Search results

1

Teoria wykładni prawa cywilnego według Eugeniusza Waśkowskiego

100%

Pietrzykowski K.

Studia Iuridica

|

2017

|

vol. 70

179-190

PL

The article contains the presentation monograph of Eugene Waśkowski (published in 1936) on the theory of interpretation of civil law. Waśkowski is a supporter of the traditional theory of interpretation that favors legal certainty. His remarks about the equity and the principle of clara non sunt interpretanda often inspire discussion.

2

Between the text and the discourse. A few remarks on the subject of communicative competence within the texts of legal acts

80%

Choduń A.

Applied Linguistics Papers

|

2018

|

issue 25/4

175-182

EN

The subject of legal interpretation is the text of a legal act as the source of law. Adequately ascertaining the substantive contents of the law therefore requires knowledge of the intrinsic characteristics of the act of law as a form of normatively defined mode of utterance. Due to the high level of conventionalization of the texts of acts of law, their interpretation requires specialized knowledge of legal interpretation of the texts of law, which may be classified as legal communicative competence. Because this competence characterises individuals who are professionally prepared to interpret acts of law, and at the same time who function in a given community of discourse, it is in essence a type of discursive competence within the law.

3

On the Normative Paradigm of Sworn Translation in the Realm of Law

80%

Król M. Z.

|

2020

|

vol. 18

|

issue 3

299-318

EN

In the 1920s the Polish legislature adopted a whole range of normative acts focused on the protection of the Polish language and on sworn translators practicing in official contexts. In accordance with statutory law, since 2004 sworn translators have been considered a profession commanding public trust. Among the many professional duties associated with sworn translators' performance, the regulations emphasize the duty to translate both spoken discourse and written texts with precision and faithfulness, and make sworn translators liable to disciplinary sanctions for poor quality work. The principles and rules for practicing the profession of sworn translator are enumerated in the Professional Sworn Translator’s Code of 2018.

4

Aktualność operatywnego modelu wykładni prawa w obliczu postmodernizmu

70%

Szymańska M.

Prawo

|

2016

|

issue 320

165-176

EN

Due to postmodernist philosophy is becoming summary increasingly popular this article concerns the validity of a legal interpretation model commonly used in modern times with regard to the postmodernist point of view. Although this problem is widely described in Western literature, in Poland, on the contrary, it is gaining popularity only among philosophers of law. The aim of the article is to present the critical approach of postmodernist philosophy to existing order and demonstrate its attitude towards interpretation of the law. It should be noted that postmodernism has no ambition of constructing its own model of legal interpretation, but comments on and reviews all that has been said on this issue in the legal theory and philosophy of law. This is due to the fact that postmodernism is hostile to all methodologies, modelling theories and theoretical constructions. On the other hand, based on the general assumptions of postmodern philosophy, a postmodern view on the interpretation of the law can be derived. The article discusses deconstructionism, hermeneutics and intertextuality as methods of creating the meaning of a legal text during interpretation, acceptable by postmodernism. The study also presents criticism of the assumption of rational legislator proposed by legal positivism. In this respect postmodernism makes a real revolution in the field of law enforcement, prioritizing the interpreter instead of the legislator, and the creation of a legal text meaning during the process of legal interpretation in place of meaning determination.

5

Oryginalizm interpretacyjny czy żyjące źródła prawa? Polityczny wymiar aktywizmu sędziowskiego

70%

Ciepły F.

Forum Prawnicze

|

2018

|

issue 2 (46)

42–52

EN

The aim of this article is to guide the Justice Antonin Scalia’s originalism concept of the interpretaion of the Constitution of the United States, in contrast to the views on the interpretation of constitutional provisions, in particular the concept of judicial activism and a living (breathing) constitution. The author points out the danger of increasing the significance of the political dimension of judges’ activism on the level of interpreting constitutional and international law.

6

Motives in Support of Judicial Activism: Critique and Ethics of Restrained Adjudication as an Alternative

70%

Berkmanas T.

