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EN
The aim of the article is to present the state of democracy in selected European countries, both members of the European Union and its neighbours (including candidate states), on the basis of the best-known indices of democracy and freedom of the press (media), published by the following organisations which develop democracy indices: Freedom House (Freedom in the World, Nation in Transit, Freedom of the Press), The Economist Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index), Bertelsmann Stiftung (The Bertelsmann Transformation Index), V-Dem Institute (Democracy Report), and Reporters Without Borders (World Press Freedom Index), an organisation specialising in press freedom. The importance of assessing the level of media freedom in European countries and its impact on the overall assessment of their political systems is emphasised. In this way, the author attempts to prove the thesis that without legal guarantees of freedom of the press (media) and unless the authorities respect these principles in practice, no country can be classified as a democracy (all the more so as a liberal democracy).
EN
Legitimacy is one of the fundamental topics of the social and political sciences, as well as a valid issue in contemporary Western societies. Legitimacy is based on the existence of a common standard for evaluating social and political systems. If such a standard is absent, legitimacy is impossible by definition (Beetham 1991). The research question of this article is: to what extent is the level of a political system’s legitimacy explained by the effect of normative disorientation? Data from round 5 of the European Social Survey is analyzed by multilevel linear regression models in order to verify hypotheses about the strength and direction of the correlation between political legitimacy and normative disorientation. Analysis showed that normative disorientation is negatively correlated with the level of political legitimacy.
EN
The aim of this article is to present the state of democracy in selected European countries, botEuropean Union member states and neighbours (including candidate countries). This is carried out o n the basis of the best-known indexes of democracy and press (media) freedom, published by the organisations that have developed democracy indexes such as Freedom House (Freedom in the World, Nation in Transit, Freedom of the Press), The Economist Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index), Bertelsmann Stiftung (The Bertelsmann Transformation Index), V-Dem Institute (Democracy Report), and Reporters Without Borders (World Press Freedom Index), an organisation specialising in press freedom. The importance of assessing the level of media freedom in European countries is emphasised as is its impact on overall evaluations of their political systems. In this way, the author attempts to prove the thesis that without legal guarantees of press (media) freedom and governments respecting these principles in practice, no country can be classified as a democracy (much less as a liberal democracy).
EN
Discussion around the concept of post-democracy in political science partially overlaps with a long-term narrative about the crisis of democracy. While there seems to be a general consensus on the concept of post-democracy, this notion is rather controversial. The current paper analyzes the treatment of the concept of post-democracy in the works of Jacques Rancière, Jürgen Habermas, Colin Crouch and others. The paper seeks to problematize temporal and spatial reductionism present in some conceptualisations of post-democracy, pointing to the contingency, temporality and contextuality of the forms of representative democracy as a possible way out of the melancholy nostalgia for a “golden age” of democracy and a way to seek a modus vivendi of democracy and representation in new conditions.
EN
The purpose of the article is to analyze the discussion on the place of Central and Eastern Europe in the European Union. The author of the article focuses on issues related to political axiology. Analyzing the statements of selected authors and politicians mainly from Poland and Hungary, he tries to determine what values are at stake in this dispute. According to the author, the two basic areas of discussion are the attitude towards liberalism and the future of nation and the nation state. The article ends with a prediction of the possible consequences of this dispute.
EN
This article analyses the discussion concerning the place of East Central Europe in the European Union. The author focuses on issues related to political axiology. Analysing the statements of selected authors and politicians, mostly from Poland and Hungary, he tries to determine what values are at stake in this dispute. In the author’s view, the two fundamental areas of discussion are the attitude towards liberalism, and the future of the nation and the nation state. The article ends with a forecast of the possible consequences of this dispute.
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PL
The author supports the claim that attempts to formulate a universal definition of the term “populism” are not worthwhile, because the sense of the term is usually determined by a specific social context. Understanding the utopian nature of populism provides a better understanding of the utopian nature of democracy and allows for a humble departure from dreams of a perfect social order, because, as has been shown in numerous survey studies, the contemporary shift of social mood, attitudes, and opinions toward some version of populism is a relatively simple consequence of the deficiencies of democracy in its neoliberal version.
EN
This brief “Introduction” to the volume discusses the general idea of the special edition of the journal, which is dedicated to the radicalism of the Enlightenment in the context of Jonathan Israel’s recent work on the Enlightenment, and highlights the topics of the articles contained in the edition.
