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PL
Judicial Review – sądowa kontrola konstytucyjności ustaw, kształtowała się na przestrzeni kilkuset lat, równolegle z formowaniem się podstawowych elementów współczesnych systemów politycznych. Jej pojawianie się poprzedziło ugruntowanie się koncepcji trójpodziału władz, suwerenności narodu (w miejsce suwerenności władzy królewskiej) oraz praw człowieka. Instytucje te oraz zasady ustrojowe wprowadzone zostały do Konstytucji amerykańskiej z 1787 r. , której struktura podkreśla fundamentalny charakter trójpodziału władz, jak również, przez wprowadzenie do niej w procesie ratyfikacji Konstytucji, pierwszych dziesięciu poprawek – praw i wolności obywatela amerykańskiego. Przez okres ponad stulecia debata polityczna, w tym także ustrojowa, Europy koncentrowała się nade wszystko nad problematyką suwerenności i praw, tym samym odsuwała na plan dalszy kontrolę konstytucyjności ustaw. Uważano bowiem, iż formowanie organu sprawującego kontrolę konstytucyjną nad aktami władzy ustawodawczej i decyzjami formowanej przez nią władzy wykonawczej, prowadzi do ustanowienia swoistej super izby wobec parlamentu będącego emanacją woli suwerena. Refleksje ustrojowe A. de Tocqueville'a, następnie rozważania i działania praktyczne H. Kelsena przybliżyły – stopniowo- instytucję sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności ustaw do realiów europejskich. Poważna debata polityczna nad tym zagadnieniem podjęta została w Polsce w latach osiemdziesiątych, a warunki do jej ustrojowej materializacji powstały dzięki regulacjom Konstytucji RP w 1997 r. Proces integracji europejskiej sprawił, iż polski system ustrojowy, w tym także funkcjonowanie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, stało się częścią tworzonego przez Unię Europejską autonomicznego systemu prawnego.
EN
The Convention of ILO № 102 is the basic source of international-law rules in the area of social security. This convention concerns the standards of judicial review in matters regarding social security. It declares that whenever a claim is settled by a special tribunal established to deal with social security questions and on which the protected persons are represented, no right of appeal should be required. It means that matters regarding social security should be settled by tribunals that are organizationally, personally and procedurally separated from those dealing with other cases. In Poland, most of the matters regarding social security are settled by common courts, by their special departments, in a special procedure. Nevertheless, relevant departments can also deal with cases concerning labor law and they do not consist of persons who are not judges and represent protected persons. It means that the Polish regulations concerning the judicial review in matters regarding social security do not fulfill the standard established by the Convention № 102.
EN
The article addresses the issue of judicial review of decisions in the area of development policy (that consist in not qualifying a specific project for funding) and an attempt is made to assess the functioning of this measure on the tenth anniversary of its introduction into the national system for implementing this policy. The analysis of legal acts, doctrine and case law in the field of development policy allows one to draw the conclusion that the act of implementing the policy, i.e. selection of a specific project for financing, is a sui generis operation of administration, not subject to the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure. The most important criterion for assessing this measure should be its effectiveness, understood as the highest degree of implementation of the objective assumed under development policy. Hence, the model of review adopted in Poland and applied by administrative courts, appointed to examine the legality of reviewed acts, does not meet the expectations. The article is an attempt to assess the adopted review model in terms of its impact on the effectiveness of the development policy system and the effectiveness of protection granted.
