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Suárezova teorie poznání a její vztah k tomismu

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Heider D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2011

vol. 59

issue 6

865-896

Suárez’s theory of knowledge, worked out in his On the Soul (1621), presents a significant philosophical addition to the famous Metaphysical Disputations (1597). Even if On the Soul was published posthumously, its basic thoughts were developed, by Suárez himself, as early as in the first half of the 1570’s. For this reason this work of pure philosophy provides the indispensable context for Suárez’s metaphysical reflections. The article presents the fundamental characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge, with emphasis on knowledge of reason, and with a view to its critical relation to Thomist theory. It is above all Thomist theory which Suárez was addressing. Next to the brief presentation of the historical context of the work and a sketch of the basic anthropological tendencies connected with Suárez’s particular form of dualism with regard to the question of the soul and body, the author presents four basic characteristics of Suárez’s theory of knowledge. 1) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised as a doctrine that puts emphasis on the vital nature of knowledge. The whole principle of knowledge cannot be considered without the factor of the attentive soul; passive reason, as really identical with active reason, cannot be treated as passive primary matter; the intentional species represent extramental objects only in an embryonic way; intentional connections of the knowing subject with the known thing can be understood as, at most, an accidental one. All these theses are clearly signs of non-Thomism. 2) Suárez’s theory of knowledge is characterised by direct cognitive realism. The rejection of the expressed species (species expressa) really distinct from the cognitive act and the rejection of the definition of a formal concept as that in which (id in quo) we grasp extramental things, shows that Suárez unequivocably advocates a conception of direct realism. He views Thomist theory as approaching too closely to an undesirable representationalism. 3) Suárez’s teaching is further characterised by a theory of the sympathy of cognitive potencies having their root in a common soul. It is this theory – widely accepted in Renaissance philosophy – which understands the relation between sensory and rational knowledge acausally. Suárez conceives it in contrast to the Thomist theory which works with a causal understanding of this relation. 4) In the final part of the study Suárez’s epistemological theory of the direct rational knowledge of material individuals is presented. Thomist teaching on the reflexive rational knowledge of individuals is rejected by Suárez for the same reason as Thomist theory on the real distinction between the concept and cognitive act: both offend against direct realism and thus also against the objectivity of our knowledge. The author comes to the negative conclusion that Suárez’s theory of knowledge is positively not primarily inspired by Thomist theory. The main influence – one which the author does not attempt to elaborate – seems to be the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. At the same time attention is drawn to some of Suárez’s themes that are taken up by modern philosophy, such as occasionalism, innate ideas, predetermined harmony and the unity of apperception – these bring Suárez close to the conceptions of early modern rationalists.

Filozoficzny spór o przedmiot poznania, a koncepcja poznania duchów czystych w wykładzie angelologii św. Tomasza z Akwinu

100%

Dutkiewicz T.

Studia Gdańskie

2016

issue 39

151-164

W filozoficznym sporze o właściwy człowiekowi przedmiot poznania wskazać można dwa najważniejsze stanowiska: idealistyczne, w myśl którego - wobec zawodności danych zmysłowych - punktem wyjścia refleksji filozoficznej należy uczynić, tak czy inaczej pojmowane, idee; oraz realistyczne, uznające wartość poznania zmysłowego, które jako jedyne umożliwia człowiekowi kontakt z rzeczywistością, a także podstawę dla poznania intelektualnego. Idealistyczny punkt wyjścia filozofii pozostaje w ścisłym związku z antropologiczną redukcją, w wyniku której człowiek ujmowany jest jako swego rodzaju byt świadomości, „czysty duch” poznający. Tego typu spirytualizm odcisnął swoje piętno także na myśli chrześcijańskiej, która przez wiele wieków pozostawała pod przemożnym wpływem platonizmu. Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, który – nawiązując do filozofii arystotelesowskiej – kreśli personalistyczną wizję człowieka jako transcendującej świat materialny, duchowo-cielesnej jedności, wiele uwagi poświęca problematyce angelologicznej, chcąc wskazać na istotne różnice, zachodzące pomiędzy naturą ludzką oraz naturą czystych inteligencji, jakimi są aniołowie. Różnice te w szczególności dotyczą ludzkiego i anielskiego poznania, w wielu jego aspektach. Teoriopoznawcze ujęcia, jakie od czasu Platona i Arystotelesa wypracowano w filozoficznym sporze o przedmiot poznania, okazały się przydatnymi dla wyjaśnienia sposobu pozyskiwania wiedzy, odpowiadającemu naturom – anielskiej i ludzkiej. O ile bowiem to drugie uwikłane jest zawsze w materię i skazane na pozyskiwanie w punkcie wyjścia zmysłowych danych, o tyle dla pierwszego – pozbawionego w naturalny sposób możliwości percepcji zmysłowej – jedynym możliwym punktem wyjścia pozostaje kontemplacja wrodzonych idei.

In the philosophical dispute over the subject of cognition appropriate for man it is possible to identify the two most important positions, namely the idealistic stance, according to which ideas, understood one way or another, should be a point of departure for philosophical reflection due to the fallibility of sense data; and the realistic position which acknowledges the value of sensory cognition as it is the only kind that enables man to have contact with reality, as well as being the basis for intellectual cognition. The idealistic point of departure for philosophy remains intrinsically linked with the anthropological reduction by which man is conceived as a certain form of conscious being, a cognizing “pure spirit.” This type of spiritualism left its mark on Christian thought, which for centuries has remained greatly under the influence of Platonism. St. Thomas Aquinas, referring to Aristotelian philosophy, presents a personalistic vision of man as a spiritual and corporeal unity transcending the material world. Aquinas devotes much attention to angelology, trying to indicate essential differences between human nature and the nature of pure intelligences, namely angels. These differences refer, in particular, to many aspects of human and angelic cognition. Epistemological concepts in the philosophical dispute over the subject of cognition which have been developed since the times of Plato and Aristotle appeared to be helpful in explaining the way of gaining knowledge in reference to angelic and human nature. As the latter is always entangled in matter, the former, naturally devoid of sensory perception, is left to contemplate innate ideas.

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1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Studia Gdańskie

1 2016

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1 Dutkiewicz T.

1 Heider D.

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Suárezova teorie poznání a její vztah k tomismu

Filozoficzny spór o przedmiot poznania, a koncepcja poznania duchów czystych w wykładzie angelologii św. Tomasza z Akwinu