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EN
A lot of controversy has arisen around the view expressed by Leon Petrażycki who proposes a division into intuitive and positive law. This division is not aimed, however, at contraposing that which is established by norms and that which could be referred to as desirable or ideal law. The content of intuitive law, just like that of positive – or statutory – law, is often equally irrational, barbarian, and backward. What Petrażycki has in mind is rather a significant, substantial difference between the two. It consists in a difference in the intellectual content of legal experience. Intuitive law does not contain any norms, but an awareness of the obligation to act in a certain way which is independent from any authorities. Intuitive law is individual and changeable, as its contents depend on one’s personal character. A certain similarity in intuitive legal experiences is, according to Petrażycki, largely dependent on the living conditions in the family and social group.
EN
The article discusses different models of justice. The author presents the way the understanding of justice developed, from its being treated as the principle of harmony ruling the universe, through justice reduced to distribution of goods and meting out of punishments, to liberal justice which underscores mostly the freedom of the subject (J. Rawls), and egalitarian justice in which the equality of the subject is of foremost importance (K. Nielsen). Justice has also been analysed as one of the aspects of intuitive law (L. Petrażycki). The discussion concludes in defining justice as the reason for action in social life.
Zeszyty Naukowe KUL
|
2019
|
vol. 62
|
issue 2
155-170
EN
The subject of this article is to characterize the official law in the Leon Petrazycki’s psychological theory of law. The first part of the study presents a definition of the official law. Then, the composition of official law was analyzed. The last part focuses on the question whether the official law in the theory of Leon Petrażycki can be justified with the psychological criteria. In conclusion, it was pointed out that the terminology and characteristic features proposed by L. Petrażycki differ in relation to other legal definitions presented in the theoretical discourse.
PL
Przedmiot rozważań podjętych przez autora artykułu stanowi charakterystyka prawa oficjalnego w psychologicznej teorii prawa Leona Petrażyckiego. W pierwszej części opracowania przedstawiono definicję prawa oficjalnego. Następnie dokonano analizy jego składu. W ostatniej części zadano pytanie, czy prawo oficjalne w teorii Leona Petrażyckiego można uzasadnić przy użyciu kryterium psychologicznego. W konkluzjach podsumowujących przeprowadzone badania zwrócono uwagę na to, że terminologia oraz charakterystyka zaproponowana przez L.Petrażyckiego jest odmienna w relacji do innych definicji prawa przedstawionych w toku dyskursu teoretycznoprawnego
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