Search results

1

The Phenomenon of Fanaticism

100%

Rosinska Z.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2020

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issue 2

159-164

EN

The paper describes the model shape of fanaticism. It defines fanaticism as a willing enslavement of personality and analysed the following features of it: intentionality, missionary attitude, being in love, intolerance, ability to satisfy ambivalent desires for objectivization and for subjectivization, and ability to evoke ambivalent feelings: moral condemnation and the feeling of admiration.

2

Reinterpretácia Akvinského tézy o identite poznávajúceho a poznávaného

100%

Mlčúchová A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2015

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vol. 63

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issue 2

215-231

EN

This study investigates the origin of the Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of the knower and the known in the context of the system of Thomas Aquinas. The author takes the view that this doctrine is central to Aquinas’ theory of knowledge and specific to his theory of intentional forms species. The aim is to present and motivate an interpretation of the identity of knower and known as numerical identity, while calling into question the traditional understanding of this identity as formal.

3

The Function of Intentionality in Ideological Cognition and Practical Activities

100%

Jingzhao L., Jie G.

Dialogue and Universalism

|

2015

|

issue 2

229-235

EN

The aim of our research is to demonstrate that intentionality as a major property of consciousness and as a basic state of mind plays an important role in all the activities in which the subject is related to the objective world. This paper is based on John Searle’s theory of intentionality. Both ideological cognition and practical activity are object oriented activities. However, the objects targeted by them and the ways they are associ-ated with their subjects are different. The function of intentionality of ideological cogni-tion is mainly reflected on its directedness, whereas in practical activities—on its moti-vating and regulating capacities.

4

Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality

100%

Ciecierski T.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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2016

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vol. 46

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issue 1

35-58

EN

The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and acts from the non-intentional ones. Next, the general desiderata for theories providing criteria for singling out the class of intentional sentences are introduced. Finally, distinct proposals for providing such criteria are analyzed. Author argues that neither is satisfactory.

5

Odpowiedzialność karna za popełnienie czynu zabronionego w stanie tak zwanej zawinionej niepoczytalności

88%

Liszewska A.

Nowa kodyfikacja prawa karnego

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2017

|

vol. 43

391-400

EN

The aim of this article is to analyse the problem of the criminal liability of a perpetrator who, while committing an offence, was in the state of inebriation or intoxication as a cause of insanity. Although the regulation of this matter was introduced in Art. 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, it should be re-examined in the light of the separation of intentionality or negligence and culpability in the Criminal Code of 1997. Traditionally, insanity was treated as an exonerating circumstance, although the legislator mentions the elements that characterise intentionality and negligence. That is why, firstly the relation between Art. 31 § 1 and Art. 9 of the Criminal Code should be examined. Taking under consideration the result of this analysis, the article presents evidence that in the light of Art. 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, the perpetrator can be sentenced only for a negligent offence.

6

Scotus on Sense, Medium, and Sensible Object

88%

González Ginocchio D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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vol. 65

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issue Special Issue 2

61-78

EN

This paper aims to examine some of Scotus’s key notions on perception in his Commentary on the De anima, focusing on the notions of sense, medium, and object. I will keep two main points of interest at hand: first, Scotus’s understanding and reception of the philosophy of perception advanced by his contemporaries, in light of his own theory of the faculties, objects, and the perfection of their respective acts; second, the distinction and classification of the external senses according to their perfection.

7

Naturalistic Descriptions and Normative-Intentional Interpretations

88%

Prien B.

Human Affairs

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2007

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vol. 17

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issue 1

22-32

EN

Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", "sanction", "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow.

8

The Structure and Functions of Language

88%

Searle J. R.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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2014

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vol. 36

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issue 1

27-40

EN

This paper will discuss the nature of language. I find the present state of the subject, the Philosophy of Language, and the present state of Lin- guistics to be both, for different reasons, unsatisfactory. The problem with the Philosophy of Language is that its practitioners tend to lose sight of the psy- chological reality of language, i.e. of speaking and writing. Historically this is because the Philosophy of Language began with Frege’s logic and has continued to the present day to be heavily influenced by considerations of formal logic. Logicians need not be interested in the psychological reality of logical systems. Frege’s logical system is much more powerful than Aristotle’s, but for all I know Aristotle may be closer to the way people actually think. It does not matter to logicians.