PL
W artykule podjęto temat sądowej kontroli rozstrzygnięć z zakresu polityki rozwoju (polegających na niezakwalifikowaniu konkretnego projektu do uzyskania dofinansowania) i dokonano próby oceny funkcjonowania tej instytucji w dziesiątą rocznicę jej wprowadzenia do krajowego systemu realizacji tej polityki. Analiza aktów prawnych, doktryny i orzecznictwa z zakresu polityki rozwoju prowadzi do wniosku, że akt realizacji polityki, jakim jest wyłonienie do dofinansowania konkretnego projektu, stanowi sui generis działanie administracji niepodlegające przepisom kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego. Najistotniejszym kryterium oceny tego działania powinna być jego efektywność, rozumiana jako najwyższy stopień realizacji celu założonego w ramach polityki rozwoju. Stąd też przyjęty w Polsce model kontroli dokonywanej przez sądy administracyjne, powołane do badania legalności kontrolowanych aktów, nie spełnia pokładanych w nim oczekiwań. Artykuł stanowi próbę oceny przyjętego modelu kontroli pod względem jej wpływu na efektywność systemu prowadzenia polityki rozwoju oraz na skuteczność udzielonej ochrony.
4
80%
EN
The article deals with the principle of parliamentary autonomy and the role it plays in decisions of courts carrying out constitutional review. The principles and interests competing with parliamentary autonomy are categorized and analysed against the backdrop of relevant case-law, offering a wide scale of approaches used by courts around the world. Three groups of competing interests are analysed separately: (i) public control of parliaments, (ii) the principle of representation and (iii) the rights of parliamentary opposition and individual members of parliament. Within the analysis, examples of good practice as well as those of unpersuasive approaches are offered. Subsequently, the article offers general doctrinal principles, the observance of which would help ensure that courts do not overreach in regulating parliamentary internal affairs, thus triggering unwanted consequences.
EN
As a general rule, every legal system in the world has regulations governing proceedings before a national court of law; some of the proceedings are possibly instituted subsequently to arbitration and thus review awards issued in arbitration proceedings. Such review may be carried out, first, where there is a motion to have the arbitral award set aside (deemed invalid, nullified) or where the arbitral award is to be recognized or enforced judicially. The general objective of the review is to secure legal transactions by eliminating decisions made in the conduct of arbitration proceedings, if their outcome may not be authorized by a state, mainly due to their disaccord with the basic principles of legal order. The scope of the review may vary as it is dependent upon internal regulations of a given state, especially whether the aforesaid regulations were set forth in compliance with the UNCITRAL Model Law, or whether the legal system provides for separate provisions on arbitral awards issued at a territory of a given country but within international arbitration proceedings, or finally whether the parties, at their discretion, may be precluded from applying to have an arbitral award set aside.
EN
Taxing discretion disrupts the dichotomous nature of tax law provisions, especially if it concerns tax liabilities. This institution may even be considered arbitrary and deemed not applicable in the Czech Republic. An analysis of English and German law indicates that taxing discretion is inevitable but may be effectively limited, e.g. by introducing a legal doctrine stating that exercise of taxing discretion is bound by the purposes of an act of Parliament granting taxing discretion and by judicial review. In the Czech Republic, taxing discretion is limited by administrative guidelines and judicial review, but further improvements are advisable. This would allow to reintroduce tax cancellation based on taxing discretion into Czech law.
EN
The article presents evolution of the case law of the Supreme Court of India on the judicial review of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments, its evaluation in the legal doctrine and perception outside India. Although the Constitution of India does not contain any limitations as to the substance of constitutional amendments, during the political crisis in the period of Indira Gandhi’s rule, the Supreme Court has developed an effective system of judicial review of constitutional amendments. It is based on the assumption that the competence of the Parliament to enact amendments to the Constitution is not unlimited, because the parliament cannot destroy the same act from which it derives its authority. It must therefore respect certain fundamental principles which form the so-called “basic structure of the Constitution”. Applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court overturned a number of amendments, including those violating principle of judicial independence. The evaluation of the Supreme Court’s case law is divergent: according to some legal scholars it helped to save Indian democracy, while according to others it is full of loopholes and gives unlimited power to the judges. Despite this, it has had a substantial impact on the jurisprudence of courts in other countries in the region or even in other parts of the World.
