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EN
The purpose of this paper is to provide an opinion on the regulation of freedom of conscience in the constitutions of European Union countries (with the exception of Italian and Polish regulations). The author concludes that freedom of conscience is guaranteed in all European Union countries. In most of them, it is expressed explicitly in the Constitution, and in other countries, it is guaranteed under Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950.
EN
The paper aims to circumscribe, through a specific history of ideas approach, the relevance of Benedict Spinoza’s theological rationalism to the major debate which generated the Early Enlightenment, the radical conception on the new status of philosophy in relation to theology, on libertas philosophandi and rational philosophizing. The main lines of Spinoza’s theological rationalism are sustained as being inspired and encouraged by Hobbes’ “negative theology,” the only theology considered consonant with the “true philosophy.” The paper also indicates the originality of Spinoza’s theological criticism and the reasons under which Hobbes—despite the radicalism of his biblical interpretation and of his thesis of separating the philosophy (natural science) from theology—Hobbes enjoyed an attenuated critical reception compared to that one applied to Spinoza and the “acute” tone of which was set by Leibniz.
EN
This opinion deals with a bill concerning conscientious objection clause in relation to doctors, contained in Article 39 of the Act on the Professions of Doctor and Dentist. The opinion emphasizes that the said provision (clause) in the current form is a manifestation of Poland’s constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion. However, in so far as it on the same time imposes – on doctors guided in their professional practice by conscience – a duty to indicate the possible ways of obtaining diagnosis or treatment from another doctor, imposes limitations on their constitutional freedom of conscience and religion (Article 53 of the Constitution). An amendment of Article 39 of the Act, proposed in the bill, aims at strengthening the guarantee of that freedom. The responsibility for ensuring that patients have access to information about the institutions from which they can obtain medical assistance rests with the State.
EN
This opinion deals with a bill which limits doctors right to conscientious objection in medical relations. The author claims that the bill imposes on doctors disproportionate limitations of their constitutionally protected freedom of conscience (Article 53 of the Constitution). The bill does not prove that the proposed regulation is actually necessary for the protection of other constitutional values. It was emphasized that legal enforcement of the performance of controversial medical services by those who have raised ethical doubts about some of these services, undermines the essence of the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Constitution and, consequently, the guarantees of State’s ideological impartiality and freedom of expression of religious or philosophical beliefs in public life.
EN
The commented decisions concern the issue of freedom of conscience in the midwifery profession and the possibility of its restriction by the state in connection with the need to ensure access to health care for pregnant women, in particular those choosing to terminate their pregnancy. The European Court of Human Rights, breaking with the previous line of jurisprudence, ruled that where the possibility of termination of pregnancy is provided for by national law and implemented within the framework of the health care system, a person intending to exercise the profession of midwife, which entails, inter alia, the obligation to participate in abortion procedures, cannot exempt herself from this obligation on the grounds of conscientious objection. The author disagrees with the position of the Court and with the reasoning presented by it, which led it to declare the complaints as manifestly unfounded.
EN
In this article it is argued that the Dutch humanist Dirck Volckertszoon Coornhert (1522–1590) consolidates his previous anti-dogmatic thoughts about religious tolerance in his imaginary Synod on the Freedom of Conscience (1582). In this pivotal and still relevant work, situated in a place called Freetown, leading West-European Calvinists, Roman-Catholics and biblical persons – including the sage Gamaliel, Coornhert’s alter ego – vividly discuss the absolute freedom of conscience, religion and press. Furthermore, this article argues why Coornhert’s use of the Dutch language makes the Synod still relevant today.
Collectanea Theologica
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2020
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vol. 90
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issue 5
585-606
EN
One of the important reasons why the issue of freedom of conscience is one of the most controversial problems of modern times is the ongoing dispute over its definition. In the context of the contemporary emphasis on the moral autonomy of the person, the recent definitions of conscience as the “voice of God” sound at least ambiguous. It is therefore important to point out the various dimensions of conscience. The first and basic one is the individual dimension: conscience is defined as moral self-consciousness in its deepest, personal dimension. It can therefore, following E. Fromm, be described as the “guardian of moral integrity.” However, in addition to this, conscience also points out to “what is common” (J. Ratzinger), to the fundamental values that make social life possible. It is therefore also a carrier of moral truth. Finally, conscience touches upon the relationship with God and this is where its important religious dimension is expressed. It is only when each of these three dimensions of conscience is taken into account that the question of its freedom can be adequately considered. It concerns, above all, the relationship of an individual conscience to an external authority, both in social and ecclesiastical context.