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Violence in de Sade (comoedia)

75%
EN
Violence occupies a regal position in the work of de Sade. It manifests itself in two forms: sexual persecution (excesses, manias, perversions, cruelty) and enlightened reasoning (unabashed promotion of naturalism, rationalism, hedonism and atheism). De Sade uses his most precious instrument as a semblance, by creating a magic spectacle of a gothic novel, and as truth, when he presents himself as a metaphysician and moralist. What kind of reading of de Sade deserves the title of the most adequate one? Does de Sade exist in text only? Is he the liberator, so praised by surrealists? Or does his transgressive nature go beyond the postulates of moral or social-political liberalism and penetrate the sphere of existence, demanding such actions that could be performed only by an individual consciously aiming at its doom? In his theatrum of passions and arguments, de Sade returns to the motif of rivalry between good and evil, simulating various narrative positions: from impulsive libertinism to dark Gnosticism, and reaches for complementary means of expression: from apology of crime to a lyrically tinted martyrological emphasis. Reading de Sade need not cause indignation. If one remembers that he is a transhistorical philosopher, one can deal with him in the way suggested by Chantal Thomas – euphorically. The reading of de Sade, like all other texts, depends on the times; in his case, the best atmosphere is provided by the mental and political atmosphere created by liberal democracy. He can be read there with open mind and physically relaxed, lightly – as becoming for a comoedia.
EN
What is the future of liberal democracy? Is the “liberal” ingredient of 21st century democracy compatible with its “demos”? Are developed democracies more equalitarian and less stratified than other regimes? Or are present day democracies evolving into something different that needs a new definition? By the early 1990s liberal democracy appeared to have become the dominant system at a global scale. The hope of citizens, scholars, and observers was that the stride toward broader democratization and inclusion would continue. It did, but as this paper argues, the forms adopted by democratic regimes, especially under the fourth industrial revolution, are not necessarily democratic. Rather, liberal democracies have created a new aristocracy that includes high tech monopolies, extremely skilled professionals, and a selected intelligentsia that from social media, conglomerates, and many times Hollywood, supports this new stratified version of the democratic polity. Family dynasties, clientele networks, and mechanisms of reward and punishment reminds us of the pseudo democracies of the late 19th century. Surely the dwindling middle class in developed democracies still have some consumer power based on credit. Global markets offer many more available consumer goods than in the past, creating the illusion that all is going well. Comparatively, however, democracies are doing worse. As this paper shows, 21st century liberal democracies have concentrated wealth in fewer hands than in the recent past, have favored power centralization especially in the executive branch, have stimulated the formation of giant high-tech monopolies, and have generated more rigid forms of social stratification. Liberal democracies, therefore, are weaking, in many cases as the logical consequence of the natural evolution of the liberal doctrine, and in most cases because of profound changes at the global scale. Citizens’ confidence in their elected representatives has been in the decline for a long time. The increasing influence of populist nationalism is an indicator that confidence in traditional politicians continues to deteriorate. Democracy could not be democratic without the popular vote, but it has been precisely the popular vote that has empowered populist nationalist leaders, both from the right and the left. There is not very much that democracies can do about the coming to power via the ballot box of leaders who can rework the system in their favor and, in some cases, destroy it. As the paper shows, changes in the international system of power have not been favorable to liberal democracies, adding to its burdens. They are no longer the optimal model of choice, especially in the less developed world. Finally, I claim that the broken promises of political elites that have traditionally provoked voters’ apathy and loss of trust, have, In the 21st century, created new unintended consequences. They have generated illusions of entitlement and deservingness that, especially young voters, have converted into a sort anti-democratic culture that cares less for the collective and much more for themselves.
EN
One of the basic principles of civil rights is that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. The life protection, liberty and property should be equally guaranteed to citizens to exclude discrimination of minorities or other parts of the population. These rights are an important part of civil liberties and are considered as an essential element for effective citizenship. Arbitrary arrest, terror, torture or other serious and unlawful interference, both by state and private actors, significantly affect the well-being of democracy as it affects the very essence of it. In liberal democracies, leaders legitimized by the people must be involved within the norms and principles of the rule of law in order to establish a healthy relationship between the state and the citizen. This relationship is considered to be damaged in non-liberal democracies as it is affected by the suspension of individual freedoms and rights. This paper aims to analyze whether these individual rights are guaranteed and protected in Albania, considering from the perspective of the legal framework as well as in the political reality. This study aims to analyze the development of human rights, judicial rights and their implementation in our country to come to the conclusion, whether our system is that of a liberal democracy or not.
EN
Understanding the relationship between experts and laypeople is crucial for understanding today’s world of post-truth and the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy. The emergence of post-truth has been linked to various phenomena such as a flawed social and mass media ecosystem, poor citizen education, and the manipulation tactics of powerful interest groups. The paper argues that the problem is, however, more profound. The underlying issue is laypeople’s inevitable epistemic dependence on experts. The latter is part and parcel of the “risk society” in which people question the scientific consensus and thus are able to manipulate the facts. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of illiberal democrats, though liberal democrats can make no use of it. The latter downplay the problem of citizens’ epistemic deficits and of the epistemic asymmetries between them. The third and fourth generations of deliberative democrats are a perfect example. The paper argues that the concepts of interactional expertise and epistemic dependence explain why understanding between experts and laypeople is impossible. The said phenomena undermine liberalism’s unrealistic assumptions concerning citizens’ decision-making competence.
EN
Privacy has been one of the major democratic values since the origin of liberal democracy. The information revolution and rapid increase of accessible information resulted in the necessity of redefinition of the privacy concept. Privacy has lost its status of the guarantee of personal liberty and turned out to be the secondary value, often regarded as commodity. Various forms of privacy intrusion (watching, intercepting, reading, interpreting) are highly accepted as the cost of being the part the digital world. It implied also the emergence of the new model of personal security. We no longer need privacy to feel secure. Consumption-oriented identity within which everything is public and common seems to overshadow perception of self as autonomous – self-dependent and sometimes solitary – citizen.
Society Register
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2020
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vol. 4
|
issue 2
83-94
EN
The aim of this article is to compare the effectiveness of two political systems: liberal democracy and illiberal democracy in fighting the coronavirus pandemic. The analysis has been carried out on the basis of the theoretical assumptions and conceptualization of non-Marxian historical materialism. In the first part of my article, I present the concept of ‘regulative credit” which has been introduced in that theory. In standard socio-political conditions, the growth of power regulations is usually contested by citizens. However, in a situation of danger, when social order is undermined, citizens support the authorities’ extraordinary regulations. This social support, called regulative credit, lasts as long as the danger persists. In chapter two, I characterize shortly liberal and illiberal democracies. In liberal democracy, there is a balance between different branches of power, and citizens share a socio-political consciousness of the individualistic type. In illiberal democracy, the executive branch of power – although it has been democratically chosen – has an advantage over the two other kinds of power, and citizens share a socio-political consciousness of the collectivist type. Those differences result in diverse reactions of the authorities to a situation of threat. The political authorities of an illiberal democracy react faster in comparison with the political authorities in liberal democracies that react slower. Also, the attitude of citizens toward the introduced restrictions varied. Societies of illiberal democracies are more self-disciplined and more willing to accept restrictions from above. Whereas societies of liberal democracies are more individualistic and less willing to accept limitations. In the fourth part of my paper, I analyze briefly the influence of the pandemic on globalization processes and on the relations between the EU and the nation states in Europe. In the summary (chapter five), I predict that the mass use of modern technologies to control social life and strengthening of the sovereignty of nation states will be the two most important effects of the pandemic.
EN
The aim of the article is to show the weaknesses of the demoliberal paradigm resulting both from its internal, discursive conditions, as well as from its historical grounding together in the course of the cultural and civilizational evolution of Western societies (on the trajectory of premodern - modern - postmodernity) and in the structures of hegemonic and dependence relations between the West and the non-Western world. The issue under consideration appears to be important because the aforementioned weaknesses affect the development prospects of the demoliberal formation in the contemporary world, the specificity of which is in turn largely determined by the post-colonial status structure and the increasingly clear symptoms of the reconfiguration of the international system of power and dependencies. The basic internal contradiction of the demoliberal discourse is based on the contradictory implications of the idea of equality and freedom, the latter of which is dynamized by emancipatory tendencies that violate the ordering powers of an equality utopia. The noticed contradiction emphasizes the growing importance of identity politics in contemporary liberal democracies. The latter derives largely from the conflict of tradition and revolution, fundamental to the beginnings of modernity, the latter of which, as a social force and as a political and social project, is motivated by, among other things, democratic and liberal ideas. The entanglement of the democratic-liberal evolution in cultural contradictions and apories characteristic of the history of the Western world calls into question the universalism of the demoliberal paradigm. On the other hand, the conflict of utopias, both those under the sign of tradition and those under the sign of the revolution, is being relativized due to the emancipatory tendencies that destroy both them. The formal fulfilment of an equality and freedom utopia not only does not mitigate the aspirations for further emancipation, but also seems to be conducive to deepening the identity dilemmas of demoliberal societies. The particularization of identity discourses that takes place in this context threatens the social consensus around traditional demoliberal values. It also threatens the authority of the demoliberal formation, its coherence and credibility in the perception of different cultures, in relation to which the former plays an analogous role as it played at the dawn of Western European modernity in relation to tradition. The author sees a remedy for the crisis of cohesion and credibility of the demoliberal formation, among others in broadening the scope of inclusiveness by liberal culture of various identity policies, as well as in deepening the practices of deliberativeness responsible for social consensuality. Noticing the importance of the discursive and moral factor in the article does not obscure the influence of Realpolitik on contemporary liberal democracy. Real politics emphasizes the importance of the United States as the leader of the demoliberal camp, although it does not yet determine whether and how the American center of power will retain its stabilizing powers in the reality of a multipolar order. Due to the interdiscursive nature of the considerations, inevitable due to their subject matter, the article refers to a broader disciplinary background, including, apart from the above-mentioned postcolonial studies, e.g. philosophical anthropology, historiosophy, political theory and cultural criticism.