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Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Putting Dawn Raids under Control

80%
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2020
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vol. 13
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issue 22
145-168
FR
« Dawn raids » sont devenus un moyen efficace de faire respecter le droit européen et national de la concurrence. Le contrôle judiciaire est un mécanisme essential de contrôle du pouvoir exécutif contre d’éventuels abus de ce pouvoir. Toutefois, ce contrôle judiciaire a montré ses limites ; il ne garantit pas toujours une reparation adéquate pour les parties concernées. Comment résoudre le problème du contrôle judiciaire limité pour assurer le contrôle des « dawn raids »? Cet article avance que les limites du contrôle juridictionnel pourraient être résolues en étendant les types de contrôle sur cette action, c’est-à-dire les orientations législatives ex ante et la responsabilité interne des administrateurs. Ainsi, la thèse plus conceptuelle de l’article est qu’il est essentiel de chercher des liens entre les différents concepts et types de contrôles pour garantir un système complet et efficace de contrôle des actions du pouvoir exécutif.
EN
Dawn raids have become an effective tool to enforce EU and national competition laws. Judicial review is an essential mechanism of control over the executive branch against possible misuse of this power. However, this judicial review has shown to have limits; it cannot always guarantee an adequate redress for the affected parties. How to address the limited judicial review to ensure control over dawn raids? This article argues that the limits of judicial review could be addressed by extending the types of controls over this action, i.e. ex ante legislative guidance and internal managerial accountability. The more conceptual argument that this paper puts forward is thus that it is essential to seek connections between different concepts and types of controls to ensure a comprehensive/water-tight system of controls over the actions of the executive branch.
EN
This article concerns constitutional problems related to the implementation of EU directives seen from both the legal and comparative perspectives. The directives are a source of law which share a number of characteristic features that significantly affect and determine the specificity of Member States’ constitutional review of the directives as well as the legal acts that implement them. The review of the constitutionality of EU directives is carried out in accordance with the provisions of national implementing acts. Member States’ constitutional courts adopt two basic positions in this respect. The first position (adopted by, inter alia, the French Constitutional Council and German Federal Constitutional Court) is based on the assumption of a partial “constitutional immunity” of the act implementing the directive, which results in only a partial control of the constitutionality of the implementing acts, i.e. the acts of national law implementing such directives. The second position, (adopted, explicitly or implicitly by, inter alia, the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court, Czech Constitutional Court, Polish Constitutional Court, Romanian Constitutional Court and Slovak Constitutional Court) concerns the admissibility of a full review of the implementing acts. This leads to the admissibility of an indirect review of the content of the directive if the Court examines the provision as identical in terms of content with an act of EU law. Another issue is related to the application of the EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review. The French Constitutional Council case-law on review of the proper implementation of EU directives represents the canon in this regard. Nonetheless, interesting case studies of further uses of EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review can be found in the case law of other constitutional courts, such as the Belgian Constitutional Court or Spanish Constitutional Court. The research presented in this paper is based on the comparative method. The scope of the analysis covers case law of the constitutional courts of both old and new Member States. It also includes a presentation of recent jurisprudential developments, focusing on the constitutional case-law regarding the Data Retention Directive and the Directive on Combating Terrorism.
EN
There is no doubt that the United States were not created as a purely democratic state. On the one hand, it established basic rules and principles of democratic government such as free elections, sovereignty of the nation, fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals or independent judiciary. All of these principles were, however, enjoyed only by the part of American society: free elections were guaranteed for white men, excluding women and blacks; sovereignty belonged to the nation, i.e. white women and men, because slaves were not considered citizens; fundamental rights and freedoms were guaranteed only for whites; institutional independence of the judicial branch did not prevent the system from injustice towards the blacks. Furthermore, one of the most important values of democratic society, equal protection of law, was absent in the original constitutional document of 1787, as well as the provisions of Bill of Rights. The clause became part of U.S. constitutional reality yet in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, as a direct result of social and political changes caused by the civil war. After introducing the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, which abolished slavery, the government took a step forward by making all citizens equal in 1868 and by providing black Americans with suffrage rights in 1870. For former slaves it meant a milestone step in their fight to destroy the social and political boundaries which limited their basic rights and freedoms. However, before the above mentioned events took place, the period of injustice and exploitation occurred with the U.S. Supreme Court in the middle of social and political tensions. The main purpose of the article is to show the changing attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to the social and political status of African‑Americans. This attitude influenced historical and contemporary social relations among the American society proving one of the most controversial aspects of U.S. democracy.
