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Otázka právního státu u Michela Foucaulta

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EN
This article analyses a theme which is at first sight is only indirectly present in Foucault’s work the question of the legal state. The author analyses a wide variety of Foucault’s texts, giving special attention to the first volume of the History of Sexuality and to the seminars on the genesis of bio-politics and on the origin of territory. He reaches the conclusion, on the basis of rather indirect indications, that in Foucault’s thought the question of the legal state is treated negatively as a concept that has no place in the analysis of the modern conception of power which Foucault is endeavouring to provide. Support for this attitude on the part of Foucault is given by a wide range of examples, ranging from the medieval conception of power to an analysis of modern ordoliberalism.
PL
Title issue that will be discussed in this article is a dispute, which began during the postglossators, as to the nature of possession, it means whether it is a legal state or fact. In its resolution doesn’t help a multiplicity of types of possession, which at least six were distinguished by the ancient Romans. Polish legislator continues this trend, because now in Polish law occur, modeled on the roman tradition, possession of things and possession of law, and modeled on the concept of Germanic possession spontaneous and possession dependent. From the roman theory derive contemporary elements of possession, however, have a different meaning. Today very important role is played by factor of will (animus), which allows distinguish autonomous possession from a dependent possession. This is confirmed in the jurisprudence of the Polish Supreme Court, which confirms that, in contrary to Roman law, under Polish law it is possible to transform dependent possession in to spontaneous possession, just by having the will clearly disclosed. Exceptionally there are also situations where about the character decides objective element, ie. The rule of law, with the result that spontaneous possessor may act as a wielder. Possession is certainly a legal institution, but it does not justify the statement that it is a legal state that without legislation would not exist. The author strongly inclined to consider that possession is the factual state, because its recognition as a legal state would make unjustified functioning of acquisitive prescription, which has been introduced precisely in order to ensure legal acceptance of long-term relations of fact.
The Lawyer Quarterly
|
2022
|
vol. 12
|
issue 1
37-52
EN
The European Convention of Human Rights, together with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights creates a special and entire legal system, which is particularly aimed to cultivation of decisions of bodies of public power in issues of natural and legal persons, or of other power intervention. The current jurisprudence particularly of the European Court of Human Rights undoubtedly shifts the concept of the legal state into the position of quantitative intensity not only of human rights and freedoms protection, but also particularly cultivation of public administration and decision activity of courts. Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights therefore sets not only on enforceability of the European law in member states, but also at requirements of organizational, intervention and decision legal level of activity of bodies of the public power. It is therefore possible to declare and confirm that the concept of the “European Legal State” is a specific European versions of constitutional protection of basic human values.
EN
The main object of the presented article is to prove that, according to Robert von Mohl’s views on the idea of civil rights, he should be classified as the exponent of moderate early German liberalism. The first section of the study drafts a background for its next two parts. It presents the socio-political circumstances of the German states from the beginning of the 19th century to the developments of the Springtime of the Peoples. The analysis of the German scholar views on the citizenship’s idea in the context of the Rechtsstaat and basic rights notion is undertaken in the second part of the article. In the third part, it is proved, that von Mohl was a thinker who chose the path of the “golden mean”. Regarding the citizen’s position in state, on the one hand, he proposed a substantial catalogue of civil rights. On the other hand, he didn’t support the idea of universal political rights.
PL
Główny cel niniejszego artykułu polega na dowiedzeniu tezy stanowiącej, że rozumienie idei praw obywatelskich w poglądach Roberta von Mohla klasyfikuje go jako przedstawiciela umiarkowanego niemieckiego wczesnego liberalizmu. Pierwsza część opracowania obejmuje omówienie uwarunkowań społeczno-politycznych ziem niemieckich od początków XIX w. do wydarzeń Wiosny Ludów. Stanowi ona tło dla następnych dwóch części. Skupiono się w nich na analizie poglądów niemieckiego uczonego na pojęcie obywatela w kontekście idei Rechtsstaat oraz na prawa zasadnicze (w których zawierały się prawa obywatelskie i polityczne). W artykule dowiedziono, że von Mohl był myślicielem wybierającym drogę „złotego środka” w odniesieniu do pozycji obywateli w państwie. Z jednej strony, zgodnie z dominującym w ówczesnym niemieckim liberalizmie poglądem, przewidywał on szeroki katalog praw obywatelskich w państwie, z drugiej zaś obca mu była idea powszechnych praw politycznych, ich wykonywanie ograniczone było bowiem u von Mohla cenzusem.
EN
Title issue that will be discussed in this article is a dispute, which began during the postglossators, as to the nature of possession, it means whether it is a legal state or fact. In its resolution doesn’t help a multiplicity of types of possession, which at least six were distinguished by the ancient Romans. Polish legislator continues this trend, because now in Polish law occur, modeled on the roman tradition, possession of things and possession of law, and modeled on the concept of Germanic possession spontaneous and possession dependent. From the roman theory derive contemporary elements of possession, however, have a different meaning. Today very important role is played by factor of will (animus), which allows distinguish autonomous possession from a dependent possession. This is confirmed in the jurisprudence of the Polish Supreme Court, which confirms that, in contrary to Roman law, under Polish law it is possible to transform dependent possession in to spontaneous possession, just by having the will clearly disclosed. Exceptionally there are also situations where about the character decides objective element, ie. The rule of law, with the result that spontaneous possessor may act as a wielder. Possession is certainly a legal institution, but it does not justify the statement that it is a legal state that without legislation would not exist. The author strongly inclined to consider that possession is the factual state, because its recognition as a legal state would make unjustified functioning of acquisitive prescription, which has been introduced precisely in order to ensure legal acceptance of long-term relations of fact.
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