Search results

1

Hybrid Threats and Warfare, Are we Really Facing Something New?

100%

Królikowski H.

Internal Security

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2017

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vol. 9(2)

9-21

EN

Since 2014 the term hybrid warfare and threats has become catchword. This term (hybrid warfare) was introduced to academic discourse by William J. Nemeth in 2002 in relation to the wars in Chechnya and popularised in 2006 by Frank G. Hoffman in relation, among other things, to the second Intifada. In 2014 after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, the terms hybrid war and hybrid threats were transferred from scholarly discussion to politics and official documents. The author seeks to answer the following question: is the invention of so called hybrid warfare and hybrid threats something new, or rather a confused reaction to European Union and NATO astonishment at Russian activity in the eastern and southern frontiers of Ukraine. The fact that armed conflict includes mixed elements of regular and irregular forms of armed combat, guerillas and terrorists, criminal acts, use of new technologies to conduct armed, information, psychological or economic warfare is not new. Scholars who investigate hybrid conflicts give examples of historic wars starting from the war between Rome and the Germans ( Publius Quinctilius Varus campaign in 9 AD against German tribes led by Arminius), through the war of independence in the USA, to the Chechen wars. Nowadays, greater and greater dependence on technology, information delivered in almost real time and the creation of more elaborate and complicated procedures and decisive processes in Western countries have increased the vulnerability to hostile actions other than military ones and ones that use military force.

2

COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS: RESILIENCE IN THE EU AND NATO’S STRATEGIES

88%

Jacuch A.

The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies

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2020

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issue 1

EN

The objective of this paper is to identify, analyze and assess NATO’s and the EU’s responses to hybrid threats targeting Europe, in particular the Baltics, the Visegrád Groupand the Balkancountries. It considers measures, regulations, structures and capabilities of both organizations. The main hypothesis stipulates that strengthening resilience through civil preparedness is the basis of both NATO and EU strategies to counter hybrid threats, and that cybersecurity, strategic communication and military mobility are key areas the two organizations are working on.Is resilient cyberspace critical for our daily life, economy, and national security? Should we enhance strategic communications to prevent disinformation? How to prepare our civil sectors so that they continue providing essential services to population and supporting military operations in a crisis? Europe is facing the greatest security challenges since the end of the Cold War. The seizure of Crimea, destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, terrorism, crisis in the Middle East, poverty, and global financial volatility create new challenges and involve Western countries in a hybrid war, fought predominantly on cyber and information fronts with the extensive use of social media. Meanwhile, globalization has made the security environment more demanding, raising an urgent question: How to prepare for a crisis?

3

Operational control over non-state proxies

88%

Bryjka F.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2020

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vol. 31

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issue 4

191-210

EN

The intention of this paper is to clarify how state patrons control non-state proxy forces fighting on their behalf. In order to address the subject matter thoroughly, specific attention was paid to a number of questions including a) the criteria determining patronproxy relations, b) factors influencing the selection process of proxy forces, and c) principles governing the maximisation of potential benefits of using proxies, whilst simultaneously reducing risks and associated costs. The author applied a neo-realistic research paradigm to his work. Patron-proxy relations were presented in the context of the principal-agent theory, as well as through detailed analysis of ongoing scenarios involving Iran and Hezbollah, Russia and the Donbass separatists, Pakistan and Kashmiri militias, the US and Syrian rebels. The essence of war by proxy is to influence the strategic result of an armed conflict without direct, full-scale, military intervention. The use of non-state proxy, external actors is aimed at maximising their political goals and strategic interests whilst maintaining “plausible deniability”. By supporting non-state proxies, indirectly or by providing limited direct assistance, sponsors operate below the threshold of war. Empirical analysis of proxy war cases proves that such models may both guarantee “strategic victory” or become a “double-edged sword”. One of the key challenges for external powers engaged in war by proxy is to avoid unintended consequences (blowback). The author argues that elements such as ideology, ethnicity or religion do not necessarily ensure control over proxies, whilst the range of common goals and interests, and the level of the proxy’s dependency, are crucial.

4

How to increase Poland’s resilience?

88%

Łazarek S.

Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka

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2022

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vol. XLVIII

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issue 3

275-286

EN

The aim of the article is to identify and analyse key formal and legal documents and applicable procedures in the field of state security, which contribute to building the resilience of society and the Polish state. The main emphasis is put on the description of current regulations and the principles of managing and responding to crisis situations. Following that, based on a brief assessment of current activities, the author will present general directional assumptions of his (unofficial) concept of comprehensive strengthening of Poland’s resilience. This will include (1) a suggestion to designate national resilience areas, (2) identification of priority resilience areas, and (3) recommendation of directions for further action.

5

HYBRID WAR – WAR OF THE 21ST CENTURY

88%

IVANČÍK R.

Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje

|

2016

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vol. 22(22)

205-239

EN

Hybrid war represents one of the most used terms in the area of military and security affairs in the last years, especially after the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine. It appears still more frequently not only in scientific or specialized military or security publications, studies or articles, but also in various journals, news, reports or debates out of military or security community. It might be seemed that it is a new term or even new type of conflict, but it is not. Hybrid war is really no new phenomenon, it is known for many years; however, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, it is much more popular and used. On the other hand, the majority of wider public do not know what the mentioned term exactly represents, and that is the reason why an author of the article deals with this topic and, through gained results of the research, tries to explain the essence of examined problem.

6

The European Union’s Strategy on Hybrid Threats

75%

Górski S. S.

Internal Security

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2017

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vol. 9(2)

171-181

EN

The article discusses and analyses the terminology and gives a description of hybrid threats. Particular emphasis is placed on their diversity, variability and the problematic nature of methods used by an aggressor in order to destabilise the social, political and economic environments against which the hostile activities are targeted. The areas which may be under the influence of hybrid threats have been indicated and many aspects of these threats’ influence on a contemporary countries’ functioning have also been underlined. The main focus of hybrid threats’ considerations is put in the context of the European Union. The related strategic documents have been analysed and the directions of action defined in them, which may prevent or neutralise the consequences of hybrid threats, have been described, as well. Particular attention has been paid to the analysis of the ”Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats”, the strategic document which acts as a map for joint anti-hybrid activities. The directions of action defined in it may, in the author’s opinion, contribute to building up resistance to hybrid threats. Particularly legitimate are activities which aim at providing an appropriate level of situational knowledge, as well as effective exchange of intelligence information among the European Union’s institutions and its member states. What is more, developing the analytical potential and the transfer of knowledge of hybrid threats, which is carried out by joint centres of excellence, may result in a situation where the influence of these threats on the social, political and economic dimension of the member states’ functioning is smaller. Comparisons between the common strategic solutions to hybrid threats and other instruments of the European Union relating to the internal security (civil protection, solidarity clause) have been made in the article. The summary discusses the directions of antihybrid strategic activities, among which developing the awareness of threats and strengthening the social resilience to hybrid threats have been given special emphasis.

7

Hybrid warfare challenges

75%

Vuković J., Matika D., Barić S.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2016

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vol. 12

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issue 3

118-138

EN

In this article, hybrid warfare challenges and their impact on the evolution of warfare in the new dynamic security environment are analysed. The aim of the research was to identify hybrid threats, explore the complexity of the hybrid conflict that involves professional Armed Forces and irregular (paramilitary) forces. The research has been conducted through two case studies of hybrid warfare: the Israeli - Lebanese conflict in 2006 and the Lebanese militia organisation Hezbollah as a prototype of hybrid opponents; and the contemporary hybrid conflict in Ukraine through the Russian paradigm of hybrid warfare. The conducted research showed that the decisive role that influenced the outcome of the conflict belonged either to rapidness or inertia in of the making of political decisions. The research results showed further that revision of the existing strategic and doctrinal documents are required, as well as reorganisation of the national security system (and the Armed Forces as part of it), without which they will not be able to deal successfully with the dynamic nature of future conflict and complexity of threats (“synergy of threats”). The political decision is the most essential parameter for sizing military organisation. The rapidity of response in the event of emergencies (especially outside the national territory) also depends on the promptness of political decisions in order to activate the Armed Forces.

