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EN
This paper discusses linguistic vagueness in the context of a semantically restricted domain of legal language. It comments on selected aspects of vagueness found in contemporary English normative legal texts and on terminological problems related to vagueness and indeterminacy both in the legal domain and language in general. The discussion is illustrated with selected corpus examples of vagueness in English legal language and attempts to show problems of the relation between vagueness and ambiguity in the context of legal institutionalised systems.The discussion also evokes theoretical issues which pertain to the relation between legal texts and their contexts, the problem of how linguistic forms acquire their contextual meaning and how linguistic expressions are disambiguated. These issues are further related to the post-Gricean theory of relevance, its inferential model of communication, and the interplay between the linguistic code and inferential processes in (specialised) communication.
EN
On the basis of Roman Ingarden’s conceptions of indeterminacy and concretization and the notion of spoken action, Jacek Mydla constructs the idea of textual authority in Shakespeare’s drama. The text is regarded as the primary source of meaning which determines theatrical representation. When reading a play actively, the reader fills out areas of indeterminacy in an attempt to build a faithful imaginary representation of the action. The thus reconstructed social mimesis can then be transferred onto the stage. Mydla argues for the precedence of textual over theatrical concretizations of Shakespeare.
EN
In the preface to his book „Philosophy of Chance”, Michael Heller writes that „the structure of the universe is twined with chances”. An analogical structure can be found in classical music, e.g. in the most of works written after 1960 by Witold Lutosławski (1913-1994) – „the biggest Polish composer of the second half of the 20th century, or maybe even the whole century” (Tadeusz Kaczyński). The goal of this paper is to describe in rough the role of indeterminacy in Witold Lutosławski’s controlled aleatoric music and to show analogies between the ways indeterminacy is presented in Lutosławski’s music and Heller’s thought.
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Polomnožiny a matematika možného

88%
EN
Alternative set theory (AST), or the theory of semisets, the spiritual father of whom is the well-known mathematician Petr Vopěnka, has never received wide recognition and at the present time is subject to neglect. In spite of this, however, it is a conception which is notable for its absolute straightforwardness and for the fundamentally different way in which it mathematises the concept of indeterminacy: the mathematisation of the infinite can be interpreted as an absolutely fundamental mathematisation of the indeterminate. A key role is played by an undetermined grouping – so called semisets. In this article, examples of semisets are discussed in detail and it is shown that semisets should be understood consistently as potentially infinite sets in the spirit of Aristotelian potential infinity. In other words, as sets contain in them a permanent possibility of creating or discovering more and more objects belonging to the given grouping.
PL
The article examines the specifics of the reader’s reception of Stanisław Lem’s novel Solaris in the context of indeterminacy, and the openness of the work to interpretation. The paper examines literary approaches to the formation of meaning in the process of reading this novel, in particular those implemented in Manfred Geier and Istvan Jr. Csicsery-Ronay works. Marie-Laure Ryan’s adaptation of the theory of possible worlds to literary analysis is employed as the methodological basis of my research. On the one hand, the effect of indeterminacy corresponds to the fantastic nature of the conditionality of Lem’s novel. Indeed, the key issue of the work – the encounter of humans with the unknown – requires the author to apply the potential of secrecy. On the other hand, this highly literary work (as well as Andrei Tarkovsky’s film adaptation) is endowed with multiple and ambiguous semantic codes that appeal to the depths of human consciousness and the unconscious. These codes cannot be interpreted unambiguously and, therefore, also provoke a state of uncertainty in the reader. In the textual actual world, semantic codes produce indeterminacy. They are linked to the essence of the single inhabitant of the Solaris, the Ocean, and phantoms created by it who visit the Station. In the novel protagonist’s Kris Kelvin personal world, the state of indeterminacy is associated with the existential essence of his relationship with his beloved Rheya and the problem of making contact with extraterrestrial intelligence. The surreal imagery of Kris’s dreams and visions provide for possible interpretations of the semantic codes of his world.
6
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Nekonečno a kontinuum v pojetí Petra Vopěnky

63%
EN
One of the key themes of Petr Vopěnka was his understanding of mathematical infinity. He put forward many objections to Cantor’s established set theory. He worked out a new, alternative, theory in which he surprisingly interpreted infinity as a means of mathematising indeterminacy. He interpreted the continuum in a similar way. He drew on phenomenology, on Husserl’s motto “Return to things themselves”, and he employed a range of phenomenological concepts. At the same time, however, he did not give up the claim to mathematical precision in his theory. This claim brings with it certain pitfalls which centre on mathematical idealisation and its relation to the natural real world.
