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EN
The aim of the article is to draw attention to the direct nature of the legal interest and to try to answer the question about the sources (grounds) of this interest. The analysis is carried out from the perspective of understanding individual interest in administrative law and focuses on the issues of qualifying legal interest, including law from the perspective of the nature of the relationship between individual interest and its normative basis, and from the perspective of the normative foundations forprotecting this interest. It also refers to the issue of the axiological determinants of directness legal interest in administrative law. The analysis here justifies the conclusion that the source of legal interest in administrative law comprises substantive norms belonging to the entire system of generally applicable law, which objectify the individual interest, and only the close relationship between individual interest and the legal norm which is the source of this interest allows such interest to be defined as a legal interest. The lack of a close relationship between the individual interest and the legal norm, which is considered as the source of this interest, allows such an interest to defined, from the perspective of administrative law, only as a factual interest. The close bond that must exist between an individual interest and the legal norm on which it is based in order for such an interest to be classified as a legal interest is expressed by the characteristic defined as the directness of the legal interest. The article also presents arguments to justify the thesis that the mere need to protect a legal interest, or even real protection provided to a legal interest in the area of civil law, does not constitute a source of legal interest in the area of administrative law. Just as the source of the legal interest should be sought in the norms of generally applicable law, the legislator decides on the protection and the degree of protection for this interest by establishing appropriate separate legal norms in this respect.
EN
This article raises the issue of violation of legal interest which is crucial for the capacity to file complaints against the resolutions of the local government authorities concerning local climate fee. The author discusses the problem of local climate fee and its implementation as well as the legitimacy to file complaint. The article mainly deals with the problem of the meaning of the ‘violation of legal interest’ term during the court control of the acts of local law concerning local climate fee and includes a review of case law. The legal interest can be presumed as violated if someone is obliged to pay local climate fee or is a tax collector. It is also claimed that the applicant is entitled to demand the full legality of local climate fee which is also the part of the ‘violation of interest’ term.
EN
The possibility of the intervention of the third state in cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) is determined by the existence of the “interest of the legal nature” that may be affected by the decision in the case on the side of the intervenient – to – be state. Author analyses the meaning given to this concept by International Court of Justice and the way ICJ uses it in its jurisprudence. The special attention is paid to the search for the difference between the popular civil term “legal interest” and the ICJ’s “interest of the legal nature” – author examines if ICJ uses those two terms synonymously and, if so, why. If on the other hand the Court does not do it, author studies, what meaning the Court attributes to each of them. The ongoing consideration is limited to the interventions based on the art. 62 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice with no reference to any form of participation in the proceedings before the Court based on the art. 63 Statute. Author emphasizes the role of the Court’s statements in the development of the rules of public international law and its contribution to create the international legal language.
EN
In recent years, there has been a heated public debate about mandatory vaccination of children. The COVID-19 pandemic further underscored the importance of vaccination and the desirability of vaccination for the protection of public health and the health (as well as life) of the individual. Nevertheless, the rise in activity and popularity of anti-vaccination movements has clearly contributed to the upward trend in the number of non-vaccinated children that we have seen since 2010. Statutory representatives of children who oppose their mandatory vaccination cite a variety of reasons, taking advantage of the imperfect legal system. The fines imposed to compel mandatory vaccination, as well as the conduct of administrative enforcement proceedings in this regard, are often challenged in administrative courts. It is of great importance that administrative courts are increasingly referring to the constitutionally protected values, as well as to the axiological justifications for the functioning obligation to vaccinate children. Given the nature of the obligation, this seems understandable, but nevertheless somewhat intrusive into the constitutional sphere, which is reserved for the Constitutional Tribunal. The purpose of the paper is to reconstruct the formation of the line of jurisprudence of administrative courts in cases involving the mandatory vaccination of children. The course of discussion will lead to a full analysis of the grounds of the grounds for the cited judgements and their consistency with the emerging line of jurisprudence on the issue. Particular attention was paid to the references made by the adjudicating panels to the legally protected values of an individual and universal nature. For this purpose the Author used the historical-legal method and the method of analysis of court jurisprudence.