8

Reflection of the Act on Cybersecurity in aviation education

75%

Kelemen M., Polishchuk V., Kelemen M., Polishchuk A.

Cybersecurity and Law

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2021

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vol. 5

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issue 1

129-138

EN

The paper presents knowledge in the field of professional and legal implementation of building a strong cyber security of the European Union at the national level of a Member State, in the context of the implementation of a new legal norm on cyber security of the state. Part of the expert knowledge is the implementation of the law and the response to the praxeological problems of cyber security in the critical infrastructure sectors, including the TRANSPORT sector, resp. Air transport, as part of flight education.

9

Digital Resilience in the Area of Hybrid Threats: Perception of Concepts Associated with the Ukrainian Military Conflict by Generation Z In Slovakia

75%

Spálová L., Mikuláš P.

Communication Today

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2023

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vol. 14

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issue 2

76-89

EN

Extreme situations, such as military conflicts, generate interest in how they are perceived by the public, which must process a broad array of media stimuli in a certain way. In this study, we discuss how the basic aspects of the current military conflict (the war in Ukraine) were perceived by young people (Generation Z) in Slovakia, with a focus on the initial part of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We argue that the digital resistance of Slovakia’s citizens is currently low, which – in conjunction with the extremely focused activity of the disinformation scene – creates a risky environment. We use the Semantic Selection Test as a psychosemantic method on a sample of Slovak university students. One of our basic findings is the associative closeness of the concept of “Self” in Generation Z and Instagram, popular Internet memes and educational videos in connection with expertise. We also found that the recipients were subject to positive media manipulation (the Ghost of Kyiv) and were able to identify standard linguistic propaganda (negative associations of terms “war in Ukraine” and “special military operation”). The results can help us understand the perception of emergency situations by Generation Z.

10

Enhancing resilience: the state of play in NATO, European Union, and Poland

63%

Lipert-Sowa M.

Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka

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2022

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vol. XLVIII

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issue 3

278-296

EN

This article presents the current state of play on resilience in NATO, the EU, and Poland. It argues that in the past couple of years, the international security environment has undergone dramatic transitions. On top of existing challenges, new threats (including hybrid) and large-scale crises (i.e., pandemics) are emerging. This complex security situation requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. Building resilience at state, local, and societal level is key. This notion is well understood both in the EU and NATO. Resilience is rooted in the Alliance’s founding Treaty. Article 3 of the Washington Treaty claims that each Ally must first take care of its individual security. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and, subsequently, the COVID-19 pandemic stressed – both in NATO and the EU – the need to be better prepared and able to respond to complex crisis. In the last couple of years, the EU’s approach to resilience has been more inward-looking. From building resilience by the EU, it has shifted to resilience of the EU. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the West to a test, including a resilience test. Opening their homes to ca. 2 million Ukrainian refugees, the Polish people have passed the test and proved, inter alia, that they are able to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people.

11

Budowanie odporności państwa na działania hybrydowe

63%

Keplin J. Ł.

Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego

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2023

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vol. 15

|

issue 29

13-38

EN

Ensuring security in an increasingly complex and uncertain world requires states to address a number of challenges. These include the need to remain cooperative in the international space and the need to pursue their strategic objectives. Often these are followed up by intentional or unintentional threats that can effectively destabilise not only a single state, but also an entire region. Their emergence may be the result of a lack of resilience against hostile actions by state or non-state actors who, in order to achieve their objectives, undertake, among other things, hybrid activities. However, the terms ‘state resilience’ and ‘hybrid activities’ are insufficiently precisely formulated in the literature and described in a conceptual rather than a definitional manner. Both national and NATO documents lack universally accepted definitions of these terms. The aim of this article is to present the concept of building state resilience to hybrid activities.