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2014
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vol. XII
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issue 4
23-40
EN
The Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06 case concerned the display of the crucifix in state school classrooms in Italy. In the judgement of 18 March 2011, Grand Chamber of the Court found no violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Court further considered that no separate issue arose under Article 9. The principle of neutrality in the provision of public services, including that in the field of public education does not automatically imply secularism or the absence of any religious symbols. The case of Fernández Martínez v. Spain (application no. 56030/07) concerned the status of religious education teachers in state-run secondary education institutions and the respective roles of the state or its education authority, and the Church in the appointment and dismissal of such teachers. In the judgement of 15 May 2012 the Chamber of the Third Section found by six votes to one that the competent courts had struck a fair balance between various private interests and therefore that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The case Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy concerned the dismissal of a professor at the Catholic University of Milan. It is one of the religious universities in Europe, universities ideologically or culturally oriented, which applies “ideological” or “doctrinal” criteria of appointment and dismissal of teachers. The Court held that the applicant, Lombardi Vallauri, had not had effective access to court, and found a violation of Article 6 § 1 by six votes to one. In the Eweida and others case, the subject is whether, to what extent, and under what conditions an employer may prohibit the manifestation of faith in the workplace by private employees, civil servants and other state employees. The domestic authorities had failed sufficiently to protect Ms Eweida’s right to manifest her religion, in breach of Article 9. The Court concluded in her case that a fair balance had not been struck. Indeed, the fact that the company had amended the uniform code to allow for visible wearing of religious symbolic jewellery showed that the earlier prohibition had not been of crucial importance. There had been no violation of Article 9 as concerned Ms Chaplin. The reason for asking Ms Chaplin to remove her cross, namely the protection of health and safety on a hospital ward, was inherently of much greater importance. The Court decided that there had been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9, as concerning Ms Ladele, and no violation of Article 9 – taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 – as concerning Mr McFarlane. The Court considered that the policies of the applicants’ employers – to promote equal opportunities and to require employees to act in a way which did not discriminate against others – had the legitimate aim of securing the rights of others, such as same-sex couples, which were also protected under the Convention.
EN
The constitutional principle of secularity is one of the foundations of the French Republic. Now adays, you can observe the process of its deconstruction in terms juridical measures and formulas. The author reminds us of constitutional origins and form of the principle of secularity, but above all shows the methods and legal instruments for the transition from the system of the so-called hostile separation of church and state to the stage of the so-called positive secularity.
EN
Conscience acts not only as a personal moral authority, but it is also a pillar of dignity and human freedom in the social life. It allows the joint search for the truth and resolve moral dilemmas by members of the human community. After presenting different interpretations of conscience, the author discusses the relationship of conscience with human dignity. The dignity of conscience is the basis of human freedom. At the same time human dignity is affirmed by the respect for freedom of conscience. The practical expression of this freedom is the right to conscientious objection. This problem occurs most often in the context of the duties of health professionals. Respect for their personal rights also demands respect for their right to conscientious objection when the proper procedure implies their moral responsibility which creates a conflict of conscience.
PL
Sumienie nie pełni tylko roli osobistego autorytetu moralnego, ale jest również filarem godności i wolności człowieka w przestrzeni życia społecznego. Umożliwia ono bowiem wspólne poszukiwanie prawdy i rozwiązywanie dylematów moralnych przez członków ludzkiej społeczności. Po przedstawieniu różnych interpretacji sumienia, autor omawia związek sumienia z godnością człowieka. Godność sumienia stoi u podstaw jego wolności. Jednocześnie godność człowieka jest afirmowana w poszanowaniu wolności jego sumienia. Praktycznym wyrazem tej wolności jest prawo do sprzeciwu sumienia. Problem ten występuje najczęściej w kontekście pełnienia obowiązków przez pracowników służby zdrowia. Poszanowanie ich osobowych praw domaga się uszanowania również ich prawa do klauzuli sumienia, kiedy właściwe im postępowanie implikuje ich odpowiedzialność moralną rodzącą konflikt sumienia.
