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Pragmatism and Evolutionary Epistemology

100%
Marsonet M.
Academicus. International Scientific Journal
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2017
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issue 16
105-112
EN
To understand the significance of a pragmatist stance in this matter we must address a basic question: which kind of evolution are we referring to when talking of “evolutionary epistemology”? If we take evolution to be an undifferentiated concept, such that no useful distinction can be found in it, we are on a wrong track. The evolutionary “pattern” is certainly one, but this should not lead us to assume that the specific characteristics of mankind must be left out of the picture, either because they are not important or because no specifically human characteristic is admitted. Nicholas Rescher’s evolutionary framework, for example, is instead pluralistic and multi-sided. It is worth noting how and why Rescher’s evolutionary epistemology differs from the one delineated in a famous book by Karl Popper. The Austrian-born philosopher based his approach on the “random conjectures and refutation” model. A scientist, for example, faces the problem of explaining nature’s doings by one of the endlessly many hypotheses that he has at his disposal. Subsequently he chooses to endorse a conjecture from this infinite range, and the testing itself, via falsification, furnishes the necessary selection. According to Popper’s picture we have, in sum, a sort of blind and random mechanism: his “trial-and-error” search procedure. Rescher’s opinion about this issue is that, on such Popperian grounds, scientific progress becomes more or less inexplicable. In particular, the success in providing explanatory theories that perform well in prediction and the guidance of applications in a complex world is now an accident of virtually miracolous proportions.
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O racjonalną krytykę racjonalizmu krytycznego - teoria postępu naukowego w ujęciu Popperowskiego racjonalizmu krytycznego

100%
Hanuszewicz S.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2011
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issue 48
95-110
PL
We analyse the position of David C. Stove who accuses Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos of being irrationalists. We concentrate on the subject whether this accusation is correct as far as Popper is concerned. In Stove's opinion, putting some words - like 'knowledge', 'discovery' or 'solution of a problem' - into quotation marks is irrational because our knowledge constantly grows, and we know more and more. Stove's position should be qualified as a foundationalism. He refuses Popper's fallibilism and, for this reason, cannot accept the view that all our knowledge is tentative and hypothetical. From the critical rationalism point of view, although our knowledge progresses, we are not justified in believing that we possess safe foundations for our knowledge, just because there are no such foundations. This position justifies our putting some success-words into quotation marks. If we accept fallibilism, formulated within framework of critical rationalism, there are good reasons for the neutralization procedure.
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Problem antecedencji fallibilizmu w poglądach Karneadesa

84%
Kubok D.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2018
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vol. 41
5-24
PL
Artykuł podejmuje problem rozpoznania i krytycznego rozważenia antecedencji fallibilizmu w filozofii Karneadesa. Warto zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że fallibilizm jest stanowiskiem, którego charakterystyka nie jest jednoznaczna. W pierwszej zatem kolejności należy wyodrębnić rdzeń znaczeniowy tej doktryny (przede wszystkim zarówno wymiar negatywny, jak i pozytywny), aby się nim posługiwać w rozważaniach historyczno-filozoficznych. Intencją artykułu nie jest próba dowodzenia, że Karneades był fallibilistą przed Peircem i Popperem, czy też że był on prekursorem tego stanowiska. Zasadniczy cel rozważań koncentruje się na krytycznym przeglądzie argumentów dotyczących fallibilistycznego odczytania jego poglądów. W tym celu odróżniony zostanie fallibilizm globalny i fallibilizm lokalny, a także omówione zostanie stanowisko eudajmonologicznego fallibilizmu. Tym samym rozważania podjęte w tym artykule mieścić się będą w obrębie ożywionej obecnie dyskusji nad historycznymi źródłami fallibilizmu.
EN
In this article, I undertake an attempt at recognizing and critically analyzing antecedents of fallibilism in the philosophy of Carneades. Because descriptions of fallibilism are somewhat ambiguous, it is imperative that we first determine the semantic root of this doctrine (both in its negative and positive dimensions) before discussing it in historical and philosophical reflections. The main goal of this article is not to prove that Carneades was a fallibilist before Peirce and Popper, or that he was a precursor of this position; rather, the aim is to critically review arguments for and against fallibilistic interpretations of Carneades’ views. To this end, I introduce a distinction between global and local fallibilism, as well as discuss the position of eudaimonological fallibilism. The reflections contained in this article fit with the current lively debate on the historical roots of fallibilism.
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Metodologická východiska kritického racionalismu H. Alberta