Baltic Journal of Law & Politics

|

2009

|

vol. 2

|

issue 1

112-134

EN

The paper concentrates, from the critical perspective, on two general ideological themes used to support and welcome judicial activism mainly in the jurisprudence of the highest level courts of the United States and Lithuania. This task is relevant in light of the judicial activism spreading in court practices, as well as its clear embrace in the academic community of Lithuania.The first theme focuses on the practice and ideology of Justice John Marshall. It is rather evident that the Marshallian ideas and activities form an ideological basis for an active and politically powerful constitutional court. However, due regard should be paid to the critique of the Marshallian heritage.The other theme is built on the juxtaposition of reality and the law as text, the former being much more complicated. This allegedly supports the theses either that adjudication could not avoid taking the form of precedent (the creation of law rather than the interpretation of law), or that judicial interpretation is meant to fill the gaps or fix inconsistencies in the legal text (the so-called thesis of interpretative sufficiency). However, due regard should be paid to the consequences of the realization of both theses to the political framework of the state.This article attempts to fill in these aforementioned gaps in critical attention with compensatory critique, as well as to suggest an alternative approach to the propaganda of judicial activism - an ethics of restrained adjudication.

7

Nieostrość języka prawnego w świetle filozoficznych koncepcji nieostrości

70%

Gizbert-Studnicki T.

Studia Iuridica

|

2020

|

vol. 83

27-42

PL

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the usefulness of application of various philosophical conceptions of vagueness to the problem of vagueness in law. Although it cannot be expected that any philosophical conception may solve the practical problems of interpretation and application of vague terms in legal texts, the philosophy of language may help lawyers to better understand their problems. The paper describes main philosophical conceptions of vagueness and in particular metaphysical, epistemic, semantic, and pragmatic theories. It is argued that the pragmatic conception of vagueness has the best explanatory force with respect to the problem of vagueness in law. The application of this conception, however, must be based on acceptance of internalistic theory of meaning and on the assumption that the purpose of legal interpretation is to reveal the intention of the legislator. Both assumptions are controversial.

8

Legal Interpretation: Towards a New Paradigm?

70%

Brożek B.

Teoria Polityki

|

2020

|

vol. 4

79-92

EN

This paper considers the foundations of legal interpretation against the background of the theory of embodied cognition and mental simulation. It is argued that interpretation has a double, concrete-abstract nature. The understanding of concrete language is made possible by the mechanism of mental simulation. In turn, the interpretation of abstract language (and hence of most of legal language) requires to apply the procedures of exemplification, paraphrase and embedding. The relationship between these two modes of language comprehension is analyzed and the thesis is defended that they represent two extremes of a continuous spectrum rather than isolated mechanisms. Finally, the significance of such a conception of interpretation for legal methodology is considered. It is argued that the conception provides a unifying, foundational framework for any theory of legal interpretation, as well as generates fresh insights into the nature of understanding legal statutes. cancelcancel

9

SYMBOLIC PROTECTION OF ANIMALS

70%

BIELSKA-BRODZIAK A., DRAPALSKA-GROCHOWICZ M., SUSKA M.

Society Register

|

2019

|

vol. 3

|

issue 3

103-121

EN

The purpose of this article is to attempt to understand some institutions of Polish animal protection law using the concept of “symbolic legislation”. The law is symbolic when, despite apparently ordering or prohibiting certain behaviours, it does not establish effective mechanisms for enforcing these obligations. The authors on selected examples show that in the field of animal protection law, there are no such symbolic solutions. At the same time, they indicate that not all of these situations deserve a negative assessment and come to the conclusion that the “symbolism” of regulation is not always the fault of the legislator himself. The concept of symbolic legislation allows a better understanding of how a legal act can affect social reality - among others, where there is a strong need for social education, such as in the field of animal protection.

10

Prawo konsumenta do obniżenia całkowitego kosztu kredytu konsumenckiego – zarys problemu

70%

Gnych-Pietrzak W.

|

2021

|

vol. 3

|

issue 31

41-56

EN

The purpose of the article is to present the issues related to qualifying the costs of a consumer credit, such as commission and fees, to costs associated with the loan period, and thus subject to reduction in the event of early loan repayment. Based on the research, a thesis was formulated that for the correct transposition and implementation of EU law, it is required to ensure the possibility of reducing all costs of a consumer loan, therefore the above costs should be considered related to the loan period and should be proportionally reduced. Methodology: For the purposes of the research, the legal-dogmatic and analytical methods were used. The jurisprudence of Polish courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union was analyzed. The adopted time horizon of the study covered the period from 12/05/2010 to 31/12/2020. The judgments published in the resources of Lex and Legalis Legal Information Systems and the Portal of Judgments of Common Courts as at 31/12/2020 were taken into account. Results of the research: It was found that the judicature largely adopted a broad approach to the problem presented, even before the judgment of the CJEU in case C-383/18, which confirms the thesis adopted for the purposes of the article. Consequently, consumers who have concluded a consumer credit agreement are entitled to a proportional reduction to all costs they had to incur in connection with the concluded agreement. In particular, these are incidental, one-off costs such as commission and preparation fee, which are subjected to reduction.