EN
The subject of this article is an analysis of Polish origins of law on freedom of religion. An author begins his article by saying that the first and most important legal document, which breaks through in protection of the freedom to profess the Christian religion, was the Edict of Milan of 313 of emperor Constantine. Historical analysis for the protection of freedom of religion was carried further, by the author, through the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment to modern times. Legal documents that were analysed were mostly the constitutional norms and the Law on the guarantees of freedom of conscience and confession of 1989, which describes in detail the religious matter, determining and specifying it.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza polskich źródeł prawa w zakresie wolności religijnej. Autor zaczyna od stwierdzenia, że pierwszym i najważniejszym dokumentem prawnym, dokonującym przełomu w ochronie wolności wyznawania religii chrześcijańskiej, był edykt mediolański z 313 roku cesarza Konstantyna. Analiza historyczna w zakresie ochrony wolności religijnej prowadzona była dalej poprzez czasy średniowiecza, oświecenia aż po czasy współczesne. Dokumentami prawnymi poddanymi analizie były przede wszystkim unormowania konstytucyjne i ustawa z 1989 roku o gwarancjach wolności sumienia i wyznania, która uszczegółowia materię wyznaniową, dookreślając ją i konkretyzując.
Studia Ełckie
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2016
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vol. 18
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issue 4
339 - 357
EN
One of the key problems of the modern world is the entrance onto the path of sustainable development, where in theory, the concept of sustainable devel-opment implies steady progress on economic and social in harmony with the natural environment, to ensure a high quality of life for present and future gen-erations. Thus, this article raises the question of how a man, and more broadly: the progress of humanity, is the starting point and also the point of arrival of this concept? For ambivalence (which can easily be noted here), creates a varie-ty of dilemmas, which opens a new field of discussion in various disciplines, including philosophy, and bioethics. One of them (speaking more in detail) is whether the concept of sustainability in the matter of human development and environmental protection means the same as the Aristotelian principle of “golden mean”? The answer, which is given, is negative. The author proposal: is the need to assimilate the principle of the “golden mean” in the framework of the concept of human development and environmental protection. This will be her love for the human person, discovered in a free and flawless conscience.
EN
The presence of Jansenism in a number of contemporary novels should lead to questioning the notion of post-secularity rather than illustrating it. The study of three of these novels (P. Quignard’s Tous les Matins du monde, L. Salvayre’s La Puissance des mouches and C. Pujade-Renaud’s Le Désert de la Grâce) cannot be limited to interpreting them as heralds of a return to religion which some see as a defining feature of post-secularity while others deem it insufficient to define the notion. The analysis of the links between the royal authority and Port-Royal makes it possible to highlight the interest of novelists in the theme of persecution and the resistance of individuals to intolerance, while remaining at a distance from 17th century theological debates. Beyond being a plea for freedom of conscience, these texts put it into perspective in a secularized democratic society that fails to conceive the place of the religious, or to conceive of itself outside that place. Literature thus shows the strength of fiction and art when it comes to considering man’s place in the world.