84%
Paitlová J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2015
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vol. 63
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issue 4
561-580
EN
This study presents a systematic treatment of the critical rationalism of the German philosopher Hans Albert, a follower of Karl R. Popper. On the basis of an analysis of his key works (Traktat über kritische Vernunft, Die Wissenschaft und die Fehlbarkeit der Vernunft, Kritischer Rationalismus, Kritische Vernunft und Rationale Praxis etc.) the eight main methodological tenets of his philosophical conception are presented. They are: 1. universal criticism, 2. consequentialist fallibilism, 3. methodological revisionism, 4. critical realism, 5. theoretical pluralism, 6. constructive metaphysics, 7. the postulate of a single method of science, and 8. a proposal of a way of life. In reference to each of these tenets, the author explains the intellectual tradition in contrast to which Albert defines his own position and, at the same time, considers several critical objections to Albert’s assumptions. The study thus provides a relatively complex view of the subject-matter in question.
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"Tím hůře pro skutečnost." Cynický rozměr Hegelovy dialektiky

84%
Kolman V.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2021
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vol. 69
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issue 4
639-654
EN
The Open Society and Its Enemies, extended beyond the narrow confines of the specialist genre. The praise of war as a means of strengthening the state or the admiration of “world historical” personalities such as Caesar or Napoleon – all encapsulated in the shocking statement: what is real is rational – are read as a clear exaltation of the status quo, that Prussian state in which history found its culmination and Hegel his coveted position of power. The statement “So much the worse for reality,” with which Hegel allegedly answered a criticism of his dissertation on planetary orbits, extends this cynical moment to his theoretical philosophy as well. In the article, I will first touch on why this topic is, right from the start, factually wrong; in the next part, I will focus on the conceptual side of the problem. My thesis is that Hegel‘s cynicism is real, but its function is primarily didactic, manifesting a complicated logical structure of our speech concerning that which “is.”
CS
Cynismus Hegelovy filosofie je téma, které již dávno, rozhodně od Popperovy Otevřené společnosti, přesahuje úzké hranice odborného žánru. Chvála války jako prostředku utužování státu či obdiv k „světodějným“ osobnostem typu Caesara či Napoleona, to vše shrnuté v šokujícím tvrzení: co je skutečné, je rozumné, jsou čteny jako jasné vyzdvihování statu quo, tedy pruského státu, v němž našly dějiny své vyvrcholení a Hegel kýženou mocenskou pozici. Výrok „Tím hůře pro skutečnost“, který údajně Hegel pronesl v reakci na kritiku své disertace o planetárních drahách, rozšiřuje tento cynický moment i na jeho teoretickou filosofii. V článku nejprve zmíním, proč je tato představa už věcně chybná, v další části se pak zaměřím na pojmovou stránku problému. Má teze je, že Hegelův cynismus je sice reálný, jeho funkce je ale primárně didaktická, manifestující komplikovanou logickou strukturu naší řeči o tom, co „je“.
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Hans Albert a Antigona

67%
Funda O.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2018
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vol. 66
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issue 1
37-54
EN
The article is not written from a polemical angle, but rather is motivated by an endeavour to extend critical rationalism beyond the bounds of Albert’s version of the doctrine. In this I am guided by these main theses: I. Albert does not distinguish the rejection of the argument of final justification from the argument of sufficient, not only final, justification, valid in the case of trivial knowledge in our “middle world”. II. If critical rationalism is going to cover not just a segment, but the whole of reality, as Albert would like, then necessarily it must give attention to existential elements when we are confronted with extreme situations in which argument takes the form of our very existential decision. III. I do not think that Albert should abandon his atheism and I, too, am a convinced atheist. However, if his critical attitude to the phenomenon of Christian faith is to be suffiently rational, he cannot overlook the anthropological dimensions of Christian faith and their heights. IV. Critical rationalism has not, in my opinion, addressed two basic questions: 1) Is capitalism a humanism? 2) Should the question of private property be the object of critical re-examination – especially with regard to the conditional problems of the globalising world. V. Even allowing for the fact that Albert, in his last writings, toned down his former disdain for psychology, we should recognise that addressing problems and contexts in which discoveries are made always has a psychological accompaniment.
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On Accelerations in Science Driven by Daring Ideas: Good Messages from Fallibilistic Rationalism

67%
Marciszewski W.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 40
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issue 1
19-41
EN
The first good message is to the effect that people possess reason as a source of intellectual insights, not available to the senses, as e.g. axioms of arithmetic. The awareness of this fact is called rationalism. Another good message is that reason can daringly quest for and gain new plausible insights. Those, if suitably checked and confirmed, can entail a revision of former results, also in mathematics, and - due to the greater efficiency of new ideas - accelerate science’s progress. The awareness that no insight is secured against revision, is called fallibilism. This modern fallibilistic rationalism (Peirce, Popper, Gödel, etc. oppose the fundamentalism of the classical version (Plato, Descartes etc.), i.e. the belief in the attainability of inviolable truths of reason which would forever constitute the foundations of knowledge. Fallibilistic rationalism is based on the idea that any problem-solving consists in processing information. Its results vary with respect to informativeness and its reverse - certainty. It is up to science to look for highly informative solutions, in spite of their uncertainty, and then to make them more certain through testing against suitable evidence. To account for such cognitive processes, one resorts to the conceptual apparatus of logic, informatics, and cognitive science.
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Intuicja matematyczna w ujęciu nowoczesnego racjonalizmu