EN
Many of Patrick Modiano’s novels involve the motif of the game – predicate and space – in the narration, at characterization, thematic and structural levels. The introduction of this minor element – it never reaches the level of a trope – nonetheless informs us both about the novelistic techniques employed by Modiano and about the metaphysical considerations underpinning his writing. As such, a close reading of various episodes articulated around the motif of the game allows us to better understand the methods adopted by the novelist in the development of his characters and in the architecture of his texts. Furthermore, the insertion of the motif of the game allows us to identify and analyse the value given to chance and indeterminacy in all its forms in the Modianian novel, from which a true metaphysics, if not an ethics, of indeterminacy, can in turn be deployed.
FR
De nombreux romans de Patrick Modiano font intervenir le motif du jeu – prédicat et espace – dans la narration, aux niveaux actoriel, thématique et structural. L’introduction de cet élément mineur – il ne s’agit pas d’un thème – nous renseigne toutefois autant sur la technique romanesque employée par Modiano que sur les considérations métaphysiques sous-tendant son écriture. Une lecture attentive centrée sur divers épisodes articulés autour du jeu nous permet ainsi de mieux comprendre les modalités adoptées par l’écrivain dans l’élaboration de ses personnages et dans l’architecture de ses récits. L’insertion du motif du jeu nous permet en outre d’identifier et d’analyser la valeur accordée au hasard et à   l’indéterminabilité sous toutes ses formes dans le récit modianien, à partir duquel se déploie une véritable métaphysique, voire une éthique, de l’indétermination.
PL
Biorąc za punkt wyjścia powszechnie znany brak spójności pomiędzy obrazem kary pośmiertnej zawartym w przypowieści o ubogim Łazarzu (Łk 16:19-31) a innymi Łukaszowymi konceptualizacjami życia pozagrobowego, autor artykułu bada wspomniany obraz w relacji do ogólnego tła Łukaszowej eschatologii. W pierwszej części zostają wydobyte na światło zarówno dwubiegunowy horyzont ideologiczny Łukasza jak i powiązanie eschatologii z etyką dóbr materialnych. Ujawniona zostaje w ten sposób ogólna spójność pomiędzy przypowieścią a Łukaszową perspektywą eschatologiczną. Kara pośmiertna zostaje ukazana jako natychmiastowa i ostateczna. W drugiej części zostają wyeksponowane elementy niedookreśloności obecne w Łukaszowej eschatologii. Ukazane zostaje jak bogata struktura Łukaszowej narracji pozwala na generowanie dodatkowych możliwości interpretacji pozagrobowych cierpień bogacza. W rezultacie, precyzyjna kwalifikacja kary jako ostatecznej, czyli nie tymczasowej, nie daje się orzec w sposób zupełnie jednoznaczny.
EN
Taking as its point of departure the commonly recognized tension between the image of postmortem punishment in Lk 16:19-31 and other Lukan conceptualizations of the afterlife, the article examines the said image against the background of Luke’s overall eschatology. In the first step, both Luke’s bipolar ideological horizon and the conjunction of eschatology and wealth ethics are brought to light, demonstrating general coherence between the parable and Luke’s eschatological perspective. The parable’s presentation of the post-mortem punishment as immediate and final is affirmed. In the second step, elements of indeterminacy in Luke’s eschatological perspective are explored. Through the workings of metalepsis, the rich texture of Luke’s narrative is shown to generate additional possibilities for interpreting the rich man’s punishment. It follows that the precise nature of the punishment – its final as opposed to intermediate character – cannot be said to be completely unambiguous.
EN
In legal practice, there is often talk of the vagueness or indeterminacy of the language or the law itself. It is therefore not surprising that legal theory is also concerned with these issues. Perhaps the most respected theorists currently addressing vagueness in law are Timothy Endicott and Scott Shapiro. What the two have in common is that they have focused a fair amount of attention on the so-called sorites paradoxes. In this text, we will point out that the sorites paradox is not so relevant to law, and that vagueness and indeterminacy in law is caused more by other phenomena. Thus, the aim of the text is to show that the pile paradox is not so relevant to law and does not have as far-reaching an impact as Endicott claims. In order to prove our thesis, we will first focus our attention on the pile paradoxes themselves, where, within philosophy as well as logic, these have been studied in detail, as Endicott and Shapiro follow up, and various solutions to these paradoxes have been proposed. We will point out that these paradoxes, are not so relevant to law. This will lead to the second part of the text, where we will introduce other sources of vagueness and indeterminacy and argue that it is these other sources, such as open texture, family resemblance, and multi-dimensional polysemy that cause law to be vaguer and more indeterminate. Following this, we will address the question of what actually happens in the interpretation and application of law in these cases. We will argue that lexical wars are authoritatively adjudicated here, but where the judge does not act as Humpty Dumpty, but his decision is constrained by the rules that previous interpreters have participated in shaping, and is also his responsibility for co-creating concepts for future interpretations.