PL
W artykule podjęto próbę ukazania problematyki wolności sumienia i religii, która jest zagwarantowana w Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku. W oparciu o dwa artykuły Konstytucji RP dokonano analizy, jak w polskim wymiarze prawnym zagwarantowana jest ta wolność, która według Jana Pawła II stanowi „serce praw człowieka”. W wymiarze indywidualnym każdy człowiek ma prawo do uzewnętrzniania swoich przekonań zarówno w życiu publicznym, jak i prywatnym. Może także nie uzewnętrzniać swoich przekonań i nikt nie może przymuszać do wyznawania jakiejkolwiek religii. W wymiarze instytucjonalnym wolność religii opiera się na zasadach relacji pomiędzy państwem a Kościołami i innymi związkami wyznaniowymi. Te zasady obejmują równouprawnienie wszystkich związków wyznaniowych, poszanowanie autonomii i niezależności każdego z tych związków wyznaniowych oraz bezstronność organów władzy publicznej wobec przekonań religijnych. Wolność religii zagwarantowana jest w każdym demokratycznym państwie prawnym i ta wolność chroniona jest także w kodeksie karnym. Naruszanie tej wolności religijnej może być społecznie szkodliwe i prowadzić do napięć pomiędzy wyznawcami różnych religii. Kościoły i związki wyznaniowe oraz każda osoba mogą składać zawiadomienia o popełnieniu przestępstwa wynikającego z naruszenia wolności religijnej. Reasumując, można zauważyć, że wolność sumienia i religii jest wartością, która jest przynależna każdemu człowiekowi i jest chroniona prawnie zarówno w wymiarze krajowym, jak i w wymiarze międzynarodowym.
EN
All human beings possess the right to freedom of conscience and religion. This right, which is included in the natural law, derives from the dignity of each human being and it is protected by every democratic state by constitutions as well as international agreements. The article refers to the issues of freedom of conscience and religion, which are guaranteed in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. The legal guarantees of this freedom are determined by two articles of this Constitution, which is designed to protect, as John Paul II expressed it, „the heart of human rights”. The enjoyment of freedom of conscience and religion is guaranteed in the Constitution in two dimensions: individual and institutional. In the individual dimension, the Constitution grants everyone the freedom to manifest their beliefs in both public and private life (the so-called „freedom to...”). Every form of freedom has its negative aspect (the so-called „freedom from...”). Freedom of conscience and religion in this aspect means a ban on a compulsion to profess any religion, and an individual’s right not to disclose his or her beliefs. In the institutional dimension, freedom of religion is based on established principles that govern relations between the state and churches and other religious organizations. These principles include equality of all religious associations, respect for the autonomy and independence of each religious association, and impartiality of public authorities towards religious beliefs. Summarizing, the violation of religious freedom can be socially harmful and lead to tension between adherents of different religions. This is the reason why freedom of conscience and religion is legally guaranteed by the system of national and international law.
15
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EN
In the following article there are presented current regulations concerning conscience clause in practical medicine. The author points to laws being the source of conscience clause and analyze their subject; points and discuss restrictions of possibility to apply the conscience clause and resulting duties. In this paper there are also presented circumstances where conscience clause can have practical applications. Selected, the most controversial problems were discussed from the current law point of view. In the last part of this study author showed important technical problems following effective law – question of information from the hospital as it will not provide specific services and also question of payment for medical advice, which resulted in use of conscience clause. The goal of this article was also to get most wide sight upon analyzed subject, thus it contain many references to outlooks presented by doctrine.
EN
The paper presents the development of criminal law regulations regarding the protection of freedom of conscience and religion in the Polish People's Republic in 1949–1969. The presented analysis shows the real intentions of these regulations. The communist party wanted to control religious associations in terms of their potential impact on public opinion. There is no doubt that the analyzed regulations were an expression of the struggle of the communist authorities with the only independent institution after 1944, which was the Catholic Church. The work also highlights the problem of the ostracism of people associated with the communist movement, which was undoubtedly present, especially after the threat of excommunication issued by the Vatican in July 1949. As a result of this, freedom of conscience and religion became a kind of "hostage" of the growing struggle for a new state system and the place of religious associations.
PL
W pracy przedstawiono rozwój regulacji karno–prawnych dotyczących ochrony wolności sumienia i wyznania w PRL w latach 1949–1969. Przedstawiona analiza ukazuje rzeczywistą intencje tych przepisów, a sprowadzającą się do spacyfikowania związków wyznaniowych pod względem ich potencjalnego oddziaływania na opinię publiczną. Nie bowiem ulega wątpliwości, że poddane analizie przepisy prawne stanowiły wyraz walki władzy komunistycznej z jedyną po 1944 roku niezależną instytucją, jaką był Kościół katolicki. W pracy uwypuklono również problem ostracyzmu osób związanych z ruchem komunistycznym, który niewątpliwie występował, zwłaszcza po groźbie ekskomuniki wystosowanej przez Watykan w lipcu 1949 roku. Tym samym wolność sumienia i wyznania stała się niejako „zakładnikiem” rozwijającej się walki o nowy ustrój państwowy i miejsce w nim związków wyznaniowych.
