. A reconstruction of the linguistic worldview should be based on a “balanced” foundation, embracing systemic-linguistic data, textual data (corpora) and questionnaires. The author shows that in the case of EUROPE, the last, experimental method (open-ended questionnaires) enables one to enrich and verify poor lexicographic data as well as diversified textual data.
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