PL

Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa w coraz bardziej złożonym i niepewnym świecie wymaga od państw sprostania wielu wyzwaniom. Należą do nich konieczność utrzymania kooperatywnego charakteru w przestrzeni międzynarodowej oraz potrzeba realizacji swoich celów strategicznych. Często następstwem takich działań są intencjonalne lub nieintencjonalne zagrożenia, które mogą skutecznie zdestabilizować nie tylko pojedyncze państwo, lecz także cały region. Ich pojawienie się może być efektem braku odporności na wrogie działania podmiotów państwowych lub niepaństwowych, które dla osiągnięcia swoich celów podejmują m.in. działania hybrydowe. Terminy „odporność państwa” i „działania hybrydowe” w literaturze przedmiotu są jednak niewystarczająco jasne i opisywane w sposób bardziej konceptualny niż definicyjny. W dokumentach zarówno narodowych, jak i NATO brakuje powszechnie uznanych definicji tych pojęć. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie koncepcji budowania odporności państwa na działania hybrydowe.

12

Building state resilience against hybrid activities

63%

Keplin J. Ł.

Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego

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2023

|

vol. 15

|

issue 29

241-266

PL

Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa w coraz bardziej złożonym i niepewnym świecie wymaga od państw sprostania wielu wyzwaniom. Należą do nich konieczność utrzymania kooperatywnego charakteru w przestrzeni międzynarodowej oraz potrzeba realizacji swoich celów strategicznych. Często następstwem takich działań są intencjonalne lub nieintencjonalne zagrożenia, które mogą skutecznie zdestabilizować nie tylko pojedyncze państwo, lecz także cały region. Ich pojawienie się może być efektem braku odporności na wrogie działania podmiotów państwowych lub niepaństwowych, które dla osiągnięcia swoich celów podejmują m.in. działania hybrydowe. Terminy „odporność państwa” i „działania hybrydowe” w literaturze przedmiotu są jednak niewystarczająco jasne i opisywane w sposób bardziej konceptualny niż definicyjny. W dokumentach zarówno narodowych, jak i NATO brakuje powszechnie uznanych definicji tych pojęć. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie koncepcji budowania odporności państwa na działania hybrydowe.

EN

Ensuring security in an increasingly complex and uncertain world requires states to address a number of challenges. eThse include the need to remain cooperative in the international space and the need to pursue their strategic objectives. Oeftn these are followed up by intentional or unintentional threats that can eefctively destabilise not only a single state, but also an entire region. eThir emergence may be the result of a lack of resilience against hostile actions by state or non-state actors who, in order to achieve their objectives, undertake, among other things, hybrid activities. However, the terms 'state resilience' and 'hybrid activities' are insuficiently precisely formulated in the literature and described in a conceptual rather than a definitional manner. Both national and NATO documents lack universally accepted definitions of these terms. eTh aim of this article is to present the concept of building state resilience to hybrid activities.

13

Bioterroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa państwa

63%

Mrożek Ż.

Przegląd Geopolityczny

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2023

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vol. 45

150-165

PL

Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie potencjalnego zagrożenia związanego z użyciem czynnika biologicznego jako elementu tzw. działań hybrydowych. Bioterroryzm jako narzędzie pozostające w dyspozycji państw jak i organizacji terrorystycznych stanowi zagrożenie mogące wywołać wielorakie niepożądane skutki. Ich zasięg jest uzależniony między innymi od rodzaju patogenu, sposobu i skali zastosowania, oraz od efektywności służb mających na celu zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa biologicznego. Broń biologiczna jest relatywnie bardzo tania i przynosi bardzo dotkliwe dla przeciwnika straty, także ekonomiczne. Jej atutem jest trudna wykrywalność a także to, że sama groźba użycia czynników chorobotwórczych jest w stanie całkowicie odmienić zachowanie stron konfliktu i jego przebieg. Ponadto bardzo trudna jest sama identyfikacja zagrożenia i przewidywanie zasięgu rażenia. W opisie patogenów stosowanych w wojnie biologicznej autorka posługuje się ich klasyfikacją opracowaną przez Centrum Kontroli Chorób i Zapobiegania w Atlancie. W konkluzji stwierdzono, że w celu zapobiegania biologicznym, psychologicznym, ekonomicznym i politycznym skutkom bioterroryzmu, konieczne jest stworzenie systemów monitoringu i wczesnego ostrzegania oraz organizacja okresowych szkoleń dla armii i służb medycznych.