Collectanea Theologica
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2016
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vol. 86
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issue 1
85-106
PL
In the first section the article presents the three main dimensions of conscience.There is no doubt that the primary dimension is the dimension ofindividual conscience. It is the “guardian of the integrity of” moral person(E. Fromm). It is so closely associated with the self-consciousness of peoplethat acting against the judgment of conscience, a man acts against himself.Conscience is also “a window on what is common” (Joseph Ratzinger), tomoral truth, what is the revelation of the objective dimension of conscience.Finally, it is important religious dimension. It manifests itself in definingconscience as the voice of God.In the second section the author analyzes the key element of the contemporarydispute about conscience that is his relationship to authority, boththe state and the church. There is no doubt that state law should respect thefreedom of conscience of citizens and, in situations of serious conflicts –provide the opportunity to invoke the conscience clause. In contrast to thepluralistic society ecclesial community has the right to have moral convictionsstemming form faith, which are crucial to belong to the individualreligious community. This does not invalidate in any way the importance ofconscience, which remains the final court (although not the highest standard,which is God) of moral action.
EN
The article is a presentation of the research topics in the field of the history of canon law and the history of law on religion which have been undertaken at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the Jagiellonian University in the last 20 years. It complements previous studies aimed at compiling the entire history of research in canon law and law on religion conducted at the University. The text presents the research topics and the associated publications in a thematic and chronological order. As it is emphasized, many of the issues analysed by the Cracow researchers are an extension of the topics discussed by Rev. Professor Henryk Misztal, especially in his monograph Polskie prawo wyznaniowe (Polish Law on Religion).
PL
Artykuł stanowi przegląd tematyki badań podejmowanych na Wydziale Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w zakresie historii prawa kościelnego oraz historii prawa wyznaniowego. Jest uzupełnieniem wcześniejszych publikacji, mających na celu opracowanie pełnej historii studiów prowadzonych w tym Uniwersytecie w zakresie prawa kanonicznego i prawa wyznaniowego. W tekście zaprezentowano tematykę badań oraz stanowiące ich efekt publikacje w układzie tematycznym i chronologicznym. Jak podkreślono, liczne spośród zagadnień podejmowanych przez krakowskich badaczy były też analizowane przez Księdza Profesora Henryka Misztala, zwłaszcza w jego monografii pt. Polskie prawo wyznaniowe.
EN
Conscientious objection is a refusal to fulfil the obligation that arises from the law due to one’s reasonably justified moral judgment that qualifies fulfilling this obligation as ethically wrong (objective evil). The right to conscientious objection, which is an integral element of freedom of conscience, is a constitutional right of every human being. As emphasised by the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland in the judgment of 7 October 2015 (K 12/14): “the right to invoke the conscience clause and, as a result, the right to refuse to perform an act contrary to one’s conscience is the guarantee of freedom of conscience”. Regulating the use of the right to conscientious objection, that is, establishing the so-called conscience clause, is the responsibility of the ordinary legislator. The draft legislation amending the Act on the professions of physician and dentist, the Act on laboratory diagnostics and the Act on the professions of nurse and midwife, adopted by the Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Petitions Committee of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, was supposed to regulate the conscience clause in medical professions, realise the petition to revoke art. 3 para. 2 of the Act of 17 May 1989 on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion, which generally prohibits the invocation of conscientious objection, and implement the above-cited judgment of the Tribunal in a comprehensive way. Although this initiative deserves approval, the current text of the draft law proves that the judgment of the Tribunal will be implemented only to a limited extent. It ignores the request made in the petition and lowers the statutory standard of protection of the right to conscientious objection. First of all, it is questionable that healthcare entities (e.g., manager of hospitals) would be obliged to indicate real possibilities of obtaining a service refused by a physician or nurse (midwife), and, in the case of a laboratory diagnostician, to perform a service. This is contrary to freedom of conscience, which means, as noted by the Constitutional Tribunal,  protection from conduct “which indirectly leads to an unacceptable ethical effect, [and] in particular [protection] from coercion to cooperate in achieving an immoral goal” (e.g., from the obligation to inform a patient who can perform an abortion and where it can be performed). At the same time, the draft law questions the so-called institutional conscience clause, which the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe requested to respect in Resolution no. 1763 of 7 October 2010.