11

Siła argumentu interpretacyjnego z prawniczego domniemania języka (znaczenia) potocznego

61%

Grabowski A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

|

2016

|

vol. 52

|

issue 3(209)

357-370

PL

Przedmiotem rozważań, prowadzonych z argumentacyjnego punktu widzenia, jest jedna z najważniejszych dyrektyw językowych interpretacji prawniczej – tzw. domniemanie języka (znaczenia) potocznego. Po odróżnieniu domniemań prawniczych od domniemań prawnych, analizy skupiają się na kwestiach sformułowania, uzasadnienia i struktury logicznej prawniczego domniemania języka (znaczenia) potocznego, opracowanego przez Jerzego Wróblewskiego. Zostaje wykazane, że w ramach pojęciowych jego klaryfi kacyjnej teorii interpretacji prawniczej, domniemanie języka potocznego jest niewzruszalne w obrębie wykładni językowej.

EN

The paper discusses one of the most important linguistic directives of legal interpretation – the so called presumption of ordinary language – from the argumentative point of view. After distinguishing juristic presumptions from legal ones, the analysis focuses on the formulation, justifi cation and logical structure of the juristic presumption of ordinary language (ordinary meaning), as elaborated by Jerzy Wróblewski. It is demonstrated that in the conceptual frames of his clarifi cative theory of legal interpretation the presumption of ordinary language is irrefutable within the linguistic interpretation of law.

12

MULTILINGUALISM AT THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

61%

Łachacz O., Mańko R.

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

|

2013

|

vol. 34

|

issue 1

75-92

EN

The paper analyses and evaluates the linguistic policy of the Court of Justice of the European Union against the background of other multilingual courts and in the light of theories of legal interpretation. Multilingualism has a direct impact upon legal interpretation at the Court, displacing traditional approaches (intentionalism, textualism) with a hermeneutic paradigm. It also creates challenges to the acceptance of the Court’s case-law in the Member States, which seem to have been adequately tackled by the Court’s idiosyncratic translation policy.

13

O sposobach pojmowania twórczego charakteru interpretacji

61%

Bogucki O.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

|

2013

|

vol. 1(6)

21-33

PL

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the notion of creative interpretation (of any text, especially creative interpretation of a legal text). The author points out that there are two different meanings of the expression “creative interpretation”. The first one can be called “ontological” and the second one – “methodological”. A given interpretation is ontologically creative when it creates a new object (which is a new meaning of some sort) and it is methodologically creative when it is established without applying any rules. Different theoretic approaches to legal interpretation presuppose different relations between ontological creativeness and methodological creativeness. The article explores some of them. The main thesis of the article is that when we say that a given interpretation is ontologically creative, we do not need to say it is methodologically creative (and vice versa).

14

Uzasadnianie twierdzeń interpretacyjnych z perspektywy derywacyjnej koncepcji wykładni prawa

61%

Choduń A., Zieliński M.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

|

2020

|

vol. 2(23)