EN
The notion of non-liberal democracy has become an inseparable element of the debate on the crisis of liberal democracy. For some scholars and journalists, non-liberal democracy is a consequence of the crisis of liberal democracy. It should be pointed out that when indicating the causes of this crisis in the economic, political, and cultural spheres, researchers rarely address the issue of the legitimacy of identifying democracy as non-liberal and its characteristics. Moreover, no one has initiated a broad debate on the possibility of a retreat from non-liberal democracy and the conditions that must be met to return to liberal democracy. That is why this paper attempts to describe the phenomenon called nonliberal democracy and analyse the conditions which should be fulfilled, both in political and social terms. It is to enable the return to the idea of liberal democracy.
EN
: Reforms implemented in recent years by the Polish government of Law and Justice party are described as a manifestation of democratic backsliding. Changes in the judiciary and the media are seen as the main signs of departing from the basic values of liberal democracy and the rule of law. They met with strong international criticism, mainly from the institutions of the European Union and Western European countries. These changes are also observed with concern in the United States, but so far the US reaction has been moderate. This was primarily due to the limited interest of President Donald Trump’s administration in promoting democracy. Later, this issue has been overshadowed by the destabilization of military security in the region. Anyway, the US reaction to the deviation of the Polish authorities from the principles of the democratic state of law must be decisive, but also constructive, based on dialogue, cooperation, clear criteria and a joint search for solutions. First of all, it must not violate the American security guarantees towards Poland.
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2019
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vol. 8
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issue 4
893-899
EN
This paper is a review of the book: John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2018). Mearsheimer observes that in the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. adopted a profoundly liberal foreign policy dedicated to turning as many countries as possible into liberal democracies. Mearsheimer concludes that the liberal hegemony of the past twenty-five years does not work: it has left a legacy of futile wars, failed diplomacy, and diminished prestige for the United States.
PL
Zjawisko lobbingu, rozumiane jako wszystkie działania wykonywane przez bądź w imieniu grup interesu, ukierunkowane na oddziaływanie na proces podejmowania i implementowania decyzji politycznych, występuje w każdym reżimie politycznym. W niniejszym artykule zbadano czy nieliberalny model demokracji funkcjonujący na Węgrzech (2010–2014) wywierał wpływ na poziom efektywności działań mających na celu kontrolowanie lobbingu. Nieliberalna demokracja różni się od swego liberalnego odpowiednika w pięciu obszarach: rządów prawa, kontroli działań rządu i parlamentu przez niezależne od władz państwowych instytucje, poziomu korupcji wśród elit politycznych, stopnia wolności mediów oraz ochrony praw mniejszości. W artykule wykazano, że Węgry spełniały kryteria demokracji nieliberalnej dla każdego z obszarów w latach 2010–2014. Na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań stwierdzono, że nieliberalny model demokracji istniejący na Węgrzech zmniejszał efektywność kontroli działań lobbingowych w tym państwie.
EN
Lobbying, understood as all actions performed by or on behalf of interest groups directed at influencing of the process of policy formation and implementation, occurs in every political regime. The article examines whether the illiberal type of democracy that exists in Hungary (2010–2014) exerts an influence on the effectiveness of lobbying control. Illiberal democracy differs from liberal democracy with regard to five systemic core principles, such as the rule of law, government control and accountability, the integrity of political elites, media freedom and civil rights and protection of minorities. This article shows that all of these systemic criteria constituting illiberal democracy were met in Hungary between 2010–2014. Examination of the case of Hungary with regard to lobbying control suggests that illiberal democracy had diminished the effectiveness of lobbying control in this country.
Tematy i Konteksty
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2017
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vol. 12
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issue 7
88-104
PL
The main theme of the paper is the issue of the foundations of social life. The author begins by outlining the tradition of the Enlightenment represented by Immanuel Kant, who attempted to justify rationally the basis of social life. Then she moves back to antiquity, to Plato, the sophists and Aristotle, to show their attitude towards the foundations of public life in order to briefly present in the following stage the original concept of Baruch Spinoza and, in more details, the views of Blaise Pascal, who is the main figure of this presentation. The final part of the paper includes a draft of the philosophical thought of postmodernism, represented by such intellectuals as Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. The author additionally presents an exposition of the concept of habitus by Pierre Bourdieu, interpreting it accordingly to her previous reflections. The course of thought in these considerations intends to formulate a thesis which takes a stand against the most obvious opinion of Enlightenment, purporting that neither the contemporary liberal democracy nor people’s respect for it and their will to obey the law are founded on reason.
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