EN
In accordance with article 42 of the Code of Administrative Proceedings, the Party is a person whose legal interest or an obligation is connected to proceedings, or who demands some legal actions to be undertaken with regard to his or her legal interest or an obligation. The fundamental right of the Party is the right to participate in administrative proceedings underway. However, very often it is rather difficult to define the scope of entities whom the status of the Party can be granted. The aim of this paper is to present discrepancies at jurisdiction of administrative courts related to the meaning of the notion of the Party in case of residence registration proceedings. For many years the attribute of the Party was granted not only to the person who wished to de-register, but also to the owner of the premises or to any other entity who held a legal title of the premises. However, according to the line of jurisdiction with respect to residence registration which started to be formed after 2008, the above mentioned entities stopped to be considered as Parties. It was pointed out that the new jurisdiction was more sensible because of the formal nature of registration of population and the ex officio obligation to undertake proceedings to update the general register in such a way that it would reflect the actual residence of a given person under a given address. Considering the discrepancies at jurisdiction of administrative courts, the Ombudsman addressed the Supreme Administrative Court for clarification of the matter. According to the thesis of resolution taken by seven judges of Supreme Administrative Court on 5 December 2011, the person who holds a legal title to premises is granted the attribute of the Party within the meaning of article 28 of the Code of Administrative Proceedings, in administrative proceedings with respect to residence registration or de-registration of other people in the premises belonging to the Party.
PL
Zgodnie z art. 28 k.p.a. stroną jest każdy, czyjego interesu prawnego lub obowiązku dotyczy postępowanie albo kto żąda czynności organu ze względu na swój interes prawny lub obowiązek. Podstawowym uprawnieniem strony jest prawo do wzięcia udziału w toczącym się postępowaniu administracyjnym. Jednak określenie kręgu podmiotów, którym należy przyznać status strony na potrzeby konkretnej sprawy administracyjnej niejednokrotnie stwarza problemy. Celem pracy było przedstawienie rozbieżności w orzecznictwie sądów administracyjnych w zakresie rozumienia tego pojęcia w postępowaniach meldunkowych. Przez wiele lat przymiot strony był przyznawany oprócz podmiotu, którego dotyczyło wymeldowanie również właścicielowi lub innej osobie dysponującej tytułem prawnym do lokalu. Zgodnie jednak z linią orzeczniczą, która zaczęła się kształtować w tym zakresie po 2008 r. podmioty te przestały być uznawane za stronę. Jak wskazywano, za takim rozwiązaniem przemawiać miał porządkowy charakter ewidencji ludności i obowiązek podejmowania z urzędu działań zmierzających do aktualizacji tego rejestru tak, aby stanowił odzwierciedlenie wyłącznie faktycznego zamieszkiwania danej osoby pod określonym adresem. Z uwagi na pojawiające się rozbieżności w orzecznictwie sądów administracyjnych Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich zwrócił się do Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego o rozstrzygnięcie tej kwestii. Zgodnie z tezą uchwały siedmiu sędziów Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z 5 grudnia 2011 r. osoba dysponująca tytułem prawnym do lokalu jest stroną w rozumieniu art. 28 k.p.a., w postępowaniu administracyjnym o zameldowanie lub wymeldowanie w tym lokalu innej osoby.
EN
The article shows selected practical aspects connected with appealing against a resolution on the local zoning plan and the study of conditions and directions of spatial management, on the basis of the violation of the legal interest of a claimant. The legislator limits the competences of the interested parties to appeal against a resolution on the local zoning plan and the study of condi- tions and directions of spatial management. The legal interest for bringing an action on these resolutions was shaped on the different principles than in the administrative proceedings. A subject to bring an action on the resolution in the administrative court is only the subject whose legal interests has been infringed. It means that the legitimacy for bringing an action is not due to the fact of be- longing to the self-government community. Therefore, in any case, it is necessary to show a violation of a specified legal norm. The article analyzes such issues appearing in the rulings of administrative courts as: the legitimacy of a subject who is entitled to obligation rights to the property covered by the provisions of planning acts; the legitimacy of the owner of the property which is not covered by the local plan and the showing of the violation of the legal interest in the complaint for a communal study.
