Tichý’s solution of two basic kinds of liar paradox is based on the ramified theory of types, which is his own explication of the original proposal of Russell’s. This ramified theory of types is used for the rigorously explained concept of ‘languages’ and the languages in question seem to be similar, in hierarchy at least, to Tarski’s languages. But Tichý avoided the disadvantages of Russell’s and Tarski’s solutions of the liar paradoxes, and he in fact stands between them, at the golden mean. The main point is that Tichý’s own solution is in no way ad hoc because he first provided a crucial reason for hierarchies and only then refuted the paradox. Any language L is construed as mapping from expressions to (logically-explicated) meanings. Because no function is allowed to be among its own values, the name of language L, i.e. ‘L’ (and then any other containing ‘L’), is thus meaningless in L (‘L’ is meaningful only in the metalanguage of L, i.e. ML; but again, ‘ML’ is not meaningful in ML). No sentence is true simpliciter, the truth of a sentence is relative to what it says (means) in a given language. The disambiguated liar sentence contains ‘truth in L’, thus it is clearly meaningless in L. Since a meaningless sentence cannot be true or false, the liar paradox cannot arise. After a detailed exposition and, above all, a thorough defence of Tichý’s approach, we successfully apply the method of his solution to other known kinds of liar paradox.
My aim in this paper is to amend the Stalnakerian view of context in such a way that it can allow for an adequate treatment of a contextualist position regarding the Liar Paradox. I discuss Glanzberg’s contextualism and the reason why his position cannot be encompassed by the Stalnakerian view, as it is normally construed. Finally, I introduce the phenomenon I call “semantic dissonance”, followed by a mechanism accommodating the Stalnakerian view to the demands of Glanzberg’s contextualism.
Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.
The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the one hand, it seems to be well formed formula, and on the other, it does not seem to have any clear sense. At the beginning of the article I point what form an adequate solution of the liar paradox should take. In my opinion it could not consist in giving rules which do not allow to build such a sentence. The paradox remains unsolved until there is such a language in which it could be expressed. In the first part of the text I try to explain why Tarski’s solution is not satisfactory. If the semantical definition of truth is correct, the liar sentence could not lead to a contradiction because formulas which are not well formed could not be premises of any inference. From that follows that the so called liar paradox does not arise and that leads to the conclusion: ‘the reconstruction’ of the liar propounded by Tarski could not be correct. In the second part I present an approach to the liar which appeals to Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language. The conclusion of my consideration is that the liar sentence is nonsense, which means it is not given any sense – either its logical form is determined but we do not fix any definite meaning to some parts of it, or an attempt to determine its logical form in the standard way leads to regress ad infinitum.
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