9

Radykalna interpretacja intencjonalności w filozofii Martina Heideggera

88%

Dąbrowski A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2012

|

issue nr 18

19-41

EN

The aim of this paper is to present Martin Heidegger’s view on intentionality. We start from initial observations on the phenomenon of intentionality (here we refer to four possible concepts of intentionality: mentalistic, linguistic, pragmatic, and naturalistic) and a few remarks on the fundamental ontology of Heidegger. Then we show what intentionality is not for Heidegger: fi rst, it is not an objectively existing relationship between two entities and, secondly, intentionality is not the subjectivity of the subject; and we specify what intentionality is: in Heidegger’s ontology, intentionality is closely related to the transcendence of being-in-the-world. Transcending – the constancy in crossing – Dasein enables it to refer to itself, other conscious beings, and, in general, all present entities. We have shown that none of the above concepts of intentionality (mentalistic, linguistic, pragmatic, and naturalistic) is not congruent with the interpretation of Heidegger, which concentrates on the following issue: how to go beyond the traditional understanding of intentionality and reach a more basic form of experience.

10

Sunt Intelligibilia Entia Quae Sunt Vera. A Late Medieval Interpretationof Intentionality

88%

Lacca E.

Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne

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2022

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vol. 10

137-151

EN

The aim of this contribution is to present the theory of intentionality proposed by the Spanish Dominican Lope de Barrientos (1382–1469), as it is offered by his Clavis Sapentiae: in this erudite work, written at the turn of the 15th century in the context of the new-born School of Salamanca, the terms proper to the gnoseological lexicon of the Thomist scholasticism are taken into consideration, analysed and renewed in a new original way. This makes possible to demonstrate from one hand how the tradition opened by Thomas Aquinas is inherited in the upcoming Renaissance and from another hand to look how a typical Renaissance scholar as Barrientos builds a theory of knowledge that is original, although faithful to the Thomist tradition to which it has been continuously and cogently referred and consulted.

11

Husserl on the Unconscious and Reduction

88%

Togni A.

Avant

|

2018

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vol. 9

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issue 2

75-86

EN

Is there intentionality in the inner most level of the soul? Do we have experience of what is unconscious? And, supposing that such an experience might exist, is it possible to perform reduction on it? In this regard the present paper aims to investigate, from a phenomenological point of view, the process of “raising awareness” of what is unconscious, trying to understand if there is (or if there can be) a connection between this process and the methodological concept of “reduction” developed by Husserl. Particular attention is paid to the specific type of reduction called “psychological reduction,” which, according to Husserl, provides access to the pure soul, the pure field of psychological experience.

12

Untangling the Knot of Intentionality: Between Directedness, Reference, and Content

75%

Steiner P.

Studia Semiotyczne

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2019

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vol. 33

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issue 1

PL

The notion of “intentionality” is much invoked in various foundational theories of meaning, being very often equated with “meaning”, “content” and “reference”. In this paper, I propose and develop a basic distinction between two concepts and, more fundamentally, properties of intentionality: intentionality-T (the fact that a state is directed to some object) and intentionality-C (the fact that a state is contentful). Representationalism is then defined as the position according to which intentionality-T can be reduced to intentionality-C, in the form of representational (i.e. contentful) states. Nonrepresentationalism is rejecting this reduction, and argues that intentionality-T is more fundamental than intentionality-C. Non-representationalism allows for a new layered view of the relations between cognitive intentionality and linguistic intentionality; this view is presented at the end of the paper.

13

Habit, Bodyhood, and Merleau-Ponty

75%

Lemanek K.

