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Extension of Critical Programs of the Computational Theory of Mind

100%
Baryshnikov P. N.
Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne
|
2022
|
vol. 10, zeszyt specjalny
263-274
EN
Technological advances in computer science have secured the computer metaphor status of a heuristic methodological toolused to answer the question about the nature of mind. Nevertheless, some philosophers strongly support opposite opinions.Anti-computationalism in the philosophy of mind is a methodological program that uses extremely heterogeneous grounds for argumentation, deserving analysis and discussion. This article provides an overview and interpretation of the traditional criticismof the computational theory of mind (computationalism); its basic theses have been formed in Western philosophy in the last quarterof the 20th century. The main goal is to reveal the content of the arguments of typical anti-computationalist programs and expandtheir application to the framework of the semantic problems of the Classic Computational Theory of Mind. The main fault of the symbolic approach in the classical computationalism is the absence of a full-fledged theory of semantic properties. The relevance of considering these seemingly outdated problems is justified by the fact that the problem of meaning (and generalproblems of semantics) remains in the core of the latest developments in various areas of AI and the principles of human-computerinteraction.
2
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Eliminativní materialismus, lidová psychologie a jazyk myšlení:

84%
Dražil M.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2020
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vol. 42
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issue 2
253-284
EN
The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program.
CS
Článek se věnuje rozboru eliminativního materialismu Paula a Patricie Churchlandových. V jejich eliminativismu rozliším dvě argumentační linie: jednu usilující o eliminaci lidové psychologie a druhou kritizující hypotézu jazyka myšlení Jerryho Fodora. Následně se blíže zaměřím na tuto druhou linii a ukáži, že představuje hlavní motiv práce Churchlandových od konce 80. let 20. století, a dále předvedu, proč úspěch argumentace proti hypotéze jazyka myšlení nezakládá důvod k eliminaci lidové psychologie. V závěru text přezkoumám důsledky tohoto přístupu pro roli lidové psychologie ve zkoumání mysli a ukazuje, že tato oslabená eliminativistická pozice stále naplňuje původní záměr programu Churchlandových.
3
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Ewolucja języka myśli

67%
Pacholik-Żuromska A.
Diametros
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2012
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issue 34
79-91
PL
W 1975 roku Fodor opublikował książkę Język myśli. W 2011 ukazała się jej kontynuacja. Celem artykułu jest krytyczne zbadanie, czym nowa koncepcja języka myśli różni się od poprzedniej. Artykuł przedstawia dotychczasowe założenia Reprezentacyjnej Teorii Umysłu i jej konsekwencje dla atomizmu pojęciowego i natywizmu. Założenia te zostały porównane treściami zawartymi w LOT2, gdzie Fodor nie tylko wzmacnia swoje poprzednie tezy, ale też ostro krytykuje pragmatyzm i dodaje ważny element do RTM w postaci reprezentacji niepojęciowych.
EN
In 1975 Jerry Fodor published The Language of Thought. In 2011 its continuation appeared. The purpose of this article is to examine whether the new conception of the language of thought differs from the previous one. The article presents the current assumptions of the Representational Theory of Mind and their implications for conceptual atomism and nativism. These are compared with the material contained in LOT2 where Fodor not only reinforces his previous claims, but also sharply criticizes pragmatism and adds an important element to the RTM, nonconceptual representation.
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