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PL
The author outlines a basic framework for anarcho-capitalism, a stateless social order in which safety, law and adjudication of disputes are provided by private companies (private defense agencies) competing with each other in the free market. In the course of presentation, three fundamental problems of anarcho-capitalism are addressed. (1) Is a peaceful cooperation among agencies possible? (2) Would agencies respect the rights of their customers? (3) How would the law look like in an anarcho-capitalist society? The last problem is especially vexing,since anarcho-capitalists seem to be caught up in a contradiction here. On one hand they are proponents of a specific moral theory (based on non-aggression principle), on the other hand they do not allow for any central, monopolistic agency to impose that moral theory on society. Is it possible for the law in the anarcho-capitalist society to be simultaneously produced by competing agents and remain libertarian at the same time?
EN
Suppose A is the rightful owner of some property, B steals if from him, and C, in turn, relieves B of his ill-gotten gains. What next? Under just law, must C return the item to A? If not, is C guilty of a crime? If C does return this resource to its initial (rightful?) owner, does A owe C a percentage of its value, as under salvage law? These are some of the questions to be wrestled with in the present paper.
PL
The accurate interpretation of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics inevitably leads to the conclusion that appropriation of creative works ought to be rejected since only tangibles can and need to be owned for artistic conceptions are ideal, not-scarce (non-excludable and non-rivalrous) objects. Moreover, their ownership would inevitably lead to a conflict over titles to their exemplars. Incorporeal rights are thus inconsistent with both the praxeological axiom and absoluteness of negative rights. Hence, an attempt to introduce “artificial scarcity” through positive copyright law is unethical. It disregards the fundamental rules of any rational ethics: universality (equality before the law) and operationality (suitability for mankind survival) because it interferes with the propertarian axiom of self-ownership and the principle of non-aggression. Therefore, a property in artistic conceptions is neither rationally feasible nor indispensable and entails self-contradiction of any deontological theory based on rules of praxeology.
PL
The accurate interpretation of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics inevitably leads to the conclusion that appropriation of creative works ought to be rejected since only tangibles can and need to be owned for artistic conceptions are ideal, not-scarce (non-excludable and non-rivalrous) objects. Moreover, their ownership would inevitably lead to a conflict over titles to their exemplars. Incorporeal rights are thus inconsistent with both the praxeological axiom and absoluteness of negative rights. Hence, an attempt to introduce “artificial scarcity” through positive copyright law is unethical. It disregards the fundamental rules of any rational ethics: universality (equality before the law) and operationality (suitability for mankind survival) because it interferes with the propertarian axiom of self-ownership and the principle of non-aggression. Therefore, a property in artistic conceptions is neither rationally feasible nor indispensable and entails self-contradiction of any deontological theory based on rules of praxeology.
EN
In this paper the author has analyzed Rothbard’s views in terms of social and eco-nomic issues in anarcho-capitalism. Market failures in the libertarian view were consid-ered as state failures (e.g. external effects, monopoly). The author has also considered opinions of critics of libertarian thought. On the ground of textual criticism this paper has demonstrated the controversy of Rothbard’s thesis and their inspirational power.
EN
In the presented paper the attention is focused on the so-called urban social movements, especially on the radical, anarchist faction of Polish urban movements. The article offers detailed analysis of the case of Ruch Społeczeństwa Alternatywnego [RSA; Alternative Society Movement], the social movement that operated most actively in Poland in the 80’s and 90’s of the 20th century. First of all, the main interest is on urban outlook that movement’s activists expressed as a part of unofficial counterpublics. It clearly corresponds with what we call today a demand of “urban democracy” or “the right to the city”. To some extent they have idiosyncratic character, however, on the one hand drawing its emancipatory potential directly from the anarchist tradition, on the other being closer to the libertarian ideas.