Diametros

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2019

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vol. 16

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issue 60

52-60

EN

The phenomenal body is an intriguing concept, and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of habit, coupled with motor intentionality, provides a novel perspective on its inner workings. I contend that his portrayal of habit tacitly bears two faces – motoric habit and instrumental habit respectively. The former is an attunement to some bodily possibilities that are already at our disposal while the latter is an explicit relation to external objects and a process of incorporating those objects into our own bodies. These two notions play into each other, creating a mechanism that offers an intuitive illustration and simple productive definition for a dynamic picture of bodyhood. Furthermore, it carries an internal delimitation that marks the boundaries of its application. The result is a view that provides something new to current interpretations of Merleau-Ponty, as well as potential applications in areas that derived from his appeals to motor intentionality.

14

The Structure of the Body Dynamics: Teleology of the Instincts and the Intentionality of the Bodily Motions

75%

Khalilizand M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2016

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issue 3

157-167

EN

One of the constitutional moments of the structure of kinesthesia—that is the mo-tions of the body—is the practical orientedness of motions towards something. In this article I will deal with this structural moment in the practical life of the subject. I will first differentiate between teleology in the instinctive movements of the body and the intentionality in the practical activities of the subject. Whereas the former refers to the primary and instinctive orientedness of the bodily motions toward something generally determined fulfilling the instinctive needs of the body, the latter is to be understood as the pre-reflexive orientedness of the bodily motions toward a goal in the practical sphere of subject-life. At the end I will examine Husserl’s idea of the universal teleolog-ical structure of reason, which has its roots in the primary instinctive life of the subject.

15

Husserl’s Phenomenological Heritage as a Source Of Innovative Inspiration and Critical Evaluation for Emmanuel Levinas’ Ethics and Martin Buber’s Ecophenomenology

75%

Bialer O.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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issue 3

127-139

EN

This article presents an ambiguous approach of two main representatives of dialogi-cal philosophy, Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Buber, towards Husserl’s phenomenolo-gy. It is demonstrated that Levinas is not an anti-phenomenological postmodernist. Although he does not implement all the Husserlian methodology, he imitates Husserl’s philosophical rigor in exploring forgotten horizons. Buber’s theory of knowledge is analyzed from Levinas’ perspective. The closing part is devoted to a still unexplored area of Buber’s ecophenomenology. It is demonstrated that by indicating on complete relationship with nature, and showing gaps in classical phenomenology Buber makes a unique contribution to the phenomenological heritage.

16

How Many Concepts of Intentionality?

75%

Dąbrowski A.

Studia Humana

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2015

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vol. 4

|

issue 3

3-13

EN

The current discussion of the intentionality nature has become more sophisticated and complex. In this paper I will delineate a number of approaches to intentionality in contemporary philosophy: 1 mentalistic; 2 semantic / linguistic; 3 pragmatic; 4 somatic; 5 and naturalistic. Although philosophers identify and analyse many concepts of intentionality, from the author point of view, there is only one intentionality: mentalistic intentionality (conscious mental states are intentional). Furthermore, there are the pre-intentionality in the physical world and the meta-intentionality (or the derived intentionality) in the world of culture.

17

Emptying Śūnyatā: a Critical Reading of Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness

75%

Motiekaitis R.

International Journal of Area Studies

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2015

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vol. 10

|

issue 1

69-83

EN

In this article, invoking some terms of phenomenology and general principles of structural semiotics, I critically examine and reveal some aporetic aspects of Nishitani’s interpretation of Buddhist concept of sūnyatā presented in his seminal work Religion and Nothingness. My critics are directed to deeply ingrained claims among scholars of a “rejection of any form of dualism” and “non-substantial philosophy” as unique characteristics of the Kyoto school or “logic of the East”. My arguments are based on examining how linguistic differentiating articulation and narrative rendering that perform a fundamental role in human cognition are at work in definition of “emptiness” (sūnyatā) too. Thus emptiness is not completely empty; being certain philosophical identity it can be articulated only by differentiation from other identities, and thus different is included in it. Nishitani needed logocentric modes of thought, as a dialectical (m)other for constructing his sūnyatā ontology. Accordingly, the realms that are considered to be secondary or derivative (i.e. sensual and rational, or linguistic representations) appear to be the condition for constituting the primary (suchness of things, sūnyatā). Considering universal mechanisms of the articulation of values I am also asking whether sūnyatā paradigm indeed is so fundamentally different from Western paradigms centered on idea, God, or a rational subject as Nishitani wants to think. Since we find a clear hierarchical differentiation into truth and illusion, authentic and inauthentic modes of thought and time, and initial and derivative ontological realms, features of “strong thought” (in sense of Vattimo) are evident in his work. I am also suggesting, that possibly by considering not sūnyatā or “idea” but human languages as a universal “house of being”, we would be able to “empty” discourses of radical difference and uniqueness, and in this way become post-nationalistically modern. Philosophy, in order not to turn into a onesided ideology, should reflect on its mythological and narratological conditions, i.e. dances on certain semiotic axes. From such a perspective, the gravitational trajectory of human thought, longing for conjunction with the absolute, defined either as God or as sūnyatā, will seem similar rather than different.

