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1

Main Problems of the Codification Works on Substantive Misdemeanor Law in People’s Poland

100%

Łysko M.

Studia Iuridica

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2019

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vol. 80

223-233

EN

The result of the codification works that were carried out in the years 1960-1971 on substantive misdemeanour law in Poland was a Code on Misdemeanours of 1971. The measures created in this Code were strongly influenced by the idea of misdemeanours polarization and stratification of responsibilities. According to this idea, severe repression was supposed to be limited to the most serious misdemeanours. Towards other offenders progressive leniency was provided, with non-criminal means replacing them. Under influence of political factors the character of general part of Code on Misdemeanours was determined by provisions which were introduced aimed at severe treatment of serious offenders. Also the specific part was shaped in the repressive spirit. The conditions to realise the assumptions accepted by codifiers of the substantive misdemeanour law were created only after the fall of communist system in Poland, when in 1990 the adjudicating boards were cut off from the influence of Ministry of Internal Affairs and placed in the structures of the Ministry of Justice.

2

Ochrona Znaku Polski Walczącej

84%

Gadecki B.

Ochrona Zabytków

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2016

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issue 2

55-68

PL

Znak Polski Walczącej składający się z liter P i W tworzących kotwicę jest jednym z najbardziej rozpoznawalnych symboli Powstania Warszawskiego. Znak ,,Polska Walcząca” został przyjęty w 1942 r. przez Armię Krajową. Znak ten jest obecnie chroniony przez prawo (ustawa o ochronie Znaku Polski Walczącej). Artykuł zmierza do objaśnienia dogmatycznych aspektów wykroczenia zawartego w art. 3 ust. 1 ustawy o ochronie Znaku Polski Walczącej. Artykuł 3 ust. 1 tej ustawy reguluje wykroczenie znieważenia Znaku Polski Walczącej: kto znieważa Znak Polski Walczącej podlega karze grzywny. W artykule objaśniono także znaczenia następujących pojęć: ,,Znak Polski Walczącej”, ,,zabytek”, ,,dobro kultury”. Autor przedstawia także proces legislacyjny.

EN

The Polish Fight Symbol composed of letters P and W stylized as anchor is one of the most recognizable symbols of the Warsaw Uprising. Symbol of “Fighting Poland” was adopted in 1942 by the Home Army. The said symbol is now protected by law (the Act on protection of the Polish Fight Symbol). This article aims to examine dogmatic aspects of the misdemeanor specified in Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Act on protection of the Polish Fight Symbol. Article 3 paragraph 1 regulates misdemeanor of profaning the Polish Fight Symbol: Anyone who profanes the Polish Fight Symbol is liable to a fine. Examined herein is also the meaning of the following terms: “Polish Fight Symbol”, “historical monument”, “cultural property”. The author also describes the legislative process.

3

System środków penalnych w projekcie kodeksu wykroczeń

83%

Szumski J.