EN
The research problem of the present paper is the following question: May the closest continuer theory serve as a background theory for the principle of self‑ownership? This issue is a peculiar instance of the more general problem of the anthropological presuppositions of the libertarian political philosophy that can be phrased in a Kantian manner: How is self‑ownership possible?; or in a more detailed way: What sort of entity a human being has to be, if it is possible for him to be a self‑owner? The research thesis that is argued for in the paper says that: 1) the closest continuer theory may not serve as a background theory for a wide principle of self‑ownership since as an example of reductionist theory of personal identity it excludes the possibility of possessing this set of psychological facts which the personal identity is reducible to and possession of which is presupposed by the wide principle of self‑ownership; 2) the closest continuer theory may though serve as a background theory for a narrow principle of self‑ownership since this principle assumes that one can own only scarce resources and psychological facts are not instances thereof.
EN
The aim of the paper involves presentation and evaluation of the concept of totalitarian democracy, which is to be found in the works of the libertarian political philosophy proponents: Murray N. Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. In the course of our analysis, the author formulates following tenets. Firstly, although libertarian thinkers do not employ the expression „totalitarian democracy” themselves, that notion can be successfully identified in their writings. To Rothbard and Hoppe democracy — including the liberal one — is a totalitarian system by nature. It is supposed to stem from democratic regime’s lust for taking control over all aspects of individual’s life (in libertarian terms: all aspects of the use of private property), as well as from the inherent fallacies of liberal safeguards, designed in order to protect democracy from degradation to mere tyranny of majority, such as the rule of law, constitutionalism, and checks and balances principles. Secondly, in author’s judgement, however Rothbard’s and — in particular — Hoppe’s critique of democracy should be considered consistent with libertarian ideals, it appears to a certain extent exaggerated also in their light.
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Searlovo pojetí problému svobodné vůle

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EN
The main aim of this article is to analyse Searle’s conception of free-will in view of the objections which have brought against it. First of all, the problem of free-will is defined as a controversy between determinism and libertarianism. Compatibilism is rejected as unenlightening. Next, biological naturalism is presented as the basis of the problem of free-will in Searle’s thought, and the psychological and neurobiological levels of the problem are delineated. In the light of this, several objections to Searle’s approach are discussed. Because Searle sees a possible solution to the problem being provided by quantum mechanics, the last part is devoted to Searle’s understanding of science, and his position is compared with quantum theory (as it is outlined by Harry Stapp). In the course of this comparison a new fundamental question emerges which can be defined in the spirit of the psycho-physical problem, and which must be answered before the problem of free will can be successfully tackled. It is demonstrated that, in the light of the current state of knowledge, none of the objections levelled at Searle’s conception of free-will is fatal to it. The solution of this question is, at this moment, dependent on the future development of science.
PL
Artykuł ten analizuje za pomocą metody równowagi refleksyjnej warunki tła naszych rozważnych sądów na temat sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej, wygenerowanych przez eksperyment myślowy określany mianem „Trójki dzieci i fletu”. Eksperyment ten został zaproponowany i w interesujący sposób skomentowany przez Amartya Sena w jego książce pod tytułem The Idea of Justice. W swym artykule stawiam tezę, że – w przeciwieństwie do konkluzji, które Sen wywiódł z tego eksperymentu myślowego – aby utylitarna i egalitarna wizja sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej mogła pozostać w mocy, szereg innych twierdzeń dotyczących życia społecznego oraz dystrybucji zasobów, których nie jesteśmy chętni zaakceptować, musi być prawdziwych. Argumentuję również, że nie jest prawdą twierdzenie Sena, iż zdecydowanie o tym, który ze wzorców dystrybucji powinien przeważyć w tym eksperymencie myślowym, nie jest wcale „trudne”. Co więcej, twierdzę też, że tzw. naturalny czy libertariański model dystrybucji nie zakłada tych samych warunków tła, co utylitarny i egalitarny model dystrybucji, a których to warunków nie jesteśmy skłonni zaakceptować. W artykule swym dochodzę do wniosku, że biorąc pod uwagę cały szereg niespójności, nieintuicyjnych konsekwencji oraz sprzecznych z doniesieniami nauk szczegółowych implikacji rozwiązań utylitarystycznych i egalitarystycznych, to naturalny model dystrybucji stanowi jedyne rozwiązanie dylematu fletu.