7-18

PL

Obowiązek uzasadniania twierdzeń jest w nauce realizacją postulatu krytycyzmu. Rozstrzygnięcia interpretacji prawniczej (niezależnie od tego, czy są formułowane w procesie stosowania prawa czy poza nim) mają postać twierdzeń o obowiązywaniu normy prawnej o określonej treści. Uprawomocnienie tych twierdzeń wymaga, podobnie jak w nauce, uzasadnienia. A w nauce twierdzenie jest hipotetyczne, dopóty dopóki ktoś nie przedstawi jego intersubiektywnie weryfikowalnego uzasadnienie. Zadaniem artykułu jest właśnie wykazanie konieczności uzasadniania twierdzeń interpretacyjnych (zarówno cząstkowych jak i finalnych) w procesie wykładni. Jako punkt wyjścia dla wykazania obowiązku formułowania takiego uzasadnienia, wybieramy derywacyjną koncepcję wykładni prawa, w której taki obowiązek przewidziano ze względów metodologicznych (i który jest wpisany w treść dyrektyw interpretacyjnych w tej koncepcji co najmniej implicite). Przedstawiamy i omawiamy typy uzasadnień twierdzeń interpretacyjnych oraz ich wersje (słabą i mocną). Ponadto różnice między uzasadnieniem zwykłego twierdzenia a uzasadnieniem twierdzenia interpretacyjnego. Wskazujemy także na konsekwencje braku takich uzasadnień.

EN

The duty to provide justification for claims is the realization of the postulate of criticism in the academia. Decisions regarding legal interpretation (regardless of whether they are formulated in the process of applying the law or outside this process) are made in the form of claims about a binding legal norm with a certain content. Validation of such claims requires their justification, just like in the academia. And in the academia, a claim remains theoretical until someone presents an inter-subjectively verified justification for it. The aim of this article is precisely that: to indicate the necessity to justify interpretive claims (both partial and final) in the process of interpretation. As a starting point in the process of demonstrating the need to formulate such a justification, we choose the derivative conception of legal interpretation, which provides for the duty to justify interpretive claims for methodological reasons (and which is an intrinsic element of the content of legal directives in this conception, at least implicitly). We present and discuss the types of justifications for interpretive claims and their variants (weak and strong). Furthermore, we analyse the difference between justifying ordinary and interpretive claims. Finally, we also identify the consequences of failure to provide such justifications.

15

Dialogiczna koncepcja interpretacji prawa

61%

Tobor Z., Kobyliński K.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

|

2020

|

vol. 2(23)

35-48

PL

Celem niniejszego tekstu jest przedstawienie zarysu dialogicznej koncepcji interpretacji prawa. Wiąże się ona z koniecznością ustalenia relacji pomiędzy prawodawcą a sądami. W wymiarze normatywnym koncepcja ta obejmuje analizę założeń odnośnie wzajemnej roli prawodawcy i sądów w ustalaniu treści prawa. W wymiarze opisowym polega on na przedstawieniu narzędzi, za pomocą których prawodawca i sądy mogą nawiązywać komunikację zmierzającą do usprawnienia procesu interpretacyjnego. Opisujemy wymagania, jakie spełniać powinna komunikacja między sądami a prawodawcą oraz odnosimy się na do istniejących rozwiązań funkcjonujących w Polsce oraz Stanach Zjednoczonych. W tekście sygnalizujemy jedynie doniosłość tego zagadnienia, które, w naszym przekonaniu, warte jest dalszych prac badawczych.

EN

The purpose of this text is to present an outline of the dialogical concept of legal interpretation. It involves the need to establish the relationship between the legislature and courts. In the normative dimension, this concept includes an analysis of assumptions about the mutual roles of the legislature and courts in determining the substance of the law. In the descriptive dimension, the authors present tools that enable communication between the legislature and courts in order to improve the interpretation process. The authors describe the requirements for communication between courts and the legislature, and refer to existing solutions in Poland and the United States. In the text the importance of this issue is only signaled, but the authors believe that it is worth further research.

16

On Possible Applications of Paul Ricoeur’s Thought in Legal Theory

61%

Pieniążek M.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

|

2015

|

vol. 1(10)

79-88

EN

The paradigm of legal positivism, historically the most important attempt at turning law into science, has been subject to thorough criticism in past decades. The criticism has concerned the most important features of legal positivism, and especially the assumption of separation of law and morality, the dogma of statue being the only source of law, and the linguistic methods of interpreting legal texts. With a crisis of the positive paradigms, the demand for new, humanistic grounds for analysing philosophical and legal questions is intensifying. This is the reason for this article’s attempt to point to the application of Paul Ricoeur’s achievements to the key questions of the philosophy of law. It must be emphasised that his works, and especially Soimême comme un autre, may serve as a foundation for a philosophy of law rejecting the problematic claims about the dualism of being and obligation, the distinction of descriptive and prescriptive languages, and also the separation of law and morality. Thanks to this, the legal topos pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) finds a reinforcement in the ontology of the subject applying law and can be understood as an ethically significant pattern of identity of the self. Equally fruitful seems the possibility of combining the questions of the ontology of the subject applying law with the question of a legal text and its interpretation. The assumption of Ricoeur’s perspective leads to a reduction in the distance between the legal text and its addressee, emphasised by the critics of legal positivism. This rapprochement becomes possible thanks to the connection of the question of the narrative that a legal text is with the question of narrativisation of the subject (i.e. the interpreter of a legal text), being itself in the ipse sense, i.e. applying the law.

