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EN
The recent economic crisis, one of the symptoms of which is a sudden increase of public debt in the majority of OECD countries, again made the government and the society aware of the necessity for conducting transparent, but also responsible fiscal policy. Creating a framework of the fiscal discipline responsible fiscal policy started to be perceived as an essential condition of effective governance leading to reduce budget deficit and public debt. The independent fiscal institutions may be included into regulations supporting public finance management. Their fundamental aim is to reduce the related risk of conducting the irresponsible fiscal policy, monitoring it, controlling deficit and assessing long-term effects of govern-ment action in this area. The purpose of this article is to present independent fiscal institutions and evaluate their usefulness in enhancing the effectiveness of the fiscal policy and stabilizing public finance. Experiences of the EU and OECD countries were used in the analysis.
XX
We have observed persistent political uncertainties in Poland. Part of this uncertainty stems from fiscal policy. Implementing international institutional solutions like the independent Fiscal Council (FC) may lower uncertainty and improve fiscal credibility. The creation of the FC would be also in line with recommendations from international institutions and changes to EU law. We have outlined below some solutions based on academic research and looking at how other countries have tackled this problem. Poland’s authorities would have to decide what kind of competencies and solutions are the most serviceable for Poland’s fiscal policy. The introduction of independent institution in the form of a FC in Poland can be part of the solution to increasing the fiscal discipline and credibility of fiscal policy and to improving its transparency. It may also improve the quality of public debate on fiscal policy and could be positively perceived by investors and rating agencies.
PL
Ustawy regulujące zasady funkcjonowania państwa w czasie obowiązywania stanów nadzwyczajnych nie zawierają norm prawnofinansowych. Konstytucyjna zasada wyjątkowości stanów nadzwyczajnych pozwala natomiast sądzić, że nadzwyczajność sytuacji, w jakiej znalazło się państwo i jego obywatele podczas stanu nadzwyczajnego, uzasadnia podejmowanie decyzji finansowych prawnie niedopuszczalnych w innych okolicznościach. Tezę tę zdaje się potwierdzać również ustawa o finansach publicznych, przewidująca wyłączenie na czas trwania stanu nadzwyczajnego obowiązywania niektórych regulacji dotyczących m.in. rygorów związanych z tzw. wydatkową regułą dyscyplinującą, podziałem rezerw celowych i rezerwy ogólnej oraz dokonywaniem przeniesień wydatków budżetowych, a nade wszystko – ograniczeń związanych z wprowadzeniem procedur ostrożnościowych i sanacyjnych. Pojawia się zatem pytanie, jak daleko w sferze regulacji prawa finansowego może posunąć się obdarzona szczególnymi kompetencjami w okresie stanu nadzwyczajnego władza wykonawcza, aby nie doprowadzić do utraty statusu demokratycznego państwa prawnego.
EN
Acts regulating principles of operation of the state do not contain legal-financial norms during a state of emergency. The constitutional principle of the uniqueness of states of emergency leads one to believe, however, that the unusual nature of the situation in which a state and its citizens are in during a state of emergency justifies the taking of financial decisions legally that would in other circumstances be unacceptable. This thesis seems to be confirmed by the Public Finance Act, which provides for the exemption, at the time a state of emergency is introduced, of certain regulations concerning, among other things, the rigours associated with so-called disciplinary rule expenditure, the division of specific provisions and general provision and effecting transfers of budget expenditures, but above all of restrictions associated with implementing prudent and sanative procedures. The question therefore arises as to how far, in the purview of financial law, an executive branch, endowed with special powers during the state of emergency, can actually go without sacrificing its status as a legal democracy.
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