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  1. 4 Zembrzuski M.

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Intelekt bierny a intelekt możnościowy w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu

100%
Zembrzuski M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2012
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vol. 1
65-84
EN
The article is an attempt to respond the following questions: is there a difference between operations of potential and passive intellect? Could one call the potential intellect passive intellect? Are there any questions, statements or opinions in the history of philosophy which separate potential from passive intellect? The passivity of potential intellect is not a problem here, because its nature and its act is to be in the state of potency towards ist object. The subject of analysis tends to define teechnical terms "intellectus passivus" and to reach philosophical implications resulting from it.
2
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Realna różnica między intelektem czynnym i możnościowym w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu

100%
Zembrzuski M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
|
2015
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vol. 4
63-95
EN
The aim of article was to prove the existence of the real difference between active intellect and potential intellect, based on the epistemological thought of Thomas Aquinas. Although many authors suggested such a character distinction, yet no one does not try to justifying it. In this article are comments on intellects in Aristotle account, very short history – following the Aquinas - of distinguishing and separating intellects. Presented is the same understanding of the real difference between existence and essence of beings created and in this light given difference between intellects, because Aquinas, actually never spoke about it in this way. A basic element of the article is to distinguish intellects on the basis of a formal rules of their objects and distinguish them on the basis of acts, which allows to build a proper argumentation. It has been shown that between what is recognized in the potential intellect is a disproportion, which may be removed by the allocation of truly different between potential and active intellect. Between intellects there is a real difference only in the case of the human intellect, since both in God and in the angelic beings, this differentiation is not needed. The real difference between intellects is based on the difference between the act and potency or being in act and being in potency, however, are not they act and potency relative to each other, but to the cognized object. Moreover, the active intellect as being in the act, is not determined nor determining the object of cognition potential intellect, it is not the object recognized by him. Finally, if the way of cognition depends on the mode of existence, the intellectual knowledge infinity of human remains in potency, by what must be in man two intellects.
3
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Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.

100%
Zembrzuski M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2017
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vol. 6
77-98
EN
Argument for spirituality of soul appears in a few places of Aquinas’ text and is sometimes called “the impediment argument”, “the argument for plasticity of intellect”, “the argument from common dimension”. The names differ as far as Thomas did not establish himself any name for his reasoning in this matter. There is no doubt that the argument derives from the Aristotelian On the soul, however, Aquinas does not develop it. The argument is present in four places and its most important presumptions would be summarized as follows: (1) man can cognize the nature of all bodies by his own intellect; (2) that what is able to cognize everything can not in itself have a nature of the cognized object – the nature of body would block a process of cognition; (3) it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body – it would not be possible for the principle of intellectual action to act through a bodily part; (4) the intellectual principle which is called the intellect or the mind acts per se does not contain any bodily involvement in its action. Hence, according to Aquinas, soul is something subsisting with regard to actions which are not the acts of body. However, this statement is disturbingly mistaken. In Summa, nevertheless, Thomas develops this issue further. In response to some objections he would emphasize that none of parts (as far as part is understood as a part of a whole) could not exist separately and act separately – neither soul nor body (as well as an eye or a hand). This is for the fact that soul is something subsisting (quod est) and inherited in matter (quo aliquid aliud est). Aquinas tries to explain the status of soul significantly, nevertheless left some questions open to make analysis on a whole human being possible, including body for which soul serves as a form. Thus, through the intellect we would observe a unique characteristic of human soul as a rational being.
4
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Prawda o intelekcie. Mieczysława Gogacza rozumienie intelektu możnościowego i czynnego

80%
Zembrzuski M.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2016
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vol. 5
75-89
EN
The aim of the article is presentation the problems of possible intellect and agent intellect in philosophy Mieczyslaw Gogacz, founder of consequent version of thomism (Warsaw School of Thomism). His understanding of the intellect was dictated by the successive publications. Difference between intellects, was first shown in the context of fundamental metaphysical positions - realism and idealism. According to M. Gogacz realistic proposition is depends on the distinction between two intellects, and idealistic related with the acceptance of a single intellect with passive and active function, and identification of the faculties of the soul with itself. M. Gogacz presented the metaphysical description of the nature of the intellect, emphasizing its being, as well as the very essence. He underlined that the possible intellect should be defined as the possibility of the soul, which is it imperfection (intellect is principle of individuation of the soul), located in the soul, but not identical with its essence. Agent intellect in his opinion should be defined as an accident of the possible intellect. Distinction between possible intellect and agent intellect allowed to remark the difference between knowing confused and clearly, and to build the theory of “speech of the heart”, which describes the most important way of knowing a principle of being – act of being.
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