EN
The article discusses the issues of justification of criminalization of complicity in another person’s suicide in the context of the protection of the legal interest, which is human life. The author also looks at conditions that validate the functioning of a provision that stipulates criminal liability for complicity in an act whose disposer waives the protection of his own legal interest. It is concluded that a person who attempts on their own life does not attack a legally protected interest, because human life should not be referred to as a legal interest in this person’s relation to their own life. However, human life remains a legal interest in erga omnes relations, irrespective of whether we refer to a person wanting to annihilate their own life. As a result, it is assumed that criminalization of the offence described in Art. 151 of the Polish Criminal Code cannot be questioned with reference to arguments based on the legal interest.
PL
W artykule poruszono zagadnienie uzasadnienia kryminalizacji współudziału w targnięciu się przez inną osobę na własne życie w kontekście ochrony dobra prawnego, jakim jest życie człowieka. Rozważono, pod jakimi warunkami uzasadnione może być funkcjonowanie przepisu przewidującego karalność za współudział w czynie, którego dysponent zrzeka się ochrony własnego dobra prawnego. Stwierdzono, że osoba dopuszczająca się zamachu samobójczego nie atakuje dobra chronionego prawem, gdyż nie należy mówić o życiu człowieka jako dobru prawnym w relacji danej osoby do jej własnego życia. Życie człowieka pozostaje jednak dobrem prawnym w relacjach erga omnes, niezależnie od tego, czy mowa o człowieku dążącym do unicestwienia swojego własnego życia. Przyjęto w rezultacie, że kryminalizacja przestępstwa opisanego w art. 151 k.k. nie może być kwestionowana z odwołaniem się do argumentacji bazującej na dobru prawnym.
Ius Matrimoniale
|
2020
|
vol. 31
|
issue 2
147-157
EN
This gloss concerns the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 8 May 2015, case II OSK 2416/13, in which the court stated that the legal interest conditioning the disclosure of personal data may be enjoyed not only in a trial before a secular court, but also in proceedings before ecclesiastical court. The gloss layout includes the introduction, the thesis of the order, premises of the factual and legal status, arguments of the Supreme Administrative Court, evaluation of the judgment and the conclusion. The author fully shares the justification of the judgment. Moreover, he points to the ground-breaking approach to the process of nullity of marriage before the ecclesiastical court, which is the basis for granting a legal interest in the procedure of disclosing personal data before a public administration body.
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2011
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vol. 7
|
issue 1 Prawo
127-167
EN
This paper seeks to answer the question: do those who live in the vicinity of alcoholic beverages trade have a legal interest in a trial for the withdrawal of the concession on this business, or only factual interest? Therefore can they be a party of this trial according to art. 28 of the Code of administrative trial, or not? This regulation reads: “a party can be anyone whose legal interest or duty concerns the trial, or who demands that the institution should do something because of their legal interest or duty.” In order to show this problem, the author used an administrative case from the Town Council of Lublin in which the concept “legal interest” was one of the key problems that affected the whole trial. It has been indicated that in the case of the administrative police the meaning of “legal interest” can be broader than in the situation of administrative rationing. The author indicates the influence of various ways to define the scope of the concept of “legal interest” on the withdrawal of the concession of the sale of alcoholic beverages to be drunk at the point of purchase or outside on the basis of art. 18 law 10 point 3 of the law of education for temperance and prevention of alcoholism. This regulation determines that the concession on selling alcoholic beverages is withdrawn in the case of “recurrent at least twice within six months in the place of sale or in its close vicinity, disturbance of public order in relation to the sale of alcoholic beverages because of a given outlet, when this outlet does not inform the organs called to defend the public order”. Taking into consideration the goal of the administrative police the author is of the opinion that private interest in the administrative code in the case for the withdrawal of the concession on the sale of alcoholic beverages destined to be drunk at the point of sale or outside on the basis of art. 18 law 10 point 3 of the above law will also have those persons who live nearby the outlet. Their private interest may result not only and exclusively from the material administrative law, but also from the norms of universal law. Therefore, having indicated private interest or duty, they will be able to take part in this procedure as a party according to art. 28 k.p.a.