EN
The purpose of this paper is to examine regulatory agencies and regulated parties in an empirical study of administrative disputes initiated against the decisions of regulatory agencies in Croatia. We first aim to provide an overview of the status and trend estimates regarding these disputes; second, to answer the question how well does the system work from the perspectives of both the plaintiffs and the regulatory agencies; third, to identify the problem areas and to compare these with problem areas identified by the authors studying the broader area of administrative judiciary in Croatia, and finally to compare efficiency level of regulatory agencies to other public authorities in confirming the legality of their decisions and actions. Data on all administrative disputes against 12 Croatian regulatory agencies’ decisions in the 17-year period between 1995 and 2011 are used to identify the main characteristics and trends relating to these disputes. Data for 2012 to 2013 was also examined to identify initial changes and emerging trends in the new administrative judiciary system resulting from fundamental legal reform as part of Croatia’s process of accession to the European Union in 2013. The results show these administrative disputes to be often costly and timely with modest outcome for the plaintiff and impressive success rate for the most of regulatory agencies.
EN
Creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office was from its very beginning accompanied by a wide-ranging debate regarding the most challenging issues, one of them being judicial review of its acts. This article deliberates on several groups of these acts and their review by either national courts or Court of Justice of the European Union. Where appropriate, in analyses their review in relation to the Slovak Republic. As a conclusion, it offers several considerations as to the Member States’ obligation to provide for effective judicial protection.
EN
The article concerns the stability of a specific political system based on the so-called non--codified constitution, which was formed in the State of Israel. The main goal is to present and characterise the systemic position of the Supreme Court in this country and, above all, the competences of this body in the field of maintaining political stability and public order. There are two main hypotheses in the paper. According to the first one, the Supreme Court is especially predestined to perform stability functions. According to second hypothesis a system based on an uncodified constitution supports the actions of the Supreme Court aimed at achieving a state of political stability. In the course of the analysis, tools from such disciplines as political theory, jurisprudence and the science of constitutional law were used. At the beginning of the article, the research perspective was defined, the most important element of which is the operationalization of the general concept of “stability” and the concept of “political stability”.
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70%
EN
The article presents models of extra-parliamentary constitutional review of law. The starting point is the methodological discussion of various concepts of the division and types of review, i.a. political vs judicial, strong vs weak, centralized vs decentralized. Most often the constitutional review of law is classified into American-type review (judicial review) and European-type review (review performed by constitutional courts). This dichotomous classification is often replaced with the categories of “dispersed review” and “concentrated review”, which is the most often classification, at the same time clearly expressing the features distinguishing the two review mechanisms. While the American model does not raise serious discussions, the European model — also referred to as Kelsenian or Austrian model — is controversial. It can be subclassified into original (pure) model and its various mutations, referred to as the mixed European model of the constitutional review of law, most often applied in practice. Moreover, other types of review are also applied in Europe, hence the French and the Scandinavian models are also sometimes distinguished. Regardless of the classification, all review models are now being homogenized. This means that the review is performed by the courts (concrete review is introduced), the protection of rights and freedoms of an individual is emphasized, and poli­tical consequences of constitutional review are becoming more significant, as a result of which the organ performing the constitutional review becomes a political, active authority within the state.
