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1

Odmowa mianowania sędziów konstytucyjnych (casus Słowacji)

100%

Chmielarz-Grochal A., Sułkowski J.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2016

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issue 2(133)

29-46

EN

The procedure for appointing judges of the Constitutional Court in Slovakia does not differ significantly from the solutions adopted in other European countries. The Slovak model has similarities with the solutions adopted in 1991 in relation to the judges of the Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The procedure for appointing constitutional judges included — at the initial stage — the entities involved in legal practice and study of law, whereas the creative power was de lege ferenda based on the cooperation between the National Council and the President of the Slovak Republic. Despite the involvement of various stakeholders, the appointment is de facto a political process, since the fi nal decisions are taken by political authorities. An important issue, which concerns the nomination of judges, is the scope of discretionary powers of the head of state in the assessment of candidates for appointment to judicial office. Given that the President appoints judges from among candidates nominated at the request of the National Council, the we cannot accept the approach limiting the role of the President of the Republic to that of the notary public devoid of the possibility of effecting membership of the constitutional court. Disputable is also the view expressed in the judgment of 17 March 2015 imposing on the President an absolute obligation to appoint a judge from among of the two candidates. The appointment of judges is the responsibility of President of the Republic and is associated with its obligation to ensure continuous work of the constitutional court. Continuity may be threatened not only if the President refuses to appoint in an arbitrary manner, but also when he appoints to the membership of the court persons whose activities may interfere with its proper functioning. It is also hard to accept the idea that the head of state would have the full impact on the process of nominating judges. The President cannot freely decide who will be the judge, nor can he/she spontaneously assess whether the candidate meets the requirement of having appropriate work experience. Possessing a knowledge of law should be the subject of public debate, a kind of competition between the candidates, and not a tool by which the President may reject the candidates nominated to him.

2

Rada Główna Władzy Sądowniczej w Hiszpanii

86%

Glejt-Uziębło P., Uziębło P.

Przegląd Prawa i Administracji

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2019

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vol. 119

59-70

EN

In this article, the authors focus on showing the normative structure of the General Council of the Judiciary as a specific body aimed at protecting the independence of the courts and the independence of the judiciary. In the content of the article they analyse the principles of creation of this body, its internal organisation and competences. The main purpose of this analysis is to answer the question of whether Spanish solutions can be an inspiration to other states that want to properly protect the above values. However, the conclusions are not positive. A very narrow constitutional regulation, and thus granting of significant freedom for the legislator in shaping the General Council, causes basic weaknesses related to the functioning of a kind of “government” of judges.

3

The Policy Role of the EU in Judicial Politics and the Limitations of Conditionality: the Case of Hungary

86%

Coman R.

Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny

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2013

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vol. 1

65-83

EN

Recent developments in Hungarian constitutional and judicial politics have given impetus to question not only the outcomes of democratisation and Europeanisation, but also the efficacy of the European Union’s compliance mechanisms. In 2010, Hungary, one of the forerunners in building democracy made the headlines with Fidesz’s attempts at adopting a new Constitution and implementing cardinal laws along with controversial institutional, cultural, religious, moral and socio-economic policies. This article attempts to depict the transformative power of the European Union within a sensitive policy area which touches upon States’ pouvoris régaliens: the independence of the judiciary.

4

The Organization of the Judicial System in Post-War Poland

86%

Madera A.

Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

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2020

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issue 6 (58)

307-316

EN

Independence of the judiciary is a fundamental value. It determines the quality of organization and work, as well as the role that judicature plays in a democratic country. Justice, based on the rule of law and constituting the highest value for the society, can be implemented only in the spirit of this independence. Any changes and modifications ought to strive for one goal - a strong, independent judicature. The paper introduces the reconstruction process of the Polish judiciary after World War II, outlining the problems and challenges that it had to face in that period.

PL

Niezależność i niezawisłość wymiaru sprawiedliwości to wartości fundamentalne. To one decydują o jakości organizacji, pracy i roli, jaką w demokratycznym państwie pełni sądownictwo. Sprawiedliwość, opierająca się na rządach prawa i stanowiąca najwyższą wartość dla społeczeństwa, może być realizowana wyłącznie w duchu tych dwóch wartości. Wszelkie przemiany i przekształcenia winny zmierzać do jednego celu, którego azymutem jest właśnie silna, niezależna władza sądownicza. Niniejszy artykuł jest wprowadzeniem do zrozumienia procesu odbudowy polskiego wymiaru sprawiedliwości po II wojnie światowej, poprzez zarysowanie problemów i wyzwań, z jakimi w tym okresie musiał się zmierzyć.

