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EN
The present study reconstructs the fortunes and viewpoints of literary critic, ideologist and politician Ladislav Štoll between 1968 and 1973. My main source was the collection of private papers of the same name housed at the Academy of Sciences Archive. Ladislav Štoll's position and public role were undermined by the reformist meeting of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee at the turn of 1967/68 and meetings between a party committee and the Czech Literature Institute Council. In the Prague Spring period leading up to August 1968, Štoll withdrew from the public arena and stepped down from his executive positions at the Academy of Sciences. He faced criticisms and media attacks for his Stalinist past and his role as the one who announced the repressive measures against pro-reform authors at writers' conventions, including e.g. the (unproven) accusation that he took part in the political trials. He kept his Soviet friends and literary historian colleagues informed about the unsatisfactory situation in Czechoslovakia, and welcomed the occupation on 21st August as the moment the historical trajectory of Czechoslovakia veered away from counter-revolution, while prioritizing solutions that would not jeopardize state and national sovereignty. From autumn 1968 until mid-1969 he remained in seclusion, focused on research activity and travelled abroad. From autumn 1969 until summer 1970 he championed the consolidation of the humanities and social sciences as an employee of the revived Czechoslovak-Soviet Institute, consulting Soviet academics regarding the consolidation of Czechoslovak Russian studies, requesting their advisory intervention and arranging for the publication of key normative documents. He worked in the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee and its Ideological Commission on party analyses of the post-1956 cultural and political developments that led to the Prague Spring. He reassessed his views on these developments and began to see them as disastrous from the outset, and his previous dialogue with the reformists to have been too generous. He welcomed the results of the consolidation process and its codification in Lessons from the Crisis. In July 1970 he became Chairman of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Arts and Sciences Committee and indirectly managed the reorganization of the Institute of Czech Literature. In February 1972 he returned to the consolidated Institute of Czech and World Literature as its Director, while becoming Editor-in-Chief of the Česká literatura journal. He also took on a number of other positions and tasks in various supervisory and academic bodies and committees. It was both because of these duties and for health reasons that he again drifted away from work at the Institute.
CS
V přítomné studii rekonstruuji osudy a názorovou perspektivu literárního kritika, ideologa a politika Ladislava Štolla mezi lety 1968 až 1973. Hlavním pramenem mi byl stejnojmenný osobní fond uložený v AAV. Pozice a veřejná role Ladislava Štolla byly otřeseny po reformním zasedání ústředního výboru KSČ na přelomu let 1967 a 1968 a po schůzích stranické skupiny a rady Ústavu pro českou literaturu. V období Pražského jara do srpna 1968 se Štoll stahuje z veřejného prostoru a ustupuje z řídících funkcí v ČSAV. Čelí kritice a mediálním útokům pro svou stalinistickou minulost, roli hlasatele represivních opatření proti proreformním spisovatelům na spisovatelských sjezdech, včetně například (neprokázaného) obvinění z účasti na politických procesech. O neuspokojivé situaci v Československu zpravuje své sovětské přátele a kolegy, literární historiky. Okupaci 21. srpna 1968 vítá jako moment, jímž se dějinné směřování Československa odklání od kontrarevoluce, zároveň však upřednostňuje řešení, která by neohrožovala státní a národní suverenitu. Od podzimu 1968 do poloviny roku 1969 se zdržuje v ústraní, věnuje se badatelské činnosti, cestuje do zahraničí. Od podzimu 1969 do léta 1970 se zasazuje o konsolidaci humanitních a společenských věd jako zaměstnanec obnoveného Československo-sovětského institutu. Konzultuje konsolidaci československé rusistiky se sovětskými akademiky, žádá jejich poradní zásah, stojí za vydáním stěžejních normotvorných dokumentů. V ústředním výboru KSČ a jeho ideologické komisi pracuje na stranických analýzách kulturně-politického vývoje po roce 1956, který vedl k Pražskému jaru. Přehodnocuje své názory na tento vývoj, začíná ho vnímat jako od počátku fatální, svůj někdejší dialog s reformisty jako příliš velkorysý. Vítá výsledky konsolidačního procesu a vznik jeho kodifikace, Poučení z krizového vývoje. V červenci 1970 se stává předsedou kolegia věd o umění ČSAV a nepřímo řídí reorganizaci Ústavu pro českou literaturu. V únoru 1972 se jako ředitel vrací do konsolidovaného Ústavu pro českou a světovou literaturu, zároveň se stává šéfredaktorem České literatury. Ujímá se i množství dalších funkcí a úloh v nejrůznějších kontrolních a akademických orgánech a komisích. Kvůli těmto povinnostem a ze zdravotních důvodů se opět odcizuje práci v ústavu.
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Byla normalizace normální?

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EN
The author focuses on the semantics of the terms ‘normalisation’ and ‘consolidation’. He then expands his initial analysis to the broader historical context in order to understand how these terms came to characterize the tactics and strategies of the communists after 1948. The author emphasizes how the pretence of normalcy was a central strategy of the Communist regime from the very beginning, arguing that the revolution it carried out in February 1948 was no more than a rhetorical one – a ‘rev olution’ in scare quotes. In reality, it was a shrewdly calculated coup that combined a constitutional loophole with the threat of armed violence. Under the effective pretence that they were acting to save an endangered ‘national path to socialism’ on which the country had previously set out in 1945, the Communists were able to take power. Outwardly, everything pointed to a ‘normal’ transition of government, to which end they took great care, at least in the first months, to present President Beneš as symbolically supportive of the transition to the new order. This is also why they did not dissolve institutional structures but instead assimilated them into the National Front, including sev eral non communist parties that would subsequently help them play up the appearance of ‘normal’ constitutional democratic procedure in parliament and the government before the domestic and foreign audience. Similarly, rather than forming extraordinary courts, they simply made use of the ‘normal’ judicial machinery for repressive purposes. The question thus arises whether this masterful simulation of normality was not one of the more important factors (along with the precision targeted repression and corruption of key social groups), which, in the broader strata of society, blunted what little remained of the will to resist, in this way contributing to the stability of the regime in both the post-1948 and post-1968 contexts.
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