EN

The purpose of this article is to explain the potential threat posed by the use of a biological agent as part of so-called hybrid operations. Bioterrorism, as a tool at the disposal of states as well as terrorist organizations, is a threat that can cause multiple adverse effects. Their extent depends, among other things, on the type of pathogen, the manner and scale of application, and the effectiveness of services aimed at ensuring biosecurity. Biological weapons are relatively very inexpensive and inflict very severe losses on the adversary, including in economic terms. Its advantage is that it is difficult to detect and that the mere threat of the use of pathogens is capable of completely altering the behavior of the parties involved in the conflict and its course. In addition, it is very difficult to identify the threat itself and predict the extent of the attack. In describing the pathogens used in biological warfare, the author uses their classification developed by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. It is concluded that in order to prevent the biological, psychological, economic and political effects of bioterrorism, it is necessary to create monitoring and early warning systems and organize periodic training for the army and medical services.

14

Nowe wyzwania dla NATO. Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w obliczu zagrożeń hybrydowych

51%

Zaremba P.

Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne

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2018

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vol. 24

136-148

EN

The end of the cold war and, consequently collapsed of bipolar partition led to the situation of appearing new, unknown threats in the security and defense sphere. The representatives of North Atlantic Alliance face the challenge, which result was taking decisive steps to counteract and level newly created threats. The following article provides outline of the problem to apply a reality which NATO is. The author try to ask the question: “Do the main safety pillar have the mechanism to counteract and prevent unwanted scenarios in multimodal character as hybrid threats?”.

15

Siły operacji specjalnych (Wojska Specjalne) w konﬂ iktach hybrydowych

51%

Królikowski H.

Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka

|

2016

|

issue 3

19-37

PL

Przejęcie Krymu przez Rosję w 2014 r. i konflikt zbrojny na wschodzie Ukrainy, w których to wydarzeniach istotną rolę odegrały rosyjskie formacje specjalnego przeznaczenia, upowszechniły termin wojna hybrydowa. Stąd też pojawiła się rosnąca liczba definicji wojny, konfliktu i zagrożeń hybrydowych, jednocześnie w dyskusji naukowej i publicznej stawiane jest pytanie – dlaczego państwa rozwinięte okazały się wrażliwe na nieregularną formę walki zbrojnej, stosowaną przez przeciwnika nieprzestrzegającego reguł prawa międzynarodowego lub szukającego nisz nieobjętych prawem międzynarodowym. Tymczasem poszukiwanie definicji wojny hybrydowej jest poszukiwaniem odpowiedzi na pytanie jak sytuacja międzynarodowa po zimnej wojnie, nowe technologie, asymetria świata, komercjalizacja i globalizacja wpływają na sposób i proporcje wykorzystania metod oraz środków prowadzenia walki. Siły operacji specjalnych są przygotowane do przeciwdziałania takim zagrożeniom. W spektrum ich operacji mieści się nie tylko wojna niekonwencjonalna, ale też rodzaje działań, definiowane jako kontrterroryzm i działania przeciwpowstańcze, które w pewnym zakresie mogą być odpowiedzią na zagrożenia hybrydowe. Równocześnie Wojska Specjalne są istotnym elementem strategii sojuszniczych, jak też narzędziem w ramach operacji ekspedycyjnych. Otwartą i odrębną kwestią, która wymaga poddania eksploracji, jest rola Wojsk Specjalnych w ramach narodowych i samodzielnych działań obronnych, w tym formy współdziałania z obroną terytorialną.

EN

The overtaking of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine, in which Russian special forces played an important role, promoted the use of the term hybrid warfare. Hence, a number of definitions of war, conflict and hybrid threats has appeared, and in the scientific and public debate a question is being asked - why have the developed countries proved to be sensitive to the irregular form of the armed struggle, used by the enemy which is not respecting the rules of the international law or is looking for niches not covered by the international law. However, the search for the definition of a hybrid war is the search for an answer to the question how the international situation after the Cold War, new technologies, the asymmetry of the world, commercialization and globalization affect the way and proportions of use of the methods and means of combat. Special operation forces are prepared to counter such threats. Within the spectrum of their operations not only the unconventional warfare is included, but also the types of actions defined as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, which to some extent may be a response to the hybrid threats. At the same time the special forces are an important element of the strategy of alliance, as well as a tool in the context of expeditionary operations. An open and separate issue that requires exploration is the role of Special Forces within the framework of national and defense operations, including forms of cooperation with the territorial defense.

