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EN
EU funds are an opportunity for many players to develop their business and expand the range of services conducted. Sometimes, however, projects carried out by beneficiaries are a breach of rules, as in accordance with article 8 paragraph 3 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008, it is assumed that any assistance to entrepreneurs under the regulation may be granted only in case the act exerts the so-called incentive effect. Hence it can be concluded that the incentive effect is a kind of guarantee that the support is essential and necessary for the subject, and without it, the investment would not be executed. The concept of the incentive effect has not been given its legal definition, but in practice it is assumed that the effect is met if the beneficiary before the investment (the applicant for funding) does not take actions related to the investment for which they request funding. However, some beneficiaries are not aware of the fact that the work undertaken or activities related to the planned investment infringe the principle of incentive and exclude the possibility to obtain funding. Often, controlling procedures against managing and intermediate bodies, as well as implementing institutions, find their final act in court. Processing the complaint, administrative courts make the interpretation of the case, with special attention to when and in what circumstances violation of the incentive effect may have occured and whether the managing authority has made a fair and impartial evaluation of the project, implementing transparent rules.
EN
It stands to reason that most railway infrastructure projects (and all transport infrastructure for that matter) are being financed by public funds. Such infrastructure addresses vital social development needs; therefore, its construction can be seen as raison d’etat. In principle, state aid can be declared compatible with the Internal Market under Article 93 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), constituting lex specialis provided for aid for transport coordination; under General Block Exemption Regulation; or directly under Article 107(3) TFEU. Each of these regimes has diff erent compatibility criteria and notification requirements. This brings up the problem of delineating the boundaries between various state aid regimes. This paper provides an analysis of the convergence and divergence factors of these regimes of sectoral and horizontal aids, highlighting controversial points with regards to the interpretation of state aid rules through the lens of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and European Commission’s decisions. The analysis covers the classification of state measures, controversies surrounding the Market Investor Principle and the incentive effect.
EN
Start-up aid seeks facilitate airlines' entry into new regional markets. It is designed as an alternative to a widespread, and combatted by the European Commission, practice of offering advantageous discounts of airport charges and various marketing contracts to air carriers in exchange for entering a given regional market. Start-up aid is designed to be time-limited and once expired, the route is intended to become profitable and thus the operating carrier would be economically incentivised to remain on that market. The research shows that airlines seeking to obtain subsidies are not interesting to remain on the market once state aid expires but are inclined to relocate their operations in order to receive new start-up aid. This brings up the question of how to perceive the effectiveness of start-up aid in the light of the regulatory challenge of using public funds as a stimulus for air routes that intends to be commercially viable.
PL
Pomoc publiczna na otwieranie nowych połączeń lotniczych została zaprojektowana w celu zachęcania przewoźników do wejścia na nowe rynki regionalne stanowiąc alternatywę dla zwalczanej przez Komisję Europejską praktyki zachęcania linii lotniczych preferencyjnymi stawkami opłat lotniskowych i zawieraniem kontraktów marketingowych. W założeniu przyznawana ma być na czas określonym, po upływie, którego subsydiowana operacja ma stać się rentowna i przewoźnik ma być zainteresowany pozostaniem na danym rynku. W praktyce linie lotnicze wykorzystując możliwość zdobycia subsydiowania generalnie nie utrzymują operacji po zakończeniu pomocy, tylko zmieniają siatkę w sposób umożliwiający uzyskanie kolejnych środków pomocowych. To każe postawić pytanie o sposób postrzegania skuteczności pomocy na otwieranie nowych połączeń w kontekście regulacyjnego wyzwania stymulowania docelowo rentownego ruchu lotniczego w zliberalizowanym sektorze za pomocą mechanizmów nakazowych.
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