The main thesis of the author of this study is the opinion that so called personal memory transformed into the literary text is not in any case the representation of past reality of individual. So called personal memory in literature is always set of speech acts with evident intention of narrator. This thesis the author prooved on text of four czech exile authors – Hostovsky, Souckova, Barenyi and Kundera.
The article is an attempt to answer the question: what happens to a literary work – understood as Ingarden’s purely intentional objects – from the recipient’s perspective? And also: how do the images of objects arise in the minds of the audience and what are their properties? Transferring purely intentional objects to the recipient’s perspective changes their status: mental images of objects are subject to numerous fluctuations (based on emotions and cognitive processes). In this way they are transformed into forms that are non-permanent reflections of objects belonging to a literary work. Referring to Ingarden’s terminology, one might say that they become purely intentional reflections (or reflections of purely intentional objects). The article is an attempt to characterize and stratify them.
In the following article, I discuss the root of Scheler’s account of the person, its origin in phenomenology and the larger impact that view has as an alternative to other conceptions of the person. My thesis in this article intends to show why we should start with Scheler’s phenomenology over other approaches to the person. First, I take a look at what theoretical resources Scheler’s phenomenology has to offer us, and secondly, I outline the cultural conditions as to why the value of the person must be affirmed in light of the 20th century and past philosophical mistakes in ethics. I, then, end on affirming the reasons why we ought to revive Scheler’s account of the person.
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