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EN
The article consists of the following thematic threads: a) an overview of three interpretations of the term “ideology” in subject literature; b) a reconstruction of Max Horkheimer`s ideology conception, presented in the first half of the 1930s in writings published in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung [Social Research Journal]; c) an attempt to answer the question to what degree this conception was paradigmatic for the early Frankfurt School (here, for comparative purposes, the author cites writings by Leo Löwenthal and Paul Landsberg, which were also published in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung).
EN
Below I ask whether the theoretical assumptions of the sociology of knowledge imply a subjectivistic and relativistic approach to cognition theory—a matter that has already been discussed in Polish subject literature (among others by Adam Schaff). Does the “social conditioning of cognition” conception propounded by the sociology of knowledge deny the existence of objective truth and adequate knowledge? Karl Mannheim himself called the sociology of knowledge an anti-relativist position. The critics of his anti-relativist argumentation say it is full of ambiguities and contradictions. I will attempt to take a closer look at this problem, and, at the same time, at the relation between Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge project and such measures of the adequacy of knowledge as the coherence and general consensus criterion. The main question I will try to answer is whether the Mannheimian sociology of knowledge project is a form of epistemological relativism (in the specific meaning of the term I use here), and if not, in what sense and to what degree it can be considered a position convergent with the relative truth conception.
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EN
The idea of assistance is important in philosophy, moral science, and in socialpolitical and economic life. Its generally positive connotation is associated mainly with its clear entanglement in the world of moral values. Assistance and altruistic actions on behalf of others are treated as a differentiator and a fundamental commitment of those who would be called, “good.” Nietzsche and other „masters of suspicion” who refute the myth of transparency and obviousness of the human self questioned the established perception of the idea of assistance. Modern science also brings its contribution to the destruction of the image of this idea, and claims that this idea is incompatible with reality; this brings to light sophisticated forms of selfishness hiding behind the appearance of morality. The position of the idea of assistance can be, nevertheless, rebuilt on a new, extra-moral ground by referring to the findings of contemporary philosophical anthropology. It points at the fundamental importance of assistance in the constituting process of the human species: without the spirit of solidarity, without spontaneous acts of assistance, not only would people never have become fully human, but in general, life in a human form would have had no chance to survive.
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