EN
In this paper, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium to analyse background conditions of our considered judgements about distributive justice generated by a thought experiment called “Three Children and a Flute”, proposed and interestingly commented upon by Amartya Sen in his book The Idea of Justice. I claim that, contrary to Sen’s conclusions drawn from the thought experiment, for the utilitarian and egalitarian visions of distributive justice to hold other things about distribution of resources and social life that we are not willing to accept must be true and that it is not the case then that it is a ‘difficult decision’ to make what pattern of distribution should prevail in the thought experiment. To boot, I hold that libertarian or natural pattern of distribution does not presuppose these background conditions that we are not willing to accept and which are presupposed by egalitarian and utilitarian distributive patterns. I conclude that taking into consideration the fact that there is a plethora of inconsistencies, counter-intuitive consequences and anti-scientific implications of the utilitarian and egalitarian solutions to the thought experiment, it is a natural pattern of distribution that prevails in the ‘flute dilemma’.
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Left and Right-Libertarianism

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EN
In the paper I discuss theoretical differences between left and rightlibertarianism. (I will skip the specific and practical issues which differ left and rightlibertarians, including among others the minorities and immigration policies or affirmative action. I assume that practical solutions suggested by the followers of both positions stem from their theoretical assumptions.) I will focus on two issues which determine the fundamental difference between left and rightlibertarianism. These are property and equality. I compare standpoints of some leftlibertarians with the positions of rightlibertarians represented by Murray Rothbard, concerning property and equality. I conclude that the main and fundamental difference between leftand rightlibertarians concerns equality. Leftlibertarians are egalitarians whereas rightlibertarians are antiegalitarians. I also argue that egalitarian position is not compatible with the notion of full selfownership, which leftlibertarians advocate for.
12
88%
EN
Three well-known physicists have recently argued that libertarian freedom is impossible. In their view, free will is incompatible with what we know about science at the most fundamental level. Here I show that their arguments presuppose a naïve version of reductionism and consider two alternatives, one appealing to mind–body dualism and the other to emergentism. The former says that free will is a capacity of one’s mind, an immaterial entity not subject to the laws of nature. The latter says that free will is an emergent capacity that cannot be reduced to the properties of an agent’s constitutive atoms. These alternatives, however, face the same problem: They seem to violate a fundamental law, namely the conservation of energy. I show how the libertarian can respond to this objection.
EN
The paper explores the possibility of finding radical elements of individualistic and libertarian (especially left-libertarian) thought in Taoist philosophy. It demonstrates that philosophical Taoism should be treated in a comprehensive way, with a particular emphasis on ethics. In connection with this, the anti-authoritarian ethico-political dimension of early Taoism is examined, and it is argued that the Taoist philosophers of ancient China had a deep respect for the equal liberty of individuals, who are all unique by nature. As a result, findings suggest that Taoist anarchism in early medieval China evolved as the logical conclusion from ancient Taoist ethico-political thought since radical ideas were embodied in it. The research goal of this paper is to develop a Taoist-libertarian virtue ethics and to show its political relevance. Therefore, it is also intended to show how Taoist libertarianism (avant la lettre) undermines political authority despite being neither consequentialist nor deontological, unlike typical American libertarianism.
EN
When a bad guy throws one innocent person against another, or uses one as a body shield so as to facilitate murdering the other, or is in the process of bashing in the heads of two such people, what are the rights and responsibilities of each of these latter two victimized parties vis a vis each other? The concept of negative homesteading is introduced in an attempt to shed light on these legal puzzles.
PL
Dominujący współcześnie w doktrynie libertariańskiej nurt propertarianistyczny utrzymuje, że dla ułożenia harmonijnych stosunków międzyludzkich niezbędne jest ustanowienie i wyraźne zakreślenie własności prywatnej. Pomimo tak silnej preferencji dla praw majątkowych libertarianie propertarianistyczni nie wypracowali spójnego stanowiska wobec prawa własności intelektualnej. W odniesieniu do prawa patentowego i autorskiego wyróżnić można trzy stanowiska: afirmację, woluntaryzm i abolicjonizm. Przedstawicielem pierwszego z wymienionych był Robert Nozick, libertarianin cieszący się bodaj największą sławą i uznaniem środowisk akademickich. Zdaniem filozofa, zasada sprawiedliwego nabywania (jeden z fundamentów teorii legalistycznej) implikuje konieczność uznania m.in. silnej ochrony patentowej. Tytuł do dóbr intelektualnych (zarówno wynalazków, jak i utworów) miałby być naturalnym i przedpolitycznym prawem każdej jednostki, wynikającym z pracy włożonej w stworzenie owych dóbr. Niezależnie od tego, czy twierdzenia Nozicka mogą być uznane za przekonujące, argumenty libertarian za i przeciw legitymizacji własności intelektualnej stanowią ważny głos nie tylko na płaszczyźnie nauk niedogmatycznych (teorie legitymizacji własności intelektualnej), ale i dogmatycznych, gdzie służyć mogą choćby w debacie nad właściwym modelem praw autorskich majątkowych.