17

Argument from Precedent in Legal Interpretation of Texts of Legal Acts from the Perspective of a Derivative Concept of Legal Interpretation

61%

Choduń A.

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

|

2022

|

issue 3(32)

19-33

PL

Celem artykułu jest ustalenie, czy w polskiej kulturze prawnej, w której precedens nie jest faktem prawotwórczym, może być on argumentem w procesie interpretacji prawniczej. W artykule przyjęto, że ustalenia na temat precedensu jako argumentu w interpretacji prawniczej należy zrelatywizować do konkretnej koncepcji wykładni prawa. Dlatego jako punkt odniesienia dla pojmowania „wykładni prawa” przyjęto derywacyjną koncepcję wykładni prawa. Wybór ten podyktowany był tym, że jest to: 1) koncepcja prezentująca kompleksowe podejście do wykładni prawa (zakładającej, że wykładnia kończy się po zastosowaniu trzech typów dyrektyw interpretacyjnych: językowych, systemowych i funkcjonalnych); 2) uwzgledniająca elementy realistyczne wykładni w postaci dyrektyw związanych wprost z ustaleniami interpretacyjnymi sądowej praktyki prawniczej; 3) przyjmująca, że wykładnia odgrywa określone role, ze względu na które można ustalić czy wynik przeprowadzonego rozumowania prawniczego mieści się w zakresie wykładni, czy też stanowi „nowość normatywną”. W wyniku przeprowadzonych rozważań ustalono, że w zależności od treści dyrektyw interpretacyjnych przyjętych w danej kulturze prawnej zależy, czy postępowanie organu stosującego prawo będzie miało charakter interpretacji czy prawotwórstwa, a w konsekwencji przesądzi o tym, jak kwalifikowane będzie powołanie się w procesie wykładni na wcześniejsze orzeczenia sądowe.

EN

The aim of this article is to ascertain whether in the Polish legal culture in which precedent is not a legislative fact, it can become an argument in the process of judicial interpretation. The article posits that an analysis of precedent as an argument in judicial interpretation must be carried out in relation to a particular concept (or theory) of legal interpretation. Hence, it adopts the Maciej Zieliński’s (derivative) concept of legal interpretation as a point of reference for understanding “legal interpretation”. The choice is based on the following reasons: 1) this concept offers a complex approach to legal interpretation (which assumes that interpretation can be concluded if three directives have been applied by an interpreter: linguistic, systemic and functional); 2) this concept considers the realistic elements of legal interpretation in the form of directives linked to the interpretative findings achieved in judicial practice; 3) this concept stipulates that legal interpretation has certain roles, which allow establishing whether the outcome of legal reasoning is within the scope of the interpretation or whether it constitutes a “normative novelty”. As a result of this analysis, it can be concluded that depending on the content of the directives of interpretation adopted in a given legal culture, the proceedings of the entity applying a law will have either an interpretative or a legislative character and will consequently determine how invoking earlier court judgments in legal interpretation will be classified.

18

Presumptions on Discretion in Law Enforcement of Financial Legal Provisions

61%

Barikova A.

Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie

|

2021

|

vol. 2(30)

7-24

EN

The author has outlined the essence of legal presumptions on discretion in law enforcement of financial legal provisions as both current legal phenomena and legal regulations. The relationship between presumptions and principles of law, as well as the classification of presumptions has been researched into. Presumptions on discretion in law enforcement of financial legal provisions are formed in relation to a particular legal fact or group of facts or compositions that correspond with a particular law enforcement situation, which is due to the origin, content and purpose of these facts or compositions, the relationship between them. With regard to discretion in law enforcement of financial legal provisions, it could also be argued that there are both legally defined irrefutable presumptions (innocence, “all doubts in favour of the taxpayer”) and rebuttable in a particular case, which does not terminate its effect as a whole. It has been concluded that presumptions on discretion in law enforcement of financial legal provisions are applied due to logical methods of induction or modelling, when the probability of a phenomenon is not high enough.