16

Działania hybrydowe na Morzu Bałtyckim. Zarys problemu dla bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

51%

Keplin J.

De Securitate et Defensione. O Bezpieczeństwie i Obronności

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2022

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issue 2(8)

54-68

PL

W niniejszym artykule podjęto się próby przedstawienia możliwych scenariuszy na Morzu Bałtyckim jako efektu działań hybrydowych. Współcześnie prezentowane w literaturze przedmiotu przykłady działania Federacji Rosyjskiej, szczególnie w aspekcie aneksji Krymu utrwalają przekonanie o skuteczności takich działań. Najczęściej przedstawia się, że są to działania skryte, wieloznaczne, a przez to powodujące trudność interpretacji co do czynu agresora. Dlatego rządy państw stoją przed wyzwaniem zachowania dotychczasowego status quo i wspólnie starają się wypracować skuteczne narzędzia do przeciwdziałania takim zagrożeniom. Podkreślenia wymaga, iż determinacja państw w osiąganiu swoich celów narodowych powoduje, że wykorzystują one narzędzia z obszarów politycznych, ekonomicznych i informacyjnych jako tańszą alternatywę dla instrumentów militarnych. Ponadto należy podkreślić, że w aspekcie Morza Bałtyckiego nadmierna eksploatacja zasobów ożywionych i nieożywionych powoduje jego ciągłą degradację. Dlatego w celu utrzymania ładu międzynarodowego na tym akwenie państwa i organizacje międzynarodowe wydają różnego rodzaju przepisy prawa i regulacje, które mają zabezpieczyć ich interesy oraz zapobiegać dalszej degradacji środowiska naturalnego. Z uwagi na ich niedoskonałość podlegają one ciągłej weryfikacji i aktualizacji, a w skrajnym przypadku mogą stanowić przedmiot sporu międzynarodowego.

EN

The aim of this article is to present possible scenarios in the Baltic Sea as a result of hybrid activities. Present in the literature on the subject, hybrid threats of the Russian Federation, especially in terms of the annexation of Crimea, are considered to be effective tools to achieve strategic goals. Most of these threats are presented as ambiguous, thus causing difficulties in interpretation as to the act of violence and agresion. Therefore, in the present, for governments, the challenge is to maintain the status quo and to develop effective tools to counteract such threats. It needs to be emphasized that the determination of states in achieving their national goals causes them to use tools from the political, economic and information fields as a cheaper alternative to military instruments. In addition, it should be underlined that in the Baltic Sea, excessive exploitation of living and nonliving resources causes its continuous degradation. Therefore, to keep international order in the Baltic Sea, states and international organizations introduce different types of laws and regulations to protect their interests and prevent further degradation of the natural environment. Due to their imperfection, they are subject to constant verification and updating, and in specific situations can be cases of an international dispute.

17

The mirror principle in assessing hybrid threats emanating from Russia and Belarus

51%

Dyner A. M.

Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego

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2023

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vol. 15

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issue 29

267-290

PL

W artykule autorka opisuje, w jaki sposób stosowaną w psychologii zasadę lustra, polegającą na odnajdywaniu w innych ludziach cech, które jednostka usiłuje wyprzeć, można wykorzystać do typowania potencjalnych zagrożeń ze strony Rosji i Białorusi. Wysuwa hipotezę, że dzięki analizie największych zagrożeń wymienianych przez te państwa, m.in. w dokumentach strategicznych, można wnioskować, zgodnie z zasadą lustra, w jakich sferach będą one najaktywniej prowadzić wrogie działania wobec członków NATO. Wskazuje m.in. działania hybrydowe, które Rosja i współpracująca z nią Białoruś mogą podjąć względem państw zachodnich, jednak bez dogłębnej analizy tych zagadnień. Tym samym artykuł nie wyczerpuje tematu, a jedynie stanowi próbę zasygnalizowania jednej z metod analizy zagrożeń płynących z Rosji i Białorusi.

