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Filosofie a literatura: čtení přes překážky

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Koťátko P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2017

vol. 65

issue 3

341-360

The author attempts to show that philosophy and literature can – in an equally radical, destructive and yet productive way – intervene in the running of our conceptual apparatus, schemes of imagination and patterns of interpretation. He focuses on three philosophical and two literary examples of this kind: 1) In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes, in a most dynamic (and “physically” evocative) way, the movement performed by thought which strives to articulate a speculative content in the traditional subject-predicate form (based on a fixed substance-attribute opposition). 2) The externalist thought experiments (H. Putnam, T. Burge and others) have an equally radical effect: they subvert our intuitions concerning the contents of thoughts and communicative acts and the “natural” assumption that these contents are located in our heads. 3) The Gricean semantics with its well-known regresses leads to the conclusion that any act of “meaning something by something” expands (in its intentional structure) in infinitum: this is a radical challenge for our intuitions concerning the nature of communicative attitudes and communicative acts. 4) The narrator in Beckett’s Trilogy (in particular in The Unnamable) describes his mind as a space for the interventions of other, more assertive and more efficient, minds. Moreover, he concludes that even this thought should be ascribed to them, the same holds for this conclusion etc. in infinitum: in this way, the narrator’s subject collapses in an infinite regress. This corresponds to the externalist revision of the internal nature of our thought (cf. 2) as well as the Gricean regresses affecting any attempts to identify the position from which we “mean something by something” (cf. 3). The resulting collapse of the referential role of the first person pronoun, as well as other examples of Beckettian destruction of basic language functions, provide a literary analogy to Hegel’s revision of the traditional sentence form (cf. 3). Another contribution to this confrontation is to be found in Borges’ Pierre Menard story.

Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci

72%

Koťátko P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2021

vol. 69

issue 3

445-470

The paper is a critical reaction to Christopher Gauker’s general attack on the Gricean way of thinking about linguistic communication and, in particular, on the role it assigns to the phenomenon of recursive mindreading. The author rejects the claim that the Gricean analysis of meaning something by an utterance is psychologically totally unrealistic, in particular because of the role which the element of recursive mindreading plays in the conditions in definiens. In this connection, the author defends a certain account of philosophical analysis, its functions and the proper interpretation of its results (Ch. 2). On the same basis, the author critically examines Gauker’s rejection of Grice’s analysis of conversational implicatures, as well as of the very reality of Gricean implicatures as a communicative phenomenon (Ch. 3). He concludes that Gauker’s alternative to Grice’s theory of implicatures, leaving no space for recursive mindreading, does not address the same questions as Grice’s theory, and its contribution to the explanation of the nature of communicative interaction is rather limited (Ch. 4). In opposition to a widely shared view, the author argues that Gricean semantics is compatible with the assumption that higher-order thoughts, required by recursive mindreading, are inaccessible to autistic speakers. There is still a good sense in which they can be regarded as meaning something by their utterances and performing speech acts (Ch. 5). The last part of the discussion concerns Gauker’s criticism of the “generalized Griceanism” in M. Tomassello’s work, in particular of the role that Tomassello assigns to the recursive mindreading in his analysis of coordination problems. Concerning this role, the author arrives at rather sceptical conclusions, for different reasons than those underlying Gauker’s criticism (Ch. 6).

Článek je obhajobou Griceovy sémantiky a pragmatiky a zvláště role, kterou v ní hraje předpoklad tzv. „rekurzivního čtení mysli“. Diskuse na toto téma, vedená převážně jako polemika s Griceovým oponentem Christopherem Gaukerem, je pojata jako příležitost k úvahám o povaze jazykové komunikace, o roli vzájemnosti v postojích jejích účastníků, o úloze filosofické analýzy v této sféře a o adekvátním čtení jejích výsledků.

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2 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 2021

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2 Koťátko P.

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Filosofie a literatura: čtení přes překážky

Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci