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Je aristotelsko-tomistický hylemorfismus schopný života? : Poznámky k článku Davida Peroutky „Tomistická psychologie a moderní pojem mysli“

100%
Vácha J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2013
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vol. 61
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issue 1
99-114
EN
A “strong” form of hylomorphism, according to which a living being is the metaphysical composition of a substantial form and of totally indeterminate first matter, is incompatible with modern natural science: the ability to have experiences, subjectivity, to differing degrees the basic property of the living, encounters not an indeterminate matter, but a matter already independently structured. A “soul” cannot function as the source of the macro-structure of an organism, which source is represented, instead, by the interaction of atoms and molecules that behave according to the same (deterministic) laws to which they are subjected outside the living body. Even less can the substantial form be responsible for the configuration at the level of atomic nuclei which do not take part, as such, in living functions and which, in terms of energy, vastly exceed such functions. For these and similar reasons, the idea of hylomorphism has been replaced by the polarity of subjectivity (mind) and body. The contemporary “organic” school (Varela, Jonas, Thompson, Spahn, and others) attempts, in the Aristotelean way, to bring mind closer to nature by pointing to the structural (formal) unity of a living being. This school is, however, conscious of the fact that a form can point to the specific unity of a living organism only if it is seen from “within” beings such as us – i.e. embodied subjectivities, with their qualia and moralia, which cannot be expressed by means of a “form”. Form, in the end, belongs to a category that is describable only in the third person, and therefore, as such, does not resolve today’s “hard problem” of the relation between mind and body.
CS
„Silná“ forma hylemorfismu, podle které je živá bytost metafyzicky složena ze substanciální formy a zcela neurčité první látky, je neslučitelná s novověkou přírodovědou: schopnost mít prožitky, subjektivita, v různém stupni základní vlastnost živého, má proti sobě nikoliv neurčitou, ale už samostatně strukturovanou hmotu. „Duše“ nemůže působit jako zdroj makro-struktury organismu, kterým je interakce atomů a molekul chovajících se podle (deterministických) zákonů. Tyto zákony působí stejně uvnitř těla i mimo něj. Ještě méně může být podstatná forma odpovědná za konfiguraci vrstvy atomových jader, která se na životních funkcích jako taková vůbec nepodílí a energeticky tyto funkce velmi podstatně přesahuje. Z těchto a podobných důvodů byla idea hylemorfismu nahrazena polaritou subjektivity (mysli) a těla. Současná „organická“ škola (Varela, Jonas, Thompson, Spahn aj.) se snaží v aristotelském stylu sblížit ducha s přírodou poukazem na strukturní (formovou) jednotu živé bytosti. Je si však zároveň vědoma, že forma poukazuje na specifickou jednotu živé bytosti jen tehdy, je-li viděna „zvnitřku“ bytostí, jako jsme my – vtělené subjektivity s jejich qualii a moralii, která se pomocí „formy“ vyjádřit nedají. „Forma“ svou podstatou spadá do kategorie toho, co je popsatelné ve 3. osobě, a jako taková proto neřeší dnešní „těžký problém“ vztahu mysli a těla.
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Materialismus a hylemorfismus

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Hříbek T.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2012
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vol. 60
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issue 4
585-600
EN
The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body.
CS
Autor polemizuje s názorem, který nedávno vyjádřili Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, že materialismus, převažující v současné filosofii mysli, by měl být nahrazen tomistickým hylemorfismem. Polemika se zaměřuje na dva aspekty Machulova a Peroutkova argumentu. Za prvé, na jejich předpoklad, že současná preference materialismu je výsledkem náhody (neznalosti faktu, že kromě materialismu a dualismu se nabízí i hylemorfismus). Tento předpoklad si ovšem neporadí s faktem, že dualismus byl kritizován již v 17. století, ale materialismus se prosadil až v polovině minulého století. Za druhé, autor souhlasí, že tomistický hylemorfismus lze aktualizovat, a to dokonce úspěšněji, než jak se to podařilo Machulovi s Peroutkou. Této aktualizaci je však třeba obětovat některé metafyzicky neúnosné představy – konkrétně představu duše jako nemateriální substance nezávislé na těle.
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Perception and Hylomorphism: Receptive Activity of Senses in Aristotle’s De Anima, II,5