EN
Propertarianism, the most prominent of contemporary libertarian factions, holds that in order to establish a harmonious society it is necessary to introduce and delineate the right of private property. Despite the strong preference for property rights, right-wing libertarians do not agree, however, on the legitimization of intellectual property. There are three main libertarian stances on this question: affirmation, voluntarism and abolitionism. The most famous and academically influential exponent of the adherents’ faction is perhaps Robert Nozick. According to the philosopher the rule of just initial acquisition (one of the pillars of the entitlement theory) implicates the necessity of i.a. the strong patent rights. Title to the intellectual goods (both copyright and patent) would be a natural and pre-political right of every individual, resulting from labor put into their creation. Regardless of whether Nozick claims seem convincing, libertarian arguments for and against legitimization of intellectual property make up for an important voice both in the sphere of philosophy of law and jurisprudence debating on the proper model of copyright.
EN
In this paper I argue for the position that the cannons of distributive justice as proposed by the Liberal Welfarists and Libertarians are structurally deficient in that they suggest a false dichotomy between two ways of ensuring the justice of the distributive system leading to a greater exercise of the freedom of the people. Liberty and Equality are not necessarily mutually exclusive nor are they individually exhaustive and sufficient. Authentic freedom is ultimately a combination of the values and essential element of liberty and equality.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia argumenty na poparcie tezy, iż kanony sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej, w postaci proponowanej przez zwolenników liberalizmu opiekuńczego i libertarian, są strukturalnie ułomne. Sugerują one bowiem rzekomą dychotomię między dwoma sposobami zapewnienia takiej sprawiedliwości systemu dystrybucji, która prowadziłaby do poszerzenia zakresu wolności ogółu. Liberalizm i równość nie muszą jednak wzajemnie się wykluczać; żadna z tych idei nie jest w pełni wystarczająca. Autentyczna wolność stanowi ostatecznie kombinację wartości oraz istotnych elementów liberalnych i równościowych.
EN
The subject of the article is the concept of political system created by Murray Rothbard. His thought is part of the philosophy called libertarianism, whose representatives recognize the right of private property as the basic and only right for the human person. From this perspective, all problems regarding the limits of individual rights and freedoms are resolved. Based on natural law, Rothbard creates a vision of stateless order in which the individual is completely free from any coercion, as long as it does not violate the freedom of other individuals. Rothbard calls his system of government anarchocapitalism or market anarchism.
18
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PL
Przedmiotem dociekań niniejszego artykułu jest relacja pomiędzy libertarianizmem a instytucją alimentów na dzieci. Artykuł wskazuje, że instytucja ta jest niekompatybilna z klasyczną libertariańską teorią sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej, reprezentowaną przez takich libertariańskich filozofów polityki, jak: Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella czy Robert Nozick. Pomimo tej niekompatybilności z klasycznym libertarianizmem głównym problemem badawczym artykułu jest pytanie o to, z którą interpretacją libertariańskiej teorii sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej instytucja ta może być kompatybilna. Tezą, którą stawia niniejszy artykuł, jest twierdzenie, że tą interpretacją jest teoria Israela M. Kirznera bazująca na tak zwanej etyce odkrywcy-twórcy. W badaniach użyto metody równowagi refleksyjnej.
EN
In the present paper, I investigate the relation between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism, particularly a libertarian theory of distributive justice. I demonstrate that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice as represented by Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella or Robert Nozick. However, the main research question that I address in the paper is: What construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of obligatory child support compatible with? I hypothesise that obligatory child support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted in terms of the “finders-creators ethic”, as represented by Israel M. Kirzner. To inquire into the main research problem, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium.