Archiwum Kryminologii

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1994

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issue XX

53-78

EN

This paper discusses and appraises changes in the system of penal measures in the draft of the Transgressions Code, and to some extent also in the draft of the Code of the Execution of Penalties. A great variety of problems are discussed: the author concentrates on a broad definition of a penal measure, treating as such measure each legal reaction to the fact of transgression, made by a competent agency upon identification of the perpetrator. The discussion concentrates on the draft’s division into penalties and penal measures. Also discussed are other reactions included in the code that can be applied to the perpetrator but do not belong to either of the above two categories. The autor carries out a critical analysis of the solutions concerning penalties, penal measures, alternatives to punishment, and the main directives as to the severity of penal measures. Taken into account in the analysis have been, on the one hand, the praiseworthy regulations, most of which result from acceptance by authors of the draft of postulates, made for a long time by the doctrine and aimed toward the rationalization and humanization of Polish law on transgressions. On the other hand, the analysis paints out those solutions which the author finds to be redundant or improperly formulated With respect to reactions that are termed “penalties” the author declares himself a resolved opponent of arrest: in his opinion, that penalty should not be imposed on perpetrators of the pettiest transgressions, the more so as some of the offences specified in the draft code are not threatened with deprivation of liberty at all. Here, the practice of deciding in cases of transgressions is brought to mind where arrest was usually imposed for disturbances of public order or peace committed by intoxicated persons; most of such perpetrators were alcoholics, and their short-term imprisonment was in fact a specific preventive measure. The author also expresses his support of the renouncement of the institution of conditional suspention of the penalty of arrest (should even arrest be preserved in the future code): in practice, instead of limiting the use of arrest, that institution was treated as a self-standing reaction, a substitute for the penal measures not involving deprivation of liberty. On the other hand, the author praises the elimination from the draft of the penalty of limitation of liberty which fails to come up to expectations as an alternative to arrest and only causes serious problems with its execution. As regards, further, the penalty of fines ‒ the basic reaction towards perpetrators of transgressions ‒ the author considers the pros and cons and declarls himself in favor of the system of daily rates. Aware of the controversial nature of this suggestion, he justifies it mainly with the need for the unification of the system of imposition of fines in penal law and the law on transgressions. The author praises the solution where only the court is empowered to impose arrest in default of paying a fine. In principle, he also praises the way this sphere ‒ the main weak point of decisions in cases of transgressions so far ‒ has been regulated in the draft of the Code of the Execution of Penalties. Here, arrest as a substitute for fines is treated as the last resort, and many solutions are Offerd to cause the payment of a fine; fines can even be defanted on if then cannot be paid for reasons beyond the convicted person’s control, and it proves impossible or inexpedient to carry out that penalty in another way. The author believes, however, that some of the solutions suggested in the draft of the Code of the Execution of Penalties have not been formulated with sufficient precision. As far as penal measures are concerned ‒ under the draft of the Transgressions Code, they include with deawal of a driving license, forfeiture of property, and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose ‒ the author criticizes mainly the limited possibilities of their application as self-standing measures: they can only be applied in the case of renouncement of inflicting a punishment. This solution is in fact a preservation of the possibility, criticized by scientific community, of the accumulation of different penal measures, and leads to unnecessary aggravation of punishment. On the other hand, the author praises many other novel solutions related to penal measures, including in particular a considerable mitigation of the statutory application of a most annoying withdrawal of a driving license; in his opinion, however, that ban should be optional and not obligatory. The author also praises the regulation of forfeiture of propesty, mainly because of the ban on its application if the decision to impose it were out of proportion with the seriousness of the transgression. Besides, the author fully approves of the renunciation of the former additional penalty, the “ban on pursuit of definite activity or performance of functions requiring a license”, and also of the labelling measure of publication of the sentence. In the sphere of general directives of the imposition of penal measures, the draft is based on the concept which combines elements of just retribution (proportional to guilt) and special prevention. The former directive is to define the maximum degree of severity of reaction under penal law, while the latter should influence the choice and extent of the penal measure applied. Unlike the draft of the Penal Code, the draft of the Transgressions Code does not include the directive of general prevention. The present author praises this omission and supports the opinion, popular in scientific community, that general prevention should be included in the statutory sanctions while its aims can be achieved within the directive of just retribution. With respect to the latter, the author argues that reaction of penal law should be commensurate not only with the guilt but also with the seriousness of the act; he also stresses that compensation for the damages done to the injured person should become an integral part of just retribution, and acquire an important position in the future Transgressions Code. Further discussion concerns alternatives to punishment, that is: (1) renunciaton of inflicting punishment, and (2) refusal to start proceedings before the boards for the adjudication of transgressions where the case is referred to other agencies (e.g. place of employment or school) for application of so-callcd educational measures. Under the draft, renunciation of inflicting punishment may consist both in a complete renunciation of applying any penal measure, and in rcnunciation of imposing a penalty which is combined with the application of another penal measure. In the author’s opinion; this solution has to be modified. The very name of the institution concerned here can hardly be squared with the possibility of applying a penal measure, often one ‒ e.g. withdrawal of a driving license ‒ that is actually more severe than a penalty such as a small fine. For this reason, the author’s suggestion aims at a situation where renunciation of inflicting punishment would consist only in abandonment of the application of any measures whatever. Instead, the possibilities of application of self-standing penal measures should be much extended and regulated by separate provisions. The other of the above-mentioned institutions, whose regulation violates the principle of definiteness of reaction under penal law, should be eliminated altogether. What also speaks for this solution is the fact that the institution concerned is based on a belief in the effectiveness of educational actions which has not been verified empirically; moreover, its application may expose the offender to consequences more severe (e.g. dismissal from work) than those resulting from proceedings before the beards for the adjudication of transgressions. In the final part of the paper, the author comments on the general conception of the Polish reform of broadly conceived penal law. He proclaims himself in favor of the opinion, found in literature, that Polish law has to be amended radically (based on the suggestions contained in the draft), and that the work on its codification have to proceed parallel to its amendment; they must also be given sufficient time to be completed.