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2018
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vol. 21
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issue 4
59-88
EN
This article examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s lesser-known educative role as an egalitarian institution within a broader deliberative democratic process. Scholars have argued that the Court’s long asserted power of judicial review, especially in the equal protection and civil rights context, has been an over-reach of the judicial branch’s constitutional authority and responsibilities. Normative and empirical critiques have been centered on the aims of judicial review, and the challenges it poses in American political life. A core issue surrounding these critiques is that Justices are appointed not elected, and thus undermine the principle of majority rule in the U.S. constitutional democratic order. Although these critiques are legitimate in terms of claims about unelected Supreme Court Justices’ seemingly discretionary powers over elected legislative bodies, and the uncertain policy implications of judicial pronouncements on the broader society, there is, nevertheless, a positive application of judicial review as a tool Justices use as part of their educative role overcoming the so-called “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” Through a close reading of oral arguments in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) and San Antonio vs. Rodriguez (1973)-two landmark cases invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the federal Constitution-the article shows how appointed Justices adjudicate individual cases on appeal and attempt to educate (through an argumentative, reason-based and question-centered process) citizenlitigants and their legal representatives about the importance of equality, fairness and ethical responsibility even prior to rendering final decisions on policy controversies that have broader national social, political and economic implications.
EN
In order to ensure that the right to bring an action before a court, which in substantive terms is understood as safeguard of the effective protection of individuals’ rights, is exercised and that a fair judgment is entered, the administrative courts may review the correctness of actions taken by governmental bodies in establishing the facts of the case, subject to the principle of legality. For this reason, it is necessary for the administrative courts to provide reasons for their judgments so as to demonstrate that the review of an administrative instrument was comprehensive and took account of all the facts of the case. The reasons so provided may cause the complainant to believe that he has indeed been granted legal protection. Moreover, this may demonstrate that the administrative courts not only review compliance with the principle of legality, but primarily exercise judicial power conferred on them. Therefore, it is appropriate to state that the applicable Polish regulations on the  administrative courts safeguard the individual’s right to bring an action before a court both in formal and material sense.
17
Content available remote

Soudní přezkum rozhodnutí zdravotních pojišťoven

61%
EN
If any issue attracts the attention of the legal public in the area of judicial review of decisions of health insurance companies, it is primarily an inconsistent attitude of administrative courts to decisions on reimbursement of otherwise non-reimbursed health services pursuant to Sec. 16 of Act No. 48/1997 Coll. on Public Health Insurance. On the basis of suggestions arising primarily from the decisions of the Municipal Court in Prague and the Supreme Administrative Court, or possibly the Constitutional Court, this paper notes three areas of problems, namely the term decision of the administrative authority pursuant to Sec. 65 of the Code of Administrative Justice, participation in the proceedings for an action against a decision of an administrative authority, and finally a procedural succession. The purpose is not to give a definitive solution to these problems, but to contribute to the discussion with further arguments, and also to place the problem in the wider context of legislation and case law.
CS
Poutá-li nějaká otázka pozornost právnické veřejnosti v oblasti soudního přezkumu rozhodnutí zdravotních pojišťoven, jde především o nejednotný postoj soudů ve správním soudnictví k rozhodnutím o úhradě jinak nehrazené zdravotní služby podle § 16 zákona č. 48/1997 Sb., o veřejném zdravotním pojištění. Tento příspěvek si na základě podnětů plynoucích především z rozhodnutí Městského soudu v Praze a Nejvyššího správního soudu, popřípadě též soudu Ústavního, všímá tří okruhů problémů, a sice pojmu rozhodnutí správního orgánu ve smyslu § 65 odst. 1 s. ř. s., účastenství v řízení o žalobě proti rozhodnutí správního orgánu, a konečně procesního nástupnictví. Účelem není podat definitivní řešení těchto problémů, ale přispět do diskuse dalšími argumenty, a také zasadit problém do širšího kontextu právní úpravy a rozhodovací praxe.