18

Collective Referential Intentionality in the Semantics of Dialogue

75%

Jacquette D.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

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2014

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vol. 36

|

issue 1

143-159

EN

The concept of a dialogue is considered in general terms from the standpoint of its referential presuppositions. The semantics of dialogue implies that dialogue participants must generally have a collective intentionality of agreed-upon references that is minimally sufficient for them to be able to disagree about other things, and ideally for outstanding disagreements to become clearer at successive stages of the dialogue. These points are detailed and illustrated in a fictional dialogue, in which precisely these kinds of referential confusions impede progress in shared understanding. It is only through a continuous exchange of question and answer in this dialogue case study that the meanings of key terms and anaphorical references are disambiguated, and a relevantly complete collective intentionality of shared meaning between dialogue participants is achieved. The importance of a minimally shared referential semantics for the terms entering into reasoning and argument in dialogue contexts broadly construed cannot be over-estimated. Where to draw the line between referential agreement and disagreement within any chosen dialogue, as participants work toward better mutual understanding in clearing up referential incongruities, is sometimes among the dialogue’s main points of dispute.

19

Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomenalnej

75%

Gładziejewski P.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2011

|

issue 16

5 - 25

EN

The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways of theoretically establishing the phenomenal-intentional relation: reductive one, which I equate with so called phenomenal externalism and non-reductive one, which is based on the idea that there is a kind of intentionality – i.e. phenomenal intentionality – that is phenomenally constituted. I argue for the second of these options. Following the work of philosophers such as G. Graham, T. Horgan, U. Kriegel, J. Tienson and B. Loar, I try to show that (1) phenomenal intentionality actually exists, (2) that content of phenomenally intentional states is narrow and (3) that both previous theses are compatible with moderate externalism about mental content.

20

Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomenalnej

75%

Gładziejewski P.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2011

|

issue 16

5-25

EN

The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways of theoretically establishing the phenomenal-intentional relation: reductive one, which I equate with so called phenomenal externalism and non-reductive one, which is based on the idea that there is a kind of intentionality – i.e. phenomenal intentionality – that is phenomenally constituted. I argue for the second of these options. Following the work of philosophers such as G. Graham, T. Horgan, U. Kriegel, J. Tienson and B. Loar, I try to show that (1) phenomenal intentionality actually exists, (2) that content of phenomenally intentional states is narrow and (3) that both previous theses are compatible with moderate externalism about mental content.

Refine search results

The Phenomenon of Fanaticism

Reinterpretácia Akvinského tézy o identite poznávajúceho a poznávaného

The Function of Intentionality in Ideological Cognition and Practical Activities

Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality

Odpowiedzialność karna za popełnienie czynu zabronionego w stanie tak zwanej zawinionej niepoczytalności

Scotus on Sense, Medium, and Sensible Object

Naturalistic Descriptions and Normative-Intentional Interpretations

The Structure and Functions of Language

Radykalna interpretacja intencjonalności w filozofii Martina Heideggera

Sunt Intelligibilia Entia Quae Sunt Vera. A Late Medieval Interpretationof Intentionality

Husserl on the Unconscious and Reduction

Untangling the Knot of Intentionality: Between Directedness, Reference, and Content

Habit, Bodyhood, and Merleau-Ponty

The Structure of the Body Dynamics: Teleology of the Instincts and the Intentionality of the Bodily Motions