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Roreitner R.
Eirene. Studia Graeca et Latina
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2014
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vol. 50
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issue 1-2
176-207
EN
This paper is meant as a contribution to recent scholarly debate on the literal, non-literal and analogical reading of Aristotle’s assertion in DA II,12 that perception consists of “receiving forms without matter”. It focuses on Myles Burnyeat’s interpretation of DA II,5 and of the notion alloiōsis tis. I discuss several attempts to disprove the non-literalist argument that in this chapter Aristotle defines a new concept of (“extraordinary”) alteration, which is not bound to any “ordinary” alteration in the way in which form is bound to matter. In general terms I formulate an objection to the literalist presumption (shared by some of those who suggest an “analogical” reading) that perception is a hylomorphic change. There are, apparently, in Aristotle’s sublunary world of natural composites changes that cannot be analysed into form and matter. I give some reasons for believing that perception ranks among these changes. If this reconstruction is true to Aristotle’s position, then in DA II,5 he offers his most refined characterization of the peculiar place that perception as a receptive activity occupies in the natural world.
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Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism vs Thomistic Hylomorphism

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Skrzypek J. W.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2021
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vol. 69
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issue 1
103-117
PL
In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne presents an updated formulation and defense of his dualist theory of the human person. On this theory, human persons are compound substances, composed of both bodies and souls. The soul is the only essential component of the human person, however, and so each of us could, in principle, continue to exist without our bodies, composed of nothing more than our souls. As Swinburne himself points out, his theory of the human person shares many similarities with the hylomorphic theory of the human person espoused by Thomas Aquinas. Swinburne suggests at one point that the differences between the two theories are “almost entirely terminological,” pertaining chiefly to how each understands the term ‘substance’. In this essay, I aim to show that the differences between Swinburne’s Cartesian substance dualism and Thomistic hylomorphism are much more significant than that. I argue, moreover, that the distinctive claims of Thomistic hylomorphism allow it to successfully avoid some key concerns for Swinburne’s view.
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Problem mind-body w świetle Tomaszowej koncepcji hylemorfizmu

51%
Zembrzuski M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2018
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vol. 7
159-176
EN
The aim of this paper is to approach the mind- body problem in the context of philosophy of Aquinas, especially in the context of his understanding of hylomorphism. Disproportion between the issues of the philosophy of mind and Thomas's position are not to the extend which would unable us to see at the variety of questions from his perspective discussed nowadays by philosophers. On the contrary, Thomas' stance might be an attractive solution with regard to positions already fixed (established)- materialism and dualism. What follows in this paper are four issues: the problem of causative interaction between soul and body, the question of cognition of other senses, the issue of personal identity, and at least, the issue of qualia. All these questions, contemporary discussed, find their answers in Aquinas' explanation which points out the most proper understanding of human being, which is defining a human being as a person.
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Substance and Dynamics: Two Elements of Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Nature in the Foundation of Mathematics in Physics

51%
Larenz R.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2017
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vol. 6
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issue 3
451-483
EN
The article aims at proposing a way of solution to the problem why mathematics is efficient in physics. Its strategy consists in, first, identifying servere reductionisms performed on physical processes in order to have them correspond to mathematics. As this makes it impossible to understand the real relationship between matter and mathematics, a necessary step on the way to an understanding is to abandon the reductionisms from the very outset. Consequently, one is faced with the need of searching for mathematical elements in nature, as if there never had been any successful mathematics in physics. And for this search, one has to rely on experience alone. To this end, the article takes its inspiration from two pillars of Aristotelian philosophy of nature, the notions of ‘substance’ and ‘dynamics’, together with a careful examination of the treasure of accumulated experience in physics. Upon this basis, the hylomorphic structure of elementary particles, which are considered to be at the basis of all material substances, is the source for the most common features of the dynamical order of material things in general. This dynamical order, in turn, is quite likely to be reflected in mathematical terms. This is a novel approach because, at present, the most common framework for dealing with the question of mathematics in physics is Scientific Realism. It addresses the question why the existent physico-mathematical theories are successful. In order to find an answer, it starts from these theories and some methodological considerations, but does not address the question of where these theories stem from. In particular, it does not consider the possibility that these theories might, at least in part, stem from the material things they are referring to. The latter approach is what is suggested here. It is that of Natural Realism, of which Aristotle is an eminent representative.
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Hylomorphic Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics II

51%
Peters C.
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2019
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vol. 8
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issue 1
147-168
EN
This study draws attention to the ordering of matter and form argued for in Aristotle’s Physics II, 8 (199a30–32). This argument for hylomorphic teleology relies on the presentation of nature earlier in Physics II, 1. In this way, it highlights the connections between chapter one’s account of nature as matter and form and chapter eight’s defense of final causality. Grounding final causality in the principles of nature reveals its central importance for Aristotle’s view of nature. To clarify the meaning of hylomorphic teleology I contrast my interpretation of Aristotle with that of Wolfgang Wieland regarding the scope and foundation of the final cause, countering his claim that chance and universal final causality are mutually exclusive. I contend that the presentation of teleology in chapter eight supports a diverse interpretation of the final cause, one that admits chance events while not sacrificing the intrinsic ordering of matter to form.
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"Homo non est intellectus". Aquinas about relation between soul and intellect

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Zembrzuski M.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2017
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vol. 53
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issue 4
75-101
EN
This paper discusses Thomas Aquinas’ stance on the relation between intellect and human soul, where the former is a power and the latter its principle. Due to the fact that Aquinas understands soul as the form of a body, rather than its mover, the problem of how to separate and characterize intellective powers arises. For it is accidental intellectuality that enables cognitive and volitional acts, which are independent of body in their essence. To explain his own position, Aquinas employs the so-called “impediment argument” for the spirituality of the human intellect. He also employs the whole/part distinction when discussing the relation between intellect and soul as whole/part categories. As a result, his account can avoid Averroistic flaws without having to identify intellect with the soul or the whole human being (as argued by Albert the Great). M. Gogacz’s thesis that the intellectual accident of the soul is identical with the possible intellect seems to solve the problem of the accidental and potential character of this particular human power.
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The theory on “eide” according to Nicholas of Methone

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Terezis C., Petridou L.
Vox Patrum
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2017
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vol. 68
551-568
PL
Niniejsze studium omawia teorie „eide” i ich związek z „materią” według Mikołaja z Methony. Jest to zagadnienie ukazujące sposób komunikacji Boga, jako najwyższej i jedynej zasady, ze światem naturalnym i człowiekiem. Autorzy rozważają to zagadnienie zarówno na płaszczyźnie historycznej, jak i systema­tycznej. Najpierw wyodrębniają różnice w tej kwestii między starożytną myślą grecką, która skłaniała się ku dualizmowi, a chrześcijaństwem, które uznawało jedynie monizm; następnie wyjaśniają monistyczną rekonstrukcję starożytnej on­tologii greckiej według neoplatoników. Stanowisko Mikołaja z Methony i chrześ­cijańska wizja ontologii stanowią centrum ich badań, w których podkreśla się, że „eide” są istotą Boskiego Umysłu oraz prawdziwymi Boskimi zamiarami. Kwestia dotyczy także związków i rozróżnień, ponieważ „eide” są jednolitą, ale wewnętrznie zróżnicowaną całością w Bogu. Na poziomie zmysłowego świata wykazano, że „materia” nie jest rozpatrywana niezależnie od „eide”. Główna kon­kluzja studium jest taka, że Mikołaj z Methony dokonał filozoficznej interpretacji chrześcijańskiej teorii dotyczącej mocy Trójjedynego Boga, pozostając w zgodzie z chrześcijańskim realizmem i odrzucając samoistny charakter „eide”.
EN
In this study, we are discussing the theory on “eide” and their relation to the “matter” according to Nicholas of Methone. This is a topic that shows the way in which God, as the supreme and only Principle, is connected to the natural world and human being. In this attempt of ours we move both historically and systemati­cally. Thus, we first point out the differences on this issue between the ancient Greek thought, which moves towards dualism, and Christianity, which accepts only monism; we then explain the monistic reconstruction of the ancient Greek ontology by the Neoplatonists. Nicholas of Methone’s views and the Christian readings of ontology constitute the core of our approaches, of which it is high­lighted that “eide” are the content of the divine Mind and that they are the good divine volitions. The question is also put in view of the unions and distinctions, since “eide” are a unified but internally differentiated whole in God. At the level of the sensible world, it is shown that “matter” is not considered independently from “eide”. The main conclusion that comes to the fore is that Nicholas of Methone makes a philosophical reading of the Christian theory on triune God’s energies, remaining consistent with Christian realism and rejecting the self-existent charac­ter of the “eide”.
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Hylemorficzna jedność radości: ujęcie Awicenny i św. Tomasza z Akwinu