PL
Współczesny libertarianizm, zwłaszcza jego odłam radykalny (propertarianistyczny i antyautorytarystyczny) odróżnia się od pozostałych doktryn politycznych swoim szczególnym stanowiskiem wobec prawnych i ekonomicznych aspektów instytucji insider tradingu. Niezależnie od tego, czy argumentacja libertarian oparta jest na doktrynie praw naturalnych i absolutyzmu etycznego, czy też przeciwnie – ma ona charakter konsekwencjonalistyczny, libertarianie, opierając się na Austriackiej Szkole Ekonomii krytykują reżimy informacyjne zawarte w większości regulacji prawa rynku kapitałowego na świecie. Podnosi się, że insider trading nie jest nieetyczny, ponieważ każdy właściciel ma prawo rozporządzać przedmiotem swojej własności i kontraktować zgodnie ze swoją wolą (tak np. M.N. Rothbard, R.W. McGee, T. Machan, R.P. Murphy), lecz nawet gdyby był nieetyczny – nie ma żadnego powodu, by prawo ingerowało w każde ludzkie nieetyczne zachowanie (tak np. W.E. Block). Insider trading może być także postrzegany jako przypadek tzw. „przestępstwa bez ofiar”. Z kolei libertarianie bliscy argumentacji utylitarystycznej argumentują, że insider trading ma tak naprawdę dobroczynne skutki dla rynku kapitałowego – i to zarówno dla insidera, jak i outsidera. W modelu tym zakłada się, że insider trading pozwala na bardziej precyzyjną wycenę instrumentów finansowych, a także przyczynia się do wzmożenia płynności rynku (tak np. P.J. Engelen, L.V. Liederke, H.G. Manne). W tym stanie rzeczy libertarianie opowiadają się za depenalizacją insider tradingu.
EN
Modern libertarianism, especially its radical branch, distinguishes itself from most of other political doctrines by its unique approach towards law and economics of insider trading. Whether based on natural rights doctrine and ethical absolutist or consequentialist (mostly utilitarian), libertarians of Austrian School of Economics descent criticize the current approach towards insider trading. It is maintained that insider trading is not unethical, it is every man’s right to dispose of his property and conclude an agreement as he pleases (M.N. Rothbard, R.W. McGee, T. Machan, R.P. Murphy), but even if it were, there is no reason for suppression of every immoral activity (W.E. Block). Insider trading might be also perceived as a “victimless crime” case. Libertarians of utilitarian orientation argue however, that insider trading is in fact beneficial both for insider and outsider. It is supposed to allow more accurate pricing of stocks and market liquidity (P.J. Engelen, L.V. Liedekerke, H.G. Manne). Thus radical libertarians argue for decriminalization of insider trading.
Nurt SVD
|
2020
|
issue 2
230-245
PL
Autor podjął próbę zarysowania relacji między moralnością libertariańską a określoną koncepcją prawa naturalnego. Artykuł składa się z dwóch części. W pierwszej zwraca się uwagę na moralne założenia libertarianizmu, które mają swoje źródło w prawie naturalnym, i związane z tym konsekwencje. Wspomniano także o różnicy między konserwatywną a postępową wersją libertarianizmu. Druga część omawia dwie koncepcje prawa naturalnego: tradycyjną i współczesną. Pierwsza oparta jest na filozofii arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej, a druga na ideach zaczerpniętych z oświeceniowych szkół prawa naturalnego. Wydaje się, że oba pojęcia znajdują wyraz w dwóch różnych wersjach moralności libertariańskiej: konserwatywnej i postępowej.
EN
The author of the article attempted to outline the problem of the relationship between libertarian morality and a specified concept of natural law. The article consists of two parts. The first one draws attention to the moral assumptions of libertarianism, which have their source in natural law and the associated consequences. The difference between a conservative and progressive version of libertarianism was also mentioned. The second part discusses two concepts of natural law: traditional and contemporary. The first one is based on Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy, while the second one refers to ideas taken from Enlightenment schools of natural law. It seems that both concepts find expression in two different versions of libertarian morality: conservative and progressive.
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