Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  factivity
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
Milne [2005] argued that a sentence saying of itself that it does not have a truthmaker is true but does not have a truthmaker. López de Sa and Zardini [2006] worried that, by parity of reasoning, one should conclude that a sentence saying of itself that it is not both true and short is true but not short. Recently, Milne [2013] and Gołosz [2015] have replied to López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, arguing in different ways that the worry is illfounded. In this paper, I’ll address these replies and argue that they fail to dispel López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, bringing out in the process some broader points concerning the use of self-referential sentences in arguments in philosophy of logic.
Polonica
|
2018
|
vol. 38
232-244
EN
The subject of the paper are such types of utterances as Nie sądzę, że p, ja to wiem (I don t believe that p, I know it). In particular, interpretive controversies of this kind of utterances are discussed. The applied research method consists in a comparative analysis of the collected language material. Moreover, the present-ed extensive empirical material confirms the thesis that such utterances are indeed corrective. The conclu-sions from the analyses support the thesis that the classical definition of knowledge (of justified true belief) is internally contradictory due to the fact that verb wiedzieć, że_ (know that_) is defined by a non-factive verb być przekonanym, że_ (be convinced that_).
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.