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Płotka M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2019
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vol. 8
61-72
EN
The aim of the paper is to deal with the problem of emotion in the context of medieval discussion on mind-body problem. The paper focuses particularly on joy and pleasure (delectatio, gaudium) as an example of intersection of mental and corporeal emotional phenomena in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas. Both Aquinas’s treatise of the passions of the soul in the Summa Theologiae and parallel works and Avicenna’s philosophical and medical works reflect the problem of the way in which the unity of the person, soul and body, is experienced and displayed in emotion. Firstly, it has to be said that although an ‘emotion’ (passio) can be considered as an unified state of mind, neither Thomas nor Avicenna considered ‘emotion’ in this way. Rather, they recognized ‘emotion’ as a set of components, of bodily involvement, intentionality, objectivity, behavioral suggestions, even a sense of ecstasy, etc. Both Avicenna and Aquinas consider joy as a conglomerate of corporeal and mental elements. Avicenna argues, that emotions of the soul, such as joy, pain, fear and anger, are also called the emotions of the spirit, since they are accompanied by cardiac and spiritual changes, as he says in De medicinis cordialibu. Analogically, Aquinas distinguishes in STH Prima Secundae formal and material aspect of emotion: the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate (STH, I-II, q. 44, a. 1, co.:) So, a central issue of my paper is the question how they could think the various mental and physiological features of emotion of joy together. Although they both refer to Aristotle’s psychology, their answers seem to differ significantly. The difference is about the specific role of estimation in the plane of sensual and intellectual cognition. For Thomas estimation is definitely sensual cognitive power; however Avicenna argues that estimation takes part in the intellectual evaluation of the objects intended. Also, there is a different account of intellectual emotion. Whereas Thomas says that emotion is a result of cognition and inasmuch there are sensual and intellectual cognition, there are accordingly sensual and intellectual emotions (passions and affection), Avicenna introduces the power of estimation which is affective evaluation for both sensual and intellectual cognition. So, one could say that Thomas elaborates two theories of emotion (theory of affection is not compatible with the theory of passions), whereas Avicenna develops an unitary theory of emotion.
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Aktualność arystotelizmu w kontekście poszukiwań ontologicznego fundamentu informacji biologicznej

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Tabaczek M.
Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy
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2019-2020
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issue 16-17
47-81
EN
Despite difficulties in formulating an unambiguously agreed and strictly scientific definition of information, including biological information, the remarkable success of the paradigm and methodology of molecular biology and genetics led to genocentrism, which elevated genes (understood as carriers of biological information) to the rank of basic biological entities, subject to natural selection and evolution. The article shows the way from questioning genocentrism to a multi-faceted approach to biological information, against the background of historical development and the current state of philosophical research on the essence of information in general. In reference to the ontological dimension of biological information, an argument is presented in favor of the timeliness of the key categories of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature as fundamental for understanding and defining the most important aspects of information stored and expressed in the functioning of living systems (beings).
PL
Pomimo trudności w sformułowaniu jednoznacznie uzgodnionej i ściśle naukowej definicji informacji, w tym także informacji biologicznej, niebywały sukces paradygmatu i metodologii biologii molekularnej i genetyki, doprowadził do genocentryzmu, który podniósł geny (rozumiane jako nośniki informacji biologicznej) do rangi podstawowych jednostek biologicznych, podlegających działaniu doboru naturalnego i ewolucji. Artykuł ukazuje drogę od zakwestionowania genocentryzmu do wieloaspektowego ujęcia informacji biologicznej, na tle historycznego rozwoju oraz aktualnego stanu badań filozoficznych nad istotą informacji w ujęciu ogólnym. W odniesieniu do ontycznego wymiaru informacji biologicznej, zostaje przedstawiony argument na rzecz aktualności kluczowych kategorii filozofii przyrody Arystotelesa jako fundamentalnych dla rozumienia i definiowania najważniejszych aspektów informacji zapisanej i znajdującej wyraz w funkcjonowaniu systemów (bytów) ożywionych.
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