PL
Artykuł poświęcony został tematyce strony postępowania w sprawie stwierdzenia nieważności decyzji administracyjnej, które to postępowanie zalicza się do nadzwyczajnych trybów postępowania administracyjnego i odgrywa znaczącą rolę z punktu widzenia gwarancji procesowych strony z uwagi na to, iż ma ono na celu eliminację ze skutkiem ex tunc decyzji administracyjnych dotkniętych najcięższymi kwali'kowanymi wadami prawnymi określonymi w art. 156 § 1 KPA, których pozostanie w obrocie prawnym nie może mieć miejsca w państwie praworządnym. Prawna de'nicja pojęcia strony zawarta jest w art. 28 KPA, który stanowi, iż stroną jest każdy, czyjego interesu prawnego lub obowiązku dotyczy postępowanie, albo kto żąda czynności organu ze względu na swój interes prawny lub obowiązek. Stroną w postępowaniu w sprawie stwierdzenia nieważności decyzji będzie zaś każdy, czyjego interesu prawnego lub obowiązku dotyczy decyzja administracyjna, której żąda wery'kacji lub która jest przedmiotem wery'kacji w postępowaniu wszczętym z urzędu. Charakterystyczne pozostaje przy tym, iż nie zawsze musi zaistnieć tożsamość między podmiotami w  postępowaniu zwykłym i  w postępowaniu, którego przedmiotem jest stwierdzenie nieważności decyzji, niemniej jednak to przedmiot decyzji badanej w postępowaniu nieważnościowym określa krąg podmiotów będących stroną postępowania zarówno zwykłego, jak i prowadzonego w tzw. trybie nieważnościowym. Dodać należy, iż w postępowaniu w sprawie stwierdzenia nieważności decyzji administracyjnej legitymację do występowania w postępowaniu jako strona będzie miała też osoba, do której skierowana została decyzja administracyjna, mimo że nie była ona stroną w sprawie (przesłanka określona w art. 156 § 1 pkt 4 KPA).
EN
!e article deals with the issue of a party in legal action for an administrative decision annulment that is classified as the extraordinary proceeding and plays a significant role in terms of the party`s procedural guarantees; the aim of the proceeding is to eliminate decisions containing the most serious defects that make them null, according to Article 156 §1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, and the presence of which is not justified in the legal system of a democratic state. !e legal definition of `a party` is included in Article 28 of the Code of Administrative Procedure where the term `party` is defined as every person whose legal interest or duty is involved in the proceeding or a person who requests action for annulment due to their legal interest or duty. A party in action for a decision annulment will be a person whose legal interest or duty refers to the decision being verified or that is verified by the court on its own initiative. !e characteristic thing is that the persons are not always the same in the ordinary proceeding and the proceeding in which the decision is to be declared null and void. However, it is the subject matter of the verified decision that defines the range of persons who are parties in the ordinary as well as in the annulment proceeding. Furthermore, a person to whom the administrative decision has been sent will be eligible to act as a party in action for a decision annulment in spite of the fact that they have not been a party to a case (Article 156 §1 point 4 of the Code of Administrative Procedure).
PL
Artykuł jest poświęcony problematyce pozbawienia życia napastnika w obronie koniecznej. Rozważania prowadzone są w oparciu o wykładnię art. 25 § 2 Kodeksu karnego, z którego wynika, że sposób obrony musi być współmierny do niebezpieczeństwa zamachu. Autorzy poszukują katalogu dóbr, których można bronić godząc w życie napastnika. Analizują ponadto art. 2 ust. 2 lit. a Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, zgodnie z którym pozbawienie życia nie będzie uznane za sprzeczne z tym artykułem, jeżeli nastąpi w wyniku bezwzględnego koniecznego użycia siły w obronie jakiejkolwiek osoby przed bezprawną przemocą. Autorzy zwracają uwagę na rolę tego przepisu w interpretacji znamion obrony koniecznej, zwłaszcza znamienia współmierności sposobu obrony do niebezpieczeństwa zamachu. W artykule definiują ponadto pojęcie kontratypu oraz scharakteryzowali krótko pozostałe znamiona obrony koniecznej.
EN
The article is devoted to the issue of killing an attacker in self-defense. The considerations are based on the interpretation of Article 25 § 2 of the Penal Code, from which it follows that the method of defense must be commensurate with the danger of attack. The authors are looking for a catalog of legal interests that can be defended by harming the attacker’s life. They also analyze Article 2 (2a) European Convention of Human Rights, according to which deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence. The authors draw attention to the role of this provision in the interpretation of the signs of necessary defense, especially the sign of proportionality of the means of defense to the danger of assassination. In the article, they also defined the concept of a countertype (justification) and briefly characterized the remaining features of necessary defense
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