EN

In this article, the author describes how the mirror principle used in psychology, which is based on finding in other people traits that an individual tries to suppress, can be used to identify potential threats from Russia and Belarus. She puts forward the hypothesis that by analysing the greatest threats mentioned by these countries, e.g. in strategic documents, it is possible to deduce, according to the principle of the mirror, in which spheres they will most actively conduct hostile actions against NATO members. Among other things, the hybrid actions that Russia and cooperating Belarus may take against Western states are indicated, but without an indepth analysis of these issues. uThs, the article does not exhaust the topic, but merely attempts to signal one method of analysing the threats emanating from Russia and Belarus.

18

Zasada lustra w ocenie zagrożeń hybrydowych płynących z Rosji i Białorusi

51%

Dyner A. M.

Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego

|

2023

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vol. 15

|

issue 29

39-62

EN

In this article, the author describes how the mirror principle used in psychology, which is based on finding in other people traits that an individual tries to suppress, can be used to identify potential threats from Russia and Belarus. She puts forward the hypothesis that by analysing the greatest threats mentioned by these countries, e.g. in strategic documents, it is possible to deduce, according to the principle of the mirror, in which spheres they will most actively conduct hostile actions against NATO members. Among other things, the hybrid actions that Russia and cooperating Belarus may take against Western states are indicated, but without an indepth analysis of these issues. Thus, the article does not exhaust the topic, but merely attempts to signal one method of analysing the threats emanating from Russia and Belarus.

PL

W artykule autorka opisuje, w jaki sposób stosowaną w psychologii zasadę lustra, polegającą na odnajdywaniu w innych ludziach cech, które jednostka usiłuje wyprzeć, można wykorzystać do typowania potencjalnych zagrożeń ze strony Rosji i Białorusi. Wysuwa hipotezę, że dzięki analizie największych zagrożeń wymienianych przez te państwa, m.in. w dokumentach strategicznych, można wnioskować, zgodnie z zasadą lustra, w jakich sferach będą one najaktywniej prowadzić wrogie działania wobec członków NATO. Wskazuje m.in. działania hybrydowe, które Rosja i współpracująca z nią Białoruś mogą podjąć względem państw zachodnich, jednak bez dogłębnej analizy tych zagadnień. Tym samym artykuł nie wyczerpuje tematu, a jedynie stanowi próbę zasygnalizowania jednej z metod analizy zagrożeń płynących z Rosji i Białorusi.

19

Disinformation and Polarization in the Online Debate During the 2020 Presidential Election in Poland

51%

Domalewska D.

Safety & Defense

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2021

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vol. 1

14-24

EN

The deliberate manipulation of public opinion, the spread of disinformation, and polarization are key social media threats that jeopardize national security. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of the content published by social bots and the polarization of the public debate on social media (Twitter, Facebook) during the presidential election campaign in Poland in 2020. This investigation takes the form of a quantitative study for which data was collected from the public domains of Facebook and Twitter (the corpus consisted of over three million posts, tweets and comments). The analysis was carried out using a decision algorithm developed in C# that operated on the basis of criteria that identified social bots. The level of polarization was investigated through sentiment analysis. During the analysis, we could not identify automated accounts that would generate traffic. This is a result of an integrated action addressing disinformation and the proliferation of bots that mobilized governments, cybersecurity and strategic communication communities, and media companies. The level of disinformation distributed via social media dropped and an increasing number of automated accounts were removed. Finally, the study shows that public discourse is not characterized by polarization and antagonistic political preferences. Neutral posts, tweets and comments dominate over extreme positive or negative opinions. Moreover, positive posts and tweets are more popular across social networking sites than neutral or negative ones. Finally, the implications of the study for information security are discussed.

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The mirror principle in assessing hybrid threats emanating from Russia and Belarus

Zasada lustra w ocenie zagrożeń hybrydowych płynących z Rosji i Białorusi

Disinformation and Polarization in the Online Debate During the 2020 Presidential Election in Poland