5

Praktyka budżetowania zadaniowego na przykładzie jednostek organizacyjnych sądownictwa powszechnego – doświadczenia i wnioski

86%

Urbaniak G., Strumnik A.

Studia BAS

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2013

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issue 1(33)

127-159

EN

This article looks at the implementation of the performance-based budget in the Polish judiciary system. The authors provide a general overview on legal framework and discuss main gaps in this area. Moreover, they point at some practical problems with incorporating performance-based budget into actual processes of the courts management. Special attention is given to the explanation of the current (provisional) structure of Polish courts’ performance budgeting and the planned (conclusive) solutions in this area based on costs analyses and enterprise resource planning.

6

Sąd Najwyższy dawniej i dziś

81%

Gersdorf M.

Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny

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2017

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vol. 79

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issue 2

25-30

EN

The establishment of Polish courts in 1917, which took place even before Poland regained independence, was a manifestation of the will and intent of Polish lawyers to create their own statehood. This is the reason why it is worth talking about the imponderabilities related to the independence of the judges and the judiciary especially today, in the current political situation, on the first anniversary of the attack of the executive and legislative power on the judiciary, and the introduction of the ‘new order’ in the judiciary system, the aim of which is to limit, if not eliminate, the division of powers, hence implementing a significant dependence of the judiciary on the Minister of Justice, and consequently, in a long run, to implement a restriction of the civic right to have matters settled by an independent court.

PL

Utworzenie sądów polskich w 1917 r., jeszcze przed powstaniem niepodległego państwa, było wyrazem dążenia prawników polskich do budowy własnej państwowości. Z tego też powodu warto mówić o imponderabiliach związanych z niezależnością sędziów i sądownictwa, w szczególności dzisiaj, w aktualnej sytuacji politycznej, albowiem w tę rocznicę mamy do czynienia z atakiem władzy wykonawczej i ustawodawczej na wymiar sprawiedliwości oraz wprowadzenie założeń nowego „ładu” w wymiarze sprawiedliwości, które w swych założeniach mają doprowadzić do ograniczenia lub nawet zaniku trójpodziału władzy przez znaczące uzależnienie sądów od ministra sprawiedliwości i przez to w dalszej perspektywie do ograniczenia obywatelskiego prawa do rozstrzygnięcia sprawy przez niezależny sąd.

7

Przewrót konstytucyjny na Ukrainie w 2014 roku. Analiza konstytucyjno-prawna

72%

Kowalski G.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2018

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issue 1(144)

31–60

EN

The article brings up issues of the change of the constitutional order in Ukraine in February 2014. For that reason the normative acts passed during that period by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (concerning the change of constitutional order) are discussed, in particular: (a) the Act of February 21st, 2014 on Restoring Specifi c Provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, (b) Resolution of February 22nd, 2014 and (c) Resolution of February 24th, 2014. Detailed analysis of Ukrainian parliament’s acts mentioned above (including the reasons for their adoption) in the light of the Constitution legally binding at that time, judicial decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and literature, leads to the conclusion that the change of constitutional order in Ukraine occurred in a manner inconsistent with the Basic Law of Ukraine, primarily in violation of the principles of: supremacy of Constitution, separation of powers, legality of operation of State authorities and independence of the judiciary, and ban on state power usurpation. This analysis proves an assumption made in the article that Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine introduced amendments to the constitutional order unlawfully.

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2 Przegląd Sejmowy

1 Polish Political Science Review. Polski Przegląd Politologiczny

1 Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego

1 Przegląd Prawa i Administracji

1 Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny

1 Studia BAS

1 Chmielarz-Grochal A.

1 Coman R.

1 Gersdorf M.

1 Glejt-Uziębło P.

1 Kowalski G.

1 Madera A.

1 Strumnik A.

1 Sułkowski J.

1 Urbaniak G.

1 Uziębło P.

1 2020

1 2019

1 2018

1 2017

1 2016