19

On Law, Ideology, and Violence: A Reply to Maciej Pichlak

61%

Mańko R.

Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem

|

2023

|

vol. 15

|

issue 1

326-338

EN

The present paper is a reaction to Maciej Pichlak’s article "Law in the Snares of the Political: Addressing Rafał Mańko’s Critical Philosophy of Adjudication" which was published in this journal (“The Critique of Law” 2020, 12(3), pp. 109–125). The present response addresses selected issues raised in Pichlak’s critique, focusing on three aspects: law and the political, the importance of justice in the critical project, and finally the question of adjudication and ideology. On a more general note, the polemic reveals the importance of philosophical, political and ideological commitments and presuppositions of legal theorists and poses the question of the limits of the autonomy of jurisprudential debates vis-à-vis such commitments.

20

Wykładnia prawa jako działanie optymalizacyjne

51%

Pulka Z.

Przegląd Prawa i Administracji

|

2020

|

vol. 120

|

issue Tom 1

79 - 94

PL

Głównym celem artykułu jest udowodnienie tytułowej tezy, zgodnie z którą interpretacja prawnicza może być postrzegana jako działanie optymalizacyjne, ponieważ jest to działanie, które nieuchronnie zmierza do maksymalizacji wartości przedmiotu interpretacji (tekstu prawnego). Ponadto, pragnę wykazać, że zarówno interpretacja prawnicza, jak i interpretacja filozoficzna mają wspólne cechy, takie jak intuicyjność, przez którą rozumiem niemożliwość stosowania empirycznych kryteriów prawomocności formułowanych twierdzeń. Zarówno w przypadku interpretacji prawa, jak i poznania filozoficznego interpretacja pełni funkcję optymalizacyjną, przez którą rozumiem ujawnianie aksjologicznego ładu w przedmiocie poznania.

EN

The purport of the article consists in defending the thesis clearly defined in the title of elaboration, according to which, legal interpretation may be conceived as an optimising activity, because it inevitably aims at maximising the value of the subject of interpretation (legal text). Moreover, I tend to point out that legal interpretation as well as philosophical cognition share a set of common traits such as intuitiveness, by which I mean the lack of opportunities to fully apply inter-subjective empirical criteria of the validity of formulated propositions. Both in the case of legal interpretation and philosophical cognition, interpretation performs an optimising function, by which I understand introducing axiological order into the subject of cognition.

Refine search results

Teoria wykładni prawa cywilnego według Eugeniusza Waśkowskiego

Between the text and the discourse. A few remarks on the subject of communicative competence within the texts of legal acts

On the Normative Paradigm of Sworn Translation in the Realm of Law

Aktualność operatywnego modelu wykładni prawa w obliczu postmodernizmu

Oryginalizm interpretacyjny czy żyjące źródła prawa? Polityczny wymiar aktywizmu sędziowskiego

Motives in Support of Judicial Activism: Critique and Ethics of Restrained Adjudication as an Alternative

Nieostrość języka prawnego w świetle filozoficznych koncepcji nieostrości

Legal Interpretation: Towards a New Paradigm?

SYMBOLIC PROTECTION OF ANIMALS

Prawo konsumenta do obniżenia całkowitego kosztu kredytu konsumenckiego – zarys problemu

Siła argumentu interpretacyjnego z prawniczego domniemania języka (znaczenia) potocznego

MULTILINGUALISM AT THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

O sposobach pojmowania twórczego charakteru interpretacji

Uzasadnianie twierdzeń interpretacyjnych z perspektywy derywacyjnej koncepcji wykładni prawa

Dialogiczna koncepcja interpretacji prawa

On Possible Applications of Paul Ricoeur’s Thought in Legal Theory

Argument from Precedent in Legal Interpretation of Texts of Legal Acts from the Perspective of a Derivative Concept of Legal Interpretation

Presumptions on Discretion in Law Enforcement of Financial Legal Provisions

On Law, Ideology, and Violence: A Reply to Maciej Pichlak

Wykładnia prawa jako działanie optymalizacyjne