EN
Under Art. 207 para. 1 of the Law on Higher Education, the decisions taken in individual cases concerning students and doctoral students fall under the provisions of the Act of 14 June 1960: “The Code of Administrative Procedure and the provisions of the making a complaint to the administrative court”. An analysis of the judgments of administrative courts shows that the judicial review of decisions concerning the above matters remains an open question. Hence the purpose of this study was to determine which cases relating to students and doctoral students are subject to judicial review. The depth, or detail, of the jurisdiction of administrative courts in those cases has also been examined. The undertaken considerations led to the conclusion that the scope of a judicial review of decisions taken in individual cases concerning students and doctoral students is patchy. The case law of administrative courts shows that exposure to the jurisdiction of the court is not limited to the sphere of relations in which the taken decision has legal eff ects; it must be determined whether a particular decision is taken on the basis of the provisions of the Act. In the context of a judicial review, the court is entitled to review the legality of general internal acts as long as they are the basis of the settlement in an individual case. At the same time, however, the court cannot control the acts of individual internal acts, even if they often constitute the basis for issuing a decision. In other words, an administrative court is not entitled to control the decisions taken on the basis of internal company acts which do not have any eff ect on the external environment and do not have a direct impact on the legal relation between a student and a university. A complaint on the inactivity of an administrative body of an establishment of higher education will be acceptable as long as such body has remained idle and fails to deliver an act or take an action pursuant to the existing legislation.
PL
Stosownie do treści art. 207 ust. 1 ustawy Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym od decyzji podjętych w indywidualnych sprawach studentów i doktorantów stosuje się odpowiednio przepisy Ustawy z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego oraz przepisy o zaskarżaniu decyzji do sądu administracyjnego. Analiza orzeczeń sądów administracyjnych wskazuje, że zagadnienie zakresu sądowej kontroli decyzji w indywidualnych sprawach tej grupy osób pozostaje kwestią otwartą. Stąd celem opracowania było wskazanie, które sprawy dotyczące studentów i doktorantów podlegają sądowej kontroli, a także określenie głębokości orzekania przez sądy administracyjne w powyższych sprawach. Podjęte rozważania skłaniają do wniosku, że zakres sądowej kontroli decyzji podjętych w indywidualnych sprawach studentów i doktorantów nie jest jednolity. Orzecznictwo sądów administracyjnych wskazuje, iż podleganie kognicji sądu nie jest ograniczone jedynie do sfery stosunków, w jakich dane rozstrzygnięcie wywołuje skutki prawne, lecz wymaga określenia, czy dana decyzja jest podejmowana na podstawie przepisów ustawy. W ramach sądowej kontroli sąd jest uprawniony do badania legalności wewnątrzzakładowych aktów generalnych, na podstawie których wydawane są rozstrzygnięcia indywidualne, nie może natomiast kontrolować wewnątrzzakładowych aktów indywidualnych, stanowiących niekiedy podstawę wydawania decyzji. Nie jest więc on uprawniony do kontrolowania, w ramach wniesionych skarg, rozstrzygnięć podjętych na podstawie aktów wewnątrzzakładowych, które nie wywołują skutków na zewnątrz, a więc niemających bezpośrednio wpływu na stosunek administracyjnoprawny łączący studenta z uczelnią. Za dopuszczalne uznać należy również wniesienie skargi na bezczynność organu uczelni wyższej, o ile organ ten pozostaje bezczynny w zakresie wydania aktu lub podjęcia czynności na podstawie obowiązujących przepisów.
19
61%
Financial Law Review
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2020
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vol. 20
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issue 4
35-52
EN
The paper examines legal disputes arising from the questionable implementation of article 205 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax into the Czech legal order. The main aim of the paper is to find out whether the provisions resulting from that implementation are applicable, and if so under what conditions. Author draws conclusions mainly from case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Czech Supreme Administrative Court and uses analysis, synthesis and descriptive method.
EN
The application of the principle of legality must meet various requirements dealing specifically with its extent or its reach in the administrative activity. The question that we will seek to answer in this paper is the following: with the entry into force of the Law on Administrative Courts and the start of the functioning of administrative courts on November 2013, how far extends Albanian judicial review? What are the limits of this control? What is the actual power of the Albanian administrative court? The Law on Administrative Courts has defined and directed the limits of judicial control over the legality of administrative actions towards three aspects: facts, time and discretionary power. Therefore, this paper aims to present an analysis of the different aspects that direct and limit the judicial review of administrative acts and which are: the reach of judicial review in the legal qualification of the facts, the reach of judicial review in time, and the reach of the judicial review in the exercise of discretionary power by the public administration.
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