67%
Marciszewski W.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
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2019
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issue 68
169-194
PL
Nowoczesny racjonalizm, w skrócie: neoracjonalizm, jest prądem, w którym mieszczą się m.in. Frege, Russell, Church, Bernays, Gödel (najwyraziściej), Quine, Putnam, Kreisel, Chaitin. Przypisuje on istnienie abstraktom, a umysłowi zdolność ich poznawania w sposób intuicyjny. W przypadku obiektów matematycznych, jak uzyskiwane w wyniku abstrakcji zbiory, liczby, algorytmy etc., mówimy o intuicji matematycznej; na niej koncentruje się artykuł. Nazwa „nowoczesny” uwydatnia różnicę w stosunku do racjonalizmu klasycznego z XVII w. Polega to na poniechaniu tezy o doskonałej wiarogodności intuicji matematycznej. Neoracjonalizm opowiada się w kwestii intuicji za fallibilizmem oraz stopniowaniem wiarogodności: tym wyższy jej stopień, im mocniej jest ugruntowana we wrodzonym wyposażeniu biologicznym (co oznacza natywizm w stylu Chomsky’ego) i w doświadczeniu zmysłowym. Ze względu na fallibilizm, pewne zbliżenie do empiryzmu i odniesienie do biologii, mylące jest nazywanie tego prądu „platonizmem”, stąd propozycja nazwy „neoracjonalizm”.
EN
Modern rationalism, abbr. neorationalism, is a philosophical orientation to include Frege, Russell, Church, Bernays, Gödel (most distinctly), Quine, Putnam, Kreisel, Chaitin, etc. It claims the existence of abstract entities as classes, numbers, algorithms etc., and mind’s ability to intuitively learn about them. When meaning mathematical entities, we speak of mathematical intuition, being in focus of this paper. The adjective “modern” highlights the difference in relation to the classical rationalism of the 17-th century. The modern one denies the mathematical intuition to possess a perfect reliability, and sees it as a gradable faculty which does not enjoy an assured infallibility. The degree of reliability depends on how close is intuition to an inborn biological equipment (what means nativism in Chomsky’s style), and to sensory experiences. What is called neorationalism in this paper happens to be called mathematical platonism by other authors. However, on account of fallibilism, a certain tilt toward empiricism, and a significant reference to biology, “Platonism” (as lacking these traits) proves to be less fitting term than is “neorationalism”.
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Stoletý solitér Hans Albert v kontextu evropské filosofie (nejen) 20. století

67%
Paitlová J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2021
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vol. 69
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issue 3
425-444
EN
On the occasion of the hundredth birthday of an important proponent of critical rationalism, Hans Albert, this article maps the key moments of his intellectual development and above all outlines his relationship to selected philosophical currents of (not only) the twentieth century. Albert’s philosophical “breakthrough” occurred in the 1960s in an open dispute with the Frankfurt School. He then published his Traktat über kritische Vernunft (Treatise on Critical Reason), which stands out especially because of its surprising observations about the context of seemingly unconnected concepts in various problem areas. Albert thus finds, for example, a common property between scholastic and modern approaches to justifying knowledge (see the problem of justifying knowledge) and a similar inclination on the part of both neo-positivism and existentialism to create a conflict between objective knowledge and subjective decision (see the problem of value-neutrality), as well as finding an effort to create autonomous areas in analytical metaethics and philosophical hermeneutics (see the problem of the relativization of truth). The aim of this article is to explain these apparent incommensurabilities, especially through the prism of Albert’s Traktat über kritische Vernunft that will soon be published in the Czech translation.
CS
U příležitosti stých narozenin významného představitele kritického racionalismu, Hanse Alberta, mapuje tato stať klíčové momenty jeho intelektuálního vývoje, a především nastiňuje jeho vztah k vybraným filosofickým proudům (nejen) dvacátého století. Albertův filosofický „průlom“ nastal v šedesátých letech minulého století v otevřeném sporu s Frankfurtskou školou. Poté vydal svůj Traktat über kritische Vernunft, který vyniká zejména překvapivými postřehy ohledně souvislostí zdánlivě nespojitých koncepcí v různých problémových oblastech. Tak Albert například nachází společný rys mezi scholastickými a novověkými přístupy ke zdůvodnění poznání (viz problém zdůvodnění poznání) nebo podobný sklon novopozitivismu a existencialismu vytvářet rozpor mezi objektivním poznáním a subjektivním rozhodnutím (viz problém hodnotové neutrality) či snahu o vytvoření autonomních oblastí u analytické metaetiky či filosofické hermeneutiky (viz problém relativizace pravdy). Cílem této stati je vysvětlení těchto zdánlivých nesouměřitelností zejména prizmatem Albertova Traktat über kritische Vernunft, který se brzy dočká i českého vydání.
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