4

GLOSA APROBUJĄCA DO WYROKU IZBY KARNEJ SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO Z 29 MAJA 2018 R. O SYGN. AKT II KK 99/18

83%

Rosiak Ł.

Zeszyty Prawnicze

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2019

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vol. 19

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issue 2

277-286

EN

The comment relates to the verdict issued by the Supreme Court on the adjudication of oﬀences and petty oﬀences against property (viz. theft), for which the financial criterion for criminalization (as of 9 November 2013) is the minimum value of payment for work, as set down in Kodeks wykroczeń (the Polish Code of Petty Oﬀences). In cases of this kind the value of minimum pay should be taken for the day when the verdict for the oﬀence was passed, not for the day on which it was committed.

PL

Glosowany wyrok Sądu Najwyższego dotyczy problematyki orzekania o czynach przeciwko mieniu, w stosunku do których od 9 listopada 2013 r. kryterium uznania danego czynu za przestępstwo albo za wykroczenie stanowi określony w kodeksie wykroczeń wskaźnik minimalnego wynagrodzenia za pracę. We wskazanym zakresie należy mieć na uwadze minimalne wynagrodzenie z daty orzekania w przedmiocie odpowiedzialności za taki czyn, a nie z daty jego popełnienia.

5

Orzekanie kary ograniczenia wolności przez Kolegium do spraw wykroczeń przy Prezydencie miasta Elbląga w latach 1972-1974

71%

Zarębska E.

Biuletyn Kryminologiczny

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2017

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issue 24

79-88

EN

The article is a concise presentation of assembled statistic data about predication restriction of liberty in Elblag in years 1972-1974. Data disclose, that restriction of liberty was rarely used and executing of this penalty elicit a lot of precariousness.

PL

Niniejszy artykuł jest zwięzłą analizą danych statystycznych dotyczących orzekania kary ograniczenia wolności za wykroczenia w Elblągu w pierwszych latach obowiązywania Kodeksu wykroczeń. Zostało to skonfrontowane z obecną praktyką orzeczniczą w Polsce. Celem tego opracowania jest ukazanie znaczenia kary ograniczenia wolności w polskim systemie karnym. The article is a concise presentation of assembled statistic data about predication restriction of liberty in Elblag in years 1972-1974. Data disclose, that restriction of liberty was rarely used and executing of this penalty elicit a lot of precariousness.

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Main Problems of the Codification Works on Substantive Misdemeanor Law in People’s Poland

Ochrona Znaku Polski Walczącej

System środków penalnych w projekcie kodeksu wykroczeń

GLOSA APROBUJĄCA DO WYROKU IZBY KARNEJ SĄDU NAJWYŻSZEGO Z 29 MAJA 2018 R. O SYGN. AKT II KK 99/18

Orzekanie kary ograniczenia wolności przez Kolegium do spraw wykroczeń przy Prezydencie miasta Elbląga w latach 1972-1974