CS
V rámci právní praxe se často hovoří o vágnosti či neurčitosti jazyka a samotného práva. Není proto divu, že se těmto otázkám věnuje i právní teorie. V současné době asi mezi nejuznávanější teoretiky, kteří se vágnosti v právu věnují, patří Timothy Endicott a Scott Shapiro. Oba dva spojuje to, že poměrně velkou pozornost soustředí na takzvané paradoxy minimálních rozdílů (v originále „sorites paradoxy“). V tomto textu poukážeme na to, že samotné paradoxy minimálních rozdílů a jejich řešení není pro právo až tak relevantní a že vágnost a neurčitost v právu je způsobena spíše jinými fenomény. Cílem textu je tedy poukázat na to, že paradox minimálních rozdílů není pro právo natolik relevantní a nemá tak dalekosáhlý dopad, jak tvrdí Endicott. Abychom mohli tuto naši tezi prokázat, zaměříme nejprve svou pozornost na samotné paradoxy minimálních rozdílů, přičemž v rámci filosofie, ale i logiky byly tyto podrobně zkoumány, na což navazují i Endicott a Shapiro, a byla navržena nejrůznější řešení těchto paradoxů. Poukážeme na to, že tyto paradoxy nejsou pro právo až tak relevantní. Tím se dostaneme k druhé části textu, ve které představíme další zdroje vágnosti a neurčitosti a budeme argumentovat, že právě tyto ostatní zdroje, jako je otevřená textura, rodová podobnost či multidimenzionální polysémie, zapříčiňují ve větší míře vágnost a neurčitost práva. Poté budeme řešit otázku, co se vlastně v rámci interpretace a aplikace práva v těchto případech děje. Budeme argumentovat, že jsou zde autoritativně rozhodovány lexikální války, kde ovšem soudce nevystupuje jako Humpty Dumpty, ale jeho rozhodnutí je omezováno pravidly, na jejichž utváření se podíleli předchozí interpreti, a zároveň je i jeho závazkem za spoluutváření konceptů pro interpretace budoucí.
Studia Bobolanum
|
2020
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vol. 31
|
issue 1
233-251
PL
Analizując problem wolności i wolnej woli, Popper dostrzegał, że w celu zrozumienia racjonalnego ludzkiego postępowania potrzeba czegoś, co będzie pośrodku między czystym przypadkiem a absolutnym determinizmem. W artykule autor wykazuje, że Popper nie wnosi nowych treści, które wyjaśniałyby problem ludzkiej wolności. Argumenty Poppera to są czyste założenia, dzięki którym pragnie on niejako oddalić trudny do rozwiązania problem. Otwartość w sobie natury otaczającego nas świata ukazuje również, że nie jest on kompletnie zdeterminowany swoimi wewnętrznymi prawami czy przyczynami. W świecie bytów rozumnych mogą zaistnieć zjawiska mające wpływ na nasze postępowanie i determinować nas mentalnie nawet wtedy, kiedy fizycznie jesteśmy wolni od przymusu. Wydaje się, że Popper wypowiada się za indeterminizmem, gdyż dostrzega w tym możliwość wykazania ludzkiej wolności. Jednak taki argument nie ma żadnych podstaw, a jedynie przeświadczenie, że bez prawdziwie wolnych decyzji ludzka egzystencja byłaby tragiczną farsą. I tak, w obronie ludzkiej wolności, Popper powraca ostatecznie do racji moralnych.
EN
In analysing the problem of freedom and free will, Popper concluded that we need something in order to understand rational human behaviour that is by its very nature between total chance and complete determinism. In this article, we state that Popper has in fact not produced any evidence in favour of human freedom. Rather, his arguments are based on an attempt to avert a situation which he finds unacceptable. The openness of the physical world involves only that this world is not entirely determined by its own laws or causes. In the world of mental entities, however, there may be certain phenomena that affect our behaviour, so even though we are not physically determined, we could be mentally determined. Popper’s effort to promote indeterminism and the consequent possibility of human freedom do not seem to be based on evidence, but rather on the belief that without freedom of choice our situation would be merely a tragic farce. That is why Popper ultimately turns to moral motives in his defence of human freedom.
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