PL
Sprzeciw sumienia to odmowa wykonania obowiązku wynikającego z przepisów prawa ze względu na racjonalnie uzasadniony osąd moralny, który kwalifikuje wykonanie tego obowiązku jako etycznie niegodziwe (obiektywne zło). Prawo do sprzeciwu sumienia – integralny element wolności sumienia – jest konstytucyjnym prawem każdego człowieka. Jak podkreślił Trybunał Konstytucyjny w wyroku z 7 października 2015 r., K 12/14: „prawo powołania się na klauzulę sumienia i w rezultacie prawo do odmowy wykonania czynności sprzecznej z własnym sumieniem stanowi gwarancję wolności sumienia”. Obowiązkiem ustawodawcy zwykłego jest uregulowanie sposobu korzystania z prawa do sprzeciwu sumienia, czyli ustanowienie tzw. klauzuli sumienia. Uchwalony przez Komisję Praw Człowieka, Praworządności i Petycji Senatu RP projekt inicjatywy legislacyjnej dotyczącej ustawy o zmianie ustawy o zawodach lekarza i lekarza dentysty, ustawy o diagnostyce laboratoryjnej oraz ustawy o zawodach pielęgniarki i położnej w zamierzeniu miał uregulować klauzule sumienia w zawodach medycznych oraz jednocześnie zrealizować petycję wzywającą do uchylenia art. 3 ust. 2 ustawy z 17 maja 1989 r. o gwarancjach wolności sumienia i wyznania (generalnie zakazującego powoływania się na sprzeciw sumienia) i kompleksowego wykonania cytowanego wyroku Trybunału. Choć sama inicjatywa zasługuje na aprobatę, to jednak analiza treści projektu dowodzi, że tylko do pewnego stopnia wykonuje wyrok Trybunału, ignoruje żądanie zawarte w petycji oraz obniża ustawowy standard ochrony prawa do sprzeciwu sumienia. Na krytykę zasługuje przede wszystkim propozycja zobowiązania podmiotów leczniczych (w praktyce będą to ich kierownicy, np. dyrektor szpitala) do wskazania realnych możliwości uzyskania świadczenia, którego odmówił lekarz lub pielęgniarka (położna), a w przypadku diagnosty laboratoryjnego – do wykonania zlecenia. Narusza bowiem wolność sumienia, która – jak zauważył Trybunał Konstytucyjny – oznacza także ochronę przed postępowaniem, „które pośrednio prowadzi do nieakceptowalnego etycznie skutku, w szczególności przed przymusem współdziałania w osiąganiu celu niegodziwego” (np. przed obowiązkiem informowania, kto i gdzie może wykonać aborcję), jak również kwestionuje tzw. instytucjonalną klauzulę sumienia, do której respektowania wezwało Zgromadzenie Parlamentarne Rady Europy w rezolucji nr 1763 z 7 października 2010 r.
EN
Question about the condition of social ethics, public morality and politics leads us to the notion of conscience and freedom of conscience. Traditionally, the term conscience has its origin in philosophy of morality and in religion. However, contemporary sociological research in Poland demonstrates that many social actors, predominately institutional Catholic representatives or politicians, within the public debate play a battle over morality. The article, in light of the empirical data and theoretical approach, undertakes the analyses on public morality and religion, bioethics, law, and politics to discuss the quest of ethical rigourism and political moralism. Nonetheless, in the context of the public debate over the freedom of conscience and its socio-political implications the author argues that religious and political debate over public morality is often an object of ideological manipulation.
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